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
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
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
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
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THE

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CHRISTIAN EXAMINER

AND

GENERAL REVIEW.

VOL. XXII.

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THIRD SERIES, VOLUME IV.

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THE  
CHRISTIAN EXAMINER.

N<sup>o</sup>. LXXIX.

THIRD SERIES — N<sup>o</sup>. X.

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MARCH, 1837.

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ART. I. — *Dramas*, by JOANNA BAILLIE. In Three Volumes.  
8vo. London: Longman, Rees, Orme, & Co. 1836.

WE are now in possession of no less than seven volumes of Joanna Baillie's *Dramas*; — the three volumes of plays on the Passions, which were published some years ago, a volume of miscellaneous plays, and the volumes before us. This collection may easily be called the richest gift which has been made to English dramatic literature in the present age; and we believe, that there are many who would not charge us with extravagance, if we were to say, that it is the richest which has been ever made to it, excepting the unapproached donation of the plays of Shakspeare. In offering such an opinion, we enter not into the question of individual genius. We remember the works, — a large portion indeed of which we should not grieve to forget, — of Ben Jonson, Beaumont and Fletcher, Massinger, Otway, and others. But, regarding both quantity and quality, intellectual elevation and moral influence, truth of substance and beauty of form, and holding a fair balance both of merits and defects, we hesitate not to place the name of this lady above even those distinguished names. However some of those writers may have excelled her in the graces of poetry and the flashes of intellect, there is a sustained dignity, a pure loftiness in her muse, which, with other attributes of power and beauty, entitle her to the precedence. But, if the charge of extra-

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gance should be preferred against us, we might shelter ourselves behind the lyre of the great Northern minstrel. Listen to its accents.

“ — the notes that rung  
 From the wild harp, which silent hung  
 By silver Avon's holy shore,  
 Till twice an hundred years rolled o'er;  
 When she, the bold enchantress came,  
 With fearless hand, and heart on flame!  
 From the pale willow snatched the treasure,  
 And swept it with a kindred measure,  
 Till Avon's swans, while rung the grove  
 With Monfort's hate and Basil's love,  
 Awakening at the inspired strain,  
 Deemed their own Shakspeare lived again.”

So sings Sir Walter Scott of the poetess of the Passions, — somewhat enthusiastically, we confess; for it must only have been in a dream of patriotism and gallantry that he could have heard that “kindred measure,” or seen the swans of Avon awaken and incline as if at the song of their master. His lines are good authority, nevertheless, for high admiration, and may support the plain prose assertion, that, with the exception of the plays of Shakspeare, our dramatic literature can boast of no such treasures, in their whole extent, as the plays of Joanna Baillie.

And yet these plays are for the closet rather than the stage. They are for select readers, rather than for a promiscuous audience. They are too classical, too chaste, too solemn, too good for the mass of those who frequent our theatres. They have power to move the hearts, and rouse the sensibilities, and confirm the principles of those who feed on truth and nature; but they have little power to command the shouts of pit and gallery. The lovers and patrons of the drama, as they are styled, must be lovers of refined sentiment, and intelligent admirers of poetry for its own real excellences, before they will patronize or even suffer the dramas of Miss Baillie. The manager who should have so much taste and so little wit as to bring forward upon his boards successive representations of these dramas, would find ere long, by the intimations of a thin house and a rapidly-collapsing purse, that he and the much feared and flattered public held different sentiments concerning the good and the beautiful, and that he must either be ruined, or return to the wonted course of gorgeous spectacles, outrageous tragedies, and foolish farces. In some coming age, the creations of this lady's mind may be personated on the stage; but, at present, they must be confined to the library.

In saying this, we know that we are expressing an opinion not the most acceptable to the lady herself. She is evidently very desirous, as it is natural she should be, that her plays may be performed and become popular in the theatres. Her several prefaces bear constant witness to this desire. But there are few who can receive the fulfilment of all their wishes. Let her be satisfied with the rank which she has won, and with the praise which crowns her name and will preserve her memory. Let her not complain that she has not reached the transcendent eminence on which *he* sits, who has written for the solitary student and the thronged playhouse, for all classes and for all times. Let her be thankful for the joy she gives to those who are not accustomed to besiege the ticket-office, and run mad after favorite actors and actresses, but whose approbation is doubtless as valuable as if they exhibited in these modes the quality of their taste and principles. Many of those who love to read her plays, seldom or never set their feet inside of a theatre; while the great body of those who frequent and support the theatre, and whose taste must be and is obeyed and consulted, would not go there to hear such plays as hers.

But Miss Baillie thinks that the absentees are wrong in neglecting the theatre, and that, if they would change their plan of action, and enter its doors in force, they would redeem it to the dominion of good taste and good morals. She allows the truth and the weight of the charges which are brought against playhouses; allows that the pieces generally exhibited in them are of bad tendency, and that the company who fill them and hang about them are, in great proportion, disorderly and worthless; but she still maintains, that the resort of a better class, those who conscientiously stay away, would alter the state of things, and remedy those crying evils.

"A manager," she says, "must suit his plays to the character of the most influential part of his audience. The crowd in the gallery and pit can be very well entertained with a piece that has neither coarseness nor immorality in it; but the more refined and better informed, who generally occupy the boxes, and occasionally the pit, cannot be pleased with one in which there is any thing immoral or indecorous. But, if the refined and well-informed stay away, there is nothing, then, to be taken into the account but how to please such auditors as commonly fill the pit and galleries; and the boxes will very soon be occupied by company, somewhat richer indeed, but not more scrupulous or intelligent than the others.

Now, supposing matters to have come to this pass, what kind of entertainment will be provided for them? Scurrility and broad satire is more easily procured than wit; and delineations of low profligacy require less skill than those of the habits and characters of higher or more virtuous society. Will a manager, then, be at pains to provide delicate fare for those who are as well satisfied with garbage? This is surely not to be expected; and, in as far as moral or intellectual improvement has been or may be superseded by intellectual debasement, occasioned by such well-meaning absentees from our theatres, so far does their absenting themselves do mischief." — Vol. II., *Preface*.

This is just one of those specious arguments, the main defect in which is, that they are flatly contradicted by facts and experience. Is it a fact, that the theatre has ever been esteemed a pure and innocent place? Is it a fact, that it was a more pure and innocent place before a portion of society ceased to frequent it, than it was after their desertion? Is it not a fact, that the restraining influence exercised on the drama and the play-house by those who stay away, is as strong as that which is exercised by those who go? What was it which originally drove away from the theatre the sober and the scrupulous, and thus created the absentees,—its morality or its immorality? Did the absentees cause the corruption of the theatre, or the corruption of the theatre cause the absentees? In the mother country, a large proportion of the clergy go to the theatres; in our own, they never go. Is the English theatre more moral than the American? And what do the English clergy gain by going to the theatre? They gain the privilege of hearing occasional scurrilous jokes about parsons, and the equally enviable one of seeing themselves pictured in such books as "Syntax's Tour," and "Tom and Jerry," seated among a motley assembly on the pit benches, in full costume of black coats, white wigs, and red noses. Such is their gain, and such the influence which they exercise on the drama and on the opinions of the public.

But a great number of the virtuous portion of the community do go to the theatre, especially when there is any thing remarkably attractive to be heard or seen there. They go, because they are not principled against going. And what is their influence on this place of amusement? They are carried along with the stream. They give their countenance to many things which, under any other roof, they would deem intolerable.

ble. The theatre still remains, in the estimation of all who will seriously consider its organization and tendencies, as the place where there is more temptation concentrated than in any other place which can be named; where the passions of the young are beset and stimulated as they are nowhere else; where pernicious excitement is breathed in with the air, and first steps on the road to ruin are taken with a sad and undiminished frequency. Tell us not, that it is our duty to go to this place. Mock us not with the fantasy that we should do any good by going. The plain fact is, that the main support of the theatre is derived from the time-killing, amusement-loving, unreflecting, and unsettled members of society; and, until the taste of these becomes refined, and their manners and their morals reach a far higher elevation than at present, any essential reform of the theatre appears to us to be hopeless. We entertain no superstitious notions concerning plays or play-houses, no hostile feelings against players or their patrons. We merely say, that, looking on the theatre as it is and always has been, we cannot enter its doors, and have no idea that it will experience a radical improvement, till there is an essential change for the better in a very large portion of the community.

Having thus ventured to express our dissent from the opinions advanced by the authoress respecting our duties to the theatre, we will say a word of her three recently published volumes. And here we must give notice, that whatever praise we have bestowed or may bestow upon her plays, is the property of her tragedies and serious dramas only. If these cannot be publicly represented, because they are in a certain sense too good, her comedies do not deserve to be represented, because they are not worth the cost and trouble of representation. They fail in the very spirit of comedy. They have neither ease, nor grace, nor wit. Some of them are amusing enough, on a first perusal, to one who has time on his hands; for they contain scenes and situations which are sufficiently ludicrous to provoke a smile. But that is all. It is not in Miss Baillie's nature to write comedy; and therefore in speaking of her plays, we do not think for a moment of her comedies, so called.

They who have read the formerly published plays of this lady, will in all probability be disappointed by the volumes now before us. And they will be disappointed, not because these volumes are inferior to those which preceded them, but because they are not superior to them, and are too like them. We are

apt to be unjust to the works of cotemporary authors, in demanding that each work shall excel the one which went before it. If it does not excel it, we think that it is not equal to it, for it has not the freshness with which the first surprised and charmed us. Towards authors whose works were all printed and bound, before we could read or lisp, we are more fair. The works stand before us in wholeness and unity, and we simply point to those which please us best, without regard to the order of their original appearance. We fear that the "Basil," the "De Montfort," the "Ethwald," and the "Constantine Paleologus" of Miss Baillie have ill prepared her readers to estimate aright the merits of "Henriquez," "The Separation," and "The Homicide"; and yet these last are noble plays, and fully sustain the writer's reputation. There is the same grave and grand spirit in these as in those, the same lofty vein of thought, the same powerful expression of deep-heaving passion. There are, too, in the latter, the same faults which are observable in the former; a certain occasional stiffness, a defect of plot, a dead clumsiness in some of the subordinate characters. The passion of jealousy is too often employed to set the machinery of the piece in motion, to harass our feelings with its gloomy suspicions and obstinate misapprehensions, to fill up the sad scenes and bring about the fatal catastrophe. Though these three last volumes, therefore, are no improvement upon the elder born, we would not by any means have lost them, and we could not now upon any account part with them.

It is one of the peculiarities of Miss Baillie's plays, that there are but few passages in them which stand out singly and splendidly from the page, to be seized by the memory, and presented as specimens of her genius. If you take up a pencil to mark the lines which please you, you will hardly determine where to begin; and if you do begin, you will hardly know where to end. The lines are striking in their connexion with each other, and with the sentiment of the whole play, rather than by themselves. A whole scene, a whole character will be lofty throughout, — one high table-land, without peaks and pinnacles. Thus it is that she is seldom quoted. She has written no short, bright sentences, no exquisitely condensed periods, no bold proverbs for the quoter. For such beauties, and we would not depreciate them, he must go to other poets. From her he must quote at length, or not at all.

If we were to quote scenes from these recent volumes for the

express purpose of vindicating their claims to an equal rank with the others, we should probably select those scenes which have already been transferred to the pages of the English reviews. But, because they have already appeared there, we shall pass them by, and go to some one of the plays which has not, so far as we know, been quoted from. Let us look into the drama, for instance, which is entitled "The Bride," and is contained in the third volume. It was written at the request of Sir Alexander Johnston when he was "President of His Majesty's Council in Ceylon," who thought, from his knowledge of the peculiar tastes of the people whom he governed, and of the good impression which had already been made upon them by a translation of one of Hannah More's Sacred Dramas, that a dramatic piece of a Christian character and tendency from Miss Baillie's pen, would assist his honorable labors for their improvement. Whether "The Bride" was ever translated into the Cingalese language, whether it was ever represented before the natives, and if so, with what effect, we do not know. This history of its origin and purpose, however, invests it with a singular and sufficient interest. In the Preface to this piece, Miss Baillie makes a short address to those for whose especial use it was written, and in whose country the story of it is supposed to have happened. She commences it thus. "I endeavour to set before you that leading precept of the Christian religion which distinguishes it from all other religions, the forgiveness of injuries. A bold and fiery-tempered people is apt to consider it as mean and pusillanimous to forgive; and I am persuaded that many a vindictive and fatal blow has been inflicted by those, whose hearts at the same moment have yearned to pardon their enemies. But Christians, who, notwithstanding the very imperfect manner in which they obey and have obeyed the precepts and example of Jesus Christ, do still acknowledge them, and have their general conduct influenced by them, — are they a feeble and unhonored race? Look round in your own land, in other countries most connected with your own, and you will acknowledge that this is not the case. You will, therefore, I hope, receive in good part the moral of my story."

The story, or plot, is as follows. Rasinga, a brave and powerful chieftain, has lived for many years in faithful union with a single wife, Artina, though authorized by the custom of the country to have more than one. It happens, however, that,

having rescued the daughter of a mountain chieftain from a gang of robbers who had sacked her father's "petty hold," and having obtained a glimpse of the young lady's face, he had fallen in love with her, and on his return home had sent a palanquin and suitable guard to conduct her in splendor to his castle, as his second "Bride." It happens, also, that the brother of his wife Artina, Samarkoon, who was with him in the fight and rescue, is equally and more virtuously enamoured of the chieftain's daughter, and, being exasperated both by jealousy and by sympathy with his wronged and most wretched sister, determines to intercept the guarded procession, and take the "Bride" for his own. This piece of desperate high-treason he effects by the assistance of the remnant of those very robbers whom he had so recently met in conflict. He waylays and vanquishes his brother-in-law's guard, takes possession of the lady, and carries her to his own castle. But hardly has he arrived within its gates, when the incensed Rasinga appears before them and summons him to surrender, and, being resisted, forces the castle, and recaptures the Bride. As he returns in triumph, with Samarkoon in chains, he is met by Juan de Creda, a Spanish physician, and religious man, who, in a former visit to Ceylon, had saved his life by his professional skill. On the strength of the influence which this circumstance had given Juan, he boldly intercedes with Rasinga in behalf of Samarkoon, but in vain. After reaching his house, the chieftain sternly resists the pleadings of Montebesa, his mother, of his wife Artina, and again of Juan, who sets before him the love and long-suffering of Jesus. Bent on vengeance, he resolves on the execution of Samarkoon; and, as Artina is soon afterwards detected in an attempt to free her brother from his prison, she also is doomed to suffer death. Samar, her son, a noble-hearted boy, at once determines to die with his mother, and cannot be moved from his purpose. Preparations are made for the execution of the two prisoners, and at this period Rasinga is thus introduced.

*"Enter RASINGA, and places himself in the seat: a deep silence follows for a considerable time.*

*MIHDOONY (who has kept guard with his spearmen over SAMARKOON, now approaching RASINGA).*

The hour is past, my lord, which was appointed;  
And you commanded me to give you notice.

Is it your pleasure that the executioners  
Proceed to do their office on the prisoners,  
Who are all three prepared?

RASINGA.

What dost thou say?

MIHDOONY.

The three prepared for death abide your signal.

RASINGA.

There are but two.

MIHDOONY.

Forgive opposing words; there is a third.

RASINGA.

A third, say'st thou? and who?

MIHDOONY.

Your son, my lord;

A volunteer for death, whom no persuasion  
Can move to be divided from his mother.

RASINGA.

I cannot credit this; it is some craft, —  
Some poor device. Go, bring the boy to me.

[MIHDOONY leads SAMAR to his father.]

Why art thou here, my child? and is it so,  
That thou dost wish to die?

SAMAR.

I wish to be where'er my mother is,  
Alive or dead.

RASINGA.

Think well of what thou say'st!

It shall be so if thou indeed desire it.  
But be advised; death is a dreadful thing.

SAMAR.

They say it is: but I will be with her;  
I'll die her death, and feel but what she suffers.

RASINGA.

And art thou not afraid? Thou'rt ignorant;  
Thou dost not know the misery of drowning; —  
The booming waters closing over thee,  
And thou still sinking, struggling in the tank,  
On whose deep bottom weeds and water snakes,

And filthy lizards will around thee twine,  
Whilst thou art choking. It is horrible.

SAMAR.

The death that is appointed for my mother  
Is good enough for me. We'll be together:  
Clinging to her, I shall not be afraid,  
No, nor will she.

RASINGA.

But wherefore wilt thou leave thy father, Samar?  
Thou 'st not offended me; I love thee dearly;  
I have no son but thee.

SAMAR.

But thou wilt soon.  
Thy new young wife will give thee soon another,  
And he will be thy son; but I will be  
Son of Artina. We'll be still together;  
When, in the form of antelope or loorie,  
She wends her way to Boodhoo, I shall still  
Be as her young one, sporting by her side.

RASINGA (*catching him in his arms, and  
bursting into tears*).

My generous boy! my noble valiant boy!  
O such a son bestow'd on such a father!  
Live, noble creature! and thy mother also!  
Her crime is pardon'd, if it was a crime;  
Ye shall not be divided.

SAMAR (*running back to ARTINA*).

O mother! raise your eyes! you are to live;  
We're both to live; my father says we are.  
And he has wept and he has kiss'd me too,  
As he was wont to do, ay, fonder, far.  
Come, come!

(*Pulling her towards RASINGA*).  
He's good, you need not fear him now.

RASINGA.

Artina, that brave child has won thy life;  
And he hath won for me — I have no words  
That can express what he hath won for me.  
But thou art sad and silent; how is this,  
With life, and such a son to make life sweet?

ARTINA.

I have a son, but my brave father, soon, —  
Who died an honor'd death, and in his grave

Lies like an honor'd chief, — will have no son,  
 No male descendant, living on the earth,  
 To keep his name and lineage from extinction.

[RASINGA *throws himself into his seat, and buries his face in his mantle.*]

FIRST SPECTATOR (*in a low voice*).

Well timed and wisely spoken: 't is a woman  
 Worthy to be the mother of that boy.

SECOND SPECTATOR (*in a low voice to the first*).

Look, look, I pray thee, how Rasinga's breast  
 Rises and falls beneath its silken vesture.

FIRST SPECTATOR (*as before*).

There is within a dreadful conflict passing,  
 Known by these tokens, as swoln waves aloft  
 Betray the secret earthquake's deep-pent struggles.

SECOND SPECTATOR (*as before*).

But he is calmer now, and puts away  
 The cover from his face: he seems relieved.

RASINGA (*looking round him*).

Approach, De Creda; thou hast stood aloof:  
 Thou feel'st my late rude passion and unkindness.  
 Misery makes better men than me unkind;  
 But pardon me, and I will make amends.  
 I would not listen to thy friendly counsel,  
 But now I will most freely grant to thee  
 Whatever grace or favor thou desirest:  
 Even now, before thou nam'st it.

JUAN.

Thanks, thanks, Rasinga! this is brave amends.

(*Runs to SAMARKOON and commands his chains to be knocked off, speaking impatiently as it is doing.*)

Out on such tardy bungling! Ye are craftsmen  
 Who know full well the art to bind men's limbs,  
 But not to set them free.

(*Leads SAMARKOON, when unbound, towards RASINGA, speaking to him as they go.*)

Come, noble Samarkoon! nay, look more gracious:  
 If thou disdain'st to thank him for thy life,  
 That falls to me, and I will do it gladly.

(*Presenting SAMARKOON to RASINGA.*)

This is the boon which thou hast granted me,  
 The life of Samarkoon: a boon more precious

To him who grants than who receives it. Yet  
Take my most ardent thanks; take many thanks  
From other grateful bosoms, beating near thee.

ARTINA (*kneeling to embrace the knees of RASINGA*).  
And mine; O mine! wilt thou not look upon me?  
I do not now repine that thou art changed:  
Be happy with another fairer dame,  
It shall not grieve me now.

RASINGA (*raising her*).  
Away, Artina, do not thank me thus.  
Remove her, Samarkoon, a little space,  
(*Waving them off.*)  
Juan de Creda, art thou satisfied?  
Have I done well?

JUAN.  
Yes, I am satisfied.

RASINGA (*drawing himself up with dignity*).  
But I am not; and that which I have done  
Would not have satisfied the generous Saviour  
Who died upon the cross. — Thy friend is pardon'd,  
And more than pardoned; — he is now my brother,  
And I to him resign the mountain bride.

[*A shout of joy bursts from all around: ARTINA folds SAMAR to her breast, and SAMARKOON falls at the feet of RASINGA.*] — Vol. III. pp. 360–366.

Of course every thing now terminates happily, and as it should. The moral effect of this drama on those for whom it was intended, could be no other than good; for they could not but respect the bravery and dauntlessness of the characters represented, and would naturally be won by this respect to approve the issue of the story, though it might be at variance with their notions concerning the obligation of revenge. The scene which we have extracted is not so striking a one as might have been given, and yet it is characteristic of the writer's manner. The pathos of the boy's filial love, the lofty yet gentle spirit and intense affection of the mother, and the full though late generosity of the chief, appeal to our hearts, and produce impressions there which we feel it is good for us to cherish.

We have been somewhat surprised to learn, that a neat edition, in one octavo volume, of Miss Baillie's works, comprising several of the plays which are printed in these three last vol-

umes, and every thing which had previously appeared from her pen, which was published in this country in 1832, has met with a slow and discouraging sale. It cannot be, that the existence of this edition has been generally known to the lovers of good literature. They surely would not have suffered the dust of five years to settle upon it, as it rested undisturbed on the shelves of the bookseller, while many an inferior work has tasked the activity of printer and binder, and entered into a wide and rapid circulation. We do not believe that the public were mistaken, when they hailed the *Plays on the Passions* with an admiring welcome on their first appearance. And though public attention has been diverted from them by hundreds of names and works which have since risen, some of them deservedly, into popularity, the fame of the authoress of those plays will survive the temporary forgetfulness, for it is founded on living and enduring excellence and on the unchangeable affections of the human heart.

F. W. P. G.

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#### ART. II. — *The Question of Expediency.*

It is often the case, that, in popular discussions upon questions of duty, there is manifested great confusion of ideas, in regard to the true nature and proper application of the abstract moral principles, upon which such discussions are professedly based. It becomes then a matter of some importance, to separate these abstract principles from the discussions in which they are involved, that we may give them a more full and impartial examination, and to regard the discussions themselves, only so far as they may serve to illustrate the principles we are examining. These remarks seem to us applicable to the popular discussions upon the subject of slavery, with which our land has been filled. We suppose that the great mass of the community, who have reflected upon this subject, may be divided into two classes. One class contends, that when, either by the light of nature or from the express precept or general tenor of Scripture, it is discovered to be wrong in the abstract to hold slaves, it becomes the duty of every slave-holder to act

in accordance with this abstract principle, to emancipate his slaves at once, without regard to the peculiar circumstances of the case, and without inquiry as to the probable consequences which may result from the act. The other class contends, that, although it be admitted to be wrong in the abstract to hold slaves, yet, that, before proceeding to action and actually emancipating those at any particular time and place in bondage, inquiry should be made into the peculiar circumstances of the case and the probable consequences of the act, into the questions, whether those to be liberated are qualified for the possession and enjoyment of liberty, and in what manner they may be set free, so as to secure the best probable consequences to the slaves themselves, to their masters, and to the whole community. It will be perceived, that there is an essential difference between these two classes, as to the standard of duty. They both agree, in regard to the fact, that slavery, in all its bearings, is an evil, and in regard to the *abstract* principle, that it is wrong to hold slaves. But they differ in regard to the rule of conduct. The one class contends for right in the abstract as the only standard, the sole rule. The other puts in a plea in behalf of expediency, as being, in some cases, worthy of regard, and contends that there may be and often are cases, in which the course to be pursued must be determined by a regard to the circumstances of the cases themselves. The inquiry then which arises in regard to the difference between these two classes, is this. Ought we, or ought we not, to ask in regard to our conduct the question of expediency? This we conceive to be, in an eminent degree, a practical inquiry,—one which must often arise in men's minds in regard to the common every-day transactions of life, as well as in regard to all the public and benevolent operations of the day. It is also a question, as we believe, in regard to which it is important that we have clear and correct views. We wish therefore, in the remarks we are about to offer, to invite the attention of our readers to the consideration of this highly important and eminently practical question, the question whether we are to regard right in the abstract as the only unbending rule of duty, or are to permit its decisions to be modified in certain cases by a regard to expediency, to the peculiar circumstances of the case and the probable consequences of the act.

The more carefully this question is divested of every thing which may cause confusion of ideas, the better prepared shall

we be for an impartial examination and correct decision. We remark then, in the first place, that it is not a question between duty on the one hand and expediency on the other. For, all admit that, when we have once discovered the course of duty, there is no further question to be asked. It matters not at this point of the inquiry, whether the course may seem to us to be expedient, or may bid fair to be pleasant, or may promise to be advantageous. If we are satisfied that it is the course of duty, we must go resolutely forward in its performance, or be guilty of sin in its neglect.

This the advocate for expediency admits as freely and as fully as his opponent. We are the more particular to state this distinctly, and at the outset of our remarks, because it is a point in regard to which there seems to be much confusion in the minds of many. We have again and again, when querying with our fellow men in regard to the expediency of some proposed course, been cut short with the remark, "that with considerations of this character, with the question of expediency we have nothing to do: when we have once discovered the path of duty, our only course is to press resolutely onwards regardless of consequences." True, we answer, we agree with you in this; but, in cases where we are not guided by express revelation, we ask, May not the expediency of the action, its utility, its accordance with the fitness of things, or, in other words, with our natures and our relations, the circumstances of the case and the probable consequences of the act, may not these be considerations which it is important to take into account in order to determine *what is duty*? This is the rank we give to all questions of this character. We do not believe that expediency, utility, or an agreeableness with the fitness of things constitutes either the foundation or the rule of duty. We regard the will of God, not only as the sole rule, but as the sole foundation of all duty. But, while we reject the systems of moral philosophy founded upon these different views, we do believe and would contend that expediency, utility, the circumstances of the case and the probable consequences of the act, are considerations important to be taken into account, in order to ascertain, in the absence of direct revelation, what is the will of God.

From these remarks it will be perceived that this question does not relate to the ultimate foundation of duty. For all, whether interested in this discussion or not, admit that the ulti-

mate foundation of all duty is the will of God. We have said, *all* admit this. We correct the assertion. There is an apparent and verbal difference upon this point. There are some, who say that an action is right, because God wills it. There are others who say that an action is right, because it is in accordance with our natures and our relations, that it is our duty to perform actions of this character whether God wills and commands them or not, and that, if we could conceive it possible that God should will and command a different course, it would be wrong and sinful for us to pursue that course. It is an improper mode of expression, these contend, to say that an action is right because God wills it. The more proper mode of speaking, say they, is that God wills and commands a certain course because it is right in itself, befitting our natures and our relations. We have called this an apparent and verbal difference. To us it seems to be so. Does any one contend that an action is right only because it is in accordance with our natures and our relations? Who, we ask, gave us these natures, and placed us in these relations? We are what we are, and where we are, simply because such was God's will. Had it pleased God to create us different, in any important respect, from what we now are, or to place us in relations different from those which we now sustain, a different course of conduct from that which we are now required to pursue would have been our duty. But why so? Because, we answer, it would be in accordance with that will of God, which had made us to differ from what we now are. We adhere then to the position, that an action is right because it is in accordance with the will of God, and we contend that we are to regard our natures and our relations but as manifestations of God's will, indications, given in our very creation, of the course of conduct which it is his will that we should pursue. This question does not then, we repeat, relate to the ultimate foundation of duty. For all do in reality, if not in name and form, regard the will of God as remotely, if not directly, the foundation of duty.

Still further, the question at issue does not relate to the only, nor yet to the best, way of ascertaining the will of God. All admit that the will of God may be made known in various ways. All admit that in regard to many points his will has been made known, expressly revealed through a long succession of prophets, and lastly and more fully by his son Christ Jesus. And all admit too, that where revelation speaks directly in

regard to any course, either by express command or by direct prohibition of the contrary course, we have no further question to ask as to what is the will of God. Let it be borne in mind in this discussion that direct revelation, wherever given, makes known the will of God, that the will of God, whenever known, determines the course of duty, and that the course of duty, once determined, closes the subject against all questions of expediency.

Finally, the question at issue does not relate to general principles of conduct, but to specific acts of duty. It is not, whether, in studying the general principles of conduct, we are to seek for right in the abstract. The correctness and importance of this course all admit. It is whether, in any specific act, we are to be governed by a single regard to what we have discovered to be right in the abstract, or are to take into consideration, in connexion with and serving to modify this, the peculiar circumstances of our situation and the probable consequences of our conduct.

We have thus endeavoured to free the question from others nearly related to it and often confounded with it. We come now to the question itself. And here we may remark, first, that, in regard to specific duties, the phrase *right in the abstract*, or the more popular phrase used to express the same thing, the eternal and unchangeable principles of rectitude, conveys to our mind no definite idea. We know not how to apply it to specific duties. It seems to us a fiction of the brain, or a mere generalization made for convenience, having no real, positive existence among living and moving and acting men, men sustaining a great variety of ever-varying relations; men of every possible shade of difference in mental capacity and moral susceptibility, in talent and temperament; men, the circumstances of whose existence and the grounds of whose duty are continually changing. We may indeed picture to ourselves a certain course of conduct, which we should regard as right in the abstract. But, when this is done, what has been the real basis of our conclusion? Have we not in our imagination pictured to ourselves some supposed circumstances in which this course of conduct is to be pursued? And do not these supposed circumstances, including, as they do, the talents, temperament, relations, and situation, constitute the grounds of the peculiarity of our conclusion, or, in other words, render our conclusion precisely what it is? We may not be conscious that we are reasoning from

fixed and definite supposed circumstances. But if we attempt to reduce our conclusions to practice in any particular cases of actual conduct, in any peculiar circumstances of real life, we shall find that it is not applicable. And why? Because the circumstances, from a reference to which the conclusion was drawn, and which give it its peculiar form and character, are different from those to which we attempt to apply it.

But it may be said, that by the phrase *right in the abstract* is meant what is right for man simply as man, without reference to any peculiarity in talents, temperament, relations, or circumstances. But this, it will be perceived, upon a moment's reflection, is but a change of ground, not an escape from the difficulty. For it is only divesting man of all the peculiarities ordinarily attaching to him. But the very circumstance of his being divested of these, constitutes a new and strange peculiarity. The conclusions, and principles, and rules, which would be applicable to him under this peculiarity, would not be applicable to him in the ordinary circumstances of actual life. If this then be a correct idea of right in the abstract, it is rendered still more evident than before that it is a mere fiction of the brain, that it has not and cannot have a real and positive existence in any community of living and acting men. For, the moment you place men together in a community, you place them in the midst of a great variety of relations, the peculiarities of which are ever changing; consequently, the conclusion as to which is right in the abstract is no longer applicable. Since, then, men do not exist in the abstract, divested of all peculiarity of talent, temperament, circumstance or relation, but are placed under every variety in these respects, and subjected to a constant succession of changes in the grounds of duty, there is and there can be no such thing as right in the abstract in regard to specific duties.

But, even if there be such a thing as right in the abstract in regard to specific duties, no one of the human race is capable of ascertaining, with infallible certainty, what that is. We are so constituted, that we can view duty only through the medium of our temperaments and circumstances and interests and prejudices. Here are two individuals engaged in conversation upon the great moral evils which prevail in the community and threaten its best interests. The one is calm and cheerful, fully aware indeed of the real nature and dangerous tendency of the evils upon which they are conversing, but, at the same time,

perfectly confident as to the favorable character of the final issue. The other is much excited upon the subject. He dwells upon the darkest aspect which the times present, and is filled with despondency as to the future. These two individuals would differ materially as to the course of conduct, which they might think the state of the times demanded; and their difference of opinion would arise from their different constitutional temperaments. This same cause, difference in constitutional temperament, would produce a similar difference of opinion in regard to the course of conduct, which would be regarded as right in the abstract. Again, if you travel through the land and listen to the conversation which occurs in the public conveyances, you will perceive a great difference of feeling and opinion in regard to the comparative magnitude of the different evils which are supposed to threaten the community. One regards the spread and increase of the Roman Catholics as the greatest and most fearful source of danger, and, consequently, he thinks that the whole energies of the community should be concentrated and put forth in opposition to this evil. Another regards the existence of slavery as the dark cloud which portends the destruction of our liberties, and wonders that men can think of or direct their exertions to any other object than the removal of this great evil. A third is of opinion that the temperance cause is the great philanthropic movement of the day, which should enlist the warmest affections and call forth the most strenuous exertions of every friend of man. Now why this difference of opinion? These individuals are, it may be, men of equal intellectual power; they are equally honest, and equally unconscious of being under the influence of any prejudice or undue bias in any particular direction. Why then this difference of feeling and opinion? Is it not because these different individuals have been placed in different circumstances, and have looked at the question of duty from different positions and through different mediums? Still further, here is one engaged in some lucrative branch of business, which is thought, by many, to be injurious to the best interests of the community. Of such an one, it is often said that he is so blinded by a regard for his own interest that he cannot distinguish the path of duty. This may be, and in many cases it undoubtedly is, true. But it may be equally true that those, who object to this branch of business, have become so deeply interested in some particular cause, and so strongly prejudiced against every thing which

may oppose the rapid progress of that cause, as to be unable to judge impartially. It may be, that while the one looks at the question of duty through the medium of self-interest, the other looks at it through the equally blinding medium of party attachment or individual prejudice. In all these cases there is an honest difference of opinion in regard to questions of duty. And the truth illustrated by them will hold true in regard to the question of right in the abstract. For we shall view even that question through the medium of our circumstances, temperaments, interests, and prejudices, and, consequently, we are none of us capable of ascertaining, with infallible certainty, the course which may be right in the abstract. Who of us will say that he is so free from any undue bias, so free from prejudice, so impartial in his feelings, and has such a thorough knowledge of all the elements necessary to the formation of a correct opinion, that he can, in all cases, judge with infallible certainty?

But this position is confirmed by another circumstance. We are all tenacious of our own opinions, unwilling that others should judge for us upon questions of duty. But why not? If there be, in regard to all our specific duties, such a thing as right in the abstract, by which we are to be guided, and we are capable of ascertaining what this is, with infallible certainty, why may not one decide for another, a few decide for all? Why then are we unwilling, and why is it improper that another should judge for us upon questions of duty? Is it not because abstract principles must be modified in their application to specific duties, according to the circumstances under which these duties are to be performed, and because others, though equally honest with ourselves, are looking at the question of duty from a different point of view, are not in our position, and cannot look through the same medium through which we are looking? We may both agree in regard to the abstract principles of moral conduct, and we may allow that we ourselves are utterly unable to determine for others what course of conduct these general principles may require of them in their peculiar circumstances, while we deny that they are able to determine the same question for us. If then there be in regard to specific duties such a thing as right in the abstract, it is something altogether beyond the reach of our capacities. We may suppose indeed that, if there be such a thing, it is what appears to be right to the eye of Omniscience, because that eye can survey at one glance all the possible circumstances and consequences of an

act. Whenever, then, the Almighty, the omniscient and eternal Jehovah, declares, by direct revelation, a certain course to be essentially and eternally right, it becomes finite and short-sighted man to submit. But in other cases, each one must judge for himself, according to the best of his knowledge and ability. And as we may suppose that Omniscience itself determines what is right in the abstract, not by looking at man divested of all peculiarity, of talent, temperament, situation, or circumstance, but by surveying, at once, all possible circumstances, and all the nearer and more remote consequences, so we are to endeavour to learn the course of duty not by looking at ourselves as divested of all peculiarities, but by ascertaining in each particular case all its peculiar circumstances, and all the nearer and more remote probable consequences, and by so modifying our general principles as to bring them into an accordance with these.

But if the two positions, which we have already laid down, be correct, we may remark, further, that not only are we permitted, but that, from the very constitution of our natures, we are compelled to have recourse to the question of expediency, to consult the peculiar circumstances of the case, and to inquire for the probable consequences of the act, in order to determine what is duty. 'To pursue any other course is an absolute impossibility. He who thinks that he is pursuing a different course, that he is forming an impartial judgment upon questions of duty, from a single regard to right in the abstract, is only deceiving himself. Whether he may be aware of it or not, his judgment is in fact influenced by his peculiar temperament, by the prejudices of his education, by the circumstances in which he is placed. By these and by a thousand other influences to which he is exposed, is his judgment liable to be warped. That we are thus compelled to modify general rules by a regard to the circumstances of the case in regard to specific duties, may be made clearly manifest by the following illustrations. What would seem more unnatural, nay, what more sinful, when viewed in relation to the question of abstract right and without regard to circumstances, than for a parent to shut out from the community of his fellow-men the son of his affections? But when that son becomes a maniac, whose liberty would be injurious to the community, it becomes the solemn duty of the parent. What more unnatural, what more sinful, than for a child to refuse obedience to the father who has watched over him, and even

to exercise a master's authority over one, whom, in the course of nature, he should only venerate? But that father may, by intemperance, become a madman, or a brute, and then it may be the solemn duty, unpleasant though it be, of the son not only to disobey his command, but also to exercise authority over him. These, we are aware, are extreme cases. But they serve to illustrate our principle. Right in the abstract in regard to the duties of parents and children is based upon some supposed circumstances which are taken for granted, and when these circumstances are changed, the general principles of duty based upon them must be modified to meet the peculiar circumstances in which the specific acts of duty are to be performed; and consequently the course to be pursued is to be determined, not by dwelling upon the general principles themselves, in the abstract view of them, but by inquiring carefully for the peculiar features of the case. It may be said, that no one objects to a careful examination of all the circumstances peculiar to any particular case of duty, but that it is entirely different in regard to the probable consequences of any particular act; that with these we have nothing to do, no inquiry to make. "Duty is ours, events are God's," is the maxim with which the mouth is shut. But, in answer, we ask, first, what is meant by an examination of the circumstances, other than an inquiry as to what will be the probable result of a course of conduct pursued under these circumstances? We answer, again, that the maxim, "Duty is ours, events are God's," is true and valuable wherever it is found to be applicable, but that it does not apply to the question before us. This question supposes the course of duty to be doubtful, and it is contended that we are to inquire into probable consequences in order to ascertain what is duty, not to determine what may be the result of a course which we are satisfied is duty. And it seems to us that on this point there can be no question. An act may be performed to-day, which, on account of some known circumstances, we have every reason to believe, will result in disastrous consequences. But, at the same time, there may be strong ground to hope, and even to believe, that there will be such a change in the circumstances as will cause the proposed act, if postponed for a few days, to be beneficial in all its bearings. If then we are in doubt as to what is duty, and there is every reason to believe that one course will be followed by beneficial, and its opposite by disastrous consequences, this circumstance,

other things being equal, should determine us in favor of the one course rather than the other. Our conclusion, then, is that in regard to specific duties we are permitted, nay, bound, to inquire carefully for all the peculiar circumstances of the case, and to judge, as well as we may, in regard to the probable consequences of the act, that so we may learn in what way and to what degree the general principles of abstract right and wrong are to be modified in their particular applications.

But we will not close our discussion with this conclusion, drawn from an examination of the question by the light of reason alone. For the question, we are aware, will arise in the minds of Christians, "Is this conclusion in accordance with the general spirit and tenor of gospel instructions?" To us it seems that our conclusions do harmonize with one prominent and striking peculiarity of the gospel. We allude to the fact that our Saviour lays down no positive cases in regard to specific duties. Had he attempted this, it is more than probable that his code would have taken its character from Jewish peculiarities. At least it must have been expressed in language drawn from these peculiarities, which would have given it a Jewish tinge. But our Saviour laid down general principles, and left it for each individual to determine for himself and from his own peculiar circumstances, in what manner these principles are to be applied to his own specific duties. He does not, for example, specify any particular acts of duty to be performed towards our neighbour, and enjoin the performance of them as a positive and unalterable duty. But he does lay down a general principle, which no true follower of his should ever violate. He says, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." This is a principle of general, of universal application. It may be applied in a later as well as in an earlier age of the Christian church, in America as well as in Judea. But, in the application of this principle to the specific duties of neighbourly kindness, each individual is permitted, because from the very nature of the case he is compelled to judge for himself, from the peculiar circumstances of his situation. Take another instance. "Do unto others as ye would have them do unto you." This, like the last, is a general principle of universal application. And here, too, as before, each individual must judge for himself and from his own circumstances, in what way it is to be applied to his own specific duties. The distinction which we make may, in regard to these two principles, be clearly seen from an illus-

tration. No man, for example, has a right to ask whether it be expedient or useful to love his neighbour as himself, to do unto others as he would have them do unto him. These are abstract principles of duty, settled by an authority higher than the most certain conclusions of reason. But every individual has a right, and is in duty bound, to ask whether these general principles require him to conduct towards his neighbour, in any particular case, in this way or in that. A fellow-man calls at our door to solicit charity. We may not say that we are not bound to love this individual as ourselves, to do unto him as we would have him, in an exchange of circumstances, do unto us. But we may, indeed, we ought, to ask in what way our love should in this particular case be manifested. Or, to take a case in regard to which much has been said in some of our papers. When Dr. Ely met the slave Ambrose, he had no right to say, "I am not bound to regard this man as my neighbour, to love him as myself, to do unto him as I should wish him, in an exchange of circumstances, to do unto me." But he had a right, and was in duty bound, to ask how these general principles were to be applied to this particular case, this specific act. And this question he must of necessity determine by looking at the peculiar circumstances of the case, and inquiring for the probable consequences of the various courses which might be suggested. We have brought forward two general principles, and illustrated the manner in which they are to be applied to specific duties. If these may be regarded as specimens of the general spirit and tenor of gospel instructions, we trust that our conclusion will not be found to be in opposition to them.

The length to which our discussion has already extended, reminds us that we should be drawing our remarks to a close. But we cannot refrain from adding one practical inference. It relates to the mode in which we are to approach those who may differ from us upon questions of duty. Our first step is to investigate and establish, as far as we may be able, the general and abstract principles of duty. These will, in most cases, approve themselves to the minds of all. Should there be a difference on general and abstract principles, it can be settled only by the superior weight of argument in favor of one side or the other, or by a change of feelings in the individuals so differing. But the differences, which most generally prevail, relate to the application of general principles to specific duties. We should approach one who may differ from us on this point not merely by

a declaration of what we may regard as right in the abstract, and of the obligations he is under to conform to this, without reference to his peculiar circumstances. Much less are we to approach him in bitter denunciation, because he does not at once adopt the course we may point out. If we take this course, we shall labor in vain. Our fellow man is our equal. He will not admit our authority nor our ability to interpret questions of duty for him, and the very attempt to do this, on our part, will only excite a prejudice against us. On the contrary, would we approach one who differs from us on questions of duty, with hope of success, we must start with the admission that he is to judge for himself, is the only person capable of judging, and that he must judge from the various peculiarities of his own situation. Then we should throw ourselves, as far as possible, into his circumstances, and enter into his feelings, that so we may view the subject from the same position from which he views it, and look at it through the same medium. In this way we are to seek for the obstacles which present themselves to his mind, that we may allow them their full weight, or show them to be unworthy of regard. And thus by meeting him in all kindness and love upon his own ground, and arguing with him upon his own premises, we may, perhaps, convince him of the propriety of the course we are pursuing, and persuade him to unite with us.

In regard to the subject of slavery, for example, we are first to seek for the general and abstract principles of duty. Taking these for our guide, we are to approach the slaveholder with the admission, that, in the application of the general principles to the specific acts of duty which are required of him, he is himself the only judge, because he only understands all the peculiarities of the case. And then we are to place ourselves, as far as may be, in his circumstances, to study and enter into all his feelings, that so we may know just how the subject presents itself to his mind, just what obstacles and difficulties he discovers, that so we may, in all brotherly kindness, meet him upon his own ground, and argue with him from premises, the correctness of which he himself admits. This is the point where Abolitionists have failed. They have investigated carefully, and stated strongly, the general and abstract principles of duty upon the subject. But they have overlooked the distinction between the investigation and statement of these, and the application of them to particular cases and specific duties.

And the recognition of this distinction is what we regard as one of the peculiar excellences of Dr. Channing's work upon Slavery. He has, indeed, stated the general and abstract principles which bear upon the subject in a most convincing manner, and has given a touching picture of the evils of slavery. But all this had been done before, by other, though as we think feebler, pens. It had been done, but not, as we think, in a manner so well calculated to allay the passions while it convinced the understanding and touched the heart. But the point in which Dr. Channing differs from and excels other writers upon the subject, is in the recognition of the distinction between the investigation and statement of general principles and the application of these principles to specific acts of duty. His chapter upon the means of removing slavery begins thus. "How slavery shall be removed is a question for the slaveholder, and one which he alone can fully answer. He alone has an intimate knowledge of the habits and character of the slaves, to which the means of emancipation should be carefully adapted. General principles may and should be suggested at a distance; but the mode of applying them can be understood only upon the spot where the evil exists." Thus, after having suggested general principles, Dr. Channing approaches the slaveholder, as we think every one should, with the distinct admission that he is to judge for himself in regard to the application of these principles, because these general principles must be modified in their application to particular cases and specific duties by the circumstances under which these duties are to be performed, and of these none can judge so well as those who are in the midst of them, and are consequently intimately acquainted with all their peculiarities.

So, too, it seems to us that the association formed in Boston, and called "The American Union for the Relief and Improvement of the Colored Race," has adopted more correct views than the Abolitionists. They agree with the Abolitionists in regard to the abstract question, the general principles. But they recognise the truth of the position we have endeavoured to maintain, that these general principles are to be modified in their application to specific duties. They state distinctly their opinion in regard to the general principles. But they do not approach the slaveholder with bitter denunciations for not at once acting in accordance with them. Their wish is to approach him in kindness and with inquiries, to learn what are

the peculiar circumstances of the case, what the particular obstacles which present themselves to the mind of a slaveholder. It is, in short, their endeavour to throw themselves as far as possible into the very circumstances of those who are called upon to act, — that so they may be the better able to judge of the duty required, — that so they may be able to meet the slaveholder upon his own ground, and reason with him upon premises, the correctness of which he himself admits.

In conclusion we would say, we have spoken because we have feared that amidst the excitement and agitation which are abroad, first principles are lost sight of, and because we have thought it important to call the attention of our readers to an examination of them. We cannot but express the hope, that, whether our remarks themselves may attract attention or not, the subject upon which we have spoken will secure the deep and careful thought of all engaged in the great moral and benevolent movements of the day. J. W.

*Portland, Maine.*

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ART. III. — *Text-Book of Ecclesiastical History*. By J. C. I. GIESELER, Doctor of Philosophy and Theology, and Professor of Theology in Gottingen. Translated from the third German Edition, by FRANCIS CUNNINGHAM. Philadelphia: Carey, Lea, and Blanchard. 1836. 3 vols. 8vo.

THE want of some better text-book of ecclesiastical history, than has been heretofore in use among us, has been long felt. After all the labor expended on Mosheim's "Institutes," by Dr. Murdock, for which we are disposed to allow him full credit, the work is not suited to the purpose of the historical student. We agree with Professor Sears, who says that "it can no longer be used." Neander's work, however great its merit in other respects, is not to be thought of as a text-book. That, as the writer just quoted accurately observes, "has another design, — Guericke's is too polemical and unattractive, and Hase's is too brief." \* We hesitate not to say, with

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\* Prof. Sears, of the Newton Theological Institution. See commendatory notices prefixed to Mr. Cunningham's translation of Gieseler.

Professor Sears, that the manual of Gieseler is the most perfect text-book before the public. We think that Mr. Cunningham has done wisely in selecting it for translation, in preference to others which may have offered themselves to his choice; and by the very successful execution of his task, by no means a light one, he has laid the American public under lasting obligations to him.

The publication, too, we regard as peculiarly seasonable, not simply because it supplies a want which, as we have said, has been long felt, but as it may possibly serve to excite an interest in the study of ecclesiastical history; the result of which may be to show, that what, in modern times, often passes for discoveries, is only a reproduction of old ideas, which, as it had been supposed, had long ago accomplished their mission, and disappeared. In truth, the importance of the study of ecclesiastical history is now, as we are disposed to think, greatly underrated. Much as there is of bigotry and narrowness in the age, which the lessons derived from the past should have the effect of mitigating or removing, there is also much that is visionary, speculative, fantastic, dreamy, and unsubstantial. But in this there is nothing new. The old Alexandrine Platonists were as arrant dreamers, as the world ever knew, and were as confident, as any "since born," of the superior claims of what, for want of a better term, we suppose, we may call the Philosophy of Intuition. It was part of the true *gnosis*. Both the philosophical and the Christian Gnostics supposed "all essential truth" to be derived from "direct inward perception," and looked with contempt on all knowledge received through the medium of the senses.\*

The work of Professor Gieseler has met with very signal success in Germany, and certainly possesses many excellences, which render it eminently suited to the purpose for which it was prepared. The first object of solicitude with the historian must be, the Sources from which he is to derive his materials. In search for these he must be thorough; he must gather around him all the remains of the times about which he is writing; he must be familiar with every existing monument of those times; and to a minute knowledge of their literary and historical

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\* A good history of Oriental Mysticism, especially in the form it assumed among the Egyptian Platonists, is much needed. A little of this mysticism occasionally comes to us reflected from modern writers of the French and German school.

relics, he must add an intimate acquaintance with modern researches and labors; he must glean from every obscure corner and nook of the field. If he fail in this, he at once forfeits a title to our confidence, since, however honest or skilful he may be in the use of the materials before him, the neglect of others, capable of throwing light on his subject, may essentially affect the accuracy of his statements. In a work like that under consideration, such want of thoroughness would be absolutely fatal.

In regard to his Sources, whether, to use his own classifications, consisting in "Testimonies, Documents, or Monuments," Professor Gieseler seems properly to have estimated the duty of the historian, and has left us nothing to desire. "The aim of the ecclesiastical historian," he says, should be "to get at facts directly from the Sources." In judging of Sources, however, great discrimination is necessary, and he has need particularly of skill in historical criticism, to enable him to decide on their "genuineness, integrity, and credibility, not only in general, but in each particular case." In this respect, as well as in the one just mentioned, we believe that the student in ecclesiastical history will find in Gieseler a very safe guide. He does not boldly, with a dash of the pen, knock away authorities, in a manner suited to an arbitrary humor; yet he shows himself perfectly aware, that they nowhere require to be sifted with so much caution as in the department in which he is laboring, as truth is nowhere so liable to be distorted by ignorance, credulity, prejudice, narrow-mindedness, and even "intentional dishonesty." We have forged documents enough, and others which evidently misrepresent, or speak falsely; and he who would thread the mazes of ecclesiastical history, has need of peculiar sagacity, and in the absence of light must often resort to conjectures, which, says Gieseler, "may be sometimes so supported by the connexion of events, analogy, the character of the time and of individuals, and even by the tenor of the very statements he judges to be false, as to fall little short of certainty; though often, perhaps, hardly more than possibilities." \* This is just and candid. No one is less disposed than Gieseler to make an unwarrantable use of conjecture, yet no one can be further removed from every thing bordering on credulity. His honesty is above suspicion; he manifests no sectarian bias; at the same time he is fully sensible of the importance in an ecclesiastical

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\*Vol. I. p. 10.

historian of a "truly religious spirit," without which "he cannot hope to penetrate into the inward character of the events he exhibits; it being universally true that he can never rightly understand the state of another's mind, who cannot reproduce it in his own."\*

With respect to the disposition and use of his materials, we think that Gieseler has shown much judgment. One great merit of his work consists in the principle of distribution, a grouping, if we may so express ourselves, which he adopts. The old methods of chronological arrangement according to years or centuries, he, in common with most recent historians, discards. Indeed, however convenient this arrangement may be in some respects, it must constantly embarrass the writer, and has the effect of breaking up his narration into a series of disconnected fragments, which can be read with neither pleasure nor profit.

Gieseler makes four periods, or divisions; the first extending to the time of Constantine, and embracing the history of the church under oppression; the second, from that time to the beginning of the "picture controversy," or controversy concerning the worship of images, A. D. 324 — 726, containing the history of Christianity "as the prevailing religion of the state"; the third from thence to the Reformation, containing the history of the "papal power in its predominance"; the fourth, the history of Protestantism.

It will be perceived, at once, that some further divisions are necessary; that these long periods must be broken up into smaller ones. In doing this, Professor Gieseler has regard partly to the chronological order of events, especially during the earlier ages, and before the internal relations of the church were sufficiently developed for the purpose; afterwards he makes use chiefly of these. To the internal relations of the church belong the history of its faith, or doctrines; their practical influence, or the religious and moral life of Christians; their theoretical development, or the history of the theological sciences; the character of public religious exercises, rites, and usages; and constitutions of church government. These serve very well to distinguish the minor divisions, as not only each period, but, generally, its several parts, have their prevailing ecclesiastical character. To seize

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\*Vol. I. p. 10.

on this character, to fix on the principle or element which is peculiarly developed at any particular time, and which is of sufficient importance to mark the era, is, of course, matter for the exercise of the historian's sagacity, and it is a task which is sometimes attended with no small difficulty. We think that Professor Gieseler has performed this task with good success. His divisions and subdivisions rest on some real and important, and not mere fanciful distinctions, a circumstance which the student in history will duly appreciate.

Prefixed to the several periods and the more important divisions and subdivisions, we have an enumeration of the Sources and Authorities chiefly relied on, more particular references being given in the foot-notes to the several pages. These references, says the author, "cannot, of course, claim to be complete. The aim has been to mention the best works on each subject, and also such as are historically remarkable." For all ordinary purposes of the student, certainly, they are sufficiently full. The translator has added a few, more particularly to English authorities, by which he has done good service.

But what gives the work a decided advantage over others, as a text-book, and constitutes, in fact, its most conspicuous merit, is the plan adopted in regard to the *narrative* portion, and the *extracts*. The former is exceedingly brief and condensed, though, we believe, it leaves no topic, of sufficient importance to claim notice in a general history, untouched. It presents an entire view of the whole field, carefully mapped out, the general course of events being distinctly laid down, and due prominence given to objects deserving of particular attention. But the narration is not encumbered by any dry disquisitions, though occasionally "a short sketch is attempted of the various views given by different parties of important sects in the church." The *extracts* are given in the foot-notes, and generally fill up the greater part of the page. They are from original Sources and Authorities, and are designed, as the author expresses it; "either to prove something which on historical or dogmatical grounds has been held doubtful, or to explain what is obscure, or, lastly, on account of their intrinsic historical importance."\*

Some of the advantages of this plan are obvious. If the

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\* Preface, p. iv.

accuracy of the writer is to be relied on, (as in the present case, we suppose, with some few exceptions, it may,) the student is saved the labor of turning to a multitude of volumes, no small task, if they are readily accessible, which is not often the case, especially with us, in this country, which contains few large collections public or private. The book, being designed to be used as a manual simply, of course does not supersede the necessity of further research; yet on all points on which it may be desirable for one to extend his inquiries, it will be found, from the peculiar principle upon which it is formed, to afford great help.

In histories constructed after the ordinary method, we must take the writer's report of the sense of the document from which he obtains his facts, or views; the passage relied on not being given, we must trust wholly to his eye and judgment. Now it is very possible that he may misconceive the sense of the passage, or in translating it, or transferring its substance into his own language, he may select terms which do not convey to the mind of the reader the exact shade of meaning contained in the original. We want the original, that we may have an opportunity of interpreting it for ourselves. It is then no longer the historian who speaks; the age of which he discourses is allowed to speak for itself, the writer sustaining, in some sort, the character of a guide, who merely furnishes general directions, and conducts the student to the points most favorable for observation, leaving him to see and judge for himself.

That the amount of service rendered to the historical student in this way is very great, it needs no labored argument to prove. Whether we regard distinctness of impression, or accuracy, the advantage is obvious and striking. And yet even upon Gieseler's principle, of giving extracts in support of particular views, or facts, or supposed facts, there is room for error; for partial extracts may mislead. We think that a few of Gieseler's statements are made incautiously, and will not bear the test of examination. To mention an instance, he imputes to Origen the doctrine of the *eternal* generation of the Son. Now we are satisfied that such was not the doctrine of the Ante-Nicene fathers generally, and certainly not of Origen, as may be clearly proved by a careful inspection of his writings, however a few expressions he employs may seem, at first view, to favor the contrary supposition. Then we think

that he attributes a great deal too much to this father, when he ascribes to him the merit of having "reinstated grammatical interpretation in its rights." It is true Origen admits that the Scriptures have a literal or historical, as well as a moral and a mystical sense; but then he is continually setting aside the literal to make way for the mystical, as more sublime, or more worthy of the Deity, and his canons of criticism and interpretation we suppose will now find few advocates.

Such, in few words, are the plan and arrangement of Gieseler's book, and they will recommend themselves, we are persuaded, to all who are competent to decide on the subject, as entitling the work to a decided preference, as a text-book of ecclesiastical history, to those at present in use among us. With the execution we profess ourselves, in the main, to be entirely satisfied. The method is clear, and the style perspicuous; and the great learning of the author; his critical skill, and truly German diligence; his remarkable candor and impartiality, which constitute a somewhat rare endowment of the ecclesiastical historian, give him a peculiar claim to our confidence, and must render his volumes, on which Mr. Cunningham has labored, as we think, with eminent success, an invaluable acquisition to the American student, to whatever class of Christians he belongs. As a manual, the book should take the place of all others of the kind, and should be adopted, at once, in all our seminaries for theological education. We could wish to see it on the table of every theological student in our country.

A work of this character can hardly be supposed to furnish many passages suitable for extract. We will attempt, however, to glean a few. The following relate to the distinctive characters assumed by the theology of the East and of the West, chiefly during the third century. The author commences with a notice of the Alexandrian School.

"In the period before us," says he, "the doctrines of the church were developed chiefly at Alexandria, at that time the seat of the sciences, where the Catholic teachers, brought into constant collision with Heathen and Heretics, were forced to enter more philosophically into the Christian doctrines. In this highly-cultivated city, the necessity of something more than the usual instruction of Catechumens had been very early felt, as well for the philosophical proselytes, as for those who were in future to become teachers. In this manner, no doubt, distinguished men had often drawn around

them great numbers of pupils; and thus prepared the way for the institution of the *Alexandrian Catechetical School*, which, beginning just before the time of which we are speaking, was now at the height of its prosperity, and through its distinguished teachers, Pantænus, Clemens Alexandrinus, Origenes, Heraclas, Dionysius, (Pierius and Theognostus?), was the source of all the advances made in Christian theology during this period. The Alexandrian school took its peculiar character from its very earliest teachers. Of Pantænus, indeed, we know nothing further than his name, and can only judge of him by his pupil Titus Flavius Clemens, on whose writings this character is plainly stamped. He presided over the school from the year 191 to 202, fled from the city in the persecution under Severus, and probably came back again afterwards, (died about 220). But these peculiarities were first fully developed and matured by the great Origen, the son of the martyr Leonidas, (died 202). At the early age of eighteen he was a catechumen at the school in Alexandria, and had a high reputation abroad. But in the year 228 he offended his bishop, Demetrius, by being consecrated as Presbyter at Cæsarea, and, after his removal thither, was soon excluded by Demetrius from communion with the church for his peculiar opinions. The churches in Palestine, Arabia, and Achaia paid no regard, however, to this measure of Demetrius, and Origen not only continued to act as Presbyter, but likewise gave instruction in the sciences."—Vol. i. pp. 134–136.

The Alexandrine school of *philosophy*, the author observes, was "held in high esteem, not only as having been to the Heathen, what the law was to the Jews, a preparation for Christianity, but as the only means of penetrating the hidden spirit of its doctrines." This *gnosis* was to be concealed from the vulgar; it was handed down as a mystery; and even Origen, though more free than others in speaking of the secret doctrines, sometimes manifests a hesitation, and is very explicit in his warnings that "these things are not to be promiscuously told to the people." The author proceeds.

"Two great principles run through the whole of the Alexandrian theology. The one, that all anthropopathic (*borrowed from human nature*) notions of God must be carefully avoided, is seen in their constant efforts to purify the doctrines of religion from every thing earthly and material; the other, that man is without any limitation a morally free being, and that the condition of all morally free beings depends entirely on themselves, led to still more striking results.

"The most remarkable of their doctrines are the following:

"1. That the Godhead can never be unemployed: so that an

endless series of worlds preceded the present, and an endless series of worlds will follow it.

"2. That all intellectual beings (angels, stars, men, demons) were originally created alike, and none of them without a body, as this is the peculiar attribute of the Deity. Some of them having sinned, God created the world and banished the fallen spirits into bodies, more or less gross, according to the degree of their sinfulness. Still they all retain their moral freedom, and are able, if they will, to rise again from their degraded state. Even the punishments of the damned are not eternal, but only remedial; whilst the Devil himself may reform and be pardoned. When the world shall have answered the purpose for which it was created, as the dwelling-place of fallen spirits, it will be destroyed by fire; and by this fire the soul will be purified from all the stains it may have contracted by its intimate union with the body. But, as spirits always retain their freedom, they may sin again; in which case a new world will be created for them.

"3. The Alexandrians speak of the Logos as a highly-exalted being, though their expressions are not always distinct. Evidently, however, they make him inferior to the Supreme God. The wish to remove every thing, that could be unworthy of God, from the notion of the generation of the Son, led at last to the doctrine taught by Origen, that the Logos did not proceed from the essence of the Father, but was produced by the will of God, generated from all eternity. He taught, also, that the Holy Ghost was created by the Son.

"4. The body assumed by the Logos, when it became man, was not of flesh, but of a nobler texture. According to Origen, it united itself not with a human body, but a human soul.

"5. The Alexandrians must of course have been averse to the doctrine of Chiliasm, which, as then held, was so contrary to their antimaterialism. Clement does not allude to it. Origen, however, opposes it openly, giving to the passages, which were thought to favor the doctrine, an allegorical interpretation.

"6. The doctrine of the resurrection of the flesh was, with many Christians, founded on such exaggerated notions of the relative importance of the body in man, that some of them (the Arabians) actually held the soul as an accident, or quality, of the body. With the Alexandrians, on the other hand, to whom the body was only the prison-house of the spirit, it was a natural and consistent doctrine, that the soul would not resume its material body, but one of an incorruptible and far more glorious texture." — Vol. I. pp. 138 – 141.

The theology of the East thus became highly speculative and mutable, and the way was finally prepared for the ap-

pearance of Arianism, of which Lucian of Antioch "has been often considered the father, because he founded the school of Antioch, from which *Arius* and his most distinguished friends went out." In the West, theology wore a different aspect.

"After *Tertullian* had led the way in adapting the Latin language to the expression of Christian ideas, it soon came into very general use amongst Christians of the West; though much was still written in Greek, and even by *Tertullian* himself. But in proportion as the Greek language fell into disuse, the interest in the theology of the Greek church diminished. In consequence the Latin church remained stationary, and the gross material conceptions of the Greek theology, introduced by *Tertullian* in the second century, were still held fast in the third; — the Latins being too much prejudiced against philosophy, and, from their ignorance of the necessary languages, too unskilled in criticism to go forward of themselves. Thus the characteristics of the Western church at this time are an aversion to all theological speculation, and in doctrine a profound immobility which prevented all improvement, except what was unconsciously brought about by the movements in the Greek church.

"Whilst they rejected the peculiar tenets of the Montanists, they still retained the gross conceptions of Christianity, and the high estimation of external observances, by which this sect was distinguished. Hence their strong disposition to extend and develop the science of *Ecclesiastical Law*." — Vol. i. pp. 147, 148.

Again,

"The peculiarity of the theology of the Western church consisted in the gross material conception of the doctrines they had received from the East. This is seen even in their conception of God. They gave to the Deity a body, and the human soul they supposed to be literally his breath. They also retained the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, of the Millennium in its lowest form, of the damnation of all unbelievers, and of eternal punishment. With regard to the Logos, they retained the old Platonic notions, both as to its origin, the details of which they figured to themselves for the most part, according to the analogy of the senses, and as to its relation to the Father." — Vol. i. pp. 149, 150.

At a later period, the doctrines of Augustine, very nearly identical, as it is well known, with those of Calvinism, met with a very different reception in the East and the West. Having been approved by African synods, as well as by Zosimus, bishop of Rome, they became, says Gieseler, "the established faith of the Western church, but were never adopted by the

Greek church, which, from the first, had taken but little interest in the controversy." They were not altogether palatable, it seems, even in the West, for, says Gieseler,

"Although Augustine's doctrine of free grace had been adopted as the faith of the Western church, but few held to it in all its strictness. Its injurious practical consequences could not be overlooked, and were occasionally exemplified; and the monks, especially, were altogether opposed to a doctrine which took away all the merit of their monastic practices." — Vol. I. p. 226.

Gieseler traces with some distinctness the several steps by which freedom of inquiry was impaired, and finally extinguished in the church.

"In the beginning of this century the universally received articles of the Christian faith were few and simple, leaving ample room for different interpretations and the exercise of private judgment. How different were the various systems thereupon founded, may be seen by a comparison of the different schools which were now in existence, — the speculative school of Origen, the traditional, and the historico-critical school, which was, as yet, in its infancy. And even a greater contrast of systems was to be expected, from the speculative turn of the Greek Christians, which the cessation of the persecutions now left them free to indulge.

"Thus theological controversies became unavoidable; nor would this have been matter of regret, or have exerted any but a favorable influence, if the old distinction between *πίστις* and *γνώσις* had only been steadily kept in view, and points of theology not made matters of religion and church discipline. But the very simplicity of the old articles of faith tempted the disputants on either side to appeal to them, each, according to his own interpretation, accusing the other of heresy. This at once brought the question before the hierarchy, who claimed the exclusive right of deciding upon all questions of faith, and were always ready to seize upon any opportunity thus afforded them of interfering in the mere theological disputes of the day. And this tendency to pursue their own interest, they were now at less pains to disguise, inasmuch as they were left more free from the necessity of struggling against Paganism, and were at the same time supported by the strong arm of the state.

"Thus the religious controversies soon assumed a new character. Formerly, they were confined to particular provinces; but now they divided the whole Christian world. To end them, the emperors called general councils, whose decisions became the laws of the realm, and were enforced by the civil power. Formerly, the councils, which were assembled to judge of heretics, contented themselves with guarding against innovation; but now, the general

councils, invested with the highest ecclesiastical dignity, and supported by the imperial power, went on to erect their decisions on disputed points into positive articles of faith.\* All this contributed to develop the system of doctrines with great rapidity, whilst the freedom of speculation had proportionably narrowed. At the same time the condemned parties were provoked to greater obstinacy, and the schisms in the church became wider and more incurable. These contests [not only had an important effect on the development of the internal relations of the church, but, from the share taken in them by the emperors, were also of great political moment. So that from this time forward, not only the whole history of the church, but often, also, the political history of the Roman empire, turns on the theological controversies." — Vol. I. pp. 191, 192.

The school of Origen was friendly to liberty.

"Of the theological schools of this period, the most distinguished were that of Origen, and the Syrian historico-exegetical school, both of which originated in the preceding period. Origen was universally held in high esteem, and to the wide-extended influence of his writings it is to be attributed, that, in the midst of these furious controversies, there remained any freedom of theological speculation whatever." — Vol. I. p. 207.

The result of the Arian controversy somewhat narrowed the field of investigation, though on other points, the utmost freedom of inquiry was permitted, during its continuance.

"A far greater danger now threatened all free inquiry and scientific research, from another side. In proportion as Monachism gained strength, the prejudice strengthened against all use of human science or learning. There arose a crowd of *traditional* theologians, who, rejecting all free investigation, would hear of no opinion which could not be found in the writings of the fathers. This character we see exemplified in Epiphanius, bishop of Constantia in Cyprus, from the year 367, (died 403). Even in his *Panarion* (hæc. 63 and 64) he betrays his bitter hatred of Origen; and as soon as the Arian controversy was at an end, he appeared as his open assailant. Whilst this new contest stopped the advance of theological science in the East, the Western world was bound in spiritual bondage by Augustine, and thus all free inquiry was banished from the church." — Vol. I. pp. 212, 213.

Superstition, of course, now increased apace. Of this, one variety consisted in Saint-worship, of the origin of which Gieseler gives the following account.

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\* \* Hilarius de Trinitate, II. 1."

"The more remote the times of the martyrs, the greater the adoration paid to them. The heathen converts, naturally enough, transferred to them the honors they had been used to pay their demigods, whilst the horror of creature-worship, which had hitherto operated as a check on the growing superstition, had been gradually dying away since the extinction of paganism. As men had long been accustomed to assemble for public worship at the graves of the martyrs, the idea of erecting churches (*Μαρτύριον*, Memoria) over them would readily occur. In Egypt the Christians began to embalm the bodies of reputed saints, and keep them in their houses. The communion with the martyrs being thus associated with the presence of their material remains, these were dug up from the graves and placed in the churches, especially under the altars; and the popular feeling having now a visible object to excite it, became more extravagant and superstitious than ever. The old opinion of the efficacy of their intercession, who had died a martyr's death, was now united with the belief that it was possible to communicate with them directly: a belief founded partly on the popular notion that departed souls always lingered around the bodies they had once inhabited, and partly on the views entertained of the glorified state of the martyrs, a sort of omnipresence being ascribed to them. These notions may be traced to Origen, and his followers were the first who apostrophized the martyrs in their sermons, and besought their intercession. But though the orators were somewhat extravagant in this respect, they were far outdone by the poets, who soon took up this theme, and could find no expressions strong enough to describe the power and the glory of the martyrs. Their relics soon began to work miracles, and to be valuable articles of trade.

"In proportion as men felt the need of such intercession, they sought to increase the number of the intercessors. Not only those, who, on account of services rendered the church, were inscribed in the Diptycha,\* but the pious characters from the Old Testament, and the most distinguished of the monks, were ranked amongst the saints. Martyrs before unknown announced themselves in visions; others revealed the place of their burial. From the beginning of the 5th century the prayers for the saints were discontinued as unbecoming their glorified state. Christians were now but seldom called upon to address their prayers to God; the usual mode being to pray only to some saint for his intercession. With this worship of the saints were joined many of the customs of the

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\* Diptycha. A double catalogue, in one part whereof were written the names of the living, and in the other those of the dead, which were to be rehearsed during the office. *Rees' Cyclop.*—Tr."

heathen. Men chose their patron saints, and dedicated churches to their worship. The heathen, whom the Christians used to reproach with worshipping dead men, found now ample opportunity of retort." — Vol. i. pp. 282–287.

The commencement of the Reformation attempted, and partially, though but partially, achieved by Luther and his coadjutors, dates as far back as the fourteenth century. On this subject Gieseler expresses himself as follows.

"In proportion as the papal power became more irresistible and fearful, the heretical parties assumed more and more the character of fanaticism, and, despairing of any reformation within the church, sought to lay the foundations of their religious faith without it. But the power of the popes being thus diminished, a more rational spirit of reform was developed in the church itself, which, acknowledging the church as the true foundation of Christian faith, sought only to purify it from the abuses that had crept in.

"In these attempts at reform there was, however, an essential difference. For the most part they aimed only at external reformation; seeking, namely, to set bounds to the papal power, and to restore the discipline and virtue of the clergy, without going deeper into the sources of the evil. The *Mystics* were nearer the truth in avoiding the over estimation of externals, and endeavouring to revive inward religion. But, on the other hand, they were too exclusively engaged in the pursuit of their peculiar object, and their religion was of too transcendental and dreamy a character to allow them accurately to examine, and rightly to understand the general state of the church.

"The true Reformers were distinguished by this: — that they looked for the evil not in single abuses, but in the pervading spirit; and this spirit it was their aim to renovate. Amongst these "*testes veritatis*," many, no doubt, have been since reckoned by Protestants, who did not deserve such honor, and of others we have only passing and imperfect notices; still the 14th century can boast of many whose right to be so reckoned is beyond dispute. The foremost of these are three of the Bohemian clergy, who, fired with pious indignation at the mechanical worship and the dead hypocrisy which prevailed, directed their undaunted attacks against the Mendicant monks, to whose influence they chiefly ascribed this corruption." — Vol. III. pp. 135, 136.

The three Bohemian clergy alluded to, are Conrad Stiekna, John Milicz, and Matthias von Janow, all cotemporaries with the English Wicliffe. During the next century individual reformers became numerous, some of whom were left

undisturbed, and were permitted to end their days in peace. "However the views taken of the abuses in the church may have differed, the feeling of the necessity of a reform," says Gieseler, "was general. It is not surprising that the wish should often have ripened into a hope, and this into confident expectation, and this again have expressed itself in prophecy." The study of ancient literature hastened the result.

"The great benefit supposed to be derived from the study of the ancients was the cultivation of the taste, and in pursuing this it was not heeded how great must be the influence of this often extravagant love of the ancients in weakening men's attachment to the church; nor, on the other hand, what means as well as excitement were thus furnished to perilous investigations of the prevailing doctrines and views." — Vol. III. pp. 393, 394.

In Italy no direct attack was made on the church, though the scholastic philosophy, which was its main prop, fell, being unable to sustain the ridicule which was thrown upon it, especially on its "barbarous epithets, and its mistaken reverence for Aristotle."

"In Germany the study of the ancients led to widely different results as regarded its effect on theology. These studies were first introduced in the schools of the Brethren of the Common Life. In these schools every thing was valued according to its influence on religion, in which light therefore this new source of knowledge was chiefly regarded; and this view, so well suited to the earnest religious character of the nation, continued to be held by most of the German Humanists." — Vol. III. pp. 397, 398.

The Scholastics made a desperate struggle; but, not being a match for the Humanists in the use of the weapons of wit and ridicule, they were finally driven from the field.

"Thus by the revival of ancient learning the most important means of reformation in the church were prepared; but learning alone could not accomplish the work. The results thus obtained could neither be brought home to the convictions of the people, nor were they fitted to excite that universal and all-absorbing interest which was necessary to enable men to break through the fetters which had been for ages riveted upon them, and venture all for the truth. But after the Reformation had been begun on the only sure foundation, that of religious feeling, an enlightened criticism proved a most useful guide in saving men from error and fanaticism." — Vol. III. p. 410.

We have only, in conclusion, to express our gratitude to Mr.  
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Cunningham for the important service he has rendered to the cause of theological learning among us by the present publication. Were we disposed to cavil, we should say, that he has retained the Latin form of names, both of persons and places, in several instances, in which the English form, being more familiar, and having the sanction of custom, would have been better. Thus he writes, *Ambrosius*, bishop of *Mediolanum*, for Ambrose, of Milan; *Hilarius*, bishop of Pictavium, for Hilary, of Poitiers; *Martin*, bishop of *Turonum*, for Martin, of Tours; Arles, he uniformly, so far as we have observed, writes, *Arelate*; thus he speaks of the Synods of *Arelate* and *Mediolanum*. We should have said, the Synods of Arles and Milan. We might give several other specimens. He is not always, however, consistent. Thus he sometimes writes *Basilius*, and sometimes, *Basil*, and once, at least, Ambrose of *Mediolanum*, and again, on the same page, we find the phrase, "Ambrose at Milan," relating to something there done by him. In these and other instances, we see no reason for retaining, in English composition, the old Latin form of the name, which would not also justify us in writing *Virgilius*, *Horatius*, *Livius*, *Sallustius*, *Roma*, *Italia*, instead of *Virgil*, *Horace*, *Livy*, *Sallust*, *Rome*, and *Italy*. But these are minute blemishes, which we should be less disposed to notice, were the execution of the work, in general, less perfect. But where we see so much to commend, and so little to censure, trivial defects arrest the attention. We hope that Mr. Cunningham will persevere and give to the public more of the fruits of his German studies.

The three volumes now before us bring down the history to the time of the Reformation. A fourth volume, not yet published, is to contain the history of Protestantism, from its origin to the present day. We hope that Mr. Cunningham will lose no time in giving it to the public, as soon as received. We trust that his labors will be duly appreciated. Such labors ought to be encouraged, though the tendency of things, both in this country, and in England, is, to hold out very slender motives to studies, which have no visible and direct bearing on outward and temporal prosperity, and the means of promoting mere physical comfort and enjoyment.

A. L.

ART. IV. — *A Harmony or Synoptical Arrangement of the Gospels; founded upon the most ancient Opinion respecting the Duration of our Saviour's Ministry, and exhibiting the Succession of Events in close Accordance with the Order of the two Apostolical Evangelists. With Dissertations, Notes, and Tables.* By LANT CARPENTER, LL.D., Minister of the Gospel. Bristol: William Browne. 1835. 8vo. pp. cxlvii., 296., (xxvi.)

IN adjusting the chronological harmony of the gospel history, the first step is to select some one of the four canonical gospels, as a basis for the harmony; for the fact that numerous discrepancies occur in the order of events as related by the different evangelists, can hardly have eluded the observation of any cursory reader, much less that of any critical student. The most obvious principle of selection is that indicated in the title of the work now before us, a work purporting to be "in close accordance with the order of the two apostolical evangelists." Of course these, who were companions of the Saviour's journeyings and eyewitnesses of his doings, were more likely to give an accurately arranged report of them, than those, who must have depended for their knowledge on second-hand narratives, however authentic. But when we investigate the nature and design of John's Gospel, we find ourselves compelled to set it aside as an insufficient basis for a harmony. Even if what he has recorded be given in its just chronological order, his omissions are so frequent and extensive as to make his narrative an entirely disjointed and broken one. Nor does his design appear to have been such as to demand even the slightest reference to the order of time. His Gospel was a "tale of the affections," — a selection from those scenes and conversations during the Saviour's life, which had appealed with the most power to his own loving and faithful breast, and by which he expected to enlist the most effectually the sympathy of his readers in his Master's cause, — a selection governed by no other principle, except one of these two virtually identical principles; the omission for the most part of what had been related by Matthew, Mark, and Luke, and the adoption of Judea Proper, instead of Galilee, as the chief scene of his narrative. Thus John's Gospel, so far from furnishing data for a Christian chronology, needs a chronology elsewhere

derived either to correct or to verify the arrangement of its disconnected portions.

We turn, then, to the three first evangelists for the basis we seek. And here, in abatement of Matthew's claims as an eyewitness, we are met at the outset by the express purpose which Luke indicates in his introduction,—to write “in order,” (κατατάξας.) But though this rendering of the original word be admissible, it is by no means necessary. The word is used by no other writer of the New Testament except St. Luke, and is used by him in the five instances in which it occurs in at least three, perhaps four, different senses. In Luke viii. 1, used substantively with ἐν τῷ, it is rightly rendered *afterwards*; in Acts iii. 22, it is employed to denote a succession in order of time; in Acts xi. 4, it may refer to the order of time, but more probably implies *systematically, methodically*,—while in Acts xviii. 23, it is an adverb of place. In St. Luke's proem, then, we are not restricted to the signification which our translators have given to the word, and there is one strong argument against it in the fact that Luke, though sometimes exceedingly precise in his note of time, yet often writes as if he were ignorant when events took place, and most manifestly groups together parables, which we can hardly suppose to have been uttered to the same audience. We would not object to Campbell's rendering,—“to write a *particular* account,” or to Doddridge's,—“to write an *orderly* account.” But we would prefer rendering the passage as follows. “It seemed good to me, having [first] traced out all things diligently from the beginning, *afterwards* to write to thee,” &c.

The other principal argument employed by those who would adopt the Gospel of St. Luke as the basis of a harmony, rests on the fact, that Luke generally coincides with Mark, where he differs from Matthew, in the arrangement of events, so as to present in his favor an array of two witnesses against one. This circumstance, at least, shows that Mark's and Luke's arrangement could not have been fortuitous or arbitrary; but that they must have relied on some common oral or written authority. And to this authority we might feel bound to yield our assent, were it not that in one portion of the narrative, in which it is impossible that Matthew should have been mistaken, and in which he could have had no conceivable motive for misplacing events, Mark and Luke differ widely from his order. We refer to the transactions recorded in Matt. ix. in immediate

connexion with the call of that evangelist. According to him, it was from the festival at his own house, on the day of his summons to become a disciple, that Jesus was sent for to the house of Jairus, on his way to which he cured the timid invalid who had suffered twelve years from a hopeless malady. The cure of Jairus's daughter and of the diseased woman, are placed, by Mark and Luke, immediately after the restoration of the Gadarene demoniacs. But with regard to the transactions of that most momentous day of Matthew's life, his spiritual birth-day, we must admit Matthew to be a trustworthy witness. In one case, at least, then, we find Mark and Luke, agreeing in a false chronology. We must therefore resort to some other theory than their chronological accuracy, to account for their agreement when they depart from Matthew's order; and the claims of the latter, as an eyewitness, remain unimpaired.

There is yet another consideration suggested by a comparison of Matthew's and Luke's Gospels, already hinted at, but which we will here give more at length in the words of the book before us, — a consideration, which seems to us entirely subversive of Luke's claim to chronological accuracy.

“With fewer details respecting the facts which he has recorded than we often find in St. Luke's Gospel, St. Matthew commonly gives more definite indications of time and place. Throughout the whole of his Gospel, excepting in his record of the first days in Jerusalem at the last passover, that of the period following the mission of the Apostles, there is no difficulty in tracing the course of events on a map and by a calendar, without the aid of the other gospels. On the other hand, — though St. Luke sometimes supplies a more distinct specification of time than the other gospels give, and shows, by chronological particularity, where it was attainable by him, (as in chap. iii. 1, 2, vi. 1, ix. 28, 37, 51,) that he made it an object of inquiry, — yet the attentive reader may find several indications of his not possessing all the information as to time and place which we can derive from the other gospels: for instance, he does not advert to the special commencement of our Lord's public preaching in Galilee, as taking place immediately after the imprisonment of the Baptist; and though, from St. Matthew we know that the cure of the paralytic took place at Capernaum, on our Lord's return from the country of the Gadarenes, and just before he called Matthew himself to attend his ministry, yet Luke, though he mentions *circumstances* which Matthew does not, speaks of it (ch. v. 17) as being *on one of the days*, and gives no clue to the place where it was wrought.” — p. lix.

So far we see ample cause for adopting Matthew's order. But the first three gospels present so many curious and at first sight perplexing phenomena, both of coincidence and of discrepancy, that we cannot but deem it the first business of the evangelical harmonist to select, defend, and establish some theory of their origin, which shall comprehend and elucidate all these phenomena. And herein lies the main deficiency of the work under review. We infer from here and there a random hint that our author adopts Eichhorn's *documentary* theory, as developed and illustrated by Bishop Marsh. But if this be the case, he has left his readers in the dark with regard alike to its grounds and its features. As the subject is one of equal interest and importance, we trust that we shall be pardoned, if, in order to the cursory discussion of it, we defer, for a few pages, the ostensible purpose of this article.

We have already referred to the discrepancy in the order of events between Matthew, Mark, and Luke. A similar discrepancy may be observed in the unessential minutiae of the narrative; and in these also, Mark and Luke generally coincide, when they differ from Matthew. Thus (to draw our illustration from the contents of a chapter to which we have made previous reference, Matt. ix.), Matthew omits, Mark and Luke both mention the circumstance, of the paralytic's being let down through the roof;—Mark and Luke both designate Matthew under the name of Levi, the son of Alphaeus;—according to Matthew, the ruler of the synagogue (whom he does not name) represents his daughter as already dead, while Mark and Luke (who both call him Jairus) represent her as yet living when her father applied to Jesus.

But notwithstanding these discrepancies, there is a far greater verbal coincidence between these three writers, not only in the record of discourses, but of events, than we commonly find in the works of independent historians. In Mark's Gospel there are but twenty-four verses, which may not be found, *almost* word for word in Matthew's or Luke's; and in very numerous instances there is an *entire* verbal coincidence between Mark and Luke, or Matthew. There is yet another singular circumstance. Luke is satisfactorily proved to have been a heathen, or at least, a Hellenist by birth,—he is uniformly said by early Christian writers to have been a man of liberal education; his Acts of the Apostles is far more pure, elegant, and classical, as a specimen of Greek composition, than any

other book in the New Testament; and the brief proem of his Gospel is marked by an almost Attic chasteness in the choice and arrangement of words. But yet his Gospel is no less full of Hebraisms, of unclassical combinations and foreign idioms, than is Matthew's; and there are several rare and peculiar words and idioms that are common to both of them. Thus they both use *περύγιον*, an Alexandrinism, *ἐπιούσιος*, a word found nowhere else, and which, Origen says, was coined by the evangelists, — *γαζοφυλάκιον* in a sense, in which classical authors do not employ it, — *ἐπιφώσκειν* in a peculiar sense, referred by Michaelis to a Syriac idiom, &c.

To account for these phenomena three classes of theories have been framed.

1. Many earlier and more recent authors have supposed that our three evangelists, though writing independently of each other, made use of a common document or documents. The first author to whom the idea seems to have occurred, was Le Clerc. It was adopted in different forms by various subsequent writers, but found very little currency or favor in the theological world, until it made its appearance in Eichhorn's complex and artificial theory, best known, perhaps, to many of our readers as given with but slight modifications by Marsh in his *Michaelis*. According to Eichhorn, these three Gospels were chiefly translated and compiled from preëxistent documents in the Aramaic dialect. He supposes, one principal document, which contained in the simplest form the events and discourses found in all three, one common to Matthew and Mark, one to Mark and Luke, concurrent, but distinct narratives by different hands of the events that are common and peculiar to Matthew and Luke, a separate *Gnomology*, to which Luke alone had access, besides various minor written and oral sources. The first thought that suggests itself on the examination of this ingenious theory is, that it creates as many difficulties as it removes,—that the queries which it raises without satisfying, are as numerous as the phenomena for which it accounts. Thus we are constrained at once to inquire whether, if such documents ever existed, it is credible that no trace of their having existed should be now discernible,—that the early fathers, on most points so minute, should have passed them over in silence,—that Origen and Eusebius, who not only give us a list of the sacred writings, but speak also of the sources whence Mark and Luke derived their information, should have made

no mention of these fountain-heads of evangelical tradition. Especially may we urge this inquiry with regard to the principal of the supposed documents, the one common to the three historians, which must have been a document of immense importance and value, of which it is inconceivable that the above-named writers should have seen or known any thing without mentioning it, yet which could hardly have had existence without their having been aware of the fact. This common document must have been far more valuable than the gospels compiled from it; and would not the same zeal, which prompted their frequent transcription and careful preservation, have rescued this also from destruction, or at least its memory from oblivion? Is it said that the evangelists, after compiling their own gospels, to give them greater currency and authority, destroyed their materials? This is accusing the sacred historians of a vanity and worldly ambition, utterly at variance with their well-known characters as self-denying and devoted Christian ministers and martyrs.

We would again ask, who could have been the author or authors of the document or documents thus used? Who could have been qualified to furnish Matthew, one of Christ's immediate disciples and constant followers, with his materials? Was it one of the four earliest apostles? We have a gospel by John; and, if Simon, Andrew, or James had undertaken a similar work, we see no reason why it should not have been transmitted to posterity in its original form, under the author's name.

We would also submit to the advocates of Eichhorn's theory, how far it is reconcilable with the following clause of St. Luke's proem: "Even as they *delivered*\* them unto us, which from the beginning were *eyewitnesses and ministers of the word*, it seemed good to me, also, *having had perfect understanding of all things from the very first*, to write," &c.

2. Another class of hypotheses rests on the idea that the first three evangelists copied from each other. The number of actual theories of this class hardly falls short of that which is arithmetically possible; nor can it interest our readers to know by what names illustrious in critical science each has been maintained. It is easy, however, to show that this whole class of theories is untenable.

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\* *Παρέδωκεν*, a word usually employed to indicate *oral tradition*.

For, first, it is inconceivable that either of the other two should have copied from Matthew; else they would surely have adopted his order of events as on the authority of an eyewitness. Especially would Luke have done this, as he professes to write, not what he knew by his own observation, but what he had heard from eyewitnesses. There are also several discrepancies between Matthew and the others, which set aside the supposition that his Gospel could have been used in the composition of theirs. Thus Matthew mentions two Gadarene demoniacs; Mark and Luke but one; — Matthew speaks of two blind men; Mark and Luke of but one, cured by Jesus in the environs of Jericho. Moreover, had Luke known of the existence of Matthew's Gospel, he would not have thought it necessary to write one of his own. He evidently regards the narratives of Christ's life, with which he was already acquainted, as void of authority and unworthy of trust, and most manifestly implies in his proem that their extreme faultiness was the chief motive which impelled him to the preparation of his Gospel, as the only means whereby Theophilus "might know the certainty of those things of which he had heard the rumor."\* Yet again, Luke in his Gospel, and especially in the Acts of the Apostles, shows himself particularly careful to designate time and place with accuracy. The latter work is written with the utmost chronographical and topographical precision. And in the former, wherever he makes mention of time and place, it is with singular definiteness and formality, as a writer who deems these things of interest and moment. Now, had he possessed Matthew's Gospel, he would most assuredly have eagerly availed himself of Matthew's indications of time and place, and thus have given the *when* and the *where* of several incidents, which he represents as having occurred *on a certain day*, or *in a certain city*.

That Matthew and Luke could not have compiled their Gospels from Mark's, is evident from the far greater reach and compass of information which their Gospels manifest, and also from the entire ignorance of the existence of an *authoritative* history of Jesus, which Luke's proem implies.

It is impossible that Luke's Gospel should have been used by the others for purposes of compilation; for there are many

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\* Thus I am inclined to render *αποκηρύξας*.

events and parables of the most intensely interesting character which Luke alone gives us, which it is absolutely inconceivable that any compiler from him should have omitted. Indeed, no one can compare the three without feeling convinced that Luke enjoyed sources of information, to which Matthew and Mark had neither direct nor indirect access.

3. We come now to the more plausible supposition that the evangelists wrote from memory, (i. e. from their own or that of others,) and independently of each other. That they wrote from memory is rendered probable by the habits of the age in which they lived. The art of writing was not commonly employed then, as now, in taking contemporaneous notes of speeches and events. But the memory received a proportionally greater cultivation than at present; so that in profane authors we read of many feats of memory, resting on undoubted authority, but which it almost shakes our faith in history to peruse. Especially unfrequent must the habit of writing have been in the class of society to which the apostles and first disciples belonged; and perhaps an absolute ignorance of the art may have been the reason why so many of the twelve have left us no records or epistles. Nor, supposing them to have been ready and apt writers, is it in the least probable that, while with Christ, on their numerous journeys, voyages, and flights, they had writing materials constantly at hand, and that, the moment their Master began to converse, they assumed the attitude of students in a lecture-room. The circumstances under which Christ's discourses were uttered, were generally such, as would produce a deep impression upon the minds of the hearers, and tend to engrave the speaker's words on their memories. Discourses, delivered in the form of parables, would have been committed to memory with much greater ease than others; nor is it improbable that this was one of the reasons why Jesus so often employed a figurative form of speech. Then, as the discourses transmitted to us are very few, even for the short period of the Saviour's ministry, we may suppose that the more important were frequently repeated in substance at least.

But if, after all, we find it hard to believe the ordinary exercise of memory adequate to the composition of the Gospels, we have only to recur to the Saviour's promise: [The holy spirit] "*shall teach you all things, and bring all things to your remembrance, whatsoever I have said to you.*"

That the Gospels were written from memory, (i. e. from the memory of Matthew himself and of Mark's and Luke's informants,) would appear from the verbal variations in the discourses which are common to the three, — variations precisely such in kind and in degree, as we should suppose would exist in the accounts of three men, each of whom taxed his recollection to the utmost for an exact transcript of the speaker's language; but so unessential and trivial, that we can hardly suppose them intentional deviations from a common document.

Another reason for believing that the evangelists wrote independently alike of a common document and of each other's Gospels, is, that many of their several additions, omissions, and modifications are easily accounted for on that ground, and can be on that ground alone. They write discriminatingly, and carefully adapt their narratives to those for whom they were intended. Thus Luke, preparing his Gospel for a heathen reader, in speaking of Satan, uses a caution, (which Matthew, who wrote for the Jews, doubtless deemed superfluous,) in guarding against the doctrine of an *independent* evil principle: "All these things will I give thee, for *that is delivered unto me.*" Luke, writing for one not resident in Palestine, defines places and dates (when he does not appear entirely ignorant of them) with more accuracy than either Matthew or Mark. Matthew, writing for the benefit of his own countrymen, holds forth to their view Christ's denunciation of future calamity to the Jewish nation, and gives in full his harshest censures upon the Scribes and Pharisees, while Mark, writing (as venerable tradition informs us) for the church at Rome, where a disposition to insult and oppress the Jews was prevalent, very judiciously omits a large portion of this denunciation and rebuke. This certainly seems like the conduct of independent historians, who had at their own command and in their own minds the resources from which they were to draw, and who felt that they were not tampering with foreign materials.

But we have as yet assigned no adequate cause for the singular verbal coincidence between the first three Gospels. To account for this, let us advert, for a moment, to the circumstances of the infant church, immediately after the Saviour's ascension. The apostles and more intimate disciples remained together at Jerusalem for nearly three years. They met almost daily at each other's residences, for mutual exhortation and religious exercises. Matthew was of course there; Mark's

mother's house seems to have been one of their usual places of assembly; and that Luke was also with them is rendered probable by the unanimous tradition which represents him to have been a very early convert, and by the graphic style, like that of an eyewitness, in which he depicts the doings of the day of Pentecost. The chief business of their meetings was undoubtedly discoursing to their own company, to the inhabitants of the city, and to the strangers who visited it at the great festivals, concerning all that Jesus said or did while on earth. They must have dwelt principally on what transpired in Galilee, as their hearers had enjoyed the means of knowing what had occurred at Jerusalem. In their long residence together, their modes of representing the history of Jesus would have naturally acquired an almost perfect uniformity, especially as the eleven doubtless strove, by a minute comparison of their several reminiscences, to fix every circumstance, however trivial, and to reproduce, word for word, the discourses as they were originally uttered. Thus in the course of these three years would have sprung up an *oral Gospel*, common to the eleven as its joint authors, having Galilee for its principal theatre, which would have been indelibly impressed, in almost identical terms, on the memories of all who uttered and heard it. Of this oral Gospel we may regard our first three Gospels, so far as their records go along together, as three separate transcripts from memory; and their coincidences and discrepancies are just such in nature and degree as we should expect to find in three such transcripts. Matthew, we have remarked, deviates farther from Mark and Luke than they do from each other; and we should naturally expect that he would deviate farther than they from the oral Gospel of the eleven, as, in committing it to writing, he would have constantly corrected it by reference to his own original and ineffaceable impressions. For the parts peculiar to him, we need refer only to his superior opportunities of knowledge as an apostle. Mark's narrative we may refer entirely to the oral Gospel of the eleven as its source.

Luke must have had sources of information peculiar to himself, sources to which even Matthew had not access. He must manifestly have had an intimate acquaintance with the family connexions of Jesus, from whom alone he could have received most of the incidents recorded in his first two chapters. We are much inclined to believe that he was the companion of Cleopas or Alpheus on the walk to Emmaus. This walk he

describes with so much distinctness and minuteness, that we can hardly suppose him to have been ignorant of the name of either party concerned in it; and he gives to the picture that peculiar freshness and vividness which always characterize a narrative of personal experience, so that we believe him to have withheld the name of Cleopas' companion from a modesty kindred to that, with which John calls himself "that *disciple*," and the like. Now Mary, the wife of Cleopas, was sister to Mary, our Lord's mother; and, if our conjecture be admitted as plausible, Luke's intimacy with Cleopas will account for his ample knowledge of the circumstances of our Saviour's birth and infancy. The mission of the Seventy is also peculiar to Luke; so are most of the parables that are recorded after the mention of that mission. We would here adopt the hypothesis of the author before us, that the mission of the seventy occurred, and that *most* of these parables were uttered during the absence of the Twelve on their missionary tour. We thus account for the silence of Matthew with regard to them; and may account for Luke's acquaintance with them by supposing (as many do, on the authority of lists found in the margin of several ancient manuscripts of the New Testament) that Luke himself was one of the Seventy, or that he drew material from personal converse with one of that body of disciples. Or, with Carpenter, we may locate the Saviour's residence in Peræa, slightly mentioned by John, (ch. x. 39-42,) and overlooked by Matthew and Mark, during the absence of the twelve, and suppose that most of the parables peculiar to Luke were uttered there, and were gathered by Luke by personal intercourse with inhabitants of Peræa, perhaps during his visit to Palestine with Paul, Acts xxi.

To account for the discrepancies in the order of events, we may suppose that Matthew wrote in the chronological order, which he alone had the means of knowing; and that Mark and Luke followed to a great degree the order, in which fortuitous circumstances might have associated portions of the narrative in their own minds. These associations would naturally have been common to them both, from their residence together at Jerusalem, so that we should expect to find them often coinciding in an order other than that of time.

Our readers will, we trust, be prepared, with Dr. Carpenter, to make Matthew's Gospel the basis of the evangelical harmony; and also to accord with him in the place which he

assigns to the principal events and discourses which are peculiar to Luke. Our next step (and one necessarily preliminary to the arrangement of the several portions of John's narrative in their proper niches) is, to determine the length of our Saviour's ministry. Our author adopts, and defends with great learning and ability, the hypothesis that this ministry included but two passovers. His reasons for this theory are,

1. "Admitting that our Lord's ministry included two passovers only, we have records of his attendance, for the all-important purposes of it, at each of the festivals which occurred during it." There are only five festivals at which we have distinct records of what Jesus said and did. The first is the Passover which occurred about two months after his baptism, and twelve days after his first miracle. The second is the feast at which he cured the infirm man at the pool of Bethesda, to which John gives no name, but which must have been the Pentecost, seven weeks after the Passover. The third is the feast of Tabernacles, which occurred in September; the fourth the feast of Dedication, near the close of November; the fifth, the crucifixion Passover. If other festivals occurred during Christ's ministry, we have no account of his presence and conduct at them. But at the Passover, Pentecost, and Tabernacles, it was the duty of every Jew to be present, and there was a grand national assembly. For both these reasons would Jesus have been present at them, in order to comply with the law of Moses, to which he always paid deference, as well as to seek opportunities of usefulness. But the hypothesis that the public ministry of Jesus included more than two Passovers, obliges us to believe that there were at least three of the great national festivals, which either Jesus did not attend, or at which he said and did nothing that the evangelists deemed sufficiently note-worthy for a place in their records.

2. "The bipaschal duration of our Lord's ministry could alone be derived from the records of St. Matthew, St. Mark, and St. Luke." "Nothing can be derived from the first three Gospels, either separately or conjointly, which authorizes us to conclude, that, after the baptism of our Lord, there were more than one Passover before that at which he was crucified. Matthew, Mark, and Luke speak only of one Passover, namely, the last; nevertheless, since the walk through the cornfields must have occurred in the part of the year after a Passover," "it follows that there must have been two Passovers in the

ministry of Christ after his baptism." The bipaschal hypothesis enables us to fill, and yet no more than fill, all the time that it embraces, with the journeyings and events recorded by the Evangelists. Any other hypothesis leaves long intervals, of which we have no record; nor do the indications of time, which we derive from Matthew, Mark, and Luke jointly, permit us to expand their narrative beyond the space of fifteen months.

3. The bipaschal hypothesis is "strictly accordant with the Gospel of John." The only difficulty presented by the Gospel of John lies in the statement, with which he prefaces his account of the miraculous feeding of the five thousand, (ch. vi. 4.) "And the Passover, a feast of the Jews, was nigh." Those, who advocate the assignment of a more extended duration to our Saviour's ministry, regard this as an intermediate Passover between the first and the crucifixion Passover. But we must, in that case, suppose the occurrence of this Passover, of a Pentecost, and a feast of Tabernacles, and the passage of several long intervals of time, unnoticed by either of the evangelists. To support the bipaschal system, Mann and Priestley maintained that the words τὸ πάσχα were an interpolation; and Bishop Pearce, in his Commentary, regards the whole verse as spurious. But the verse is found, as in our received text, in all known manuscripts, and in all existing versions; and such an emendation of the text, on critical conjecture solely, is entirely inadmissible. We are therefore inclined to believe that these words are genuine, and that the Passover to which they refer was the crucifixion Passover. Were we to follow the indications of time given us in the first three Gospels, we should assign to the feeding of the five thousand a date of but a few weeks prior to the crucifixion; for the intervening events that they record would not occupy a longer space. But John inserts this miracle before the feast of Tabernacles; and if it actually occurred but a little before the last Passover, how are we to account for his lack of chronological accuracy? To this we would reply, that it was by no means John's object to give a connected and full account of his Master's ministry. "His leading object was, to record the ministry of Christ in Judea, particularly at the festivals; showing, in an especial degree, the means which had been afforded to the Jewish rulers and chief priests, of knowing the authority of Jesus." The miracle of the five thousand is then an insulated fragment, out of the general scope of John's Gospel, and was

doubtless introduced by him as prefatory to the discourse to which it gave rise, in the synagogue of Capernaum, which he alone has recorded, — a discourse “remarkable, both in itself, and in its effects upon the worldly-minded among his disciples.” Supposing (what we have reason to believe) that, so far as the transactions in Judea are concerned, John wrote in chronological order, he yet would have been likely to insert this insulated miracle and discourse in that place, where they would least disturb the continuity of his main history. Now, had he inserted them where, as we think, they chronologically belong, he must have placed the *sixth* chapter between the *eleventh* and *twelfth* chapters, and thus must have separated two narratives which he would naturally have desired to present in connexion, and which, in a history of transactions in Judea, belonged together, namely, the resurrection of Lazarus, and Christ's next meeting with Mary, Martha, and Lazarus in Bethany, six days before his death. This consideration, to us at least, accounts satisfactorily and beautifully for the position which the miracle of the five thousand occupies in John's Gospel, and removes the only serious objection which that Gospel presents to the bipaschal hypothesis.

4. This hypothesis “was certainly the opinion of those who lived nearest to the time of Christ, which at least proves that there was no authentic tradition opposing it.” How the weight of this opinion of the early Christian writers is affected by the fact that some of them professed to rest it on a literal interpretation of the “acceptable *year* of the Lord,” mentioned by Isaiah, we have not time to inquire. But we consider the proof in favor of the bipaschal system as amply competent without, or (did the case so stand) against their testimony.

We have thus given a sketch of the reasoning in support of the hypothesis, which lies at the basis of Dr. Carpenter's *Harmony*, and have also, in the course of our remarks, proved or illustrated each of his other fundamental positions. Of these positions, which he deems essential to the coherent and satisfactory arrangement of the gospel history, he enumerates *five*. They are as follows.

“I. Our Lord's ministry included two Passovers only.

“II. The miracle of the Five thousand was wrought when that Passover was approaching, at which our Lord was crucified.

“III. In framing a Chronological Arrangement of the Records of our Lord's ministry, a general preference is due to St. Matthew's order of events, where it differs from that of Mark and Luke.

"IV. The portion of St. Luke's Gospel which is contained in the tenth and following chapters, as far as the 11th verse of the seventeenth, is a Miscellaneous Collection of Discourses and other Occurrences, recorded, in general, without reference to the order of time; and we are at full liberty to arrange the separate Records of which the Gnomology is composed, in the position which best suits the chronological order, as established by the Gospels of the Apostles Matthew and John.

"V. Portions which are connected by contiguity in any Gospel, should not be needlessly separated from each other."—pp. cxv, cxvi.

We do not hesitate to pronounce this Harmony far superior in its claims, alike upon the critical student and the religious reader, to any similar work with which we are acquainted. Its chief merit consists in its having been conceived and executed in a sentiment of profound reverence for apostolic authority, and for the subject matter, the language, and the spirit of the evangelical narratives. It is accordingly free from that reckless, flippant style of criticism, from that readiness for conjectural emendation, from that taste for dismemberment and overturn, which has characterized not only the vulgar herd of biblical harmonists, but many scholars of great acumen and high attainments. Dr. Carpenter has, in no instance, for the sake of theory, altered the original text, or even refused assent in a doubtful case to the preponderance of critical authority. He has preserved, to an unprecedented degree, the integrity of each of the four Gospels; and with much fewer transpositions than his most wary predecessors have made, has woven the four into a natural, connected, comprehensive, and complete history. His work is literally a *harmony*; for, unlike most works of the kind, it presents the elements of the gospel narrative, not as *disjecta membra*, tumultuously arranged, and jostling each other in the places which they respectively occupy, but in a state of repose, aptly framed together, and fitting into each other like the timbers of a well-built edifice. The order of Matthew and of John is preserved almost without change; and the portions peculiar to Luke are inserted with very little alteration in his arrangement. This Harmony, as is well known, is the result of years of patient study and reflection; and it is a result amply worthy of the time and labor which it has cost.

The Harmony is preceded by four Dissertations. The *first*,  
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"On the Duration of our Saviour's Ministry," considered as a critical disquisition, is preëminently characterized by clearness, thoroughness, and cogency of argument. To us its reasoning seems conclusive and unanswerable, though, before reading it, we were inclined to dissent from the author's hypothesis. The *second* dissertation, "On the Structure of the First Three Gospels in relation to the Succession of Events in our Lord's Ministry," maintains and establishes the general preferableness of Matthew's order. The *third* is an elaborate, graphic, thorough, and highly-instructive essay, "On the Political and Geographical State of Palestine at the period of our Lord's Ministry; giving a Descriptive Survey of the Districts in which he resided or journeyed." The *fourth*, "On the Succession of Events recorded in the Gospels; giving an Outline View of our Lord's Ministry," comprises a recapitulation of the points established in the preceding dissertations, and a synopsis of the Harmony. These dissertations will all be read with deep interest by the biblical scholar; and the third, if published by itself, would be welcomed and perused with avidity by readers of every class and age, nor are we acquainted with any brief compend of gospel geography so well adapted both to enlighten and to please. We would urge the expediency of its being issued separately, as a manual for Sabbath schools and bible classes.

In the Harmony, the birth and infancy of Jesus form an introductory chapter; and the records of his ministry are divided by as many prominent eras into ten parts; these are separated into smaller sections, and these again broken into paragraphs according to the sense, while the usual division of verses is indicated, for purposes of reference, by figures too minute to distract the reader's eye, or deform the page. The text of the Harmony is a chaste, careful, and valuable revision of the common text of James's translators, from whose time-hallowed phraseology we cannot find a single deviation not demanded by sound criticism. The very few critical notes, which accompany the text, are comprehensive, judicious, and pertinent.

The Harmony is followed by a Calendar of our Lord's ministry, a Tabular View of the contents of the Gospels, and a detailed Analysis of St. Luke's Gospel.

We would refer, before closing, to a very interesting feature of the volume before us. The work is in its aim, purport, and end, a purely critical one. Yet it is written in a style far

different from the cold, unfeeling, anatomizing style, which in these latter days the transatlantic muse of biblical criticism seems to have made her own. Dr. Carpenter's language is always that of reverence, devotion, and piety. Though he keeps singularly close to his province as a critic, though he in the whole volume does not, so far as we remember, indulge so much as a single moral or religious reflection, though there is no parade whatever of devotional words or thoughts, he seems never to forget, and he never lets his reader forget, that it is a *holy* record that he is analyzing, the history of the *Son of God* that he is illustrating.

We are told that the five hundred copies of the first edition of this *Harmony* were all demanded for subscribers, or for the author's personal friends. There must be a call for it in the theological public both of England and America. We hope to see it soon republished here; and cannot believe that party prejudice would prevent or delay the circulation, among the inquiring and studious of all denominations, of a work of so much learning and merit, on a subject of so deep interest and moment.

A. P. P.

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ART. V. — *Poems*, by WILLIAM CULLEN BRYANT. Fourth Edition. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1836.

THE poetry of Mr. Bryant has been before the public long enough to allow a dispassionate judgment to be formed of its merits, and the fact that four editions have been called for, shows what that judgment is. We think it highly creditable to the taste of the reading public, that such poetry should be relished. It has nothing to recommend it except its intrinsic excellence. It resorts to no tricks to obtain favor. It is not particularly exciting to the feelings. It does not appeal very strongly to the passions. It is neither licentious nor sentimental. It is not marked with any eccentricity. It is neither wildly romantic, nor brilliantly fanciful. It is not egotistical. It has none of these seasonings to recommend it to the public taste, and its popularity, in the absence of these, is more likely to indicate its genuine worth.

Mankind have, in every age, shown a great partiality for the poet. They have slept under the homilies of the preacher, and turned away from the dry formulas of the philosopher, but have sat with charmed ear while the poet has interpreted the book of life, hinted at the designs of Providence, appealed to the sense of right, and taught them the duties of their stations. In the early stages of society the poet is chronicler, monitor, and prophet. He celebrates the virtues of the dead. He stirs the soul to present action. And he carries forward the hopes of men into the unknown future. In a more cultivated period, when science has enlarged the bounds of exact knowledge, although the sphere of the poet's influence is contracted, he still wields a vast moral power, and continues to be followed with admiring eyes. But although poetical genius is a rare gift and highly to be prized, the possessor of it is perhaps less to be envied than is commonly supposed. Such is the wise impartiality of Providence, that splendid endowments of mind are attended with peculiar sources and avenues of pain. To whom much is given, upon him much also is imposed by way of discipline. That exquisite sensibility from which spring the highest efforts of art, subjects the poet to the acutest sufferings which "flesh is heir to." That work which the reader sits down in placid mood to peruse, and which he runs through with unabated delight, which warms his fancy and calls into exercise his best affections, which brings before him images of beauty and scenes of joy,—that work, when it was revolving in the strained and agitated mind of the author, was probably the occasion of more misery than satisfaction.

"At, Phœbi nondum patiens, immanis in antro  
Bacchatur vates, magnum si pectore possit  
Excussisse Deum: tanto magis ille fatigat  
Os rabidum, fera corda domans, fingitque premendo."

Could the process be laid open to us which has been going on in the writer's mind from the time when the first idea germinated to the date of a full completion of his task; could we know how much of despair and disgust have mingled with his exertions; how imperfectly the pen has succeeded in drawing out and expressing the images that have passed before the mind; what lassitude, exhaustion of spirits, dissatisfaction with common objects and pursuits have attended long-continued exercise of the faculties, we should, instead of coveting, rather commiserate the lot of him upon whom God has breathed the

inspiration of genius. It reconciles one to mediocrity to meditate upon the sufferings to which the gifted are exposed. Read the life of Cowper, and ponder its moral. At what a price did he purchase his undying fame! What conditions were, in his case, annexed to the gift of genius! All high intellectual qualities are accompanied with corresponding hazards. But this is eminently true of the poet. He exercises the most delicate part of human nature. If even one invisible string in the internal machinery gets awry, the harmony and peace of the soul are disturbed.

In conformity with the division of labor which has been introduced by the progress of society into all human employments, it is sometimes thought that the mind must confine itself to some single department of study or branch of art, in order to accomplish any thing worthy of being remembered. To a certain extent the doctrine may be admitted, and the practice may be good. But such specimens of humanity as the process, when carried to extremes, exhibits to us, are any thing but agreeable. The man who has spent the larger part of a life in studying the etymology of a word, or determining the genus to which a plant belongs, and he who in his humbler occupation toils year after year in making heads to pins, and who knows no more about their points than he does about astronomy or metaphysics, serve to remind us of that cruel custom which luxury has suggested, of turning the whole economy of animal life to the preternatural enlargement of a liver or other part, in order to furnish a more dainty dish for the sensualist.

But if the exclusive process we are considering be injurious in other departments of intellectual labor, we believe it to be almost sure to be fatal where the imagination is concerned. If the body cannot be supported and the health preserved by living exclusively upon stimulants, neither can the internal life and health by the use of the imagination alone. Hence, perhaps, has arisen much of the unhappiness, which has been proverbially the lot of poets.

It formed part of the intellectual discipline recommended by the practice of the ancients to unite the study of mathematics with the study of poetry. There was wisdom in this course. The abstract sciences, by their rigid method and their severe and tenacious logic, are well adapted to act as a balance to the expansiveness and elasticity of the imagination, and to induce that medium action of the mind, which is alone safe and

followed by durable beneficial results. The remarks we have ventured will show that we are not of the number of those who see with regret a man of brilliant imagination immersed in the active business of life. It might have saved Lord Byron many a bitter hour, had he been chained by necessity to the drudgery of office, and it might have corrected much of the poison which now glitters on his brilliant pages. And we think that the healthy tone which distinguishes Mr. Bryant's poetry, its freedom from a morbid melancholy and from false sentiment, would not have been likely to mark the productions of one who occupied no place in society, and who had no connexion with the realities of life.

But if the exercise of his art be attended with so many dangers to the poet himself, it is also highly important, on the reader's account, what kind of stimulus and how much is provided for his imagination. The poet exercises a more immediate and more powerful sway over the bent of the opening mind, and does more to determine character, than perhaps any other laborer in the field of literature. There is a period of life when poetry is seized upon to feed an importunate craving of the soul; when it is read, not for the sake of the quiet and innocent pleasures that accompany a cultivated and delicate taste, but to sharpen an insatiable appetite. And that period is a critical one. Alas for him who then drinks at a polluted fountain! And in this view the community owes much to Mr. Bryant. He has published nothing calculated to pervert the judgment, or to corrupt the heart. He has not dipped his pen in gall to write a bitter invective against his race. He has not thrown over the limbs of vice the beautiful drapery which should adorn virtue. He has caused no pain to the good by sneering at what the world calls holy and reverences as such. Nor is his merit in this respect merely negative. His poetry is moral and religious in a true sense. Without formal, technical allusions to the subject of religion, his works are yet imbued with a spirit of hearty devotion, which steals into the mind of the reader with a grateful sweetness. His pictures from Nature are adorned with light from above; and whether we walk with him "in the shadow of the aged wood," or follow the water-fowl through "the rosy depths" of heaven, we are led "from the creature to the Creator." He does not separate Nature from that Being of whom Nature is only the visible manifestation. It has been too often the case that poets have gone to one or the other of

the two extremes, either of utter indifference and sneering infidelity, or of a technical modish sanctity. It is therefore the more grateful when we meet with a writer who has thoughts and feelings of his own on the great subject, and who brings them forth on fit occasions, connects them with other thoughts by easy transitions and natural associations, and expresses them in the free, simple, unaffected language of the heart. What elevation of feeling pervades the Hymn of the City, which we cannot but rank among the very best of Bryant's productions.

"Not in the solitude  
Alone, may man commune with Heaven, or see  
Only in savage wood  
And sunny vale, the present Deity ;  
Or only hear his voice  
Where the winds whisper and the waves rejoice.

"Even here do I behold  
Thy steps, Almighty ! — here, amidst the crowd  
Through the great city rolled,  
With everlasting murmur, deep and loud, —  
Choking the ways that wind  
'Mongst the proud piles, the work of human kind.

\* \* \* \* \*

"Thy spirit is around,  
Quickening the restless mass that sweeps along ;  
And this eternal sound, —  
Voices and footfalls of the numberless throng, —  
Like the resounding sea,  
Or like the rainy tempest, speaks of thee.

"And when the hours of rest  
Come, like a calm upon the mid-sea brine,  
Hushing its billowy breast, —  
The quiet of that moment, too, is thine ;  
It breathes of him who keeps  
The vast and helpless city while it sleeps."

The genius of Bryant is of a meditative cast, suited to moral, didactic poetry. With not enough of sublimity for the epic, or of character-painting for the drama, or of fire and passion for the higher lyric, he breathes a calm and quiet strain that harmonizes well with the gentle excitement awakened by contemplating the beauties of Nature. There are

several lyric pieces in the volume before us, easy, graceful, and some of them spirited. The "Song of Marion's Men" is full of spirit and action. But the peculiar genius of Bryant seems to us best evinced in such pieces as the "Lines to the Past," "Thanatopsis," "Rizpah," "The Rivulet," "Hymn to the North Star," and the "Lines to the Waterfowl," which have been so often quoted that they are familiar to the lovers of poetry. In such pieces he is at home, in his element; his nature guides his art, instead of being subject to it. And yet his moralizing never becomes tedious, nor does his sober spirit degenerate into melancholy. See in the following with what eyes he looks upon Nature.

"There are notes of joy from the hang-bird and wren,  
And the gossip of swallows through all the sky;  
The ground-squirrel gayly chirps by his den,  
And the wilding bee hums merrily by.

"The clouds are at play in the azure space,  
And their shadows at play on the bright green vale,  
And here they stretch to the frolic chase,  
And there they roll on the easy gale.

"There's a dance of leaves in that aspen bower,  
There's a titter of winds in that beechen tree,  
There's a smile on the fruit, and a smile on the flower,  
And a laugh from the brook that runs to the sea.

"And look at the broad-faced sun, how he smiles  
On the dewy earth that smiles in his ray,  
On the leaping waters and gay young isles,  
Ay, look, and he'll smile thy gloom away."

There are a few of our author's productions in which he attempts the sportive, and ironical, and humorous. We think they are entire failures. The "Lines addressed to the Musquito," "Spring in the City," and "A Meditation on Rhode-Island Coal," are of this class. That there are in them many of Bryant's excellences,—the same correct diction, and the same purity of style, that characterize his other writings, cannot be denied; but they fail in the very point that ought to distinguish them. He does not possess that power of rapidly combining ideas and images, that keen sense of the ridiculous, that brilliancy of fancy and gayety of temper, or that easy flow of language, which give such grace, and sprightliness, and point

to similar efforts by Halleck. All that need be said is, that such is not his turn; and if it were, he would probably be spoiled for those higher purposes to which he now ministers so admirably. There are few who can turn from grave to gay with a graceful and easy transition. Few are able to throw off the heavy armour of the serious muse, and in light steps move to the sprightly measure of gayer numbers, and woo successfully both *L'Allegro* and *Il Penseroso*.

In point of style the poems of Bryant evince the greatest care, in touching and retouching, polishing and repolishing; and in these days, when books are written and published in such rapid succession, and often with so great carelessness, and when the hearing and reading public is inundated with a flood of words, it is refreshing to meet with such an exception, and one cannot but commend that wise delay which retains his works until they are as perfect as art can make them, and that nice taste which weighs his words and phrases in golden scales. What exquisite delicacy marks the following sonnet!

“Ay, thou art for the grave; thy glances shine  
 Too brightly to shine long; another Spring  
 Shall deck her for men's eyes, — but not for thine, —  
 Sealed in a sleep which knows no wakening.  
 The fields for thee have no medicinal leaf,  
 Nor the vexed ore a mineral of power;  
 And they who love thee wait in anxious grief,  
 Till the slow plague shall bring the fatal hour.  
 Glide softly to thy rest, then; Death should come  
 Gently, to one of gentle mould like thee,  
*As light winds wandering through groves of bloom*  
*Detach the delicate blossom from the tree.*  
 Close thy sweet eyes, calmly, and without pain;  
 And we will trust in God, to see thee, yet again.”

With respect to versification, we think our author succeeds better with rhyme than with blank verse. In a poet like Bryant, whose genius inclines to a quiet, moralizing mood, including very little of passion or enthusiasm, there seems to be the more need of the music of rhyme to redeem the verse from what might occasionally be set down as dullness. The volume before us exhibits a great variety of versification. In some of the lines we think there is not sufficient distinction from musical prose. The music of verse is to be judged of by the ear, and of course reading must be a good test. Now it

may be doubted, whether a person reading some of our author's pieces, especially those in the Spenserian verse, would easily convey to a listener a perfect idea of the structure of the verse. The lines run into each other. The thoughts are not always so compressed as is desirable. It requires two or more lines to express a thought or sentiment. The consequence is that the rhyme occasionally falls upon unimportant words; the sense pauses and the musical pauses interfere, and what is realized by the ear does not harmonize with what is realized by the mind of the reader. One of the conspicuous beauties of Dryden and Pope is the wonderful talent each possessed, of preserving his verse distinct, and at the same time expressing his thoughts with brevity, with ease, with point, with force. We do not contend that each line should form a separate sentence, but that each line ought to convey a distinct image; it may be only a branch of a sentence, but it may be complete as a branch, if such an expression may be allowed. Our impression of Wordsworth is, that in many of his pieces, he is diffuse, spreads his idea over several lines, and, in using more words, makes the image less distinct on the mind, and the music less perfect to the ear. The effect of this amplification in poetry is somewhat similar to the effect of the recitative in music.

One of the best specimens of musical verse in the volume before us is, we think, the little piece from the Spanish, called "The Siesta." It is a delicate love-ditty. We give a portion of it.

"Airs! that over the bending boughs,  
And under the shadows of the leaves,  
Murmur soft, like my timid vows  
Or the secret sighs my bosom heaves, —  
Gently sweeping the grassy ground,  
Bearing delight where'er ye blow,  
Make in the elms a lulling sound,  
While my lady sleeps in the shade below."

The pieces entitled "Rispa," "The Song of Marion's Men," "The Gladness of Nature," "Green River," and that "To the Waterfowl," are fine instances of the adaptation of the verse to the thought. In the pieces entitled "The Death of the Flowers" and "The Song of the Stars," there seems to us an equal want of adaptation.

With respect to the translations from the Spanish we are not able to judge of their merit as translations; but there are two

of them we have read again and again with great delight. One of them is called "The Life of the Blessed," which is distinguished by a charming simplicity. The other is entitled "Mary Magdalen," and is a perfect gem.

"Blessed, yet sinful one and broken-hearted !  
The crowd are pointing at the thing forlorn,  
In wonder and in scorn !  
Thou weapest days of innocence departed ;  
Thou weapest, and thy tears have power to move  
The Lord to pity and love.

"The greatest of thy follies is forgiven,  
Even for the least of all the tears that shine  
On that pale cheek of thine.  
Thou didst kneel down to him who came from heaven,  
Evil and ignorant, and thou shalt rise  
Holy, and pure, and wise.

"It is not much that to the fragrant blossom  
The ragged briar should change ; the bitter fir  
Distil Arabian myrrh ;  
Nor that, upon the wintry desert's bosom,  
The harvest should rise plenteous, and the swain  
Bear home the abundant grain.

"But come and see the bleak and barren mountains,  
Thick to their tops with roses ; come and see  
Leaves on the dry dead tree :  
The perished plant, set out by living fountains,  
Grows fruitful, and its beauteous branches rise,  
For ever, towards the skies."

Mr. Bryant is one of those poets who come home to the universal mind and heart, consecrating our most familiar affections. He deals not in those obscure thoughts and images which present themselves to a small class only of thinkers, but pours the soft light of his genius over the common path on which the great multitude is moving. His poetry is simple and unaffected, beautiful without being overloaded with ornament, inspired by quiet communion with nature, not a transcript from the writings of others. He avoids altogether the literary epidemic of our times, when, out of a morbid fear of saying what has been said before, writers distort not only language but ideas, caricature sentiments, and present the most grotesque images to the fancy.

There is a cant in poetry as well as in criticism and religion. There are catchwords and set phrases, and a stereotyped language, which poetasters use, and with which they lure their readers into a high idea of their merit. The pages of Bryant are clear of such trash. We find in them no moping melancholy, no tinsel glitter, no empty conceits, no fulsome exaggerations. His poetry is of that sort which is of *use*. Let not the lovers of verse start at such praise. We are no Utilitarians in the ultra sense of the word. We would not degrade the noble art of poesy to the level of a piece of machinery, and calculate its value in the same way as we estimate the worth of a mechanical invention. Neither do we profess to be so transcendental as to put out of view the influence which poetry can and ought to exert upon the character, by operating through the most delicate part of that complex and mysterious nature God has given us. There is a poetry which maddens and sensualizes, and befools, which fills the imagination with all that is vulgar and vicious, which brings confusion into the thoughts, weakens the judgment, enervates the whole character, and unfits one for the duties and trials of life. We consider it the office of the true poet to elevate the mind sufficiently above common life to remind us of our destiny, and not so far but it may return from its soarings with a fresh relish for the realities of the present, and find itself braced up and invigorated for its work. That we hold to be the true poetry which sheds a rosy light upon the path of duty, which marries the imagination to the judgment, which performs a part, and aims so to do, in building up and adorning a true humanity,—a humanity in which shall be blended in graceful union the “beauty of holiness” and the severity of truth.

W. P. L.

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ART. VI.—*The Sunday School. A Discourse pronounced before the Sunday School Society.* By WILLIAM E. CHANNING.

MATTHEW xix. 13, 14. Then were there brought unto him little children that he should put his hands on them and pray: and the disciples rebuked them. But Jesus said, Suffer little children, and forbid them not, to come unto me, for of such is the kingdom of heaven.

THE subject of this discourse is indicated by the name of the Society, at whose request I appear in this place. The Sunday

School, this is now to engage our attention. I believe, I can best aid it by expounding the principles on which it should rest and by which it should be guided. I am not anxious to pronounce an eulogy on this and similar institutions. They do much good, but they are destined to do greater. They are in their infancy, and are only giving promise of the benefits they are to confer. They already enjoy patronage, and this will increase certainly, necessarily, in proportion as they shall grow in efficiency and usefulness. I wish to say something of the great principles which should preside over them, and of the modes of operation by which they can best accomplish their end. This discourse, though especially designed for Sunday schools, is in truth equally applicable to domestic instruction. Parents who are anxious to train up their children in the paths of Christian virtue, will find in every principle and rule, now to be laid down, a guide for their own steps. How to reach, influence, enlighten, elevate the youthful mind, this is the grand topic; and who ought not to be interested in it? for who has not an interest in the young?

I propose to set before you my views under the following heads. I shall consider, first, the Principle on which such schools should be founded; next their End or great object; in the third place, What they should teach; and, lastly, How they should teach. These divisions, if there were time to fill them up, would exhaust the subject. I shall satisfy myself with offering you what seem to me the most important views under each.

I. I am, first, to consider the principle on which the Sunday school should be founded. It must be founded and carried on in Faith. You must not establish it from imitation, nor set it in motion because other sects have adopted a like machinery. The Sunday school must be founded on and sustained by a strong faith in its usefulness, its worth, its importance. Faith is the spring of all energetic action. Men throw their souls into objects, only because they believe them to be attainable and worth pursuit. You must have faith in your school; and for this end you must have faith in God; in the child whom you teach; and in the Scriptures which are to be taught.

You must have faith in God; and by this I do not mean a general belief of his existence and perfection, but a faith in him as the father and friend of the children whom you instruct, as desiring their progress more than all human friends, and as most ready to aid you in your efforts for their good. You must not

feel yourselves alone. You must not think when you enter the place of teaching, that only you and your pupils are present, and that you have nothing but your own power and wisdom to rely on for success. You must feel a high presence. You must feel that the Father of these children is near you, and that he loves them with a boundless love. Do not think of God as interested only in higher orders of beings, or only in great and distinguished men. The little child is as dear to him as the hero, as the philosopher, as the angel; for in that child are the germs of an angel's powers, and God has called him into being that he may become an angel. On this faith every Sunday school should be built, and on such a foundation it will stand firm and gather strength.

Again, you must have faith in the child whom you instruct. Believe in the greatness of its nature and in its capacity of improvement. Do not measure its mind by its frail, slender form. In a very few years, in ten years perhaps, that child is to come forward into life, to take on him the duties of an arduous vocation, to assume serious responsibilities, and soon after he may be the head of a family and have a voice in the government of his country. All the powers which he is to put forth in life, all the powers which are to be unfolded in his endless being, are now wrapt up within him. That mind, not you, nor I, nor an angel, can comprehend. Feel that your scholar, young as he is, is worthy of your intensest interest. Have faith in his nature, especially as fitted for religion. Do not, as some do, look on the child as born under the curse of God, as naturally hostile to all goodness and truth. What! the child totally depraved! Can it be that such a thought ever entered the mind of a human being? especially of a parent! What! in that beauty of childhood and youth, in that open brow, that cheerful smile, do you see the brand of total corruption? Is it a little fiend who sleeps so sweetly on his mother's breast? Was it an infant demon, which Jesus took in his arms and said, "Of such is the kingdom of heaven?" Is the child, who, as you relate to him a story of suffering or generosity, listens with a tearful or kindling eye and a throbbing heart, is *he* a child of hell? As soon could I look on the sun, and think it the source of darkness, as on the countenance of childhood or of youth, and see total depravity written there. My friends, we should believe any doctrine sooner than this, for it tempts us to curse the day of our birth; to loathe our existence; and, by

making our Creator our worst foe and our fellow-creatures hateful, it tends to rupture all the ties which bind us to God and our race. My friends, have faith in the child ; not that it is virtuous and holy at birth ; for virtue or holiness is not, cannot be born with us, but is a free, voluntary effort of a being who knows the distinction of right and wrong, and who, if tempted, adheres to the right ; but have faith in the child as capable of knowing and loving the good and the true, as having a conscience to take the side of duty, as open to ingenuous motives for well-doing, as created for knowledge, wisdom, piety, and disinterested love.

Once more, you must have faith in Christianity as adapted to the mind of the child, as the very truth fitted to enlighten, interest, and improve the human being in the first years of life. It is the property of our religion, that whilst it stretches beyond the grasp of the mightiest intellect, it contracts itself, so to speak, within the limits of the narrowest ; that whilst it furnishes matter of inexhaustible speculation to such men as Locke and Newton, it condescends to the ignorant and becomes the teacher of babes. Christianity at once speaks with authority in the schools of the learned, and enters the nursery to instil with gentle voice celestial wisdom into the ears of infancy. And this wonderful property of our religion is to be explained by its being founded on, and answering to, the primitive and most universal principles of human nature. It reveals God as a parent, and the first sentiment which dawns on the child is love to its parents. It enjoins not arbitrary commands, but teaches the everlasting principles of duty ; and the sense of duty begins to unfold itself in the earliest stages of our being. It speaks of a future world and its inhabitants, and childhood welcomes the idea of angels, of spirits, of the vast, the wonderful, the unseen. Above all, Christianity is set forth in the life, the history, the character of Jesus ; and his character, though so sublime, is still so real, so genuine, so remarkable for simplicity, and so naturally unfolded amidst the common scenes of life, that it is seized in its principal features by the child as no other greatness can be. One of the excellences of Christianity is, that it is not an abstruse theory ; not wrapt up in abstract phrases, but taught us in facts, in narratives. It lives, moves, speaks, and acts before our eyes. Christian love is not taught us in cold precepts. It speaks from the cross. So immortality is not a vague promise. It breaks forth like the morning from

the tomb near Calvary. It becomes a glorious reality in the person of the rising Saviour; and his ascension opens to our view the heaven into which he enters. It is this historical form of our religion which peculiarly adapts it to childhood, to the imagination and heart, which open first in childhood. In this sense the kingdom of heaven, the religion of Christ, belongs to children. This you must feel. Believe in the fitness of our religion for those you teach. Feel that you have the very instrument for acting on the young mind, that you have the life-giving word.

II. Having considered the faith in which the Sunday school should be founded, I proceed now to consider the end, the great object, which should be proposed and kept steadily in view by its friends. To work efficiently and usefully, we must understand what we are to work for. In proportion as an end is seen dimly and unsteadily, our action will be vague, uncertain, and our energy wasted. What, then, is the end of the Sunday school? The great end is, to awaken the soul of the pupil, to bring his understanding, conscience, and heart into earnest, vigorous action on religious and moral truth, to excite and cherish in him Spiritual Life. Inward life, force, activity, this it must be our aim to call forth and build up in all our teachings of the young, especially in religious teaching. You must never forget, my friends, whether parents or Sunday-school instructors, what kind of a being you are acting upon. Never forget that the child is a rational, moral, free being, and that the great end of education is to awaken rational and moral energy within him, and to lead him to the free choice of the right, to the free determination of himself to truth and duty. The child is not a piece of wax to be moulded at another's pleasure, not a stone to be hewn passively into any shape which the caprice and interest of others may dictate; but a living, thinking being, made to act from principles in his own heart, to distinguish for himself between good and evil, between truth and falsehood, to form himself, to be in an important sense the author of his own character, the determiner of his own future being. This most important view of the child should never forsake the teacher. He is a free moral agent, and our end should be to develop such a being. He must not be treated as if he were unthinking matter. You can make a house, a ship, a statue, without its own consent. You determine the

machines, which you form, wholly by your own will. The child has a will as well as yourselves. The great design of his being is, that he should act *from* himself and *on* himself. He can understand the perfection of his nature, and is created that he may accomplish it from free choice, from a sense of duty, from his own deliberate purpose.

The great end in religious instruction, whether in the Sunday school or family, is, not to stamp *our* minds irresistibly on the young, but to stir up their own; not to make them see with our eyes, but to look inquiringly and steadily with their own; not to give them a definite amount of knowledge, but to inspire a fervent love of truth; not to form an outward regularity, but to touch inward springs; not to burden the memory, but to quicken and strengthen the power of thought; not to bind them by ineradicable prejudices to our particular sect or peculiar notions, but to prepare them for impartial, conscientious judging of whatever subjects may, in the course of Providence, be offered to their decision; not to impose religion upon them in the form of arbitrary rules, which rest on no foundation but our own word and will, but to awaken the conscience, the moral discernment, so that they may discern and approve for themselves what is everlastingly right and good; not to *tell* them that God is good, but to help them to see and feel his love in all that he does within and around them; not to tell them of the dignity of Christ, but to open their inward eye to the beauty and greatness of his character, and to enkindle aspirations after a kindred virtue. In a word, the great object of all schools is to awaken intellectual and moral life in the child. Life is the great thing to be sought in a human being. Hitherto most religions and governments have been very much contrivances for extinguishing life in the human soul. Thanks to God, we live to see the dawning of a better day.

By these remarks, I do not mean that we are never to give our children a command without assigning our reasons, or an opinion without stating our proofs. They must rely on us in the first instance for much that they cannot comprehend; but I mean, that our great aim in controlling them must be to train them to control themselves, and our great aim in giving them instruction, must be to aid them in the acquisition of truth for themselves. As far as possible, religion should be adapted to their minds and hearts. We should teach religion as we do nature. We do not shut up our children from outward nature,

and require them to believe in the great laws of the Creator, in the powers of light, heat, steam, gravity, on our word alone. We put them in the presence of nature. We delight to verify what we teach them of the mineral, animal, and vegetable worlds, by facts placed under their own eyes. We encourage them to observe for themselves, and to submit to experiment what they hear. Now, all the great principles of morals and religion may be illustrated and confirmed, like the great laws of nature, by what falls under the child's own consciousness and experience. Indeed great moral and religious truths are nearer to him than the principles of natural science. The germs of them are in his soul. All the elementary ideas of God and duty and love and happiness come to him from his own spiritual powers and affections. Moral good and evil, virtue and vice, are revealed to him in his own motives of action and in the motives of those around him. Faith in God and virtue does not depend on assertion alone. Religion carries its own evidence with it more than history or science. It should rest more on the soul's own consciousness, experience, and observation. To wake up the soul to a clear, affectionate perception of the reality and truth and greatness of religion is the great end of teaching.

The great danger of Sunday schools is, that they will fall into a course of mechanical teaching, that they will give religion as a lifeless tradition, and not as a quickening reality. It is not enough to use words conveying truth. Truth must be so given that the mind will lay hold on, will recognise it as truth, and will incorporate it with itself. The most important truth may lie like a dead weight on the mind, just as the most wholesome food, for want of action in the digestive organs, becomes an oppressive load. I do not think that so much harm is done by giving error to a child, as by giving truth in a lifeless form. What is the misery of the multitudes in Christian countries? Not that they disbelieve Christianity; not that they hold great errors, but that truth lies dead within them. They use the most sacred words without meaning. They hear of spiritual realities, awful enough to raise the dead, with utter unconcern; and one reason of this insensibility is, that teaching in early life was so mechanical, that religion was lodged in the memory and the unthinking belief, whilst the reason was not awakened, nor the conscience nor the heart moved. According to the common modes of instruction, the minds of the young

become worn to great truths. By reading the Scriptures without thought or feeling, their minds are dulled to its most touching and sublime passages; and, when once a passage lies dead in the mind, its resurrection to life and power is a most difficult work. Here lies the great danger of Sunday schools. Let us never forget, that their end is to awaken life in the minds and hearts of the young.

III. I now proceed to consider what is to be taught in the Sunday schools to accomplish the great end of which I have spoken;\* and this may seem soon settled. Should I ask you what is to be taught in the Sunday school, the answer would be, "The Christian religion. The institution is a Christian one, and has for its end the communication of Christian truth." I acquiesce in the answer; but the question then comes, "In what forms shall the religion be taught, so as to wake up the life of the child? Shall a catechism be taught?" I say, No. A catechism is a skeleton, a dead letter, a petrification. Wanting life, it can give none. A cold abstraction, it cannot but make religion repulsive to pupils whose age demands that truth should be embodied, set before their eyes, bound up with real life. A catechism, by being systematical, may give a certain order and method to teaching; but systems of theology are out of place in Sunday schools. They belong to the end, not the beginning, of religious teaching. Besides, they are so generally the constructions of human ingenuity rather than the living forms of divine wisdom; they give such undue prominence to doctrines which have been lifted into importance only by the accident of having been made matters of controversy; they so often sacrifice common sense, the plain dictates of reason and conscience, to the preservation of what is called consistency; they lay such fetters on teacher and learner, and prevent so much the free action of the mind and heart, that they seldom enter the Sunday school but to darken and mislead it.

The Christian religion should be learned not from catechisms and systems, but from the Scriptures, and especially from that

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\* In the remarks which I am to make on what is to be taught in the Sunday school, I take it for granted that this school is the first stage of a course of religious instruction, not the whole course; that it prepares for, but does not include Bible classes and other classes, in which the most difficult books of Scripture, the evidences of natural and revealed religion, and a system of moral philosophy, should be taught.

part of the Scriptures in which it especially resides, in the histories, actions, words, sufferings, triumphs of Jesus Christ. The Gospels, the Gospels, these should be the text-book of Sunday schools. They are more adapted to the child than any other part of Scripture. They are full of life, reality, beauty, power, and in skilful hands are fitted above all writing to awaken spiritual life in old and young.

The Gospels are to be the study of the Sunday-school teacher, and of all who teach the young; and the great object of study must be, to penetrate to the spirit of these divine writings, and above all things to comprehend the spirit, character, purpose, motives, love of Jesus Christ. He is to be the great study. In him, his religion is revealed as nowhere else. Much attention is now given, and properly given, by teachers to what may be called the letter of the Gospels, to the geography of the country where Christ lived, to the customs to which he refers, to the state of society which surrounded him. This knowledge is of great utility. We should strive to learn the circumstances in which Jesus was placed and lived, as thoroughly as those of our own times. We should study the men among whom he lived, their opinions and passions, their hopes and expectations, the sects who hated and opposed him, the superstitions which prevailed among the learned and the multitude, and strive to see all these things as vividly as if we had lived at the very moment of Christ's ministry. But all this knowledge is to be gained not for its own sake, but as a means of bringing us near to Jesus, of letting us into the secrets of his mind, of revealing to us his spirit and character, and of bringing out the full purpose and import of all that he did and said. It is only by knowing the people among whom he was born, and brought up, and lived, and died, that we can fully comprehend the originality, strength, and dignity of his character, his unborrowed, self-subsisting excellence, his miraculous love. We have very few of us a conception, how Jesus stood alone in the age in which he lived, how unsustained he was in his great work, how he found not one mind to comprehend his own, not one friend to sympathize with his great purpose, how every outward influence withstood him; and, for want of this conception, we do not regard Jesus with the interest which his character should inspire.

The teachers of the young should strive to be at home with Jesus, to know him familiarly, to form a clear, vivid, bright idea

of him, to see him just as he appeared on earth, to see him in the very dress in which he manifested himself to the men of his age. He should follow him to the temple, to the mountain top, to the shores of the sea of Galilee, and should understand the mixed feelings of the crowd around him, should see the scowl of the Pharisee who listened to catch his words for some matter of accusation, the imploring look of the diseased seeking healing from his words, the gaze of wonder among the ignorant, and the delighted, affectionate, reverential eagerness with which the single-hearted and humble hung on his lips. Just in proportion as we can place ourselves near to Christ, his wisdom, love, greatness will break forth, and we shall be able to bring him near to the mind of the child.

The truth is, that few of us apprehend vividly the circumstances under which Jesus lived and taught, and therefore much of the propriety, beauty, and authority of his character is lost. For example, his outward condition is not made real to us. The pictures which the great artists have left us of Jesus have helped to lead us astray. He is there seen with a glory around his head, and arrayed in a robe of grace and majesty. Now Jesus was a poor man; he had lived and wrought as a carpenter, and he came in the dress common to those with whom he had grown up. His chosen companions were natives of an obscure province, despised for its ignorance and rude manners, and they followed him in the garb of men who were accustomed to live by daily toil. Such was the outward condition of Jesus. Such was his manifestation to a people burning with expectation of a splendid, conquering deliverer; and in such circumstances he spoke with an authority which awed both high and low. In learning the outward circumstances of Jesus, we not merely satisfy a natural curiosity, but obtain a help towards understanding his character and the spirit of his religion. His condition reveals to us the force and dignity of his mind, which could dispense with the ordinary means of inspiring respect. It shows the deep sympathy of Christ with the poor of our race, for among these he chose to live. It speaks condemnation to those who, professing to believe in Christ, separate themselves from the multitude of men because of the accident of wealth, and attach ideas of superiority to dress and show. From this illustration you may learn the importance of being acquainted with every part of Christ's history, with his common life, as well as his more solemn actions and teachings. Every thing

relating to him breathes instruction and gives the teacher a power over the mind of the child.

The Gospels must be the great study to the Sunday-school teacher. Many, when they hear of studying the New Testament, imagine that they must examine commentators to understand better the difficult texts, the dark passages in that book. I mean something very different. Strive indeed to clear up as far as you can the obscure portions of Christ's teaching. There are texts, which, in consequence of their connexion with forgotten circumstances of the time, are now of uncertain meaning. But do not think that the most important truths of Christianity are locked up in these dark passages of the New Testament. There is nothing in the dark, which is not to be found in the plain, portions of Scripture. Perhaps the highest use of examining difficult texts is to discover their harmony with those that are clear. The parts of the Gospel, which the Sunday-school teacher should most study, are those which need no great elucidation from criticism, the parables, the miracles, the actions, the suffering, the prayers, the tears of Jesus; and these are to be studied, that the teacher may learn the spirit, the soul of Christ, may come near to that wonderful being, may learn the great purpose to which he was devoted, the affections which overflowed his heart, the depth and expansiveness of his love, the profoundness of his wisdom, the unconquerable strength of his trust in God.\* The character of Christ is the sum of his religion. It is the clearest, the most beautiful manifestation of the character of God, far more clear and touching

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\* Commentaries have their use, but not the highest use. They explain the letter of Christianity, give the meaning of words, remove obscurities from the sense, and so far they do great good; but the life, the power, the spirit of Christianity, they do not unfold. They do not lay open to us the heart of Christ. I remember that a short time ago I was reading a book, not intended to be a religious one, in which some remarks were offered on the conduct of Jesus, as, just before his death, he descended from the Mount of Olives, and amidst a crowd of shouting disciples looked on Jerusalem, the city of his murderers, which in a few hours was to be stained with his innocent blood. The conscious greatness with which he announced the ruin of that proud metropolis and its venerated temple, and his deep sympathy with its approaching woes, bursting forth in tears, and making him forget for a moment his own near agonies and the shouts of the surrounding multitude, were brought to my mind more distinctly than ever before; and I felt that this more vivid apprehension of Jesus was worth more than much of the learning in which commentators abound.

than all the teachings of nature. It is also the brightest revelation to us of the Moral Perfection which his precepts enjoin, of disinterested love to God and man, of faithfulness to principle, of fearlessness in duty, of superiority to the world, of delight in the Good and the True. The expositions of the Christian virtues in all the volumes of all ages are cold and dark, compared with the genial light and the warm coloring in which Christ's character sets before us the spirit of his religion, the perfection of our nature.

The great work then of the Sunday-school teacher is to teach Christ, and to teach him not as set forth in creeds and human systems, but as living and moving in the simple histories of the Evangelists. Christ is to be taught; and by this I mean not any mystical doctrine about his nature, not the doctrine of the Trinity, but the spirit of Christ, breathing forth in all that he said and all that he did. We should seek, that the child should know his heavenly friend and Saviour with the distinctness with which he knows an earthly friend; and this knowledge is not to be given by teaching him dark notions about Christ, which have perplexed and convulsed the church for ages. The doctrine of the Trinity seems to me only fitted to throw a mistiness over Christ, to place him beyond the reach of our understanding and hearts. When I am told that Jesus Christ is the second person in the Trinity, one of three persons, who constitute one God, one infinite mind, I am plunged into an abyss of darkness. Jesus becomes to me the most unintelligible being in the universe. God I can know. Man I can understand. But Christ, as described in human creeds, a compound being, at once man and God, at once infinite in wisdom and ignorant of innumerable truths, and who is so united with two other persons as to make with them one mind, Christ so represented baffles all my faculties. I cannot lay hold on him. My weak intellect is wholly at fault; and I cannot believe that the child's intellect can better apprehend him. This is a grave objection to the doctrine of the Trinity. It destroys the reality, the distinctness, the touching nearness of Jesus Christ. It gives him an air of fiction, and has done more than all things to prevent a true, deep acquaintance with him, with his spirit, with the workings of his mind, with the sublimity of his virtue. It has thrown a glare over him, under which the bright and beautiful features of his character have been very much concealed.

From what I have said, you see what I suppose the Sunday-school teacher is to learn and teach. It is the Christian religion as unfolded in the plainest portions of the Gospel. Before leaving this topic, I wish to offer some remarks, which may prevent all misapprehension of what I have said. I have spoken against teaching Christianity to children as a system. I have spoken of the inadequacy of catechisms. In thus speaking, I do not mean that the teacher shall have nothing systematic in his knowledge. Far from it. He must not satisfy himself with studying separate actions, words, and miracles of Jesus. He must look at Christ's history and teaching as a whole, and observe the great features of his truth and goodness, the grand characteristics of his system, and in this way learn what great impressions he must strive to make on the child by the particular facts and precepts which each lesson presents. There ought to be a unity in the mind of the teacher. His instructions must not be loose fragments, but be bound together by great views. Perhaps you may ask, what are these great views of Christianity, which pervade it throughout, and to which the mind of the learner must be continually turned. There are three, which seem to me especially prominent, the Spirituality of the religion, its Disinterestedness, and, lastly, the vastness, the Infinity of its Prospects.

The first great feature of Christianity which should be brought out continually to the child, is its Spirituality. Christ is a spiritual deliverer. His salvation is inward. This great truth cannot be too much insisted on. Christ's salvation is within. The evils from which he comes to release us are inward. The felicity which he came to give is inward, and therefore everlasting. Carry, then, your pupils into themselves. Awake in them, as far as possible, a consciousness of their spiritual nature, of the infinite riches which are locked up in reason, in conscience, in the power of knowing God, loving goodness, and practising duty; and use all the history and teachings of Christ, to set him before them as the fountain of life and light to their souls. For example, when his reign, kingdom, power, authority, throne, are spoken of, guard them against attaching an outward import to these words; teach them that they mean not an outward empire, but the purifying, elevating influence of his character, truth, spirit, on the human mind. Use all his miracles as types, emblems, of a spiritual salvation. When your pupils read of his giving

sight to the blind, let them see in this a manifestation of his character as the Light of the world; and, in the joy of the individual whose eyes were opened from perpetual night on the beauty of nature, let them see a figure of the happiness of the true disciple, who, by following Christ, is brought to the vision of a more glorious luminary than the sun, and of a more majestic and enduring universe than material worlds. When the precepts of Christ are the subjects of conversation, turn the mind of the child to their spiritual import. Let him see, that the worth of the action lies in the principle, motive, purpose, from which it springs; that love to God, not outward worship, and love to man, not outward deeds, are the very essence, soul, centre, of the Christian law. Turn his attention to the singular force and boldness of language, in which Jesus calls us to rise above the body and the world, above the pleasures and pains of the senses, above wealth and show, above every outward good. In speaking of the promises and threatenings of Christianity, do not speak as if goodness were to be sought and sin shunned for their outward consequences; but express your deep conviction, that goodness is its own reward, worth infinitely more than all outward recompense, and that sin is its own curse, and more to be dreaded on its own account, than a burning hell. When God is the subject of conversation, do not spend all your strength in talking of what he has made around you; do not point the young to his outward works as his chief manifestations. Lead them to think of him as revealed in their own minds, as the Father of their spirits, as more intimately present with their souls than with the sun, and teach them to account as his best gifts not outward possessions, but the silent influences of his spirit, his communications of light to their minds, of warmth and elevation to their feelings, and of force to their resolution of well-doing. Let the spirituality of Christianity shine forth in all your teachings. Let the young see how superior Jesus was to outward things, how he looked down on wealth and show as below his notice, how he cared nothing for outward distinctions, how the beggar by the road-side received from him marks of deeper interest than Pilate on his judgment-seat or Herod on his throne, how he looked only at the human spirit and sought nothing but its recovery and life.

I have spoken of the Spirituality of Christianity. The next great feature of the religion to be constantly set before the child is its Disinterestedness. The essence of Christianity

is generous affection. Nothing so distinguishes it as generosity. Disinterested love not only breaks out in separate teachings of Christ ; it spreads like the broad light of heaven over the whole religion. Every precept is but an aspect, an expression, of generous love. This prompted every word, guided every step, of Jesus. It was the life of his ministry ; it warmed his heart in death ; it flowed out with his heart's blood. The pupil should be constantly led to see and feel this divine spirit pervading the religion. The Gospels should be used to inspire him with reverence for generous self-sacrifice and with aversion to every thing narrow and mean. Let him learn that he is not to live for himself ; that he has a heart to be given to God and to his fellow-creatures ; that he is to do the will of God, not in a mercenary spirit, but from gratitude, filial love, and from sincere delight in goodness ; that he is to prepare himself to toil and suffer for his race. The cross, that emblem of self-sacrifice, that highest form of an all-surrendering love, is to be set before him as the standard of his religion, the banner under which he is to live, and, if God so require, to die.

There is one other great feature of Christianity, and that is the vastness, the Infinity of its Prospects. This was revealed in the whole life of Jesus. In all that he said ; we see his mind possessed with the thought of being ordained to confer an infinite good. That teacher knows little of Christ, who does not see him filled with the consciousness of being the author of an everlasting salvation and happiness to the human race. "I am the resurrection and the life. He that believeth on me shall never see death." Such was his language, and such never fell before from human lips. When I endeavour to bring to my mind the vast hopes, which inspired him as he pronounced these words, and his joy at the anticipation of the immortal fruits which his life and death were to yield to our race, I feel how little his character is yet understood by those, who think of Jesus as a man of sorrow, borne down habitually by a load of grief. Constantly lead your pupils to observe, how real, deep, and vivid was the impression on the mind of Jesus of that future, everlasting life, which he came to bestow. Speak to them of the happiness, with which he looked on all human virtue, as being a germ which was to unfold for ever, a fountain of living water which was to spring up into immortality, a love which was to expand through all ages and to embrace the universe. It is through the mind of Christ, living,

as it did, in a higher world, that they can best comprehend the reality and vastness of the prospects of the human soul.

Such are the three great features of the religion which the teacher should bring most frequently to the mind of the child. In these, as in all my preceding remarks, you perceive the importance which I attach to the character of Christ as the great means of giving spiritual light and life to the mind. The Gospels, in which he is placed before us so vividly, are in truth the chief repositories of divine wisdom. The greatest productions of human genius have little quickening power in comparison with these simple narratives. In reading the Gospels, I feel myself in presence of one who speaks as man never spake; whose voice is not of the earth; who speaks with a tone of reality and authority altogether his own; who speaks of God as conscious of his immediate presence, as enjoying with him the intimacy of an only Son; and who speaks of heaven, as most familiar with higher states of being. Great truths come from Jesus with a simplicity, an ease, showing how deeply they pervaded and possessed his mind. No books astonish me like the Gospels. Jesus, the hero of the story, is a more extraordinary being than imagination has feigned, and yet his character has an impress of nature, consistency, truth, never surpassed. You have all seen portraits, which, as soon as seen, you felt to be likenesses, so living were they, so natural, so true. Such is the impression made on my mind by the the Gospels. I believe, that you or I could lift mountains, or create a world, as easily as fanaticism or imposture could have created such a character and history as that of Jesus Christ. I have read the Gospels for years, and seldom read them now without gaining some new or more striking view of the great teacher and deliverer whom they portray. Of all books they deserve most the study of youth and age. Happy the Sunday school in which their spirit is revealed!

But I have not yet said every thing in favor of them as the great sources of instruction. I have said, that the Christian religion is to be taught from the Gospels. This is their great, but not their only use. Much incidental instruction is to be drawn from them. There are two great subjects, on which it is very desirable to give to the young the light they can receive, human nature and human life; and on these points the Gospels furnish occasions of much useful teaching. They give us not only the life and character of Christ, but place him before us in the midst of human beings and of human affairs.

Peter, the ardent, the confident, the false, the penitent Peter ; the affectionate John ; the treacherous Judas, selling his Master for gold ; Mary, the mother, at the cross ; Mary Magdalen at the tomb ; the woman, who had been a sinner, bathing his feet with tears, and wiping them with the hair of her head ;—what revelations of the human soul are these ! What depths of our nature do they lay open ! It is a remarkable fact, that the great masters of painting have drawn their chief subjects from the New Testament ; so full is this volume of the most powerful and touching exhibitions of human character. And how much instruction does this book convey in regard to life as well as in regard to the soul ! I do not know a more affecting picture of human experience than the simple narrative of Luke ; “When Jesus came nigh to the city, behold, there was a dead man carried out, the only son of his mother, and she was a widow ; and much people of the city was with her.” The Gospels show us fellow-beings in all varieties of condition, the blind man, the leper, the rich young ruler, the furious multitude. They give practical views of life, which cannot be too early impressed. They show us, in the history of Jesus and his apostles, that true greatness may be found in the humblest ranks, and that goodness, in proportion as it becomes eminent, exposes itself to hatred and reproach, so that we must make up our minds, if we would be faithful, to encounter shame and loss, for God and duty. In truth, all the variety of wisdom which youth needs may be extracted from these writings. The Gospels, then, are to be the great study of the Sunday school.

I cannot close these remarks on what is to be taught in the Sunday school, without repeating, what I have said of the chief danger of this institution. I refer to the danger of mechanical teaching, by which the young mind becomes worn, deadened to the greatest truths. The Gospels, life-giving as they are, may be rendered wholly inoperative by the want of life in the instructor. So great is my dread of tame, mechanical teaching, that I am sometimes almost tempted to question the utility of Sunday schools. We, Protestants, in our zeal for the Bible, are apt to forget that the very commonness of the book tends to impair its power, that familiarity breeds indifference, and that no book, therefore, requires such a living power in the teacher. He must beware, lest he make the Gospels trite by too frequent repetition. It will often be best for him to assist his pupils in extracting the great principle or truth involved in a

precept, parable, or action of Jesus, and to make this the subject of conversation, without further reference to the text by which it was suggested. If he can lead them by fit questions, to find this principle in their own consciousness and experience, in their own moral judgments and feelings, and to discover how it should be applied to their characters and brought out in their common lives, he will not only convey the most important instruction, but will give new vividness and interest to the Scriptures and a deeper conviction of their truth, by showing, how congenial they are with human nature and how intimately connected with human affairs and with real life. Let me also mention, as another means of preserving the Scriptures from degradation by too frequent handling, that extracts from biography, history, natural science, fitted to make religious impressions, should be occasionally introduced into the Sunday school. Such seems to me the instruction, which the ends of this institution require.

IV. We have now seen what is to be taught in the Sunday school, and the question now comes, How shall it be taught? This is my last head, and not the least important. On the manner of teaching how much depends! I fear it is not sufficiently studied by Sunday-school instructors. They meet generally, and ought regularly to meet, to prepare themselves for their tasks. But their object commonly is to learn *what* they are to teach, rather than *how* to teach it; but the last requires equal attention with the first, I had almost said more. From deficiency in this, we sometimes see that an instructor, profoundly acquainted with his subject, is less successful in teaching than another of comparatively superficial acquisitions; he knows much, but does not know the way to the child's mind and heart. The same truth, which attracts and impresses from one man's lips, repels from another. At the meeting of the Sunday-school teachers, it is not enough to learn the meaning of the portion of Scripture which is to be the subject of the next lesson; it is more important to select from it the particular topics which are adapted to the pupil's comprehension, and still more necessary to inquire, under what lights or aspects they may be brought to his view, so as to arrest attention and reach the heart. A principal end in the meeting of teachers should be to learn the art of teaching, the way of approach to the youthful mind.

The first aim of the teacher will of course be, to fix the attention of the pupil. It is in vain, that you have his body

in the school-room, if his mind is wandering beyond it, or refuses to fasten itself on the topic of discourse. In common schools attention is fixed by a severe discipline, incompatible with the spirit of Sunday schools. Of course the teacher must aim to secure it by a moral influence over the youthful mind.

As the first means of establishing an influence over the young, I would say, you must love them. Nothing attracts like love. Children are said to be shrewd physiognomists, and read as by instinct our feelings in our countenances; they know and are drawn to their friends. I recently asked, how a singularly successful teacher in religion obtained his remarkable ascendancy over the young. The reply was, that his whole intercourse expressed affection. His secret was a sincere love.

The next remark is, that, to awaken in the young an interest in what you teach, you must take an interest in it yourselves. You must not only understand, but feel, the truth. Your manner must have the natural animation, which always accompanies a work into which our hearts enter. Accordingly, one of the chief qualifications of a Sunday-school teacher is religious sensibility. Old and young are drawn by a natural earnestness of manner. Almost any subject may be made interesting, if the teacher will but throw into it his soul.

Another important rule is, Let your teaching be intelligible. Children will not listen to words which excite no ideas, or only vague and misty conceptions. Speak to them in the familiar, simple language of common life, and, if the lesson have difficult terms, define them. Children love light, not darkness. Choose topics of conversation to which their minds are equal, and pass from one to another by steps which the young can follow. Be clear, and you will do much towards being interesting teachers.

Another suggestion is, Teach much by questions. These stimulate, stir up, the young mind, and make it its own teacher. They encourage the spirit of inquiry, the habit of thought. Questions, skilfully proposed, turn the child to his own consciousness and experience, and will often draw out from his own soul the truth which you wish to impart; and no lesson is so well learned, as that which a man or child teaches himself.

Again, teach graphically where you can. That is, when you are discoursing of any narrative of Scripture or relating an incident from other sources, try to seize its great points and to place it before the eyes of your pupils. Cultivate the power of description. A story well told, and in which the most

important particulars are brought out in a strong light, not only fixes attention, but often carries a truth farthest into the soul.

Another rule is, Lay the chief stress on what is most important in religion. Do not conduct the child over the Gospels as over a dead level. Seize on the great points, the great ideas. Do not confound the essential and the unessential, or insist with the same earnestness on grand, comprehensive, life-giving truths and on disputable articles of faith. Immense injury is done by teaching doubtful or secondary doctrines as if they were the weightiest matters of Christianity; for, as time rolls over the child, and his mind unfolds, he discovers that one and another dogma, which he was taught to regard as fundamental, is uncertain if not false, and his skepticism is apt to spread from this weak point over the whole Christian system. Make it your aim to fix in your pupils the grand principles in which the essence of Christianity consists, and which all time and experience serve to confirm; and, in doing this, you will open the mind to all truth as fast as it is presented in the course of Providence.

Another rule is, Carry a cheerful spirit into religious teaching. Do not merely speak of Christianity as the only fountain of happiness. Let your tones and words bear witness to its benignant, cheering influence. Youth is the age of joy and hope, and nothing repels it more than gloom. Do not array religion in terror. Do not make God a painful thought by speaking of him as present only to see and punish sin. Speak of his fatherly interest in the young with a warm heart and a beaming eye, and encourage their filial approach and prayers. On this part, however, you must beware of sacrificing truth to the desire of winning your pupil. Truth, truth in her severest as well as mildest forms, must be placed before the young. Do not, to attract them to duty, represent it as a smooth and flowery path. Do not tell them that they can become good, excellent, generous, holy, without effort and pain. Teach them that the sacrifice of self-will, of private interest and pleasure, to other's rights and happiness, to the dictates of conscience, to the will of God, is the very essence of piety and goodness. But at the same time teach them, that there is a pure, calm joy, an inward peace, in surrendering every thing to duty, which can be found in no selfish success. Help them to sympathize with the toils, pains, sacrifices of the philanthropist, the martyr, the patriot, and inspire contempt of fear and peril in adhering to truth and God.

I will add one more rule. Speak of duty, of religion, as something real, just as you speak of the interests of this life. Do not speak, as if you were repeating words received from tradition, but as if you were talking of things, which you have seen and known. Nothing attracts old and young more than a tone of reality, the natural tone of strong conviction. Speak to them of God as a real being, of heaven as a real state, of duty as a real obligation. Let them see, that you regard Christianity as intended to bear on real and common life, that you expect every principle which you teach to be acted out, to be made a rule in the concerns of every day. Show the application of Christianity to the familiar scenes and pursuits of life. Bring it out to them as the Great Reality. So teach, and you will not teach in vain.

I have thus set before you the principles, on which Sunday schools should rest, and by which they should be guided. If they shall, in any degree, conform to these principles, and I trust they will, you cannot, my friends, cherish them with too much care. Their purpose cannot be spoken of too strongly. Their end is, the moral and religious education of the young, and this is the most pressing concern of our times. In all times, indeed, it has strong claims; but it was never, perhaps, so important as now, and never could its neglect induce such fearful consequences. The present is a season of great peril to the rising generation. It is distinguished by a remarkable developement of human power, activity, and freedom. The progress of science has given men a new control of nature, and in this way has opened new sources of wealth and multiplied the means of indulgence, and in an equal degree multiplied temptations to worldliness, cupidity, and crime. Our times are still more distinguished by the spirit of liberty and innovation. Old institutions and usages, the old restraints on the young, have been broken down. Men of all conditions and ages think, speak, write, act, with a freedom unknown before. Our times have their advantages. But we must not hide from ourselves our true position. This increase of power and freedom, of which I have spoken, tends, in the first instance, to unsettle moral principles, to give to men's minds a restlessness, a want of stability, a wildness of opinion, an extravagance of desire, a bold, rash, reckless spirit. These are times of great moral danger. Outward restraints are removed to an

unprecedented degree, and consequently there is a need of inward restraint, of the controlling power of a pure religion, beyond what was ever known before. The principles of the young are exposed to fearful assaults, and they need to be fortified with peculiar care. Temptations throng on the rising generation with new violence, and the power to withstand them must be proportionably increased. Society never needed such zealous efforts, such unslumbering watchfulness for its safety, as at this moment ; and without faithfulness on the part of parents and good men, its bright prospects may be turned into gloom.

Sunday schools belong to this period of society. They grow naturally from the extension of knowledge, in consequence of which more are qualified to teach than in former times, and they are suited to prepare the young for the severe trials which await them in life. As such, let them be cherished. The great question for parents to ask is, how they may strengthen their children against temptation, how they can implant in them principles of duty, purposes of virtue, which will withstand all storms, and which will grow up into all that is generous, just, beautiful, and holy in feeling and action. The question, how your children may prosper most in life, should be secondary. Give them force of character, and you give them more than a fortune. Give them pure and lofty principles, and you give them more than thrones. Instil into them Christian benevolence and the love of God, and you enrich them more than by laying worlds at their feet. Sunday schools are meant to aid you in the great work of forming your children to true excellence. I say they are meant to aid you, not to relieve you from the work, not to be your substitutes, not to diminish domestic watchfulness and teaching, but to concur with you, to give you fellow-laborers, to strengthen your influence over your children. Then give these schools your hearty support, without which they cannot prosper. Your children should be your first care. You indeed sustain interesting relations to society, but your great relation is to your children ; and in truth you cannot discharge your obligations to society by any service so effectual, as by training up for it enlightened and worthy members in the bosom of the family and the church.

Like all schools, the Sunday school must owe its influence to its teachers. I would, therefore, close this discourse with

saying, that the most gifted in our congregation cannot find a worthier field of labor than the Sunday school. The noblest work on earth is to act with an elevating power on a human spirit. The greatest men of past times have not been politicians or warriors, who have influenced the outward policy or grandeur of kingdoms; but men, who, by their deep wisdom and generous sentiments, have given light and life to the minds and hearts of their own age and left a legacy of truth and virtue to posterity. Whoever, in the humblest sphere, imparts God's truth to one human spirit, partakes their glory. He labors on an immortal nature. He is laying the foundation of imperishable excellence and happiness. His work, if he succeed, will outlive empires and the stars.

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ART. VII.—*The Young Lady's Friend.* By A LADY.

Boston: American Stationers' Company. 1836. 12mo. pp. 436.

EDUCATION, properly understood, is the preparation of the human being for the duties and cares of life; and wherever its meaning is limited to a part of that preparation without embracing the whole, the character formed by its influences will have something wanting. The interests of the mind are not the only ones to be regarded, the physical nature and the moral nature have equal claims to attention; and in our original constitution they are so intimately associated together that whoever gives all his care to one at the expense of the rest, will find it impossible to succeed with that one. Sooner or later our nature avenges its own wrongs. If the mind be cultivated while the body is neglected, such misplaced attention leads not to intellectual power and excellence, but to a wretched life and perhaps an early grave. And there are examples not a few, in which the moral nature or the religious affections have been forced into premature developement to such an excess, that, if God did not in his mercy remove the victim, he lived barren and useless; a burden to himself, and no blessing to mankind.

From our own observation, we are inclined to fear that what

is often called female education, at the present day, regards a part of our nature rather than the whole. We do not refer to instructors, who in general are employed for specified purposes, and, when these are accomplished, naturally consider their duty as done. We refer rather to the ambition of parents, who are apt to take pride in the attainments, rather than in the character, of their children. If they have the name, and in general it is nothing but the name, of knowing a sufficient variety of languages and sciences, the parents are delighted with their improvement, and feel as if there was nothing more to desire. In order to remove all obstacles from so brilliant a progress, the mother will submit to be a contented and patient drudge for her children, relieving them from all domestic cares, even from the care of themselves. And when their education, so called, is finished, and the joyous mother welcomes them home as so many lights and blessings to the household, she finds, to her surprise and indignation, that since she has performed their domestic duties so long, they prefer that she should perform them still; they do not know, and do not choose to learn them. When she expects them to follow her own good example of watching with the sick, visiting the poor, and doing those various offices of kindness which social life imposes, she finds that they are disgusted with the vulgar reality of suffering, and have patience with nothing but interesting and elegant distress. No wonder she is disappointed; but she should remember that these are cares and duties which the young do not learn of themselves; they need to be taught them; but she has placed them without the sphere of her own influence and example, and so far has done her part to unfit them for usefulness and social duty. Moreover she is disappointed in the prime object of her ambition; for the character must grow in fair proportions, or not at all: and while the moral powers are unexerted, the intellectual vigor can increase only to a certain point, beyond which it will not go.

It must be observed here, that we lament this prevailing ambition, because we think it implies a limited view, or rather no view at all, of the objects of education. Of excessive and premature developements of the mind at the expense of the moral and physical nature, we have no sort of apprehension. For, as we have remarked, this danger seems to be provided for in the order of nature, which requires that the powers shall be carried forward in harmony or not at all. We do, indeed,

see examples of such intellectual developement, where the body fails as fast as the mind gains strength; but in such cases as we have had an opportunity to observe, this developement was not the cause but the effect of disease: it was apparently the unhealthy action of the brain which produced these preternatural exertions. An artificial system of forcing might injure the body, no doubt, but there are very few instances in which it would produce the expected results upon the mind. It is not excessive care of the mind, but rather entire neglect of the physical system, which brings so many lamented victims to an untimely grave. Of course we speak generally; there are some exceptions: but, for the most part, the ill-judged ambition to make children intellectual without regard to the other purposes of existence, simply injures the body without enlarging the mind. The mind sympathizes with the frame, and grows weaker every day, till the whole nature becomes a ruin.

In fact, the great proportion of intellectual developement which rejoices a parent's heart, is not such as to inspire many fears, except, perhaps, that the mind may perish by disuse and decay. The memory is a faculty which may be cultivated at a very early age, and in the common routine of school instruction it will give a child the appearance of brilliant promise; but as the time approaches when the reasoning powers should be unfolded, they are not found to be quick and active in proportion, and the remarkable childhood dwindles to the common standard, sometimes far beneath it, though more frequently under-estimated in consequence of the disappointment of early hopes. The taste for reading which we sometimes witness in early childhood, a devotion to books, which is regarded as indicating the finest intellectual promise, is apt to be of the same description. The parent hails this taste with delight, and encourages it to the utmost of his power; but after a time he finds that it was only a substitute for intellectual activity, and the mind was entirely passive when it was thought to be so actively employed. The reading which has been provided in such abundance for children, intended to sweeten moral and intellectual instruction which would not otherwise go down, has had a most injurious effect. The expectation is that, as the mind expands, it will seek more substantial food for itself; but this expectation is disappointed. The cry is still for fiction, nothing but fiction: and the swarms of pestilent novels, written by authors who seem to have been created without the moral

sense, and brought by ship-loads to this country for want of a sale at home, complete the work which the Sunday-school library had begun. Many parents can bear sorrowful testimony, that the promise from which they took so much encouragement, was of this description; their children made use of books not as materials, but as substitutes, for thought, and their minds were in danger of perishing by inaction rather than over exertion.

We should be very far from discouraging the ambition to make children intellectual; but we protest against sacrificing the moral and spiritual nature. It will be to no purpose; the object will seldom be gained, while other things, of more importance to the character, will be neglected and lost. That part of our nature which has to do with God and spiritual subjects, should receive the first attention, and it should be impressed on the parent's heart, that if conscience and the moral and religious sentiment are not developed, no other improvement would be worth possessing, supposing it were possible to make it. To leave this spiritual culture, therefore, to time and chance, as many parents do, is a ruinous mistake of the interests of the human being, and it is one which may never be repaired. There are many who were thus neglected in childhood, and have become painfully sensible of this neglect on the part of those who were meant to be parents of the souls of their children. They feel now, that their parents were in a melancholy error, when they attempted to force the intellectual growth, and left the soul uncared for. They now attempt to repair the consequences of that error; but they find it so difficult that they almost despair. Their minds fall off from the subject of religion as fast as they attempt to grasp it: they are not at home in serious contemplation: they find that it would be much easier to turn the hands to new labors, or the mind to new studies, than to wake up the spiritual nature to consider those subjects which concern its welfare; subjects which it was not taught to regard in those years when impressions are deepest, and which it now, in consequence of that early neglect, regards from necessity, not from choice; in a spirit of fear, rather than of love.

The writer of this valuable work supposes that the conscience of her young readers is awakened, and that they are desirous to know and do their duties; her object is to aid them to estimate and discharge the common duties of life. Because

they are common it does not follow that they shall be familiar, still less that they shall be discharged; for very often the imagination of the young dwells on uncommon duties, such as they will seldom or never be called on to practise, and while they are taken up with such flattering visions, they neglect the obligations that are always before them. Some have mothers who can give them such instruction on this subject as they need; but such parents, far from feeling that a work like this is not needed, will value it as a clear and discriminating view of youthful duty. It will not be thought unnecessary, except by those who do not feel the importance of character and usefulness in their children, and of course are indifferent to the details of which character and usefulness are made up. But there are many children, even among those who have parents living, who are not blessed with such instruction; and to them this book will be welcome as a friend who affords them the suggestions and counsels which they need, and are not likely to find elsewhere.

This work is written with great directness and simplicity; the style is easy and graceful, and the arrangement of the subjects is good; moreover it is written with a proper spirit of independence, paying small regard to that fastidiousness which tolerates only easy generalities of virtue, and shrinks from the common details of domestic and personal duty. The writer deserves well of her sex for the design and execution of her work; nor is ours less interested, for the comfort of every family essentially depends on those for whose benefit this work is intended. If they do not know or do not care for the obligations which she reminds them of, the fireside, the sick-chamber, and all places where they should be ministering angels, become places of desolation. Such duties must be early learned, or they will never be gracefully and easily done. It is not the willing spirit only which is wanted; the hands need practice to obey the suggestions of the feeling: and there are few objects more melancholy, than that of the amiable and untried, when they are called to render services and attentions to those whom they love. They find that the inexperienced hands are of small service, even when the heart is right; and they are obliged to leave to the stranger and the hireling to perform those acts of kindness which they would rejoice to do.

In the opening chapter of her work, the writer comments with great good sense upon the aimlessness of what is often

- called education. It is supposed to begin and end in the school. When the girl leaves the school, to become an efficient member of the family, her education is, in common phrase, said to be *finished*; whereas she finds, to her sorrow and shame, that it has not yet begun: she finds herself an utter stranger to those means and powers which make useful and happy members of the domestic circle; and even the improvement of her mind, the only object which her previous instruction aimed to secure, is all at a stand, because she has never learned to use it, having been accustomed to receive impressions, not to make exertions. Knowing that many, who are really desirous to be useful, find themselves unable from this want of the necessary discipline and instruction, the writer offers suggestions to aid them in supplying the defect. She treats not of morals and religion, but of the manner in which conscience shall be applied to the duties and concerns of every day, on which, after all, the great amount of human happiness depends, and which are apt to be neglected, because they are common and familiar, the very circumstance which gives them their great importance.

“How it would startle many an amiable and well-educated girl to be thus addressed by an experienced friend; ‘You are in the daily habit of doing things, which shock my taste, infringe upon my rights, cause me continual personal inconvenience, remind me unnecessarily of the infirmities of your body, make you appear selfish where you least intend to be so, coarse where you would fain be refined, noisy where you might be gentle, an incumbrance where you might be an acquisition.’ Yet this might be said with truth to half the misses in their teens, who little know how much they are indebted to the patience and good humor of their elders, for tolerating them in their awkwardness and ignorance; but, if their faults were once pointed out to them, they would see them in their true light, and avoid them for ever afterwards.

“Those who are most annoyed by the faulty manners of the young, cannot always point out to them the little details in which they are defective; they condemn their conduct in general terms, without attempting to analyze it, or to help them to correct it. To supply this deficiency in the friends of the young, and to stand in the place of friends to those who have none, is the purpose for which the following pages are written. By entering into the most minute details of every-day life, I would hold up to view those little particulars of conduct, which, though trifling in themselves, go to make up an agreeable or disagreeable whole; I would show the

numerous ways, in which thoughtlessness of the rights of others leads to their violation." — pp. 11, 12.

In the second chapter are some very good remarks upon the want of time, that prevailing complaint among the young, who, like other spendthrifts, suffer from want by reason of their very abundance. The writer shows that if the hours are used with any regard to system, time enough and to spare will be found for all the purposes of existence. But the great practical maxim which saves from every kind of want is, "Gather up the fragments that remain, that nothing be lost!" It is incredible how much may be accomplished in those orts and ends of time which hang heavy on most hands for want of something to do. She tells us that she herself read through the Spectator and the Rambler while waiting for a dilatory member of the family, and netted many yards of lace while he was despatching his breakfast. Loss of time is not the only thing prevented, by this habit of improving the minutes; loss of temper, the process by which we take vengeance on ourselves for the misdeeds of others, is also guarded against by this habitual industry. Were it only as an antidote for ill-humor, certainly the worst ill that flesh is heir to, the recipe deserves to be recommended to all, old as well as young; the neglected duty might have been performed twice over in some of those moments which are passed in fretting and lamenting that it has not been done.

There is one thing connected with this subject which the writer has suggested, and might have dwelt upon at greater length; we mean the habit of mind which allows the young to indulge in reverie, mistaking it for thought, and regarding this kind of enjoyment, which is little better than a pleasure of sense, as a high intellectual gratification. The young consider their minds as active on these occasions; they might as well give the name of bodily exercise to drumming with the fingers. To let the mind play upon a subject is one thing, and to bring the mind to act upon a subject is another. This musing is a kind of intellectual dissipation; and while it appears like one of the most harmless ways in which time can be wasted, it is doing irreparable injury to the mental powers, which, after being accustomed to this luxurious indulgence, can never again be induced to engage in any severe exertion.

In respect to domestic management, a subject in which all are interested, the writer gives much valuable instruction.

The miserable little story books, brought over in such abundance from the mother country, strongly inculcate kindness to servants and other inferiors; "a fine trait," as Dr. Johnson said of a lady who was praised for it, "though it might not be so easy to tell who the lady's inferiors were." If any young lady in this country were to form her manners upon such judicious suggestion, she would soon find that she had given mortal offence by her condescension, and that domestics would leave her to finish her journey alone. The prevailing prosperity of our country is changing our domestic and social system; no one here is compelled, by power or circumstances, to serve another. This state of things may occasion inconvenience at times, to those who are accustomed to be served; but we do not hear it complained of by the serving party, whose interests are certainly entitled to regard. If the whole extent of the evil is, that it compels mothers to press their daughters into the service of the family, it cannot be regarded as very tragical: since it affords them a knowledge of those cares and duties, without which they will be helpless and useless beings; and it is better to bear the yoke in youth, than to bend the neck to it, for the first time, in later years. But whether it is welcome or not, the change will go on; the only way to prepare for it, is to depend as little as possible upon the services of others, and as much as possible upon our own. We like the free spirit with which the writer has discussed the subject of domestic economy. Many of the daughters of wealth will look with huge contempt on such details, but unexpected changes are common in this country; the rich to-day may be poor to-morrow; and the qualifications which enable the poor to bear want with dignity, are the same which the rich need to teach them the use of wealth, which is lent, not given, and which must be strictly answered for at last.

The subject of health is discussed with judgment and freedom; and it is certainly one of the most important that can be presented to the females of our country. The premature decay, so often charged upon the climate, is owing, not to the climate, but to a neglect of all those habits and observances on which health depends. One who would be induced to follow the rules laid down in this work, which are by no means excessive, would, in ordinary circumstances, live in health and happiness for a score of years beyond the period when decline is apt to begin. Consumption is the great destroyer in our

country ; but a great proportion of those who sink under it, are little better than suicides, who will not regard the rules necessary to secure their health, and are therefore called to pay this solemn penalty for their violation.

In the chapter on the subject of behaviour to parents and their friends, the author touches upon a subject of great importance.

" Whence comes it, then, that there is so little demonstration of respect, in the manners of the rising generation, toward the authors of their being ? What can the state of *feeling* be, when the language to a parent is such, as would be scarcely tolerable when addressed to a young companion ? Is it compatible with filial reverence, flatly to contradict a father, to laugh at a mother's ways, to reply to a grave question jocosely, without giving the information required, to interrupt parents in the midst of speaking, to oppose their opinions in a tone of self-confidence, implying that your judgment is quite as good as theirs, or to leave the room whilst they are still addressing you ? Yet all these things are continually done by girls, who, if questioned on the state of their feelings towards their father or mother, would say, they loved and respected them, and would not do any thing to give them pain." — pp. 202, 203.

The evil here alluded to, is one which no one can help observing. Considered merely in relation to manners, it is improper and ungraceful : but it implies a more serious defect : for reverence is inseparable from virtue. Those who know how to estimate high attributes of character, always respect them in others : and where this respect is wanting, we may be certain that there is an indifference to every thing really excellent and exalted. We give the author's remarks on this subject ; they are written with great discrimination, and what is of less importance, with great beauty of style.

" The sentiment of reverence is one of the noblest attributes of the human mind ; to its exercise, God has affixed an exquisite sense of enjoyment ; it operates in a thousand ways to elevate and embellish the character. Its first developement is in the feelings of a child for its parents, and this is the natural preparation of the mind for its rise to a higher object, even to the Father in heaven. As the understanding ripens, and this sentiment is cultivated, it embraces all that is great and good among men, all that is vast and magnificent in nature and in art ; shedding over the character of its possessor an indescribable grace, softening the very tones of the voice, and rendering it impossible for the manners to be wanting

in deference and courtesy towards parents, or teachers, or the aged of any description.

"Where the sentiment of reverence is deficient, a foundation is wanting for many graceful superstructures; and the defect shows itself in various ways, of which the irreverent are little aware, or they would endeavour to supply the deficiency, as a mere matter of taste, if not of principle. Such persons will have unpleasant manners which no rules of good breeding will correct; and as the irreverent state of feeling grows by indulgence in disrespectful demeanor, they are in danger of becoming bold, reckless, and even impious.

"You whom I address are yet young; whatever may have been your education, you are yet young enough to reëducate yourselves; you have hearts capable of being touched by the beautiful, the true, the sublime; you feel reverence for God and the things that belong to religion; but you have not perhaps considered how the same sentiment is connected with other relations in life. In all the great moral authors whom you have read, you have found filial piety, and reverence for the aged, treated as indispensable qualities in a virtuous character, whether heathen or Christian; but you may never have reflected on the indications which you give of the want of it in your own. If then your conscience tells you that you are guilty of those faults of manner, which I have described as but too common in our society, you may be sure that your feelings of reverence need quickening and cultivating; and if you would escape becoming the harsh, ungraceful character which grows out of such delinquency, you must reform your manners." — pp. 204, 205.

In the chapter on conduct at public places, are some remarks which we extract without comment, save to say, that they allude to an evil which we have heard lamented by the poor. They say, and with reason, that it is not in human nature not to feel the contrast between their own dress and the exhibition of finery with which their rich neighbours at church oppress them. Those who thus make use of the church as a Vanity-Fair, will doubtless say that their thoughts on such occasions ought to be otherwise employed. There is some weight in the remark; and if they who make it, will take it home and act upon it, the evil will soon be corrected.

"The display of finery and of new clothes, which is too often made at church, is so out of place, and grates so harshly on the feelings of more sober-minded people, that I have heard wishes expressed that we had a fixed costume to wear to places of worship, like the Spanish ladies, who always put on a black dress and

veil on such occasions. If our ladies were obliged to appear at church all dressed alike, in some very plain guise, I fear their attendance on public worship would not be so frequent as it is now. Better than this, however, far better, would it be, if every sober-minded Christian woman would dress, at all times, in a style suited to her character, and not let the tyranny of fashion force upon her an outward seeming, wholly at variance with the inward reality. I hope the time is not distant, when it will be considered ungentle to be gayly dressed in walking the streets of cities, towns, and villages; when a plain bonnet that shades the face, a plain dress, and thick shoes and stockings, shall be as indispensable to the walking costume of an American lady as they are to that of most Europeans." — pp. 338, 339.

There is a suggestion with respect to conversation which deserves regard. Every one must have noticed that there are young ladies, who, in social life, have nothing to say for themselves, and who listen to the benevolent persons who strive to entertain them, with a frigid silence that drives patience itself to despair. If it were owing to diffidence, it might be forgiven; but in almost every case of the kind, this bashfulness is created by the consciousness that their manners are too free for refined circles, and therefore the young lady, who at other times is somewhat too eloquent, is obliged to shelter herself in silence on these occasions. Great talkers are certainly great evils; but they do not abound among us: and in mixed society the difficulty generally is, to find those who are willing to do their part.

"Good conversation is one of the highest attainments of civilized society. It is the readiest way in which gifted minds exert their influence, and as such, is worthy of all consideration and cultivation. I remember hearing an English traveller say, many years ago, on being asked how the conversational powers of the Americans compared with those of the English, 'Your fluency rather exceeds that of the old world, but conversation here is not cultivated as an art.' The idea of its being so considered anywhere, was new to the company; and much discussion followed the departure of the stranger, as to the desirableness of making conversation an art. Some thought the more natural and spontaneous it was, the better; some confounded art with artifice, and hoped their countrymen would never leave their own plain honest way of talking, to become adepts in hypocrisy and affectation. At last one, a little wiser than the rest, explained the difference between art and artifice, asked the cavillers, if they had never heard of the art of thinking, or the art of writing; and said, he presumed the

art of conversing was of the same nature. And so it is. By this art persons are taught to arrange their ideas methodically, and to express them with clearness and force; thus saving much precious time, and avoiding those tedious narrations, which interest no one but the speaker. It enforces the necessity of observing the effect of what is said, and leads a talker to stop, when she finds that she has ceased to fix the attention of her audience.

"The art of conversing would enable a company, when a good topic was once started, to keep it up till it had elicited the powers of the best speakers, and it would prevent its being cut short in the midst, by the introduction of something entirely foreign to it.

"Fluency of speech seems to me a natural gift, varying much in different individuals, and capable of being rendered either a delightful accomplishment, or a most wearisome trait of character, according as it is combined with a well or ill disciplined mind. If as a nation we are fluent, it is especially incumbent upon us to be correct and methodical thinkers, or we shall only weary those who are so, by our careless and thoughtless volubility."—pp. 385, 386.

On the whole, we think this a very valuable work, and as such we recommend it to those for whom it was designed. Some parts of it will, no doubt, be ridiculed as needlessly minute; but the author must have foreseen this: and we like the moral courage which induced her to overlook all such apprehensions, and to make free reference to every thing which she thought useful and important. She has an independent and observing mind, and a power of communication that must give her great influence with the young. She seems disposed to use her talents for their benefit, and as this kind of labor requires a measure of self-denial, we trust it will be rewarded by their permanent gratitude and applause.

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ART. VIII.—*Remarks on the Four Gospels*. By W. H. FURNESS. Philadelphia: Carey, Lee, & Blanchard. 1836. 12mo. pp. 340.

CHRISTIANITY is historical. It consists, essentially, in its facts; and the evidences of these facts naturally divide themselves into two classes, the direct and the indirect, — or external and internal; understanding by the latter, principally, those incidental traits of truth and nature, circumstances of probability;

casual allusions to well-known facts and usages, — undesigned expressions that mark the time, or the country ; and various other particulars that distinguish reality from fiction, and honesty from artifice, with which the Gospel narratives abound.

To this latter branch of the subject, the remarks of Mr. Furness, in the work before us, are confined ; and we regard them as generally pertinent and striking. They manifest a true and enlightened interest in the subject, and throw, often, a new, and always, a beautiful light on the records of our faith. Mr. Furness has evidently contemplated his subject from the true point of view ; and there is a freshness and warmth in his manner that commends it to every reader of taste and true feeling.

We regard his remarks on the character of the Gospel narratives, — on the unconscious consistency of the writers ; their singleness of purpose, and disregard of effect, — on the harmony and keeping of the characters, and especially that of Jesus, as among the finest specimens of moral criticism with which we are acquainted. In his delineations of the character of Jesus, the most strikingly interesting characteristic is their moral power, — the spirituality of feeling, with which they are manifestly imbued. And it is this spirit, too, that constitutes their peculiar excellence, even in a critical point of view. For, without this spirit, it is impossible to appreciate the character of Jesus, or understand his words, — his words, that are but the expressions and exponents of his character. We say, the *exponents* of his character ; and they are so in a sense, and to a degree, never paralleled, perhaps, in the case of any other being. Of him it may be said, with literal truth, that “out of the abundance,” the up-springing, overflowing abundance “of his heart, his mouth spake.” In him was exemplified, as in no other instance, the mysterious power of *true speech*. His language was action, and his action language. There was no discrepancy between them ; but they were perfectly blended, and harmonized together. And hence their power on the hearts of men. In him is set forth the deep philosophy of that Hebrew usage, — not altogether peculiar, however, — which has so much puzzled verbal critics, the substitution of the term “*word*” for the external manifestation of intellectual or spiritual power. In Jesus, as well as in his Father, they were identical. The words that he spake, they were *spirit* and they were *life*. We repeat, the true key to

the interpretation of the Gospel, is a mind imbued with the spirit of Jesus. Its light, in all its purity and brightness, can be reflected only from an object of correspondent purity. This may be said to savor of mysticism. Still, it is essentially true, and true in a deep and important sense. We do not say, that such a spirit is, of itself, sufficient without learning and study. By no means. The intellect must be enlightened, as well as the heart purified. The mind must have facts and principles on which to build its theories, and by which to guide its meditations. But we do say, that the latter, without the former, will, in this case, be of little avail. They will be without true vitality. Does not every day's experience teach us, that minds between which there is no true sympathy, are continually liable to mutual misconstruction?

Sympathy, then, is the true interpreter of mind to mind, the electric chain between spirit and spirit. And hence it is, that as every one must have observed, the humble and illiterate often show a depth and spirituality in their religious views and sentiments, that profound scholarship fails to attain. There is a more intimate and vital connexion between moral purity and intellectual discernment, than is generally supposed.

We hail this work with pleasure, as valuable in itself, and pertinent to the exigencies of the times. We trust that men are not more indifferent to their spiritual concerns at present, than in times gone by. We see no evidence that they are so. But there is in the community a more restless spirit of activity than ever before; and this induces an impatience of formal discussion on all topics. It were unwise to look for an exception in favor of religion. Now these remarks of Mr. Furness are of a nature, and are conceived in a form, not likely to offend and repel the prevailing taste. They are addressed, too, to the primeval sentiments, and deepest feelings of the human soul,—those that are last reached by the paralyzing influence of worldly pursuits. And they are more likely to command attention, and rekindle the smouldering embers of religious affections, than the same truths, presented under other forms, could be expected to do.

We think, therefore, that, in these portions of his work, Mr. Furness has performed good service for the cause of truth and piety, and we heartily accord him our grateful acknowledgments. But there are other parts of this book of which, we regret to say, we entertain very different opinions; and from

which we must be allowed to express our unqualified dissent. We refer to the chapters on Miracles, and that on Prophecy, — especially to the former; and we will avail ourselves of this occasion to discuss the former of these topics somewhat at large.

We have observed, of late, a growing disposition, as we think, on the part of the defenders of Christianity, to get rid of the question of miraculous agency, altogether, as if it were a burden that embarrassed their movements, — something, as it seems to us, like a spirit of compromise, — a disposition to meet the unbeliever half-way. Now against any such spirit as this, if it really exists, we take leave to enter our solemn protest. There is no middle ground between religion and irreligion, between faith and infidelity. There must be something *distinctive* in the belief of the Christian; or it is idle, and worse than idle, to dignify it with the name.

Our apprehensions, perhaps, are unfounded; but we do honestly apprehend, that there is a class of writers among us, who are, consciously or unconsciously, *philosophizing* away the peculiarities of the Gospel, and reducing it to a level with mere naturalism. Such, we verily believe, to be the *tendency* of Mr. Furness's theory of miracles, — and on this account we are disposed to regret its publication. We are persuaded Mr. Furness would disavow any such purpose, and he is among the last men to whom such a purpose should be attributed. Still, it is not in his option to check, limit, or *qualify* the tendency of his book. The arrow has been discharged from the bow; where it may fall, or whom it may wound, is not for him to determine. We say not this from any disposition to discourage investigation. We would not, if we could, impose any check, other than that of sound discretion and an enlightened conscience, on the expression of opinions, in any form. For ourselves, we have no dread of free and full discussion. We are not afraid to follow wherever truth may lead. Let the subject of miraculous agency be fearlessly entertained, and examined in all its aspects and bearings; and if just criticism and sound reasoning demand its rejection, in God's name, let it be rejected. We would retain nothing as an article of faith, which the most rigid logic would require us to exclude. But, as we verily think, that a disbelief of this agency involves the disbelief of Christianity, we may surely be excused for requiring that it be examined fairly, dispassionately, and *cautiously*,

and with a clear apprehension of the consequences it involves. And let us be as ready, too, to abandon *names* as *things*.

Mr. Furness sets out with giving us a definition of the term "miracle"; according to which it means simply, "what is wonderful." Now if Mr. Furness intends to abide by this definition, — and he gives us no other, — then, of course, there is no such thing as a *proper miracle* for him. Laying out of the question the effect of familiarity, one event, he thinks, is as wonderful as another; and thus by rendering every thing equally miraculous, he makes it impossible that any thing should be so. But, is this the true import of the term, in the minds of those that admit the reality of the thing? Most certainly not. Wonderful and miraculous, are not convertible terms. They differ from each other as genus and species; and they differ, too, in regard to their *proximate* causes, at least. With this loose and inaccurate apprehension of the meaning of the terms, it is not surprising that Mr. Furness's reasonings concerning them should partake of the same character. We have no intention to entangle ourselves in the toils of a definition; but we will state, as nearly as may be, what is our understanding of the thing.

When a certain physical event takes place, we are impelled by the very constitution of our minds to look for another correspondent to it. The latter we call cause; the former, effect. Now these terms may, or may not, be metaphysically and abstractly correct. They mark, however, a relation, that we regard as invariable, between two facts. And this is sufficient for our purpose. Now, if of two events thus related to each other, the one were to occur without the antecedent occurrence of the other, we might with perfect propriety denominate it miraculous; and we should so denominate it. If, for instance, the accounts of the birth of Jesus, in their popular acceptance, are true, then his birth was strictly miraculous. Again, were we to see an unlettered peasant, whom we knew to be ignorant of any other language than his mother tongue, instantaneously endued with the power of conversing freely, in their own languages, with the natives of other and far distant countries, we should regard this as a proper miracle; and so, we think, would every one that witnessed it. And, should we find the subject of this miracle considering and representing it as wrought within him for a most wise and beneficent purpose, namely, to enable him to convey the knowledge of moral and

religious truth to the natives of these countries, thus redeeming them from the bondage of error and sin, and purifying and elevating their souls, we should deem that the fact stood *justified*, — accounted for; that a reasonable and adequate cause for its existence, — for this manifestation of preternatural power, — was adduced. Our judgment would be satisfied, and our faith sustained. We should regard the case as presenting an occasion worthy of the divine interposition. And such, it seems to us, would be the decision of the common sense of mankind. We say "interposition," and we use the term advisedly. But we would have it understood, that we use it in reference to human apprehension, not to divine omniscience. We are far from regarding the fact in question as an "emergency" in reference to the Infinite and All-wise, an oversight, a *casus omissus* in the plan of Providence. Such a view of miracles constitutes no part of our system, however the popular use of language may seem, at times, to imply it. To our limited vision, these events stand out and apart from the general course of things, and are incapable of being reduced to their established laws. They are inconsistent with these laws, *violations* or *interruptions* of their natural order. We call them *physical impossibilities*; and we are justified in so calling them. In our apprehension they are so, and in this very circumstance consist their pertinence and their use. If they are to be regarded as mere "wonderful events," wonderful because not understood, we can perceive no adequate reason for their having been wrought, no reason worthy of the wisdom of God or the respect of man. They are almost reduced to the level of the tricks of jugglers and mountebanks; wrought, it may be, with a benevolent purpose, but certainly implying deception, if not an intention to deceive. Miracles then, we say, are inconsistent with the established laws of the material world; those laws which regulate the action of one material substance on another, and the action of the human mind on objects external to itself. But we doubt not that they are in perfect accordance with higher and more comprehensive laws; existing in the divine intelligence, but unrevealed to us, and incapable, therefore, of regulating our judgment. To the Divine Mind there can be no miracles. But this forms no objection to the reception of the doctrine on our part. We see but "in part"; but by this imperfect vision our judgment must be determined, till the veil shall be lifted from the unseen.

This, then, is what we mean by miraculous agency. A violation, or suspension, of the laws of nature; or a case, in which, what we call the effect, takes place without the previous occurrence of what we denominate the cause; or, a fact, for which no cause can be alleged but the *immediate* exertion of preternatural power. We have endeavoured to explain our meaning by the instances adduced; and by these we are willing to abide.

But what do we understand by the "laws of nature," — the "established order of things"? Not, certainly, what Mr. Furness seems to suppose we mean. We do not regard the universe as a machine, contrived and set in motion by the Deity, subject only to a general supervision, and liable to occasional interruption, or rectification, as new and unforeseen circumstances may require. If such be the conceptions of any in regard to this subject, we are not answerable for their misapprehensions. By the "laws of nature," we mean merely the order in which Infinite Wisdom sees fit to proceed. The order of events in the natural world is the law of God's operations, — the way in which the divine energy manifests itself, — and it is nothing more. We term it a law; and such, to our apprehension, it must be in order to effect the purposes of infinite wisdom. The order of nature is a revelation of God to the human soul. Is it not so? It is intended, beyond all question, to serve the purposes of intellectual and moral discipline to man, — perhaps to other orders of intelligences. Now these purposes would not be effected in any degree, nay, the processes of physical life would not be carried on, in a system where there was no established and perceivable order, where the laws of physical events could not be recognised and relied on. But, without insisting on this point, it is obvious, that, were these demonstrations of infinite power put forth capriciously, the human mind would be overwhelmed and paralyzed; perpetual wonder and amazement would induce perpetual infancy and imbecility. There must, then, be order, laws, and these laws must be revealed to the human mind, or the great purposes of our being cannot be accomplished. We do not attribute any proper causality, or vital efficiency, to inert matter; this, we think, resides in mind alone. But we do believe that the Creator has subjected the elements of the world to certain laws, or *conditions*, which cannot be changed otherwise than by an exertion of his own omnipotence. And

we further believe, that these laws, or conditions, are revealed to man; we know that the human intellect has been able to detect them, and trace their operation, and classify, by means of them, the facts that come within the sphere of its remark. We know, that on the knowledge of these laws have been erected the noblest monuments of human genius, those sciences, namely, by which man weighs the planets in his scales, and traces and calculates the comet's flight.

Mr. Furness, (p. 151,) objects to this view of the subject, that "it takes for granted, that the whole order of nature is known to us; that the limits of our knowledge are commensurate with all the laws and modes of existence." Now this is by no means a correct representation. The popular notion of miracles assumes no such thing. It assumes only, that *some part* of the order of things is known and understood; it assumes only that our experience is of *some value*, and to be relied on to a certain extent. This is the utmost amount of the assumption in question, at least, in the minds of judicious men. And to this extent the assumption is both just and necessary, and safe. We cannot proceed a step in our reasoning, whether physical or moral, without it. Nay, it lies at the bottom of all calculations, all plans and purposes of human life, as we have already remarked, domestic, social, and political. This *argumentum ad verecundiam* is, we conceive, wholly misplaced. We know, indeed, but little of the ways and works of God; we pretend to know but little. Little, we mean, in reference to the sum of things, to the compass of infinite knowledge. In reference to our own appropriate sphere, to that which it imports our well-being to know, our knowledge is not scanty. But because our view cannot embrace the whole chain of events, extending from eternity to eternity, does it therefore follow, that we are incapable of judging concerning the links that are immediately under our eye? Our horizon is a narrow one, it is true; still we may clearly perceive the objects that lie within it, and ascertain their nature, relations, and uses. We certainly do know the physical laws of our being, we know them well; to a certain extent at least; an extent, sufficient, we think, to cover the ground of the present investigation. We are entitled to call our knowledge of nature by the clear name of science, imperfect science, perhaps, but giving a clear and steady light to the extent within which it shines, and which is not to be distrusted within these limits because it cannot penetrate the

dark profound of the unknown and unknowable. Be it, that we know little of the works of God. Nevertheless, we know well that men are not wont to walk on the surface of the water. We know well, that some thousands of men are not fed on four or five loaves of bread. We know that the blind are not restored to sight by a word, or a touch. Be it, that both life and death are, in a great degree, mysterious; still we do know, that there is no law of physical organization, in consequence of which the dead return to life, at the bidding of any voice less powerful than that of him who kindled the vital flame at the first.

These things, and others of similar character, we know, with all the assurance that experience and observation ever give, and all that is requisite for the satisfaction of our reason, and the guidance of our lives. Nor will it, nor ought it, shake our faith in this experience, to be told, what we most readily admit, "that all the forms and limits of that mighty spirit, that is within and around us, are not perfectly known to us." "Secret things," doubtless, — oh how many of them, and how vast — "belong to the Lord;" but these we cannot but reckon among "those that are revealed."

We have thus stated, somewhat at length, our own views of miraculous agency in its relation to the laws of nature and the principles of the human mind. Mr. Furness, if we understand his theory, regards the miracles of the Gospel as *natural facts* merely, wrought in strict accordance with the general laws of the universe, and the principles of the human mind; the results of high, but not *preternatural*, powers; and only more wonderful than other events on account of their rarity, and, perhaps, of their higher moral aim and import. As physical events they have nothing distinctive.

If this be so, there is an end to the question of miraculous agency at once. The agency of God in these events, *ex vi termini*, was precisely the same as in all other, the most ordinary events. In so far as they manifested a generous and benevolent spirit, they were attestations to the moral character of Jesus, but none whatever to his official character. For it did by no means follow, that, because he was a kind and compassionate man, and a man, too, of remarkable endowments, he was, therefore, the expected Messiah, the moral regenerator of the world. Yet, surely, we cannot be mistaken in supposing, that he appealed often, habitually, to his miracles, as the credentials of

his authority, of his peculiar mission from God. Were these appeals, then, groundless? On the theory we are considering, for aught we can perceive, they must have been so. They were evidence of remarkable, but, if we understand Mr. Furness, not of peculiar, powers. But men, more or less remarkable, have appeared in the world in all ages; and each, too, charged, in the providence of God; as every human being is, with his own mission. How then does the case of such differ from that of Jesus? Is it merely a question of more or less, between them? We confess we cannot so regard it. We view the mission of Christ as *peculiar*; peculiar in its objects, its sanctions, and its credentials. We think Christianity rests on grounds peculiar to itself; and that the miracles of the Gospel constitute these grounds. What is new and distinctive in Christianity, is not so much the moral truths it embodies; these, in their elements at least, were long anterior to it, as in the *authority* with which it speaks. And this authority it derives from its miraculous character. We know not from what other source it could be derived. We can conceive of nothing besides the display of power *strictly* miraculous, which would justify any human being in claiming the religious faith and homage of mankind. He that comes to us with "Thus saith the Lord" upon his lips, must be prepared to verify his title to use this form of address. He must produce his commission. This Jesus did. He rests his claims on the fact, that he had "done the works that none other man did." "The works that the Father has given me to finish, the same works that I do, bear witness for me that the Father hath sent me." Hence appears the primary use and importance of the Gospel miracles; a use not local and temporary, but universal and perpetual. Contemplated from this point of view, — for we think they have other aspects, — they constitute the foundation of our faith and hope as Christians. For they show, that when Jesus announced himself as "the resurrection and the life," — when he set forth the doctrines of man's future being, and of the pardon of sin on condition of repentance, — he spoke with an authority not to be questioned. And authority on these points, we conceive, is precisely what was required to meet the wants of the general mind. There may be those, who have been able, by other means, to attain to a satisfactory conviction of their own immortality, and of the efficacy of repentance to obviate the consequences of sin; but such, we are persuaded, is not the case

with mankind in general. For them the results of abstract reasoning are too vague, too shadowy, and too cold, to give peace in life, or sure hope in death. And how the requisite authority could have been adduced without miraculous agency, as already remarked, we are unable to conceive.

Mr. Furness's theory represents the miraculous powers of Jesus as native and inherent, as much a part of his intellectual and moral being as the faculties of his understanding or conscience; and equally liable, in the nature of things, to misapplication, or perversion. We cannot think so. On the contrary, we believe they were *conferred* for specific purposes; and were it allowed, to suppose that these purposes could have been mistaken, or disregarded, the powers themselves would, for him, have ceased to exist. We cannot believe, for instance, as has been often said, that it was at his option to meet the expectation of his countrymen, by putting himself at their head and leading them forth to victory and conquest. Could he have so forgotten his high and holy destination, as to unfurl the banners of war, we are persuaded he would have led them, not to victory, but to ruin. The lion of Judah would have writhed powerless in the grasp of the Roman eagle; and the result would only have been, to antedate by a few years the overthrow of the Jewish state.

Further, if the miracles of Jesus were, as Mr. Furness maintains, "natural facts," wrought by his own inherent power, and "disclosing the natural sovereignty of mind over matter, of the spiritual over the physical, illustrating the vital force of his own spirit and of *all spirits*, and teaching us that the energy to which all things are, by the constitution of nature, subordinate, is spiritual force, and that this power resides to an unknown extent in the bosom of man, and will, under certain conditions, assert its supremacy;" then surely it follows, nay, it is hardly left to be inferred, that those who resemble Jesus in character, must resemble him also in miraculous power; and the one resemblance ought to be the measure of the other.

But, from the passages quoted above, taken in connexion with remarks in various parts of the book, and especially pages 181, et seq., we think Mr. Furness goes much further than this. We understand him to maintain, that all men are endued with miraculous powers; that the human mind, as such, possesses a "supremacy over" material things. This is to us a very startling proposition; and we do not wonder that he should

have anticipated the very obvious objection, that, "if it were true, we should have had more numerous manifestations of the wonder-working power of this spiritual law." We are only surprised that this objection should not have somewhat abated his confidence in the correctness of his theory. To us it seems quite incredible, that this mighty energy should have lain dormant and undiscovered, in the human soul from the days of the creation to the times of the Saviour; and still more so, if more could be, that, having been once revealed, it should again escape from the consciousness of all men, and require to be discovered anew in the nineteenth century. Here have men been beating their heads for six thousand years against the adamant bars, within which destiny has encaged them, when all the while they carried, each in his own bosom, a key that might at any moment have set him free. For ourselves, we could as soon believe that a sixth sense remained to be discovered. No *new* power of the human mind, we believe, has been developed since the days of Moses; and if men, — if universal man, — had possessed this power, it must, for ages, have been as familiar as his power of reasoning and observation. Mr. Furness intimates, indeed, that glimpses of this consciousness have, from time to time, shown themselves among men, and instances the exorcists in the time of Jesus. The mountebanks of the world, then, as it seems, have been its seers and prophets; and what the profane call quackery is inspiration.

But let us look at this theory of mental power a little more in detail, and see to what consequences it will lead us.

We ask, then, in the first place, where and how is this "natural sovereignty" of mind over matter manifested? what is its extent, and what its laws? Or is it unlimited, absolute, subject to no conditions? Is it the property of all minds, incidental indeed, as the expression seems to import, to the nature and relations of the two substances? If so, then, at all times and under all circumstances, matter is naturally subject to the influence of mind; the latter never to that of the former. That such is not the case, we may safely appeal to every one's experience. That the mind of man, in its embodied state, possesses, to a certain extent, a power over the material organization, with which it is united, is undoubtedly true. The precise limits of this power, it may not be easy to assign; but it is quite easy to fix on a point to which it is perfectly obvious it does not

reach. And it is equally obvious to every one's experience, that matter, in this connexion, acts powerfully on mind. The mind does not give alone, it takes, and takes largely, from the body. Human character, intellectual, moral, spiritual even is, to a great degree, what it is, in consequence of this reciprocal influence. What conceptions of time, of space, of relations, — of the mighty influences at work throughout the universe, and of the laws by which they work, could pure intellect attain by itself, without a union with matter? It must, we think, be brought into relation with extension, in order to its having any knowledge of motion, by which both time and space are measured. In other words, it must be embodied, subjected to the influence of matter in due and proportionate degree.

And for its moral qualities and powers, how extensively is it indebted to this same relation! How powerful upon the moral being is the ministry of physical pains and pleasures, and, we may add, upon the intellectual also! They are the great agents in quickening the activity of both. And are not the affections, the loftiest and the purest, modified and disciplined by this same ministry? Could hope, or joy, or gratitude, or love, be what they are, without the exercise and training, which come to them through the medium of organic impressions? These speculations might easily be extended; but enough has been said to show, that the relation between mind and matter, as united in the human being, is any thing rather than that of sovereignty on one side, and mere subjection on the other. The action of the mind is modified, controlled, impeded by the body to a great extent, and at all times.

And for the power of mind over matter external to itself, — we speak of mind, of course, as existing in man; we are concerned with it in no other condition, — so far is it from being a sovereign or indefinite power, that its limits are perfectly known, and its conditions ascertained. Man has no power over external substances but by means of the muscular force he can bring to bear upon them. To this position we know of no exception. His power is simply mechanical, impulsive. Over matter beyond his reach he can exert no power whatever.

It seems to be the opinion of Mr. Furness, that the power, which he claims for the human mind over the material world, is to be found specially in the *principle of faith*, and in this principle as operating in a twofold direction, first, in the minds of the subjects themselves of miraculous agency, whence it con-

stitutes either the condition, or the efficient cause, of the miracle ; and secondly, as exerted outwardly, subjecting the material world to its control. In regard to the first of these respects, he represents Jesus as "making faith an indispensable preliminary to the exercise of his extraordinary power." We confess, we can find no authority for this representation. Jesus certainly dwells often, and much, on the importance of faith as a general principle ; and we admit, that, in some instances, he does *seem* to require it as a condition, or, at least, as a concomitant, of his performing a cure. Thus far we can go ; but this is far short of Mr. Furness's position. And it seems to us an insuperable objection to his theory, that allowing to this sentiment all that he claims for it, it will solve a part only of the facts it is put forward to explain. The very case he adduces in illustration, so far from confirming his theory, seems to our minds wholly inconsistent with it. It is that of the father who brought to Jesus his lunatic son, and besought him to cure him.

After describing his case in terms adapted, and probably intended, to work on his sensibility, he concludes by saying, "If thou canst do any thing, have compassion on us and help us." The form of expression, "if thou canst," and the feeble and wavering faith which it indicated, did not escape the notice of Jesus, and with characteristic pertinence and point he replies to the unhappy father, taking up his own phraseology, and retorting upon him his own words, "If *thou* canst believe, all things are possible." As much as to say, if you had any sound and adequate faith in me, you would not doubt either my ability or inclination to help your child. That the father felt the force of this retort somewhat as we have stated it, is evident, we think, from his reply ; and Jesus having apparently brought his mind to the right state, proceeds to perform the cure.

Now, on a review of this whole transaction, we are unable to perceive, that it furnishes the slightest support to Mr. Furness's views. We see here nothing of the wonder-working power of faith. We cannot perceive that there either was, or could be, any connexion between the faith of the parent and the cure of the child. The latter, in fact, was in convulsions at the very time of the cure, and incapable of sympathizing either with his father, or with Jesus. It is quite evident, indeed, from the whole narration, that he must have been a mere passive and unconscious recipient of the healing influence, whatever, or whencesoever, it was. And we repeat, what connexion, not

merely arbitrary, there could be between the faith of another and his cure, on the theory of Mr. Furness, we cannot conceive. But we can easily conceive, that the divine benevolence of Jesus should avail itself of the occasion presented, to confer a double blessing ; and, while it relieved the sufferer, cast into the soil of the father's heart, softened by paternal affection, the seed of an operative and sustaining faith.

The case of the woman who came behind the Saviour in the crowd, and touched the border of his garment,—to which Mr. Furness likewise refers as illustrative of the power of faith,—is of a very different character. We are free to confess, that, to our minds, it is encumbered with difficulties ; but, on the whole, we are inclined to regard it as one of those cases, in which strong mental emotion, by whatever cause excited, and to whatever object directed, produces a powerful effect on the physical frame. She evidently, if our apprehension of the subject is correct, looked for relief, not to any immediate exertion of divine power and goodness in her behalf, but to some mysterious and occult property in the person of Jesus, to be drawn from him mechanically, and without his knowledge, by a touch. Such a faith it was, that, in other regions, and at other times, induced numbers to seek the royal touch for the cure of scrofula ; and which has, at all times, and in all countries, been the ground on which empiricism has established its dominion.

If this be the principle which Mr. Furness intends, when he speaks of the power of faith to work miracles, we admit its efficacy to a certain extent ; but we do not perceive that it has any other than an accidental connexion with the miraculous agency of Jesus. Its efficacy consists in the emotion produced, no matter by what means, and is measured by the intensity of this emotion. No matter whether the subject of this emotion entertained true or false conceptions of its object, or whether that object be worthy or unworthy. Be it a veritable prophet of God, or an arrant impostor, the effect will, in either case, be the same. If these views be correct, it is manifest that this transaction, by whatever name we call it, is not to be reckoned among the miracles of Jesus. It is manifest, that there was, on his part, no conscious exertion of power in the case, either miraculous or otherwise. He was not even sensible of her presence. The act, therefore, was all her own, the whole efficiency resided in her own spirit. On whatever principle,

then, we are to explain this fact, and others of the same character, it is quite clear, that it cannot be regarded as a satisfactory solution of the general problem of miraculous agency. Let every fact of this sort be disposed of as it may, the great question of the miraculous power of Jesus remains untouched. It is still to be settled on considerations wholly distinct from any that these cases present. What has the resurrection of Lazarus, for instance, in common with the case we have been considering? and what more chimerical than the attempt to reason from the one to the other? It is from this want of discrimination, this confounding of things so diverse in character, that much of the skepticism, conscious and unconscious, on the subject of miracles, has arisen. The facts related in the Gospel histories, have, through a vague and indefinite notion of their inspiration, been generally taken in the mass, as of equal authority, bearing the same relation to the great subject of these histories, and equally involving the veracity of the historians, and the credit of the religion. Christianity has, in this way, been subjected to a responsibility which it is not bound to sustain. In reading, for example, the story we have been considering, it is hardly possible, we should think, that a sentiment of distrust, unavowed, perhaps, even to ourselves, should not spring up in the mind, a feeling more or less distinct, that the transaction is not in keeping with the character of Jesus. And feelings of this kind, if hushed, or neglected, work their effects unperceived, and secretly diffuse the leaven of doubt and misgiving through the whole character. In all such cases, it is the part of wisdom to deal honestly and fearlessly with our own spirits, to analyze our doubts, and detect the elements to which they adhere, and ascertain whether these are material facts and great principles, or only incidental circumstances and unimportant details. But weak minds are afraid of doubts, and dread to look them in the face; and scrupulous consciences often regard them as suggestions of the tempter, to be repelled, or smothered, without examination. Nothing can be more dangerous than such a course. Smothered doubts are often smouldering fires, that work unseen till the central substance of faith and peace are wasted away. There is neither sin nor danger in doubts, if they are honestly entertained, and fairly dealt with. They are, on the contrary, the harbingers and guides to truth, the elements of strength alike to the intellect and the faith. Undoubting confidence may be the happiness of

innocence ; but it is hardly the condition or habitude of virtue. Reasoning men must have a rational faith ; a faith based on facts and principles, that the understanding can recognise and appreciate, or it will be without steadiness and without value.

We have been led into this train of remark by the case before us. It has, perhaps uniformly, been regarded as one of the miracles of Jesus, for the reality of which the credit of the gospel history stood pledged. Yet we are persuaded, as already remarked, that it was not so. Taking the facts as stated by the writers of the Gospels,—and stated, we doubt not, so far as the intention was concerned, with perfect fidelity,—and we think they are satisfactorily explained by a reference to the existing state of things, to the intense excitement of the public mind, which the ministry of Jesus must be supposed to have produced. When we endeavour to go back in imagination, and place ourselves among the coteremporaries of the Saviour, scenes and occurrences like this we have been considering present to our minds all the features of nature and probability. It seems to us as natural to look for them as to expect that the report of the cannon should be sent back to us from the surrounding heights. We confess we should be surprised were we not to find such traces of the popular excitement, which, if the main facts be true, must have existed. We should, in such case, deem the narratives deficient in one feature at least, of verisimilitude.

In the same class as the above, we should reckon the accounts in the book of the Acts, of “handkerchiefs and aprons” carried from Paul to those that were diseased ; and the bringing forth of the sick into the streets, that the shadow of Peter might fall upon them. The historian does not attempt to explain these proceedings ; he does not even characterize them ; he simply relates them as facts. And facts, beyond all doubt, they were, just such facts as the philosophy of human nature would lead us beforehand to expect. How many were cured in this way we are not informed ; nor whether the cure was permanent or temporary. That some were relieved, seems to have been the impression of the writer ; and this we can readily believe. The state of mind that led to measures of this sort could not have been without effect.

But, we repeat, facts of this character have no claim to be classed among the miracles of Christianity. Explain them as we may, they are to be regarded as incidental only, and collat-

eral to the main action of the drama. Let the truth, and reality of this be admitted, and these will follow of course, as the shadow pursues the substance. To expect the introduction of a *revelation*, in our apprehension of the term, among men, unattended by these counter-workings of human nature, were hardly more reasonable than to expect to produce motion without friction.

Mr. Furness would, we suppose, regard the case of Peter walking on the water, as exemplifying what we denominate the *secondary operation* of faith, its *exertion outwardly*. His language is, "The walking upon the water was not an infraction of the laws of nature, but a demonstration of the natural sovereignty of mind,—that spiritual power, upon which the mighty law of gravitation is, in the nature of things, dependent, and to which it must, of course, be subordinate." This language strikes us as not a little extraordinary, and we are not sure that we rightly apprehend its import. If by "spiritual power" is intended the power of the infinite spirit,—the power of God,—the statement is doubtless true; but we cannot perceive its pertinency. It accords with our system, but not with his; and we are, therefore, constrained to regard the expression as referring to the spirit of man,—to the inherent energy of the human soul. It is manifest, whatever import we are to assign to particular phrases, that Mr. Furness supposes, that Peter was sustained on the water by the *power of faith*,—the natural and inherent powers of faith, of course,—not any extraordinary and mysterious power peculiar to the person or the occasion; but just such a power as any man, and every man, in whom the sentiment of faith is developed, and in proportion to its developement, may exert at his will.

The statement amounts to this, or it amounts to nothing. And now we ask, can this be true? Can any rational man believe, that men,—all men,—are naturally endowed with the power of suspending, at will, the law of gravitation, either in their own bodies, or in others? Is it in the power of all men, or of any man, to walk on the surface of the water? or to throw himself, with impunity, from a precipice, buoyed up by the power of faith? If it be so, how happens it that the practice has not been continued,—or the experiment repeated, at least? Or will it be said, that this is the attainment of faith only in its higher degrees, and more perfect developement? Was, then, the faith of Peter so much clearer, stronger, and

more efficient than that of any man who has since lived? There is nothing in the tenor of his history to countenance such an opinion, but much of an opposite complexion.

The law of gravitation is perfectly well ascertained, and known to be universal. We cannot even conceive of matter as divested of this property. The body of Peter, like all other bodies, was made in accordance with this law, and by this law must necessarily have sunk in the water. Otherwise, it were perfectly rational, on throwing a bullet into a bucket of water, to expect to see it float upon the surface.

We say, then, if Peter, on this occasion, walked on the surface of the lake, here was a violation, or suspension, of this universal law; and, if he was sustained by the power of his faith, then faith is competent to set aside, or suspend, the law of gravitation. The walking on the water is an admitted fact, — the problem is to account for it. Mr. Furness thinks it reveals a new law. We confess we regard it as more rational, more *philosophical*, to admit the occurrence of a proper miracle, the interposition of preternatural power, in a given case, and for a worthy purpose, than to infer the existence of a new and superior law from the contemplation of a single fact, — a fact, too, in opposition to the universal sense and experience of mankind. But, if there is such a law, then, like other laws it must operate uniformly and universally, — and if one man may walk on the water, suspending the law of gravitation by the power of faith, then any other man, by the same power, may perform the same act, and may counteract, with equal facility, any other of the laws of matter. To what conclusion, then, are we driven? Evidently to this. If the mind of man possess this sovereignty over matter, then he is, potentially, set free from all physical laws and conditions whatever. He may as well walk on his head as on his feet. He may as well move through the air as along the surface of the earth. Law and accident, the possible and the impossible, become convertible terms. Natural philosophy, the knowledge of the properties and relations of physical substances, loses its uses and its end. The established course of things, the regular order of events, as antecedents and consequents, causes and effects, ceases to be. Experience of the past gives no clue to the future, — furnishes no ground of sober calculation or rational conjecture, of apprehension or of hope. The wildest dreams of the imagination cannot be discriminated from the dictates of sober judgment. He that

sows tares, may well expect to reap wheat, and he that plants brambles, to gather grapes. There is no extravagance in these statements. Of the principle in question they are no more than the legitimate consequences. The very fact adduced, — if it be correctly interpreted, — involves them all. For, if this fact were wrought by a power that is “natural,” intrinsic, to the human mind, the result of a general law, — then each and all the effects we have supposed, may, demonstrably, be wrought by the same power. Thus all things are made to depend, not on fixed and unerring laws, but on the exercise of the human will.

To our mind we must say, the possession of such a power as Mr. Furness claims for the human mind, implies the subjection of the infinite to the control of the finite. The order of Providence, the order in which God chooses to proceed, is liable to be interrupted, and the regular sequences of events broken off, by this intrusive power. It is hardly possible, we think, to overstate such a principle as this.

What the inherent energies of the human soul might enable it to perform, if freed from the restrictions of its present organization, indeed, we pretend not to say. Perhaps it might, perhaps, hereafter, it *may*, be able to pass with a volition from planet to planet, and to hold converse with other minds at the far distant points of the universe. But we do know, that, in its embodied state, these things are beyond its power; and there is no “presumption” in saying so. We have a clear conception of the modes in which it is possible for man to act. We know, that his action, whatever it be, must be in accordance with the laws of the physical world, — that he does not control these, but is controlled by them. And we know, further, that these laws must be consistent with each other. No new law that may be revealed to human inquiry, can be repugnant to any one already revealed. Further investigation may show us that we have been mistaken, — that our views were deficient in comprehension, — or that we had taken as ultimate facts those that were not so. Still, all the facts in the natural, as in the moral world, must be in harmony, and point in one direction.

We deem it absurd, for instance, to suppose that any law should be discovered by which man could act on external *matter* otherwise than by impulse, because this would be to change their whole being and condition, and supersede the

harmonies and mutual dependences of things. This is what we mean by saying that we have a clear conception of what it is possible for man to perform,—a conception that justifies us in saying, that it is *naturally impossible* for a man to walk on the water, or without mechanical aid, acting in accordance with mechanical principles, to rise into the upper regions of the air. Nor should we hesitate to apply this remark,—though, we admit, not with the same *kind* of certainty,—to the raising of the dead, or the restoring of sight, on the instant, to the blind. The common sense and apprehension of mankind in regard to these events are, we are apt to think, substantially correct. It is not difficult, perhaps, for ingenious objectors to perplex and confound these apprehensions; but it is, we think, quite impossible wholly to eradicate them from the mind,—at least without breaking up the whole texture of faith, and introducing universal skepticism. Till this is done, men will continue to believe, that the actual restoration of a dead man to life is a *miracle*,—something beyond the *power* of man, physical or spiritual, to perform.

“Since the world began,” was the natural and forcible appeal of the blind man restored to sight by our Saviour, “was it not heard that any man opened the eyes of one that was born blind.” He regarded it, and so, in our opinion, it ought to be regarded, as a miracle,—not a mere wonderful performance, like those of mountebanks and jugglers,—which are wonderful only because the process by which they are wrought is concealed,—this were a most unworthy supposition,—but a real miracle, something wrought by divine power, in a way, if not contrary, yet certainly superior, to the ascertained laws of material action,—something, in short, which would not be a whit the less wonderful, but the more so, could we be made to perceive the principles and process by which it was effected.

But there is a class of miraculous facts recorded in the Gospel, to which it is obvious, the principle we have been considering, allowing all that Mr. Furness would claim for it, is wholly inapplicable. To this class belongs the resurrection of Lazarus, and that of the widow’s son, and the daughter of Jairus. In these cases there could, by possibility, be no scope for the exercise of faith. In regard to the former of these, Mr. Furness asks, “How do we know but the soul of Lazarus was present, and within the influence of the voice of Jesus, when he called to him to come forth?” And we, in our turn, might

ask, How does he know that it was so? This, it seems to us, would be a fitting and adequate reply. What ground, even of plausible conjecture, can he allege that such was the fact? It is his business to find facts to sustain his theory; and it is his theory not ours, that renders this conscious and intelligent presence of the dead necessary. It is his theory, not ours, that requires us to suppose, that the soul of Lazarus, after it had cast off its "mortal coil," disembodied, and inorganic, was still capable of hearing the human voice of Jesus, and of being moved by it, in accordance with a natural law, to such powerful exertion as to reanimate the lifeless body, and restore its suspended functions. And we are required to believe all this in order to avoid the supposition of an interruption, or suspension, of what we call the laws of nature. In other words, in order to evade the admission that God, who for wise and beneficent ends, conducts events in the physical world in a regular and perceptible order,—so proceeds that we may trace his footsteps, be able to classify facts, and establish sciences,—should, on occasions, for reasons equally wise and beneficent, *step aside* from this order, interrupt the regular series, and introduce an event which we cannot classify,—which, so far as human sagacity can penetrate, has no physical cause, and which, for this very reason, we call miraculous. Now, to our apprehensions, this is solving one difficulty, if difficulty it be, by another much greater. But to our minds the supposition of miraculous interposition on adequate occasions involves no difficulty. We deem the supposition of a revelation to be made by the Father of spirits a *reasonable* one, and we see not how it is possible there should be a revelation without miracles. Truths, however important, which the human mind should attain to in the ordinary exercise of its native powers, would not constitute a revelation,—a system of revealed religion. This must, in its very nature, be miraculous, or it cannot be at all. If the miracles of the Gospel are to be regarded as "natural facts," capable of being reduced to natural laws, and explained by them, it does appear to us, that Christianity, as a system of revealed truth, ceases to be. We are thrown back upon *mere naturalism*. The moral lessons of Jesus must be taken for what they are worth, like those of any other wise and good man; encumbered however with the whole weight of this history of wonderful events, which, on this supposition, *prove* nothing, and *tend* to nothing but to excite wonder at the outset, and skepticism in the sequel.

We have already had occasion to point out what we regard as the primary use of miracles; to establish, that is to say, not the general truths of Christianity, but its *authority* as a revelation from God. Mr. Furness, however, objects to the idea that God should be represented as "bringing any thing to pass merely to prove somewhat." Now, not to insist on the unquestionable fact, that God is often represented in the Scriptures as performing works of power and grace before the Israelites "that they might know that he was the Lord," we remark, that it seems to us an erroneous theory to regard the whole course of things, not as a process, in which part is made ancillary to part,—one event the means to another, and introduced for the sake of another,—but as a mere series of separate and independent facts,—each existing for itself, and introduced for the sake of its own intrinsic excellence and importance. This theory, we think, derives no support from the word or the works of God. How many objects do we see in nature, the beauty of which is not absolute but relative! The world is full of them. So in all the works of human skill. In complicated machinery, for example, we seldom think of dwelling on individual parts. Our sense of beauty, or admiration, is addressed and affected by the perception of design and harmony pervading the whole. We feel that single parts have little beauty in themselves,—that they are not there on their own account,—that they were not regarded by their maker, and are not to be by us, as ultimate, but intermediate,—not as ends, but as means. Thus, too, in the works of God. The spirit of beauty is indeed everywhere diffused. It seems to delight in pouring itself forth with even a prodigal profuseness on all objects, the great and the small, in general and in detail. Because the infinite Father would manifest himself in every thing, and speak to our hearts everywhere and at all times.

Still the difference is not in kind so much as in degree. The analogy is broad and palpable. The same law regulates our apprehension of both,—we cannot avoid contemplating them with kindred emotions. And this law it is that lies at the bottom of all true principles in art. The parts are regarded as relative,—subsidiary,—not as ends but as means,—and deriving their fitness and beauty from this very relation. Is the shading in a picture introduced for its own sake? And in the great moral picture of the universe, are the shades of sin and suffering there on account of their own intrinsic beauty and loveliness,—are they *ends*, or means alone?

There is no impropriety, we conceive, in representing God as carrying on a process, the various steps of which have reference one to another, and all to the final result. For to finite apprehension such is the fact. We cannot perceive that there is any unfitness in representing God as having brought something to pass *merely* — so far as this event was concerned — to *prove* something to our reason. Why should there be? Is not truth the great agent in moral regeneration, — in the advancement and purification at once of the individual, and of society? And does not — or may not — truth require to be proved? And if it does, is it unworthy of God to institute means to effect this proof? Suppose the miracles of the Gospel were a fitting, or necessary proof of any, or all, the truths of Christianity. Would it be unworthy of God to qualify a messenger to perform such miracles for this specific purpose? We think not. And yet on this supposition, it would be perfectly correct to say, that the miracles were wrought merely for this purpose. In effecting this single object their mission would be accomplished. But we do not restrict the miracles of Jesus to this single object. We have stated already that we think they have other aspects. We regard them as striking manifestations of his spirit and character, — parts of his *moral* mission no less than credentials of his official authority. And we agree with Mr. Furness that this aspect of these works has been too much overlooked. He was intended, in these as in other respects, to be to us the symbol of the infinite Father, — “the image of the invisible God.”

M. L. H.

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#### NOTICES AND INTELLIGENCE.

*A Greek and English Lexicon of the New Testament*, by EDWARD ROBINSON, D. D., late Professor Extraordinary of Sacred Literature in the Theological Seminary, Andover. Boston: Crocker & Brewster. New York: Leavitt, Lord, & Co. 1836. 8vo. pp. xii. and 920. — Under the above title we have another valuable work from the indefatigable pen of Dr. Robinson. The lovers of sacred literature have been largely indebted to his labors heretofore,\* and now they are called upon to return him their thanks for this new favor.

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\* We need only mention his “Translation of Buttmann’s Greek Grammar,” a popular edition of “Calmet’s Dictionary of the Bible,” and the four volumes of “The Biblical Repository.”

In the year 1825, Dr. Robinson published a translation of the first edition of Wahl's "*Clavis Philologica*," with improvements of his own. The whole edition of fifteen hundred copies was speedily disposed of, a fact which shows the urgent demand of some work of this kind. Eight years later, after his return from Germany, where he had been prosecuting his biblical and philological studies with singular ardor, he applied himself to the task of preparing a *Lexicon*, in which he should call no man master upon earth, but should rely on his own judgment, while he made use of the copious materials collected by his predecessors in this work. Improvements had been made in the subsequent editions of Wahl and Bretschneider. Passow and Winer had extended their profound researches, and published the results of their labors, so that Greek lexicography had, in a good degree, changed its aspect during this brief period. This was the result of that new impulse given to the study of philology in Germany, by inquiries into the origin of languages, and their various modifications.

Possessed of various and accurate knowledge in this department of learning, availing himself of the latest discoveries of the Germans, recurring at all times to original authorities, and above all, animated by a noble enthusiasm in the cause of sacred letters, the author has manifold advantages over most, if not all, his predecessors.

His object in the present work is not to give a complete Dictionary of the Greek language, but, simply, as its title indicates, a *Lexicon* of the New Testament; although he uniformly gives first the primary meaning of each word in classic Greek, even if it does not bear this signification in the New Testament. The sources whence he has drawn information are the same which all modern lexicographers have frequented, with various tastes,—to wit, the Greek Version of the LXX., the Apocryphal writings of the Old and New Testament, the works of Philo and Josephus, and writers of classic Greek in all the three stages of its existence.

In this work he has aimed to give the etymology of all the words, so far as it pertains to the Greek and Hebrew, and, sometimes, to the Latin. A general denotation of the affinities of the Greek with other tongues belongs to a general lexicon of the language, and is therefore wisely omitted. This etymology is uniformly placed at the beginning of the article, enclosed in brackets, and is not put at random, at the beginning, middle, or end, as is done in Schneider's *Lexicon*. After assigning to each word its primary meaning, he puts down all the other significations which it bears in the New Testament in logical order, thus making each article a sort of *logical* history of the word which is defined. The construction of verbs, &c., with their adjuncts, is noted at large; difficult constructions are dwelt upon and explained by reference to the usage of other writers, grammatical rules, &c. The frequent

reference to other writers is of great utility. A Lexicon is no place to *discuss* constructions, etymologies, &c., but it is convenient to the student, if the Lexicon point out to him the works wherein the discussion may be found. References to Buttmann, Matthiæ, Winer, Tittmann, &c. are very frequent in these pages. Irregular forms of words are, in general, fully explained. The peculiar usage of the writers of the New Testament is fully illustrated by reference to Hebrew and Greek authorities, both classic and Hellenistic. The peculiar use of prepositions and particles is well explained, many examples are given, and difficult passages illustrated in this manner. We might cite the words *ἵνα* and *ἀνά*, as well as many others, in proof of this assertion; but examples of this character are too numerous.

Difficult passages are sometimes illustrated, but in this respect perhaps the work will not be found so satisfactory as some others, to those who expect a Lexicon of the New Testament to be a perpetual commentary upon it. Schleusner, no doubt, carried this too much into detail: this rendered his work cumbrous, and the matter one sought for, like Mercutio's wit, something difficult to find, and possibly not always worth the search when one was successful. Still there was a certain completeness in this regard, in his work, for almost all difficult places received a sort of explanation, but the explications in the present work strike us as somewhat short, and occasionally unsatisfactory. But this charge applies to the work as a commentary upon Scripture, not as a Lexicon, strictly speaking.

A scholar will usually look with eyes more or less affected by sectarian prepossessions upon all passages he attempts to explain, and this gives a certain sectarian character to the work. This character will no doubt display itself if only the definition of words is given, but it will be more apparent when whole verses are explained. Each Lexicon then becomes, to a greater or less extent, the mouth-piece of the party to which the author belongs.

Notwithstanding all the learning and candor of Dr. Robinson, we fear that he sometimes looks with partial eyes upon certain words and passages. Under the word *Θεός* we find an illustration of what we mean. After defining the word to mean the *Supreme Divinity*, he says further, it is "spoken of Christ, the *Logos*," and cites the following passages as containing the declaration, that Christ and *Θεός* are identical. John i. 1; xx. 28. Rom. ix. 5. Phil. ii. 6. 1 Tim. iii. 16. Heb. i. 8. 1 John v. 20. Rev. xix. 17, coll. vs. 7; xxii. 6, &c. We were not prepared to expect this. Compare the remarks of Bretschneider upon the same word, who more cautiously says, "de filio Dei, *λόγῳ*, qui, an Deus appelletur, et quo sensu, judicandum est ex locis, Jo. i. 1," and the others adduced by Dr. Robinson. But these are minor blemishes

which are to be expected in every human work, and do not essentially impair its usefulness.

This work has another advantage; for, as the author tells us in the Preface, each article, as far as practicable, contains a reference to every passage of the New Testament where it is used. Thus in seven eighths of the cases the Lexicon is a complete concordance of the New Testament, and when it is not, the student is notified of the fact. All the references, so far as we have examined them, are correct, and this cannot be said of its predecessors. In Schleusner, e. g., particularly in the English edition, notwithstanding the boast in the Preface, the references are frequently inaccurate.

We trust that this work will be extensively circulated amongst us, and that its use will not be confined to the sect of its author. We do not, however, wish it to supersede the works of Schleusner, or Bretschneider, for each of them has likewise great merits. In respect to the typographical execution of both Professor Robinson's Lexicons, they possess a decided superiority over all others which we have ever seen. The page even of Bretschneider is ungrateful to the eye, on account of the dinginess of the paper, and, still more, from the disorderly arrangement of the paragraphs. In Schleusner this defect is worse a thousand fold. It is absolutely painful to use his work, on account of the difficulty in finding what you seek. Paragraphs "are huddled and lumped," not "sundered and individual." But these pages are agreeable to the eye, and convenient for use, a sufficient interval being left between each paragraph and its fellow.

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*New Views of Christianity, Society, and the Church.* By O. A. BROWNSON. Boston: James Munroe & Company. 1836. 12mo. pp. 116. — The first impression of most persons would probably be that "New Views" of any subject are more likely to be sought after and read because they are *new*. But this is not the case. What nine out of ten most desire is, to be confirmed in their present views, and this too not so much by new arguments as by new illustrations, which will enable them the better to see and feel the force of the old arguments. The reasons, on a moment's reflection, are obvious. Original speculations, when the topics are interesting and momentous, are apt painfully to unsettle the mind; they turn the thoughts out of the track in which they are accustomed to move, and have learned to move easily, into one in which they move with difficulty; our deepest sympathies and time-hallowed associations are disturbed; and then it is an offence to our pride to be told virtually that we have need that one should teach us again "which be the first principles of the oracles of God." Accordingly it is found that the popular writers, as they are called,

especially on the subject of religion, belong, for the most part, to that class who start but few new questions, and are chiefly remarkable for their skill in throwing a new light, or a new attractiveness around commonly received truths. Mr. Brownson's book will suffer, so far as its circulation is concerned, from the real novelty of some of the speculations contained therein; and still more, as we suspect, from the title-page, and from the novel application throughout the body of the work of a few terms, such as *spiritualism*, *materialism*, and *atonement*, which have the effect to give to the whole discussion a strange and foreign air. In this, we think, the author has erred, in common with other able writers among us, — not in the originality and freedom of his speculations, for that could not be helped, but in a willingness to seem very original and free, though at the hazard of losing the sympathies of the public; or, at any rate, in the adoption of a manner which can only serve to make his originality and freedom unnecessarily startling and offensive. We are aware, however, that his own account of the matter, as given in the Preface, is so discriminating and unpretending, that it must do not a little to disarm the prejudice of which we have spoken.

"It must not," he says, "be inferred from my calling this little work *New Views*, that I profess to bring forward a new religion, or to have discovered a new Christianity. The religion of the Bible I believe to be given by the inspiration of God, and the Christianity of Christ satisfies my understanding and my heart. However widely I may dissent from the Christianity of the Church, with that of Christ I am content to stand or fall, and I ask no higher glory than to live and die in it and for it.

"I believe my views are somewhat original, but I am far from considering them the only or even the most important views which may be taken of the subjects on which I treat. Those subjects have a variety of aspects, and all their aspects are true and valuable. He who presents any one of them does a service to Humanity; and he who presents one of them has no occasion to fall out with him who presents another, nor to claim superiority over him.

"Although I consider the views contained in the following pages original, I believe the conclusions, to which I come at last, will be found very much in accordance with those generally adopted by the denomination of Christians, with whom it has been for some years my happiness to be associated. That denomination, however, must not be held responsible for any of the opinions I have advanced. I am not the organ of a sect. I do not speak by authority, nor under tutelage. I speak for myself and from my own convictions. And in this way, better than I could in any other, do I prove my sympathy with the body of which I am a member, and establish my right to be called a Unitarian."

According to Mr. Brownson, two systems have been disputing from the first the empire of the world, — *Spiritualism* and *Materi-*

alism; meaning thereby two social rather than two philosophical systems, sometimes denominated *spiritual* and *temporal*, *heavenly* and *worldly*, *holy* and *profane*, &c. Christianity was given to bring about a reconciliation or atonement between these two systems, but has failed thus far of accomplishing its object, not so much through misconceptions as through partial conceptions of what is required. The Catholic Church strove to realize spiritualism at the expense of materialism; that is, to give an exclusive prominence and dominion to that class of ideas which are denoted by the terms, God, the priesthood, faith, heaven, eternity. Protestantism, on the other hand, when true to itself, is in its tendency essentially *materialistic*; that is, transfers the preponderance to that class of ideas which are denoted by the terms, man, the state, reason, the earth, and time. Now the mission of the present, according to Mr. Brownson, is to put away these partial views, and so to exalt and purify the ideas denoted by both classes of terms as to destroy all antagonism between them, and thus to realize the true Christian doctrine of atonement as the foundation of union and progress.

These, as well as we can give them in a few words, seem to be the "New Views of Christianity, Society, and the Church," which this book is intended to set forth. We were in hopes of being able to give a fit examination of the merits of the work in our present number, but failing herein, this slight notice must suffice, until a better is prepared. One thing, however, we will say, in justice to the author. Those even who are most convinced of the unsoundness or fancifulness of his general doctrine, will be as ready as any to acknowledge the ability, eloquence, and earnest feeling expended in its exposition and defence.

We give Mr. Brownson's closing remarks.

"I do not misread the age. I have not looked upon the world only out from the window of my closet; I have mingled in its busy scenes; I have rejoiced and wept with it; I have hoped and feared, and believed and doubted with it, and I am but what it has made me. I cannot misread it. It craves union. The heart of man is crying out for the heart of man. One and the same spirit is abroad, uttering the same voice in all languages. From all parts of the world voice answers to voice, and man responds to man. There is a universal language already in use. Men are beginning to understand one another, and their mutual understanding will beget mutual sympathy, and mutual sympathy will bind them together and to God.

"And for progress too the whole world is struggling. Old institutions are examined, old opinions criticized, even the old Church is laid bare to its very foundations, and its holy vestments and sacred symbols are exposed to the gaze of the multitude; new systems are proclaimed, new institutions elaborated, new ideas are sent abroad, new experiments are made, and the whole world seems intent on the means by which it may accomplish its destiny. The individual is struggling to become a

greater and a better being. Everywhere there are men laboring to perfect governments and laws. The poor man is admitted to be human, and millions of voices are demanding that he be treated as a brother. All eyes and hearts are turned to education. The cultivation of the child's moral and spiritual nature becomes the worship of God. The priest rises to the educator, and the school-room is the temple in which he is to minister. There is progress; there will be progress. Humanity must go forward. Encouraging is the future. He, who takes his position on the "high table land" of Humanity, and beholds with a prophet's gaze his brothers, so long separated, coming together, and arm in arm marching onward and upward towards the Perfect, towards God, may hear celestial voices chanting a sweeter strain than that which announced to Judea's shepherds the birth of the Redeemer, and, his heart full and overflowing, he may exclaim with old Simeon, 'Lord, now lettest thou thy servant depart in peace, for mine eyes have seen thy salvation.'— pp. 114-116.

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*Memoir of WILLIAM CAREY, D. D., late Missionary to Bengal; Professor of Oriental Languages in the College of Fort William, Calcutta.* By EUSTACE CAREY. *With an Introductory Essay,* by FRANCIS WAYLAND, D. D., *President of Brown University.* Boston: Gould, Kendall, & Lincoln. 1836. 12mo. pp. xxii. and 422.— It cannot generally be said in praise of American editors of English works, that they add any thing to those works by their additions, or improve them by their improvements; but the value of this edition of the Memoir of Dr. Carey is decidedly increased by President Wayland's Introductory Essay. It is, indeed, the spirit and moral of the volume which it precedes. For facts and details, the reader goes of course to the Memoir, but the philosophy of Carey's life and labors is condensed in the Essay, and so condensed there, that it really introduces, not supersedes the Memoir, and sharpens the reader's curiosity to peruse it, instead of taking off its edge. The Memoir itself is printed, as was just and right, unaltered from the English edition. It consists chiefly of extracts from Dr. Carey's own journals and letters, which his biographer has connected into a narrative by occasional remarks and statements, preëminently interesting and judicious.

Dr. Carey was a most remarkable man. Without the advantages of high birth, of fortune, of bright genius, of any but a common education, without influential friends, and in spite of influential opposers, he arrived at the honor of being the first to introduce Christianity into the British possessions in India. He was the son of a village schoolmaster, and was born in Paulerspury, England, August 17th, 1761. He was apprenticed to a shoemaker at Hackleton, became a shoemaker himself, acquired his first knowledge of Hebrew on his shoemaker's bench, and, while a shoemaker, began preaching to a small congregation of dissenters. He was miserably

poor, had a sick and nervous wife, and a fast-coming family of children. This indigent, burdened, preaching shoemaker conceived the design of making known the Gospel to British India, to a vast and rich country, the selfish merchant-princes of which needed it as much as the natives, and were as strongly set against it. To British India no British vessel would take him. He sailed in a Danish ship, and on declaring his purpose, some time after his arrival, was obliged to quit the British possessions, and live in a territory which was held by the Danish government. By means of his indomitable perseverance, blessed by Divine Providence, he at last succeeded. Prejudice and self-interest were overcome, and favor was conciliated. He acquired the languages of the natives; translated the Bible into those languages; was made Professor of Oriental Literature in the College of Fort William; gave a religious impetus to his countrymen, which resulted in the establishment of bishoprics, churches, schools, and other means of improvement in India; gained, by way of recreation merely, a knowledge of botany which ranked him among the first natural historians of the day; and, after disbursing large sums which were confided to him in the prosecution of his labors, died, owing no man, honestly and honorably poor. — We know not how some may be affected at the view of such a man, but to us, a whole row of common kings and potentates looks very mean by the side of him.

The example of Dr. Carey is an especially useful one to those who feel that they have not what is called genius; as it may show them that they can accomplish important objects without genius. "In Dr. Carey's mind," says his biographer, "there is nothing of the marvellous to describe. There was no great and original transcendancy of intellect; no enthusiasm and impetuosity of feeling; there was nothing in his mental character to dazzle, or even to surprise. Whatever of usefulness, and of consequent reputation he attained to, it was the result of an unreserved and patient devotion of a plain intelligence, and a single heart, to some great, yet well-defined, and withal practicable objects." "Eustace," said he once to his nephew, the author of the present Memoir, "if, after my removal, any one should think it worth his while to write my life, I will give you a criterion by which you may judge of its correctness. If he give me credit for being a plodder, he will describe me justly. Any thing beyond this will be too much. I can plod. I can persevere in any definite pursuit. To this I owe every thing."

As Dr. Carey was a Calvinistic Baptist, he was, as a matter almost of course, not at all too friendly to liberal views of Christianity, or to those who entertained them. But every man of a truly liberal mind will overlook this, and not suffer it to diminish

the gratification which he will receive from reading the Memoir of one who was an ornament to his race. He died at Serampore, June 9th, 1834.

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*The Complete Poetical Works of WILLIAM WORDSWORTH: together with a Description of the Country of the Lakes in the North of England*, now first published with his Works. Edited by HENRY REED, Professor of English Literature in the University of Pennsylvania. Philadelphia: James Kay, Jun. & Brother. Boston: James Munroe & Co. 1837. Royal 8vo. pp. xxiv. and 551. — In the compass of a short notice it will not be expected that we should attempt any thing like an estimate of the merits of such a poet as Wordsworth, or a criticism on his works. The time has gone by when a page or two of lordly sarcasm, as ignorant as it was arrogant, or a page or two of hesitating praise, mingled and stiffened with a requisite portion of censure, was deemed proper treatment of a bard, whom the whole reasonable world now ranks among the greatest. We therefore feel that there is no immediate call upon us for a paragraph of defence and eulogy. Our present purpose is simply and heartily to recommend Professor Reed's edition of Wordsworth, as one which does justice to the poet, and is calculated to satisfy the not easily satisfied wishes of the many who love and revere him. It is, what it professes to be, a complete edition of his poetical works, such as might be sought for in vain in his own country, and contains also his prefaces and essays, his beautiful description of the Lakes, and his Essay upon Epitaphs. The editor has performed his part in a most judicious manner, and in the true spirit of one "who claims to have brought to the task an affectionate solicitude for every verse in the volume." He has given us the pure text, and has interspersed, with the poet's own notes, a few, and but very few others, which consist "almost entirely of illustrative passages from the writings of those with whom Mr. Wordsworth would most willingly find his name associated." The poems which were lately published under the title of "Yarrow Revisited, and other Poems," are placed in their appropriate divisions, as the poet himself would have arranged them. The publishers may challenge for themselves a full portion of praise, for having sent forth a book which confers credit on the American press. Since we received it, we have read a considerable portion of its contents, and, accustomed as we are to proof-sheets, and familiar as we are with the author, we have not yet detected a typographical error. The page is clean and bright, and the type is as clear and large as eyes can wish. We have seldom seen a book which has given us so much pleasure.

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*New Publications.* — James Munroe & Co. have issued the first and second volumes of "*Conversations with Children on the Gospels; conducted and edited by A. Bronson Alcott:*" a singular work, of which we hope to give some account in our next number. Benjamin H. Greene has just published a truly valuable "*Memoir of the Rev. Bernard Whitman.*" By Jason Whitman." 16mo. pp. 215. Perkins & Marvin have sent out an American edition of *The New Testament, arranged in Historical and Chronological Order, with copious Notes, &c.*; by the Rev. George Townsend. *The whole revised, divided into paragraphs, &c.*; by the Rev. T. W. Coit, D. D." Royal 8vo. pp. 455 and 472. Perkins & Marvin have also given a beautiful reprint of the second London edition of Dr. Bloomfield's "*Greek Testament, with English Notes, critical, philological and exegetical.*" In two volumes, 8vo. It is one of the most elegant and accurate specimens of various and difficult typography which have appeared in this country, and reflects great credit on the enterprise of the publishers, on the University Press at Cambridge, from which it issues, and on the gentlemen who have the control of that establishment. Of the merits of the work itself we hope to speak hereafter.

We are glad to learn from an advertisement of James Munroe & Co. that the second and third volumes of Mr. Noyes's *New Translation of the Hebrew Prophets* is now in press. It is understood that the first volume of Professor Palfrey's *Lectures on the Old Testament*, is going to press immediately. Gould & Newman also advertise as in press, a translation of *Olshausen on Acts*, by D. Fosdick, Jr.; Wiseman's *Twelve Lectures on the Connexion of Science with Revealed Religion*; a reprint of *Tyndale's New Testament*, edition of 1526, with marginal readings; and the first American edition of Cudworth's *True Intellectual System of the Universe, with a Discourse concerning the True Notion of the Lord's Supper; and two Sermons on 1 John ii. 3, 4, and 1 Cor. xv. 57: also, A Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality*, in two volumes, 8vo.

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We have on hand several articles, among which is one on the Duties of Young Men in respect to the Dangers of the Country, being a review of the Rev. Mr. Muzzey's excellent little manual, *The Young Man's Friend*, and a Discourse on the character of the late Rev. Dr. Howard, of Springfield, which we regret not being able to find room for in this number. They will appear in our next.

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## EDITORIAL NOTICE.

IN the Introduction to the New Series of the "Christian Disciple," of which this Journal is a continuation under another title, the objects of the work are thus stated, in 1819. "It will aim to point out the methods and sources of a right interpretation of the Scriptures; to throw light on the obscurities of these ancient records; to state and maintain the leading principles of Christianity; to vindicate it from the misinterpretations of friends, and the cavils of enemies; to illustrate its power in the lives of eminent Christians; to give discriminating views of evangelical virtue, and of the doctrines most favorable to its growth; to weigh impartially the merits of theological works, and of other books, which have a bearing on morals and religion; and to furnish interesting information, particularly in regard to the religious condition of the world." In the Preface to the first number of "The Christian Examiner," in 1824, the editor says: "Our most satisfactory labors will be those in which we may coöperate with our fellow-Christians; and we are happy to think, that the truths in which they dissent from us, stand less in need than heretofore of direct vindication, and that we shall be more at liberty, in future, to trace their application to the concerns of life, the reformation of literature, the correction of moral sentiment, the progress of society, the universal discipline of human nature, and the accomplishment of the designs of the divine benevolence." Two years afterwards, on a change in the editorial department, the work, it is said, "will be conducted on the same principles, maintain the same doctrines, and its contents be supplied by the same writers as heretofore. It has advocated no doctrines, however, and been conducted on no principles which forbid making a change, whenever a change shall appear to be an improvement. Indeed, it owes its existence to the demands of an inquiring and improving age; and unless it keep up with, or in advance of the progress of the times, it will be left behind to perish; — a consummation which, we trust, we have a higher motive than that of any worldly interest for striving to prevent." "Above all," says the editor in the same Address, "may we never forget, that the same freedom we claim for ourselves, belongs of equal right to the whole family of man. We therefore will not be angry with our brethren who dissent from us, for it may be without a cause. Though the great outlines of our constitutions are in all men alike, yet in the filling up, in the lights and shades of men's minds, there are differences without number, which must produce a corresponding variety in judgments and opinions: When tempted to complain of others, therefore, because they cannot think as we think, hear as we hear, read as we read, we hope we shall stop and consider who

hath made us to differ. They are God's servants, not ours; and to their own Master let them stand or fall. As we would resist all dogmatism, and imposition, and prescription ourselves, we shall be careful how we impose upon, dogmatize, or prescribe to others." Again; the association of gentlemen, under whose care and general supervision "The Christian Examiner and General Review" was undertaken in 1829, observe: "It shall be the main object of the publication, in treating any book or subject which has a bearing on religion or morals, to present those considerations respecting it, which would suggest themselves to the mind of an enlightened Christian. The work shall be characterized by openness, fearlessness, and moderation in the expression of opinions on any topic of public interest, not flattering popular prejudices, nor accommodating itself to them."

The undersigned, who are again associated as editors of the Christian Examiner, avail themselves of the occasion afforded by the commencement of a new volume, and the passing of the work into the hands of other publishers, to state, with some explicitness, the principles on which they propose to conduct it. These principles are the same on which it has been conducted, as we have seen, from the beginning. It is the intention of the editors to give as large a portion of their pages as ever to literary criticism, to history and biography, and to topics of common and practical interest; to sustain and vindicate the reputation the work has acquired for candor, liberality, and independence; and to make it, in short, not the organ of a society or of a sect, but a work for liberal Christians, the contributors to which will neither be required to sink their individuality, nor be understood to implicate others. If, as in former years, new topics of difference and discussion find their way from time to time into the Examiner, it will not be owing to any change in the principles on which it is conducted, or to any change of writers, for the principal contributors are to be the same, in general, as heretofore; but to the progress of inquiry, or the altered circumstances of the church. In the early days of the Christian Disciple, the Trinitarian controversy was new in this country, and the various questions it involved were yet to be gone over, and supplied ample material for theological discussion, on which Unitarians were agreed among themselves. But this controversy is wellnigh worn out, and other questions have taken its place in the public interest, respecting which the leading members of our own denomination differ, or have not yet made up their minds. Now it is obvious that in regard to all such questions the Examiner must adopt one of three courses: be silent; allow one side only to speak; or allow both sides to speak. Silence would not only betray an unworthy timidity, and prove fatal to its

interest and circulation as a periodical work, but be in contradiction to the very idea of such a work, the peculiar province of which is to take up and discuss the topics of the day, the controversies by which the public is agitated at the time. If then the Examiner were to adopt the second alternative, — taking up these controversies, but allowing one side only to speak, — that side might perhaps be satisfied; but the Examiner would cease, of course, to be a work for the whole denomination, and become the exclusive organ of one section of it. A rival work would immediately be commenced by the excluded, that through it they might obtain the justice of a fair hearing before their brethren; and the consequences of this step would not only be injurious in many respects to the Examiner, but multiply, exasperate, and prolong the disputes in question, to the serious harm of the denomination and the public. It remains that we should allow both sides, as Unitarians, to be represented in this work. And it is believed that no evil whatever will result from such a course, so long as the work is conducted on the part of the editors with discretion and firmness; so long as no more than the usual space is allowed to controversy of any kind, and no controversy is admitted which has not made such progress as to demand public attention, and no one is permitted to engage in this, who is not competent and disposed to maintain his side of the argument with intelligence, as a believer in Christ, and in a Christian spirit; so long as it is understood, that, from the nature of the case, no one is responsible, in any degree, for the views presented in such an article, but the individual over whose signature it appears; and, finally, so long as mutual recriminations are abstained from scrupulously, the only object had in view by all the parties being to supply the reader with the materials for making up an independent judgment. On the contrary, it is hoped and confidently expected, that a temperate and judicious carrying out of this liberal plan, will have the effect to impart additional life and interest to the Examiner, qualify it the better to meet the exigencies of the times, and contribute materially and essentially, under the divine blessing, to extend its circulation and its usefulness.

F. W. P. GREENWOOD.  
JAMES WALKER.

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THE  
**CHRISTIAN EXAMINER.**

Nº. LXXX.

*THIRD SERIES—Nº. XI.*

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MAY, 1837.

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**ART. I. — *The Young Man's Friend.* By A. B. MUZZEY.  
Boston : James Munroe & Co. 1836. 18mo. pp. 178.**

It belongs to the system of education at the present day, to pay great attention to the training of youth in preparation for its participation in the action of society. There is great wisdom in this, because much of the energy and enterprise, on which the prosperity and advancement of the world depends, is found among the younger men. The spirit, the hope, the sanguine enthusiasm, the fearlessness of consequences which are essential to great undertakings, are to be found in those whose hearts have not yet been chilled by disappointment, and to whom experience has not read lessons of doubt and caution. Some great things can only be achieved by a sort of desperate struggle, which none will venture who have lived long enough to be aware of its desperateness. Some evils never will be removed if their removal depend on those who have become accustomed to them, for they then become less burdensome than the toil of removing them. The old are naturally conservative ; they wish to keep things as they are ; they have ceased to hope any thing better ; innovations disturb them as unwise and ungraceful. The young fancy every thing might be better ; they take counsel of their imaginations and their dreams ; they think every thing to be possible, and are impatient to introduce changes which shall

bring to pass all their visions. The middle aged unite much of this caution of the elders with much of this ardor of the young; experience has given them wisdom, and years have not changed that wisdom to timidity; they love to act and desire to improve, but their action is not that of impulse, and they judge of improvement more by lessons of history and real life than by the suggestions of a sanguine imagination. For these reasons it might be best if the affairs of society could be wholly entrusted to them, if its security and peace for the present, and its steady advancement toward something better, could be committed to their mature wisdom and energetic but thoughtful experience, subject to no revolutionary violence on one side, and to no lethargic contentment on the other. But as these wise counsellors in the prime of life could never exist excepting as they arose from the ranks of the young, and as their wisdom could be acquired only by their experience in earlier years, it is impossible that the guidance of the public weal should devolve on them alone; the younger must have a share with the more mature in order to their right introduction to the cares and trusts of manhood; and the aged should be retained among the counsellors that their caution may keep the balance right, and prevent the undue preponderance of hasty impulses and ill considered projects.

There is always a tendency in the ranks of the young men to press forward and seize prematurely the active stations in society. The fire of ambition and enterprise consumes them; they are impatient of tardy action. In the great procession of society they can ill bear to be kept in the rear rank, and be obliged to school down their quick step to the deliberate movement of their elders in the van. In various ways this tendency has always exhibited itself. If there be a great political revolution, youths are among its leaders; if a career of military glory which sets the world in flames, it is a young man that commands it. Alexander was in India at thirty, and Napoleon in Italy at twenty-six. In arts also, and letters, how many have done their amazing works and gained their imperishable renown before the dawn of middle life. The fame of Raphael, the king of painters, of Byron, of Burns, of Lucan, and even of Newton in science, is the fame of early manhood.

The remarkable calmness and wisdom which marked the

conduct of the American revolution, was owing to the circumstance that its leaders were men in mature life, of sober experience and ripe wisdom. The author of the Declaration of Independence was younger, but he had seen thirty-two summers; there were few so youthful; and their undue impetuosity, if they could have been impetuous in so grave a cause, was more than balanced by the sobriety of the elder men, who, like so many Nestors, grey in years and patriotism, were joined to the councils which Chatham eulogized. The same is observable in the Army. The commander-in-chief, never a young man in the sense of being rash, was then arrived at the sober age of forty-four; the chiefs next to him had outlived the boyishness which counts war a frolic, and the young men who came forward during the struggle in the bloom of youth, like Lafayette and Hamilton, became imbued with the prevailing temper, engrafted the sobriety of years on their own ardent stock, and thus the war was saved from all predominance of folly, disorder, and caprice. It took from the first, and held to the last, the character of a grave performance of a serious duty.

During the last twenty years, in which there has been a new development of the active energies of man, and society in every direction has been extending its efforts for an increase of knowledge, wealth, power, and whatever constitutes the good of civilized man; when the moral has been as active as the political, and plans for the spiritual well-being of the race have been as enthusiastically formed and pursued as ever were expeditions for personal aggrandizement;—during this period, the universal stir has imparted a peculiar impulse to the young men. The circumstances of society in this country call them out, at an age which in other lands confines them to a state of pupilage, into the various fields of manly competition, invite them to become not only actors but leaders, and put them at once into places of responsible trust. The world was once astonished to behold the first place in the British empire bestowed upon a man of twenty-one years; but extraordinary emergencies always stand by themselves, and are exempt from the common rule; here and there arises a man who is a phenomenon among men. The tendency amongst us has been to put an end to these exceptions, and to fill the trusts of church and state with young men. This feature of our condition has been a subject of frequent animadversion by foreign observers,

and deserves attention from ourselves. We cut short the period of education and precipitate that of action, and lessen the time of preparation that we may begin that of labor; in consequence of which it is to be feared that the members of our acting community are, on an average, less completely accomplished in the desirable attributes of mind, than those of the same rank in other civilized lands. Our daughters leave school at sixteen, before they can have gained any adequate discipline of the intellect, or established a taste for profitable reading. Our sons are taken from school at fourteen or fifteen, pressed into business which allows them no time for further study, and they arrive at manhood, wealth, respectable connexions, perhaps a leading place in society, with nothing more than a school-boy's learning, and without the tastes which should adorn their station. Or if they pass through the course of education at our colleges, it is still such a course as brings them early and oftentimes but half educated into the professions, with only here and there one who can stand in fair competition with the scholars of the older countries; while many of them, who should have devoted their education to the all-important purpose of promoting the intellectual improvement of their country, shut up their books at the call of business, and, tempted by the prospect of speedy wealth, plunge into the active bustle of life. In a word, such is the opportunity for youth to appear and act as men, that they are fairly in danger of leaping at once from childhood to manhood, and by taking into their own hands the whole work of society, bring upon it something of the evil which Solomon suggests in that well known exclamation, "Woe unto thee, O land, when thy king is a child!"

In this state of things, it is no wonder that many thinking and patriotic men have addressed their counsels of political and moral wisdom to the young, for in truth never were the young so important to a country, nor so perilously situated; and he, who can succeed in impressing on their minds an adequate sense of the responsibility and dignity of their situation, so that they shall feel their place truly, be awed, but not depressed, by its responsibility, be excited, and not intoxicated, by its grandeur and promise, be made wise to seize and hold to use its vast opportunities without rashness, reverently deferring to the cautious judgment of the experienced, and yet not deficient in the energy which is requisite to go

forward as the times demand ; — that man will be their truest friend, as well as a benefactor to his country.

Mr. Muzzey has come forward to do his share in this work, and has done it well. Simple, direct, and affectionate, with a happy selection of topics and a judicious method of treating them, he has prepared a volume which may be confidently recommended, and which cannot fail of being read with strong interest by those for whom it is designed. Mr. Muzzey understands the position and wants of the young ; he has an evident sympathy in all that pertains to their period of life as a season of severe exposure, trial, and responsibility ; he comprehends, he is feelingly alive to, the importance of this period to them as moral and accountable beings whose happiness is to be found in their fidelity, and to the country which is so soon to see them the active controllers of its institutions, and to receive from them the influences which are to determine its character and fortunes. He offers his counsels to them under these two aspects, as individual men and as members of society, and sets before them the principles which shall guide them to usefulness, virtue, and fame in all the relations they may sustain. The several principal topics of his chapters are ; the importance of youth as the period when principles are to be fixed and habits formed ; the value of character to young men ; their moral dangers ; their duties to the family, to society, and the country ; the value and means of religion as the foundation of virtue and the source of happiness. In all these a high standard is set up, and throughout the whole there is a reference to religious principle as the one thing needful which imparts a sacred character to the most ordinary duties and the meanest obligations.

We select a few specimens which may give an idea of the manner in which some of these subjects are treated, and verify the remarks we have made.

“ We pass next to our last inquiry. *How may a praiseworthy character be best established?* The first requisite, I would name for this purpose, is Moral Enthusiasm. By this I mean a deep, unquenchable love of moral excellence. How has the distinguished Poet, Orator, Artist, the man indeed who excels in any pursuit, attained his eminence ? By an all-absorbing love of it, by being first fired with a thirst for that one species of excellence. So let our young man gaze on a perfect character, meditate on inward purity and solid merit, until his bosom shall burn with a

fervent desire to possess it. And if it be worth no more than this chapter has imperfectly described, does it not deserve this elevated rank? Can we indeed exaggerate its value? Revolve then in your mind, during your most secret and retired hours, the charms of virtue. Dwell on the beauty of holiness by day and by night, and you will soon have entered her sacred temple.

“Determine next to acquire the prize that has kindled your soul. There is nothing in man so mighty for weal or for woe, as firmness of purpose. Resolution is almost omnipotence. To this the noblest achievements owe their accomplishment. Sheridan, one of the ablest men in English Parliamentary history, — though unhappily ruined by vice, — was at first timid, and obliged often to sit down in the midst of a speech. Convinced of, and mortified at the cause of his failures, he said one day to a friend, ‘It is in me, and it shall come out.’ From that moment he rose, and shone, and triumphed in a consummate eloquence. Here was true moral courage. And it was well observed by a heathen moralist, that ‘it is not because things are difficult, that we dare not undertake them; but they appear difficult, because we dare not undertake them.’ Be then bold in spirit. Indulge no doubts, for doubts are traitors. Believe that you can be eminently virtuous, as correct in your principles, and as pure in your conduct and conversation, as any man living. If you do this, circumstances will favor you; temptation will be awed before you; and present honor and eternal glory will await you. He who is thoroughly in earnest, and who has set to his seal, that rich or poor, through good and through evil report, let it cost what it will, he will form a good character, that young man will not, he cannot fail of his end. He may not be rich; he may suffer from envy, and from the tongue of calumny; but sure as he lives, he will reach the mark which he placed before him. He will acquire what he would not exchange for mines of wealth, nor for the Hosannas of a world. \* \* \*

“In the practical pursuit of our high aim, let us never lose sight of it in the slightest instance. For it is more by a disregard of small things, than by open and flagrant offences, that so many come short of Christian excellence. How has he, who entered the city as a poor waiting boy, become now a man of immense wealth? Because he laid up at first small sums, and let no opportunity escape to gain even a trifle. Be you, a child of light, aspiring to be inwardly rich, profited by his example. Lay up the least circumstances that will enrich your character. Where principle, duty, improvement are concerned, never should you say, ‘it is of little consequence how I shall act.’ Feel rather that all goodness is pure gold. Think not lightly of the smallest

particle of it. There is always a right and a wrong; if you ever doubt, be sure you take not the wrong. Observe this rule, and every experience will be to you a new means of moral advancement. Retirement and society, observation, business and recreation, reading, conversation, outward success and adversity, all things will converge toward the one high aim of your soul." — pp. 36–40.

"Having said thus much of the pleasures and advantages of Religion, I am now to speak of *the Conditions on which you may hope to enjoy them*. These correspond to its value. Piety renders one truly happy. But who may enjoy that happiness? Is it right to expect the full rewards of obedience in the commencement of the Christian course? Certainly not. A young man may tell us that he has tried the ways of Religion, and they do not furnish that delight, which the pious ascribe to them. But how did he make this experiment? By meditating, perhaps, a few hours upon serious things; by spending one Sabbath with more strictness than usual; by forcing himself to read his Bible, or reflect on some particular personal fault for a short period. Call you this a fair trial? How do we bring the uninterested scholar to love his studies? Do we compel him to fix his eyes for one, two, or three hours on his books, and then, if he is not charmed with his task, confess to him that study is always unpleasant? No, we tell him to persevere; and that the longer he applies himself, the better will he be convinced, that the acquisition of knowledge and the improvement of his mind will afford him true happiness.

"So must it be in your pursuit of Religion. Consider, in the outset, that it is a vast subject; and that it requires much time, and much patient, self-denying devotion. And believe it to be a great prize, worth the sacrifice it demands. Doubt not that the farther you proceed in the love of God, and in keeping his commands, the more will you understand, and partake of its pleasures. Habit often renders the most irksome employment at length welcome. How then must it augment our affection for moral and spiritual employments, for those services which awaken the noblest sentiments of our nature; which possess an intrinsic and eternal interest; which need not, like our daily avocations, that we go and come to accomplish them, but are performed at home, in the solemn quiet of our own souls, and are an ever-present privilege, a part of our divine, inalienable, and glorious birth-right. The path of a young man thus occupied cannot lead to unhappiness. He may be called to toil, resist, and struggle; but man was made for action. He may be visited by trials, and sorrows; but his faith will not be consumed, it will be kindled and glow in the fiery ordeal; and his path shall be 'as the rising

sun, which shineth more and more unto the perfect day.'"—pp. 161—163.

We have been particularly impressed, while reading our author's remarks on the public duties of young men, with the exceeding importance of spreading right notions on this subject. The political, moral, and religious destinies of this country are all dependent on the practical opinions which the coming generations shall carry with them into the action of life; and there are certain hazards to which our prosperity and character are exposed, concerning which they ought earnestly to be put on their guard, and solemnly instructed to provide a seasonable resistance. These are hinted at, more or less minutely, in the book before us; and on one or two of them we would take the present opportunity to enlarge.

It has often been remarked, and the remark is doubtless founded in truth, that the principle of personal and political equality, in being acted out, operates to produce undue familiarity in intercourse, and a disregard of those outward forms of courtesy which render the intercourse of society pleasant and agreeable. The ancient air of deference with which gentlemen met each other, the decorous uncovering of the head, and the tone of respectful regard which marked the address of the younger to their seniors, these have departed; and young men scarcely out of their teens speak of their elders and to them, with the same familiar tone and colloquial freedom of good fellowship, with which they meet their own companions. We may well rejoice, that what was irksome and frivolous in the artificial forms of other days, has been banished; but it is lamentable that it should ever be allowed to carry with it the natural expression of respect, and still more so, to erase from the heart the disposition to give honor where it is due. Yet one cannot altogether avoid the apprehension, that to this extent the age has gone in far too many instances. It is to be admonished and recalled. Respect for age is a natural sentiment, implanted in the human soul for wholesome purposes, in all ages and nations esteemed and inculcated. Respect for superior virtue, for high station, for eminent services, is also a natural sentiment, which can be dispensed with only by so far unhumanizing the community which abrogates it. All nations have found it necessary in all ages to cherish it; the human being demands it, and cannot live

happily in society without it. Hence the promptings of nature have been followed in the establishment of chiefs and kings, standing apart from the people. Hence the gradation of ranks among the ancient Egyptians, among the Eastern nations in all ages, among the European nations even the most civilized and free down to the present time. Let it be allowed that in all these the institution has been false and mischievous; that man has been thus debased, and deprived of many of his noblest rights; still it remains true, that they were founded in an original suggestion of human nature. Those who gained the ascendancy may have abused it, but the original sentiment was a noble one, and the multitude exercised a state of mind virtuous in itself, though the objects on which it rested might be unworthy, and the forms of its exhibition degrading. To look up with awe to real greatness, to express deference for true wisdom, to bend in reverence to that which is high and is appointed to administer the essential functions of society, so far from being a weakness is a virtue, so far from a debasing is an elevating trait of character. The child stands thus in the presence of his father, or we brand him as a monster. The man stands thus in the presence of his Creator, or we shudder at his insane daring. He that honors his parent and worships his God with the deepest devotion, is always accounted as doing what is most becoming MAN to do. He thus manifests that he knows his place, and that he may be trusted. And just in proportion as any other beings or institutions stand toward him in relations similar to those of his parent or his God, something of the same honor is exercised toward them. The old man, the good man, the public benefactor, the magistrate, the law, the state, each is an object of respect. Nay, he recognises in every individual, a brother of the parent whom he reveres, a son and image of the God whom he adores, an equal subject of the law he honors; and therefore he honors all men. He feels that none are to be treated with disrespect; if equal, then equally entitled to consideration with himself; if in each a portion of the national sovereignty resides, then that sovereignty is to be honored in the person of each; and he can no more be guilty of, than be willing to receive, that indecorum of speech or of manners which implies that a man has a right to be rude.

This deserves to be seriously considered. If it were, men would perceive it to be altogether base, worthy only of a

grovelling mind, to thrust the principle of political equality into the face of every man he meets, and thus abolish the courtesies of life. Yet it has been strangely permitted, even where it would be least expected; men forget their moral duty in the selfish application of a civil right. As we once heard it well described, the interpretation of the republican principle seems too often to be, "I am as good as you;" hence disrespect and rudeness; whereas the true interpretation is, "You are as good as I,"—which would lead to universal deference and politeness.

It is not too much to say of the tendency we refer to, that it leads to unfaithfulness toward the institutions of the country, and puts in jeopardy the high expectations which have been founded on them. We have here nothing which is venerable for its antiquity, no sacred relics of former days, no ancient institutions of government or religion, which bear on their front the hallowed impress of departed ages, and are inseparably mingled with the earliest recollections and associations of our souls. All is new. All has been created as it were by ourselves, within the memory of the present generation. Our constitution, our government, our whole political organization, are the work of our own hands, and the work of our own hands we will not worship. We eulogize and flatter them as fond parents do their children, but as for reverence—no, they are our creatures; we are the sovereigns, not they; they can be changed at our pleasure, and shall be whenever we see fit. We therefore hold them in as little respect as we please. And with this habit of viewing the constitution, the law, and the law-makers, what are we to anticipate? Is it strange that we have seen what we have seen? Even the most sacred thing among us,—that which attaches to itself more nearly than any thing else that deep feeling of inviolable devotion which is termed *LOYALTY*,—even the Constitution of our Government, the subject of so much verbal panegyric, overladen with so much violent and fulsome eulogy,—yet how easily, in more than one instance both in the national and the state governments, has party spirit been able to set it at defiance, and erect itself into a power above it? How have men sworn to defend it, yet laughed it to scorn, when it stood in their way! How have even Legislators been bold enough to contradict it by their enactments! Then the Law,—which if it be not supreme in the land, alas for our liberty and security;

which if it be not king, then is nothing to be looked for but anarchy and chaos — have we not seen this sacred guardian set at defiance by the people in violent assemblies ; and that, not only, as might sometimes be expected to occur, in seasons of sudden exasperation and passionate excitement, but deliberately, systematically, under the guidance of men of high name, large influence, reputed patriotism, confessedly appealing to a power above the law, and in place of the law, as something better than the law ; while meantime the over-awed press held an ominous and dreadful silence, not daring to rebuke the vile conspiracy against the people and their rights.

When such things can be, there is occasion for serious alarm. If the Law can be despised, if the Constitution can be crushed, if men of influence can be found capable of asserting, and acting on the assertion, that there is an authority in the land higher than these, the country is undone. Now is the season to look to it while this fearful development is yet new, before the disorder has spread and corrupted the whole people. And it is the Young Men of America who are especially interested, it is for them to recover and restore the respect for law and right. Let them see to it that they early cherish in themselves and in all around them a heartfelt, unwavering, all-submissive respect for the Law ; neither by word nor by act, let them cast a breath of ill will upon it, or raise in themselves or others, a willingness that it should be evaded. If there be a bad law, (as unhappily the rage for legislation, and the insufficient reverence for law have but too often caused evil enactments,) seek its repeal ; submit implicitly while it exists, at any inconvenience, at any loss ; it will be to your honor to suffer for the general good ; but seek its repeal by righteous means, and always in such wise as shall prove your profound respect for Law itself, and your deep sorrow that so great a wrong should have been done to its majestic name, by the usurpation into its place of an unrighteous statute. Do thus the utmost in your power to maintain the inviolable sacredness of that authority without which there is no security to the nation, and to enshrine the image of it in the hearts of all the people.

These remarks may be extended to another point : the manner in which the men who hold office in the government shall be regarded and treated. It is true, that very unworthy men may be thrust into places of high dignity ; but it greatly

concerns the well-being of the community, that the *place* should at all events be honored, and the man in it for the sake of the place. Like a bad law, he should be displaced by the regular forms as soon as possible, but like the law, should be honored until displaced, not for his own sake, but for the sake of the institutions and the people. Dishonor him, and you wound the general good, by casting contempt on an office essential to be honored. The incumbent cannot dishonor the office; it is unsoiled by his baseness, it is uncontaminated by his corruption; he leaves the seat as he found it, pure and revered, unless the offensive missiles, hurled at him while he filled it, may have desecrated it in the thoughts of the bystanders, and the office thus become an object of contempt, because associated with the contempt cast on the man. Who, therefore, can regard with unconcern, or with any feelings but those of mortification and alarm, the reckless tone of so large a portion of the political press in all that relates to public men and their public life! Let them be exposed to free observation and severe judgment; it is right. Never let a base man usurp the place of a public functionary, or prove himself untrue to his trust, without being exposed. But let this be done with the calm and grave tone with which the judge on the bench pronounces sentence after the process of impeachment, so as to save the dignity of the office, and the honor of the mistaken men who raised him to it, while it unmasks the falsehood of the man. Then good might be done, the press would exercise a wholesome and needful moral control. How is it now? We are obliged to say, that to too great an extent it is a mere instrument of party. It is a mouth-piece to spread unfounded calumnies, without regard to character, truth, or consequences; it catches up and propagates any report which may prove injurious to an obnoxious statesman, or welcome to the mass of gossiping readers; it imposes with the most enormous and untiring impudence on the credulity of the people, and throws the facts and opinions of the times into such confusion, that a sober inquirer can hardly hope to arrive at the truth. And this press is nearly the governor of the community! The journals which are less violent, less false, more principled, calm and fair, are so much more tame, that they have comparatively a small circulation, and the mass of the people is left to the mercy of a large body of self-constituted, irresponsible editors, whose whole care it is to make such journals as

will attract the readers of their party, and secure a good livelihood to themselves. Is there not thus a perpetual warfare waged against the spirit of patriotism in the people? Can our institutions fail to fall into disrespect? We call on the ingenuous and fair-minded Young Men, who are coming up into life, as yet unsoiled by the low contests of party, and still glowing with their native love of the pure and the true, to discountenance and rebuke this unholy brood. It is for them to set a higher example; to make it dishonorable, either to edit or receive a gazette which is indifferent to truth, good morals, and the fair reputation of public men. Let them unite with one voice, and declare that the profanation we complain of shall go no farther; that the good name of every son of the common Mother is sacred, until forfeited by crime, and shall not lie at the mercy of political writers, whose trade is defamation. We call on them to give to their country a generation of fair-minded and generous politicians, and thus secure to her that respect and love, which cannot live in the bosom of her children, if her image be forever associated in their minds with what is low and selfish.

A part of the duty of the rising generation to their age and country, relates to the cultivation of the mind, the advancement of knowledge, and the spread of those elegant tastes which refine and exalt. "Onward" is the watchword of the times, and it should be applied to this as well as to other subjects. Onward the nation is going with astonishing rapidity, in population and wealth, and consequently in the means of promoting any object which shall seem desirable. It is infinitely desirable, that this wonderful external progress should be accompanied by a corresponding progress in education and refinement, so that when we shall equal the older nations in wealth, and exceed them in numbers, we may not be mortified by inferiority in science, literature, and the civilizing arts. Now the danger is, that the progress of the mind will lag tardily behind the growth of the outward prosperity; it certainly will do so, if effects correspond to causes, unless our youth are trained in a supreme regard to the higher objects of man, and sedulously cultivate in themselves the love of letters and refinement. Thirty years ago, Mr. Buckminster, filled with the generous spirit that belonged to him, and with an apprehensive regard to the tendency we are adverting to, wrote home from Europe, as an apology for purchasing so ex-

tensive a collection of books, when his own life was so uncertain, "I consider that, by every book I send out, I do something for my dear country, which the love of money seems to be depressing almost into unlettered barbarism." This is the spirit that should animate our young men. When they see how the whole people is abandoned to this idolatry, how many gifted minds are decoyed by the glittering temptation from the quiet pursuit of letters and the cultivation of knowledge, they should awake to a sense of the peril that threatens. They should understand how the true greatness of a people does not consist in its external prosperity; that it never can be secure or happy without knowledge. Let them give their most strenuous effort to maintain the truth on this point. Let those, especially, who have had the benefit of the highest education, know, that to them is committed a solemn charge in this respect. They are constituted by Providence guardians of this portion of the public weal. They are made watchmen over the intellectual interests of the people. They are to be overseers of the instruction of the land, and in no small part its educators and guides. Let them know that they descend from their lofty position, when they forsake this honorable vocation, and go out from the temple of science and the halls of instruction to join the throng that is toiling for mere wealth and power. They are not wanted in the counting-room or the market-place. There are enough without them to do the active work, and carry on the commerce of the world, and fill the offices of state. But they are wanted in the seats of education. More teachers in all departments; more sober, enlightened, judicious educators of the people alike in the humbler schools and in the higher seminaries of science, morals, and art, are pressingly needed; and he does more service as a patriot who puts his books in a knapsack, and walks away with it to some frontier settlement, and lays the foundation of a solid education in that infant town, than he who by enterprise, adventure, or speculation, becomes the nabob of a city. A thousand men have the education and the talent for the latter, for one that is fitted for the former, or has the character requisite to accomplish it.

We address a similar train of remark to all. For the sake of their own happiness and dignity, for the sake of their country and fellow-men, let all cultivate the love of letters, and intellectual accomplishments, and a spirited interest in the

cause of education. It often happens to men of active vocations, that they cultivate no taste for reading beyond that of the newspapers; they therefore never arrive at any enlargement of mind, or systematic and extensive knowledge; they have no resources if health and fortune fail them; in sickness and in age they are forlorn and desolate; the mind and its treasures are nothing to them; even the book of life fails to command their lethargic attention; nay, in instances not a few, it has been known that when a sudden reverse of fortune has left such men without resource, they have cast themselves into the arms of death. Such instances should plead trumpet-tongued for a juster treatment of the immortal mind, which demands to be fortified against evil, by tastes, resources, and habits corresponding to its nature and destiny.

But let them be warned against being led astray by the temptations presented by the present condition of literature. The multiplication of books offers equal facilities at the present time for the cultivation of the most beneficial, and the most injurious taste in reading; and while the land is deluged with worthless publications at inconceivably low prices, the exposure of unwary minds to corruption and waste is very much like the temptation to intemperance, which lies at the corners of the streets. One may read continually without being benefited. A large proportion of the popular works which lie in every body's way, lauded in the newspapers like patent drugs, and offered at every corner like cheap spirits, are little else than poisonous stimulants, exciting the appetite, creating a craving for indulgence, and debilitating instead of nourishing the mind which resorts to them. We could as soon recommend our young men to feed at the confectioner's, and drink at the bar of a second-rate tavern, in order to ruddy health and manly vigor of body, as send them to the circulating libraries in order to a clear and strong mind. We warn them against the effeminacy of soul to which this feeding on the popular literature of the day will inevitably lead. The resources of classic English literature, both of former times and of the present day, are abundant in books of solid merit, and equally interesting with the trivial volumes just referred to; and it is pitiable to find so many resorting to the society of the foolish and corrupting, in preference to that of the strong and elevating. However we may lament the vast proportion of worthless trash published and republished by the American press, we cannot deny that

a large mass of valuable works also are continually brought before the public. So that no one need complain that wholesome nutriment is not at hand ; it is his own fault if he select the deleterious. And let the rising generation but use a wise and discriminating judgment ; let them reject whatever a pure moral and literary taste disapproves ; let them take advice of men competent to give it ; let them be guided in the selection of books, not by the purchased panegyric of flippant editors, or the advertising puffs of interested booksellers, but by the deliberate recommendation of some judicious friend, or the impartial testimony of some trustworthy literary journal ; and the evil so much complained of will cease to exist.

We do not mean to repeat here what is so often and so urgently said of the importance of intellectual cultivation and taste to the character and prosperity of this nation. It has become a proverb, that popular institutions can rest securely only on the intelligence and virtue of the people, and that to these universal education is essential. But proverbs are words ; and it is wonderful how superficially, after all, the great truth herein expressed has taken hold of the actual convictions of the people, or, at any rate, how exceedingly low is the estimate of the requisite intelligence and virtue. Our governments and our politicians seem as yet to have hardly caught a glimpse of the truth, or to have suspected the responsibility which it devolves on them. They go forward as if the great duty of public men were still, as in the barbarous ages, to provide for external defence, as if the depredations of robbers were the only thing to be feared, and as if all wealth were wasted which is diverted to any other object. And, therefore, when they hold in their hands the public wealth, beyond what this object requires, they know not what to do with it. Short-sighted beyond other men, they do not perceive that Providence has given them this unheard of boon, just at the present age of the world and in this precise state of society, that they might perform a duty for their country, which no other country ever had such an opportunity or such a need of performing, namely, the establishing that universal thorough EDUCATION which all the wise and good see to be the one thing essential to the national prosperity. One might suppose it to be the great charge of a government so situated, to secure that one essential thing on which the hope of the nation rests. And yet, instead of thus acting up to the spirit of the age, they limit themselves by the narrow

views of former and ignorant ages, and dissipate for temporary objects those means which might have been made to rear institutions that would bless the country to the end of time. Perhaps nothing different could be reasonably expected of the government of the nation ; but we blush that Massachusetts should have proved so false to her former reputation as to throw away the splendid opportunity. We are ashamed that the magnificent sum of nearly two million dollars should be divided and subdivided, and scattered over the surface of this State, like so much water spilt upon the ground, on the poor pretence of lightening the burdens of the people. Have the sons of the Puritans come to regard this petty relief as the summum bonum ? Is this the legislation which they ask at the hands of their representatives ? We are slow to believe it, though it has been asserted. Or if, for the present, they are willing, like improvident children, to take a temporary gratification in place of a solid and lasting good, the time must come when they will count themselves wronged by the parsimonious indulgence.

While these things are so, it is the more necessary that individuals should devote themselves to this all-important concern. What has been done amongst us hitherto, has been done principally by private beneficence ; and the signs of the times indicate, that government is determined to throw the future yet more upon the munificence and forethought of private men. However this may be, it is clear that the further progress of education depends on the interest which shall be taken in it by the men who are coming forward to fill the future places in society. They must, therefore, be early aware of their responsibility. However absorbed in their own affairs, they must allow themselves leisure to devote a portion of their care and thought to this general good. Public spirit must be a pervading and universal virtue ; not displaying itself merely in those works of general convenience, by which intercourse is promoted, trade facilitated, and our cities adorned ; — in regard to these, neglect is little to be apprehended, because they lie in the very path of men, and are palpably instrumental in the growth of population, wealth, and luxury. The public spirit which the times demand must go deeper ; it must act as if the minds and character of the people were the chief concern, and therefore be anxious to enlarge the means of education and virtue, watch over the schools, encourage the institutions of philanthropy, and labor for whatever advances society

by advancing the minds of its individual members. What might not be the progress and glory of this land, if our Young Men would devotedly address themselves to this great enterprise !

To all this, there is yet a higher principle to be added. It is not for patriotism only, that we speak ; it is not merely the prosperity, order, and peace of the community, that we would promote ; nor can it be hoped that the highest form of civilization will be attained, if man be regarded as the creature of society only. There are no principles adequate to this end, but those of the Christian Faith. All others stop short of the requisite thoroughness and consistency. The laws of the Commercial world uphold honesty because it is the best policy, and connive at breaches of morality when they are good policy also. Politicians and governments make wealth and power the supreme good, and have little care whether individuals be ignorant or informed, virtuous or vicious, happy or miserable, so long as the state prospers. The law of Honor establishes an external decorum of deportment, and obliges the base to appear like gentlemen ; but it cares not for any thing deeper than the appearance ; it leaves character unimproved, affixes no stigma to the grossest debauchery of life, permits the seducer to walk unmarked amongst men, and applauds him who lives with the cherished purpose of revenging with murder any insult to his own person. The mere pursuit of Science or Letters, refining and strengthening as it may the intellect, yet allows the corruption of the heart to remain, frowns ambiguously on the irregularities of life, and admits the profligacy of Byron and Voltaire to the same honors with the purity of Cowper and Milton. It is not here, then, that we must have our young men schooled. It is not a punctilious personal honor, nor a mere devotion to country, nor a zeal for knowledge, that can satisfy. We must see them concerned for PRINCIPLE ; — patriots and scholars, for the reason, not that it is public spirited and good policy, but from a sense of moral obligation, because it is immoral to be otherwise. They must regard Virtue as the chief concern, the interests of the religious nature the chief interests, and whatever is done for themselves and for society, must be done in obedience to the will of God, and with a view to the highest welfare of his moral children.

We have not room to press this great topic. We can only

implore our Young Men to give it their faithful consideration. Let them ask themselves, what there is worth living for except virtue, and how virtue can exist without principle, and what principle can be trusted excepting that of Religion. Let them take counsel of their moral nature, let them listen to the spirit's voice within, which they cannot fail sometimes to hear, however overborne by the noise of the world and the tumult of earthly desires. Let them set their mark high, and press steadily forward to reach it. What other lesson are they to learn from the hallowed history of their own land? Who made New England what it is? What laid the foundations of strength, virtue, knowledge, which have been and still are, blessed be God, our just boast? Men, with whom religious considerations were the first question; who did their duty to the state, because it was their duty to God; who thought that no real good existed for the human family, but that which grew up from Christian faith, and a stern devotedness to conscience and truth. Herein we discern the spirit that makes a commonwealth, and it is the only spirit that can keep it. So far as New England has gone forward, it is in the power and by the guidance of this spirit; and if it has gone backward,—if,—in the love of liberty, in devotion to knowledge and human rights, in high moral independence, she has gone backward,—it is because she has been unfaithful to this spirit of the Forefathers, and recreant to their example. If in any honorable thing the Commonwealth has deteriorated, it is because it is less a Christian Commonwealth, and because inferior views have turned aside the hearts of the rulers, and corrupted the tastes of the people.

It is a narrow and short-sighted policy which excludes private principle from public actions; as if God were not the sovereign of the nation as well as of the man, as if he were not Lord of society as well as Father of its individual members, as if the whole history of the world did not show how he has exacted heavy retribution from the nations whenever they allowed selfishness and luxury to usurp the place of integrity and virtue. One would suppose, from the manner in which some men talk, that the ballot-box and the press were infallible talismans, breathing into the people undying vigor and everlasting youth; forgetting that they are both of them but the tools of the people, and sure to become corrupt and corrupting the moment that public and private principle are held cheap.

And so of all our political institutions. They are at the beck and will of individual men ; and they are the readiest instruments of the nation's ruin, if those men are allowed to become unprincipled. They may be unprincipled in spite of constitutions, free elections, and newspapers ; in spite of a general education which should confine itself to human learning and the mere art of getting along in the world. Oh, that our brave and goodly armies of youth just coming into life, eager, resolute, and with the destiny of forty millions in their hands, could be made to see this ; that they could be roused to understand, and to act on the understanding of this infallible truth ; that they could see how there are other institutions, those of moral instruction and Christian faith, on which the happiness and weal of themselves and all they love depend, infinitely more than on what the politicians and schemers about them contrive and enact. Let them observe, that there is no ground to fear lest the exchange and the senate-house be deserted, but there is fear lest the house of God be forsaken, and the institutions of Religion cast away ; lest the generations, that are rapidly filling up our extensive borders, should spread their tents upon the hill-sides and in the valleys without the Tabernacle of the Lord among the tribes ; lest worldly-mindedness and earthliness should possess and deprave the inheritance of our posterity.

Let our YOUNG MEN come to the rescue, and resolve to prevent the evil before it is too late. Beautiful it is to observe how many of them are already on the alert, and doing with their might what the times and their religion demand. How much does the cause of temperance, of education ; of philanthropy in all its various branches, owe to their hearty aid and affectionate zeal. We look with admiration and devout gratitude on the examples we have seen of the cultivated and accomplished bringing the treasures of their intelligence, their refinement, and their wealth, and laying them at the feet of the altar, in the service of the poor and the church. We say to them, God speed ! They are doing for themselves and for society a work that can never pass away, the most important work now to be done for mankind. If their spirit could pervade the land, if in all our cities and villages this youthful energy could be excited, and the united force of our ten thousand beating and growing hearts be directed to this object, what a revolution should we not behold, and how like

Paradise would be our land, before the current century shall close. We put it to the conscience of every young reader, whether he will not do his part. It may seem little he can do; but let him think it would be criminal in him to withhold this little; let him know, that if he do it in simplicity and faith, it will be far more than he imagines. There is no infallible sign that the world is to be despaired of, until individual men think there is nothing for them to do toward its salvation.

H. W., jr.

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ART. II. — *Notices of the Rev. Bezaleel Howard, D. D., of Springfield; being the Substance of the Rev. Mr. Peabody's Discourse at his Interment, February 22, 1837.*

I. CORINTHIANS, XV. 26. The last enemy that shall be destroyed is death.

IF any of you have enemies, you will find that there is but one way to disarm and subdue them. If you have power to crush them and trample upon them, they will still be your enemies, — more hostile and determined than ever. By power, you may silence and overawe them, but they will cherish their hatred in the silence of their souls. The only way effectually to remove an enemy is to change him into a friend. This is the way in which the Savior of the world has destroyed the enemies of his religion. Ever since he was lifted up on the cross he has been drawing the human race to himself; their aversion to his spiritual religion is overcome by the power of his dying love.

And this is the way in which the Savior of the world has subdued the last enemy of man. He has changed death into a friend, and taught men to regard him as a friend; he has changed the whole aspect of death and the grave. Once the voice from Heaven said to erring man, "Dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return." Heavily that sentence fell upon the human heart. But He says, — "He that liveth and believeth in me shall never die." And now he expects us to regard the visitation of mortality as friendly to our welfare; he expects us to alter all our views of the subject; he expects us to give way as little as possible to our natural feelings; and to open our hearts as much as possible to the hopes and prom-

ises which he hath brought us from above. It makes an immense difference, how we look upon these things, and we can determine for ourselves how we will look upon them. If we look upon them in the faint light of human science and imagination, it shows us nothing but dust returning to the earth as it was ; but if we see these things in the light of his religion, it makes all things new.. There is no more death ; the departed are passed from death unto life ; the shadow of death, — it is but a shadow, — gives way before the dayspring from on high. The grave is the entrance of the shining path in which the just shall continually ascend from glory to glory in heaven.

I can urge you now, with more confidence than ever, to look upon death as the friend and not the enemy of man ; for I can offer you the example of our father, whose loss we now deplore. For years he has been drawing near the grave, with the prospect of death full before him. He has thought upon it all the day ; he has thought upon it in the watches of the night. All the closing years of his life have been spent in preparation for its coming. While it was yet afar off, he regarded it as a happy change ; when it came near, he saw it with a calm and even cheerful eye ; and those who stood near the death-bed can bear witness, that no friend, returning after the absence of years, was ever more welcome than the coming of death was to him. He felt that it came to release him ; his whole feeling was, "Now lettest thou thy servant depart in peace."

I am speaking to those who enjoy the light of Christianity. The Red Sea was life to those who were permitted to pass through it, but death to those who perished in its waters. So death is death to those who hope for nothing beyond it ; but it is life to those who look forward to rest in heaven. Life and immortality have been brought to light by Jesus Christ. Before Christianity, there were hopes of a future existence, — there were imaginations of a future existence ; but it never was confirmed, — never appeared like a reality, till the grave had actually given up its dead, — till the Son of God was seen returning from its deserted caverns, and declaring that it never again should have power to imprison the just.

And now let me ask you to look upon death in the light of Christianity, and see whether it is, or is not, a friend to the race of man.

First. Death is the friend of the world. Improvement is the great law of existence, and the improvement of the world is secured by that order of Providence which sweeps successive generations away. As each generation passes, some of its prejudices, errors, and sins are buried with it, while its improvement remains and is preserved in the great treasures of the human mind and heart. Death is the great reformer; it is continually removing those obstacles which prevent the world from advancing. There was a time when the wickedness of man was great, and God removed it by a sudden and universal flood. And he is now doing the same thing, not suddenly, but in the daily order of nature; all are carried away as with a flood; and sure it is easier to direct the young mind than to reform the old,—since those evil habits which become so strong in fifty years would become invincible in five hundred, it is well that one generation passeth away and another cometh. Without this succession, there would be no improvement,—no advance,—no hope for the race of man.

But you say it is not so with the good; the world loses something when they die. It does indeed; but it does not lose the effect of their services; it does not lose the benefit of their example. On the contrary, the dying can make an impression on many whom the living cannot reach. There is no eloquence like that of the dying tongue; it commands attention and teaches lessons which even the thoughtless cannot forget. And when the righteous are gone from the living, they do not lose their power: though dead, they yet speak; their instructions affectionately remembered have more power than in the day when they were given. Consider, then, that were it not for death there could be no such relations of life as now give life its charm. The relation of parent and child, and many others, which now give room for the best discipline of the human heart, and the best displays of human virtue, could not exist were it not for death. Also the beautiful contrast between the young and the hoary head would be unknown; the happy influence which age exerts on childhood would be lost; and what is more than all, we should lose the power,—the awful power which resides in the memory of the dead. Without death, the world would be like a vast forest with all its leaves fallen and all its branches dry. Death is the friend and not the enemy of the collective race of man.

Secondly. If death is thus friendly to our race in general,

is it so to the individual? When we bring home the subject as a matter of direct personal interest, is death the friend or enemy of man?

Consider what our earthly tabernacle is. It is a material construction; it is made of earthly substance, and therefore it can last but for a certain time. The hour must come, when, from its very nature, it must decay and fall. Man could not exist long on earth unless the body were renewed. And then the question comes, — Is it better for this corruptible to put on some new corruptible form? Is it not better for this corruptible to put on incorruption, and this mortal immortality? Is it better to renew the mansion of clay with its infirmities and pains? Is it not better to lay it down, — to leave it for a world where infirmity, pain, and sorrow can never come? Is it better to remain “dying daily” on the earth, or to pass through the change of death at once, and place ourselves forever beyond his power?

But that death releases from the mortal frame is not the greatest of its blessings; it puts us in possession of enjoyments, privileges, and powers, which living we could never reach. A seed cannot be quickened without first dying; unless it is cast into the ground, it cannot become a new existence, — cannot reappear in verdure, covering the earth with its living green. So it is with the mortal man. Except he die, — except his body perish in the dust, he cannot reach that high state for which his God designed him; but when he has passed through it he may become as the angels of God. New powers of action may be given to his mind, — new warmth and glow to his heart. Surely the soul of the just must rejoice in a change like this; when it goes like a Siberian exile, returning from the region of cold and storms to the sunny hills and valleys of his native land.

But though the change of death is gain to the Christian, men fear its coming. This is true; and yet death may be a friend to man. There are friends who find no welcome from those whom they serve. Our feeling with respect to death shows, perhaps, that we are not contemplating it and preparing for it as Christians should. Our Savior shuddered at the thought of what death he should die; but not at the thought of dying. When he announced to his disciples that he must suffer, he remarked to them, “Sorrow hath filled your heart; if ye loved me, ye would rejoice, because I go unto my

Father." He himself rejoiced in the hope of meeting with his God.

We are to determine in what aspect death shall appear to us. It depends upon ourselves, whether to receive him as an enemy or a friend. Our lives are now determining what the change of death shall do for our souls. We are floating upon the tide of time ; whether we are bearing onward to a harbor of rest, God only knows. I see some, who are drifting, without keeping any purpose of existence in view. I see others, who are standing away, — far away from the course which leadeth unto life. Their destiny is in their own hands. Death will be a friend to all who will suffer him to serve them. What more can the warmest friendship do ?

Thirdly. When death calls others away, — when he takes from us those whom we venerate and love, is he our enemy or our friend ?

We must distinguish between our welfare and our feelings. There are many things which are good for our welfare, but distressing to our feelings. We think not of pain which we undergo, in order to secure a blessing ; we can submit to short privation to secure a distant good. And this is all that death requires us to do. It only asks us to give up the excellent and faithful, that they may go to a better world. Who would detain them, if he had the power ? Who would dare detain them from their home ? from the friends who are waiting to receive them ? from the Savior who claims them as his own ? from the Father who is ready to welcome them to the skies ?

If, when our friends are taken from us, we say, "An enemy hath done this," we charge death unjustly. He has not taken our friends away, any more than he has taken our God away. They are present with us still as God is present with us ; not seen by the eyes indeed, but present and visible to the soul. They are not lost ; we may meet them again if we will. We may recover our lost treasures if we will. Why then should we ever say of death, "He hath stripped me of my glory and taken the crown from my head ?" He takes nothing from us except for a moment ; and what he has taken he will restore in new brightness and glory.

But the Savior's purpose is not answered while we persist in treating death as the great enemy of man. We must learn to see these things in a different light, — in the light of the gos-

pel of Jesus Christ. We must feel that if death is sometimes severe, he is severely kind, — severely true. It is time that the old imaginations were done away, which for ages have covered the grave with gloom. Once it was supposed that the light of the dog-star shed heat and pestilence on the earth whenever it shone; and yet you may see that star in each winter night shining in icy brightness. So death never had the power to injure which human fancy ascribed to it; it never had power over the souls of the just. Let the scales fall from our eyes; let us see these things as they are; let us look on death, not as the close of existence, but as the day-spring of immortal life; not as the everlasting door that shuts us out from the living, — but as the gate of mercy, on golden hinges turning, which admits the blessed to glory and joy on high.

Such were the views of death which were taken by him whose loss we now deplore. For years he has been teaching us how to live, and now he has taught us how to die. He regarded this life as the beginning of existence; he kept the purposes of existence steadily in view. He resolved that when his Master came he should find him watching. Knowing that he might at any moment be called to take the voyage of death, he would not be far from the shore. He looked on death as a happy change, not because he trusted in any thing which he had done; for never was the sense of human unworthiness more deeply felt by any man. It was because he trusted in the Savior of the world, — because he had confidence in the Redeemer's dying love; it was because the great and precious promises were always before him, that he was able to look forward, with so much calmness, to the grave.

Since the example of our departed friend was one of religious faith, hope, and charity, I may be permitted to indulge my feeling in spreading out a few of its traits before you. It is indeed a departure from my usual course; but there are reasons to justify the exception, which will suggest themselves to every mind. I would propose him to you as an example, — an example of one whose endeavor it was to walk with God. We never again shall behold his venerable form; we never again shall hear his impressive and earnest tones. Suffer him then to instruct you by his memory and example, since it is all that he now can do.

The Rev. Dr. Howard was a native of Bridgewater in this State, where he was born in the year 1754. His youth

was passed, not in study, but in active employment of various kinds, by which he gained a great practical sagacity and large acquaintance with mankind. He had arrived at maturity before he determined to embrace a learned profession; but having a clear, manly understanding and strong intellectual tastes, he easily overcame the disadvantages of his earlier years in respect to education; while the chief qualification for his profession, piety, was never wanting; from his childhood he grew up in the fear of God.

He became pastor of the church in Springfield in the year 1785; and for many years discharged the duties of his profession with exemplary fidelity and conscientious self-devotion. In his preaching he was direct and familiar. Without the least ambition to be eloquent, and without imitating the artificial manner of preaching, which was then so common, he addressed his audience from the desk as if he were conversing with them; telling them with perfect freedom what were their transgressions and dangers, and representing to them the beauty of holiness with simplicity and power, like one who spoke from the inspiration of his own soul. Faithfulness was, in his eyes, the chief grace of his profession, and he was distinguished through life by his exact and unshrinking performance of his duty.

In the year 1805 his health failed in such a manner that he was obliged to retire from his public labors. When the exclusive system was first put in force he resisted it; and finding that there was no peace but in separation, he, with others of the same liberal views, formed themselves into a new religious society. He was at the time a firm believer in the Trinity; but he believed also in the excellence and piety of many who rejected the doctrine; and he would not lend his aid, nor even the silent authority of his name, to a system which treated them as enemies of righteousness, and cast them out as unworthy to come to the table of his Master. But I shall not dwell upon his history. My object is to present him to you as a religious example, for I never knew one more uniformly excellent, or one in which less was wanting.

And first; let me say that his duties to himself were always matters of principle, and rigidly and faithfully discharged. To him the duties of common life were so many duties of religion. In his social and domestic relations he acted as if in the presence of God, and counted nothing trifling which concerned the

welfare of his soul. In all his dealings with others he was exact and punctual ; prudence was with him a familiar virtue. In all his habits he was rigid and self-denying ; but his object was not to be rich, — not to secure comforts and pleasures for himself ; perhaps there never lived a man who cared less for self-indulgence, or more for the wants and happiness of other men.

But, the cares of this world, though they were faithfully regarded, were not near his heart. He thought it his first duty to himself to ascertain what he was created for ; why he was sent into this world ; and how he might become what the religion of Jesus Christ was meant to make him. In order to fulfil the purposes of existence, he kept the word of God always near him ; it was his counsellor, his guide, his most familiar friend. He went to it for enjoyment, — he went to it for consolations ; it was before him every morning ; it was the subject of his meditations every night. And thus he drank deeply into the spirit of the gospel ; thus he kept near the throne of grace ; his soul was always ready to rise in prayer, and to pour itself out in praise. His religion was not worn like a sabbath garment and put aside on other days ; it was closely blended with all the concerns of every day. Feeling that the duties which God required of him were for his own good, it was never a hardship, but always a pleasure to do them.

His chief object was to make himself spiritual in preparation for a spiritual state. Not that he thought lightly of religious forms, for he well knew that religion has no hold upon the man by whom its forms are not sacredly regarded. But his constant endeavor was to turn his attention from the things which are seen and temporal to those which are unseen and eternal. And thus he was able to see what others do not see ; God and eternity were realities to him ; he spoke and thought and acted like an immortal being ; like one whose prospects were not bounded by the grave. This spiritualmindedness had its natural and happy effect ; his piety was not gloomy and frowning ; it was cheerful, animating ; it spread a persuading light around him ; it inspired others to glorify their heavenly Father, for his example always seemed to say, “ Ye know these things, happy are ye if ye do them.”

Whenever he meditated, as he did often meditate upon his duties to himself, he set his standard high ; he was not one of those who think that a common, unspiritual morality would

answer the demands of God. He believed that man, as born into this world, begins a worldly life only ; he believed that man must be born again ; that he must begin a spiritual life,—a life with purposes and pursuits not depending on this world, but reaching forward to the other. And when the powers of the mind and the affections of the heart found objects above and beyond this world, when God was more regarded than man, and eternity more thought of than the passing day, he thought it sufficient evidence that this spiritual change was passed through. He walked in newness of life ; and by constant communion with God, by unceasing watchfulness, meditation, and prayer, he kept alive the fire which was kindled in his soul.

Again ; in his discharge of his duty to others, our departed friend may be offered as our example.

He was naturally of a bold and independent spirit ; impatient of contradiction, and not ready to submit to wrongs. He felt these natural tendencies, and endeavored to put a guard upon himself ; if ever he wounded the feelings of another, he would humble himself to make reparation. No one could doubt the genuineness of his regard for others. He was one of those to whom the supplicating eye was never raised in vain. He considered his property as a trust, as means which God had placed in his hands in trust for his fellow men. Wholly indifferent to the opinion of men concerning him, he was anxious to prepare the account of his stewardship for the eye of God ; and acting under this high and holy principle, he dispensed his charities with a liberality almost without example. He was not afraid of encouraging vice in others by relieving distress ; the vice which he feared to encourage was that of selfishness in his own breast. I have seen generous men,—charitable men,—men who were followed with eloquent thanks and grateful tears ; they are lights shining in this dark world, and from my soul I bless them. But I must say, that I never saw generosity that equalled his. Alas ! that the open hand is now cold in death ; never again to be extended to relieve the sufferer, or to raise the bowed down ! Yes ! the poor have lost a friend indeed. Well may they lament him ; well may they fear that his place will not be filled !

But while he was anxious to supply the temporal wants of others, he was still more earnest to secure the salvation of their souls. He had a deep sense of the value of the soul ; the

humblest being, — most degraded being was in his eyes, the possessor of an immortal soul. He could not bear to see this pearl of great price defaced by sensuality and sin; nor would he look on and see a soul in danger without an effort to save it from death. When he saw how many around him seemed wrapped up in worldliness, — and as careless of all spiritual things, as if there were no God above us and no life to come, it filled him with apprehension and dismay; he felt bound to call their attention to the subjects which they were fatally disregarding. It is not strange that he should have been moved to energetic remonstrance; the wonder is that men, having hearts and souls, can live on year after year, without the least preparation for that eternity to which they all must go. Sometimes his advice was received and remembered; and was the means, under God, of saving endangered souls. Sometimes it was rejected and scorned. But if there are any who have resented his freedom, let me ask them, — do you not in heart believe that when you lie on the death-bed, you will lament that you have not followed the advice he gave you? Do you believe that any thing less than a fervent love of his race would have induced him to offer you his counsel and warning?

In forming and maintaining his religious opinions, he manifested the same generous regard to the rights and claims of others, though he was firm as a rock in defence of his own. One of the severest trials of conscience is to form new convictions, in direct opposition to those which a man has preached and defended for years. This was the case with him. Though he was on friendly terms with divines who rejected the Trinity, he believed it to be a true and important doctrine, and endeavored to impress the evidence in its favor upon the minds of his people. It was not till a comparatively late period that he suspected the soundness of his opinions. Finding that the believers in that doctrine were advocates of what he deemed unchristian exclusion, while those who rejected it were advocates of that freedom which was always so dear to his soul, he resolved to examine the Scriptures thoroughly in reference to the subject. He did so, and the result was a clear conviction that the Bible taught nothing in opposition to the truth that God is one. It was no small effort to confess that he had been mistaken for years; it was painful to have his offered hand of fellowship cast away; but he openly avowed his change of sentiment, and remained a decided Uni-

tarian to the last. Still, he had an unaltered friendship for those who had but little charity for him. Do you say that he sometimes grew warm in defence of his own views of truth? If so, it shows the strong, single-hearted conviction with which he held them. Then I claim the more honor for his liberality, for he gave substantial proof that he was ready to aid other sects as well as his own, that every one might serve God in the way which his conscience enjoined. But on this point I need not dwell; for no one ever charged him with being a slave to religious party.

Once more; I would direct your attention to the manner in which he discharged his duties to God. The feeling that seemed always uppermost in his heart,—the feeling that sprang readiest to his lips, was gratitude for divine goodness; every thing in the wide world inspired that feeling in him; and most of all did he treasure those daily mercies which most men do not regard, because they are common and universal,—the very reason that should fill their hearts with praise. He had a profound conviction that every thing, which happened to him beyond his own control, was brought upon him by Divine Providence. While circumstances which men choose and order for themselves often result in evil, he knew that the arrangements of Providence, if men do not resist them, will always end in good. Having this inspiring faith deeply engraven on his heart, he counted it no hardship,—no sacrifice to submit to the dispensations of heaven. He was not free from changes and sorrows,—he saw his friends going before him; he saw his children going before him,—those on whom he depended much for the comfort of his closing years; but after he had prayed, “Father! if it be possible let this cup pass from me,” he bowed his head to the chastening, and said firmly and with all his heart, “Father, thy will be done.”

It was, however, by constant care, that he cherished and kept alive in his heart this feeling of the divine goodness. Every thing in nature spoke to him of God,—from the early day-break to the red sunset and the evening star,—all the beauty and grandeur, all the order and changes of the visible world, reminded him of the hand that made it. The meanest flower which others carelessly tread upon had language to him; in truth, every thing which he saw carried his thoughts upward to Him, whose power created, whose wisdom sustains, whose goodness crowns them all. Nor did he content himself with

such evidence as stood open before his eyes ; he made it his daily study to search out the proofs of divine mercy ; in all the works of nature, in all the events of life, he sought for and was sure that he should find traces of heavenly love. Even in the suffering of his last hours, the fire burned within him as he mused on the goodness of his heavenly Father, and he breathed out his overflowing gratitude with his dying as well as his living voice.

Verily I say unto you, he had his reward. This constant engagement of mind and heart,—this deep devotion to an absorbing study saved him from all the dreariness and vacancy, which so often bring misery to old age. You did not hear him sighing over the past ; you did not hear him lamenting, that the summer was past and the cold autumn of his life was come. Being thus interested, always interested in a pursuit which kept the mind and heart in perpetual and exalted action, he did not mourn for what time takes away ; he was always cheerful,—always happy ; because he was looking forward with high hope to what eternity would bring. Thus his path was upward to the very last ; though his eye was dim and his natural strength abated, there was no decline,—no old age to his soul. In truth, there is no winter in the year of a life spent in the service of God.

His death was the natural close of such a life. Knowing that the Son of Man might come at an unexpected hour, he endeavored to be always ready ; and when the Master came and called for him, he arose willingly, cheerfully to depart. In that hour when the bravest tremble, he kept the firmness of his soul ; he leaned with unshaken confidence upon the Rock of Ages ; with delightful serenity he expressed his faith in the religion of Jesus ; he felt that his work was done ; when he thought of heaven he was impatient to be there ; but he was willing to linger here as long as it pleased his God. Would to God that all who hear me this day, could have been present at his closing hours ; the chamber of death was not a place of darkness and gloom ; the sun shone in bright at its windows, and the light of the Sun of Righteousness shone upon his dying bed. When he fell asleep, there was not a word of sorrow ; for we felt that he was gone where the wicked cease from troubling and the weary are at rest. The feeling of every heart was, “ Let me die the death of the righteous ! ” What has this life half so desirable as such a death ? Who would

not say, "Let me die in the lowest wretchedness,—let me die in poverty and sorrow,—let me die on the pavement of the dungeon, if my last end may be holy and happy as this!"

We have before us a solemn lesson of mortality and of life; we see the need of preparation; we know that our souls may be required this night; why will we not apply our hearts unto wisdom? O, that he could break the sleep of death! O that he could start up from his slumber to give us one more warning! But it may not be! his form is forever motionless! his voice forever still! He has done his part, to remind us of our duty, and well and faithfully was it done. What greater blessing can we ask of God, than that our lives may be equally faithful, and that we may finish our course with equal joy?

And now I should address myself to the mourners;—but I forbear; they know that we mourn with them; for their loss is ours.

To the associates of the departed,—to those who are going down the vale of years, I would say, another of your number is gone, and you are following fast; the circle of your acquaintance is lessening, and very little is left to remind you of your early days. All vestiges of the past are sinking under the change of improvement and the change of decay. And now let him say to you, as when living he has often said to you, "Set your affections on things above. Do not cling to the dust. Unclench your grasp from earthly possessions; you must lose them at the grave; for the entrance of eternity is so narrow, that only the naked soul can pass through. Bless God that there is yet time to redeem. Live so, that you can welcome death when he comes. Live so that the end of life may be the birth-day of a better existence,—that you may be welcomed in heaven by the friends of former days, by your fathers and the prophets, by the Mediator of the new covenant, and God the Judge of all."

And let the coming generations tell me, who shall fill the places where the wise and the just have fallen? who shall step forth to uphold the institutions of religion? Now it is as when a standard-bearer fainteth; for well do you know, that the departed stood forward without fear to plead the forsaken cause of God. I entreat you to come forward,—to do as he hath done. Thousands on earth will rise up to bless you, and God will give you the immortal crown.

And now, for the grave! nothing remains but to give the

dust to dust. Bear him to his narrow mansion ; but as the clods of the valley are cast upon him, remember that we shall meet him yet once more at the judgment-seat of God. And then, my people, enter into your chambers, and shut the doors about you. Pray that you may have that love which is stronger than death ; pray that you may have that faith in Him that liveth and was dead, which shall enable you to overcome the grave.

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ART. III. — *Ἡ ΚΑΙΝΗ ΔΙΑΘΗΚΗ. The Greek Testament, with English Notes, Critical, Philological, and Exegetical, partly selected and arranged from the best Commentators, ancient and modern, but chiefly original. The whole being especially adapted to the use of Academical Students, Candidates for the Sacred Office, and Ministers ; though also intended as a Manual Edition for the use of Theological readers in general.* By the Rev. S. T. BLOOMFIELD, D. D., F. S. A., Vicar of Bisbrooke, Rutland. First American, from the second London edition. In two volumes. Boston : Perkins & Marvin. Philadelphia : Henry Perkins. 1837.

THIS is the last of three editions of the Greek Testament, with a critical apparatus, the almost simultaneous publication of which would imply that the English theologians intend to vindicate themselves against the charge of slumbering upon the labors of their predecessors. Mr. Valpy, Dr. Burton, and Dr. Bloomfield, the editors of the three works, now claim to be enrolled on the list which bears the respected names of Hammond, Whitby, Locke, Lowth, Pearce, Benson, Kenicott, Geddes, Newcome, Priestley, Wakefield, Campbell, and Macknight. The *Eclectic Review*, in a notice of the three works, gives the preference to that of Dr. Bloomfield, pronouncing it to be the most valuable that has yet been issued from the English press.\* The reviewer, however, more than

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\* *Eclectic Review*, Third Series, Vol. VIII, p. 473.

hints that both Dr. Burton and Dr. Bloomfield were provoked to their good works by the example of Mr. Valpy, concerning whose publication, though it was the first, the two Doctors maintain "a contemptuous silence." That the work of a clergyman of the Established Church should be held in unqualified esteem by the Dissenters, is not to be expected, though we think there are sufficient reasons, independent of this, for the judgment added by the Reviewer, in the following words;—"Dr. Bloomfield's Exegetical Notes are for the most part very inferior to his Critical and Philological ones, proving that an accomplished scholar and biblical critic, may be at the same time a very ill-furnished divine." And again, the Review qualifies its praise by impeaching the fidelity of Dr. Bloomfield as a theological commentator, and his judgment as a critic. The Doctor saw this Review, and in his second edition speaks of it as an "able critique" on his work.

In our country, Dr. Bloomfield's *Greek Testament* is commended to the religious public, as it was to the publishers, by Professor Stuart, who states that Dr. Bloomfield had expressed great solicitude in his letters to him, that American scholars might possess the work in a neat and accurate form. The books before us, in their correct and beautiful, though most difficult, typographical execution, bear witness that the request has been complied with. Of course it is not to be supposed that Professor Stuart agrees with all the opinions of the English editor. He enters his dissent from Dr. Bloomfield's opinion, expressed in his note on Titus iii. 5, "that regeneration accompanies the external rite of baptism." Probably the same dissent is implied in relation to the Anticalvinistic opinions advanced by Dr. Bloomfield. It is pleasant, however, to see so much good feeling manifested by the parties. We must make allowance for the common overstrainings of courtesy, in Dr. Bloomfield's complimenting the Professor in return as "the Father of Exegetical Science in the New World."

We learn from the Prefaces to the work before us, that Dr. Bloomfield possesses "an inconsiderable benefice, in an obscure situation," and resides at Tugby, in Leicestershire, where he has had the care of two parishes. He says, —

"As a faithfully attached son of the Church of England, he has the highest satisfaction in reflecting that his works are so strongly confirmatory of her doctrines, discipline, and principles.

May she derive that accession of *support* from the contents of the present work, which it is calculated to supply! *Then* indeed, unsparing as have been the sacrifices of *health, fortune, comfort, and whatever renders life desirable*, — which he has so long made in her service, — he will not, under any circumstances, think that he has labored in vain, and spent his strength for nought.” — p. xx.

The other works, by which Dr. Bloomfield is known to us, are a fourth English translation of the History of Thucydides, with Annotations, and his “*Recensio Synoptica Annotationes Sacræ*.” From the latter work we have often derived considerable aid in the critical study and exposition of the New Testament. It is a digest of the other commentators, intended to assist the Student in making up his opinion among the various interpretations thus collected together.

Dr. Bloomfield now comes before the public again, with a confidence inspired by the approbation which his former works have received. Anticipating the question which he knew would be asked touching the necessity of another critical edition of the New Testament, he undertakes in his Preface to justify his present labors.

He admits that as regards the Text of the New Testament, the various editions already existing afford sufficient evidence to enable those who are competent, in learning and criticism, to ascertain the true reading. But the standard texts differ considerably, when compared with the *textus receptus*. He wishes, therefore, to supply a Text so constructed, that readers who have not all the standard editions at hand, may, as far as is practicable, have the *variations* from the *textus receptus*, marked in the Text itself, and not be left to seek them in the notes; and further, that the *evidence* in all important cases, and the *reasons* of any variations adopted by the editor, might be submitted to the judgment of the student. A *new recension*, formed on such a plan, and based on sound principles of criticism, the author says, nowhere existed..

“The Texts for Academical and general use on the Continent, being little more than reprints of that of Griesbach; of which the imperfections (as will appear from what is said in these pages [Dr. Bloomfield's Preface] and in the course of the following work,) are very considerable.”

So much for the ground of necessity for a new Text. “The want of a consistent and suitable *body of Annotation* was much

greater." The earliest modern Commentaries of the New Testament being modelled after the Scholia on the classical writers, were little more than unconnected criticisms on difficult passages. This was a convenient method to the earlier commentators, who did not intend to form what is called a *perpetual Commentary*. They chose mostly those passages where they might exhibit their own learning or reading, rather than explain the sense of their author. This system continued to a late period, and may be traced in most of the Commentators of the seventeenth century, even in Grotius. Those whose works were exceptions, as in the case of Calvin, Luther, and Crellius, extended their discussions to an immoderate length, so that instead of being read, they are used exclusively for reference. The English Commentaries of the seventeenth and a part of the eighteenth centuries partake of the same fault, as that of Grotius, being too prolix and desultory in some parts, and unsatisfactorily brief in others; no approach being made to any thing like a connected Commentary.

Koppe was the first who attempted to remedy this defect, by commencing in 1778 an "Edition of the New Testament, with a corrected Text, short critical Notes, and rather copious philological and exegetical Annotations, serving to establish the literal and grammatical sense; all doctrinal discussions being excluded." The editor lived to publish only two volumes of the work, containing Romans, Galatians, Ephesians, and Thessalonians. It was continued by Heinrichs and Pott, who, by altering the plan, defeated the purpose of the work, and besides were of so heterodox principles,

"That whatever may be the learning and ability occasionally displayed, their interpretations ought to be received with the greatest distrust and caution. Koppe himself, indeed, was not wholly free from that leaven of heterodoxy, which has worked so extensively and perniciously in the greater part of the German Commentators, for the last half century, from Semler downwards. To omit such decidedly heterodox works as are better passed over in silence, the Commentaries of Rosenmueller and Kuinoel have (especially the latter) much valuable matter. The work of the former, however, (besides that its principles are very objectionable,) is almost wholly a *compilation*. Far more valuable is that of the latter; its principles, too, are better; though what are called Neologian views not unfrequently discover themselves; and the work, being too often interlarded with some of the most pestilent dogmas of Semler, Paulus, and others, though accompa-

nied with refutations by the editor, is very unfit to come into the hands of students." — p. ix.

Dr. Bloomfield adduces the other principal Commentators, whose failings, either in judgment or learning, in principle or doctrine, in superficiality or redundancy, show that an edition of the New Testament, adapted as a manual for Academical and general use, is still a *desideratum*. This want it was his intention to supply. He then proceeds "to unfold the plan of the present work, to state the principles of Criticism and Interpretation, by which he has been guided, and the purposes which it is especially intended to answer."

The last edition of Robert Stephens, adopted by Mill, differing slightly from our common Text, which is founded upon the Elzevir of 1624, and is supposed to be preferable to it, is selected by Dr. Bloomfield as the basis of his Text. He professes to exclude critical conjecture entirely, and to make only such alterations as are supported by decidedly preponderating evidence. He avows his total dissent from the *system of Recensions*, first promulgated by Griesbach, and founded, as he apprehends, upon a misapplication of the *Canons of Criticism*, which the German editors professedly acted upon. He charges Griesbach with temerity and irreverence for his "perpetual, and, for the most part, needless cancellings and alterations of all kinds."

The reader has before him both the Stephanic and the corrected Text. Nothing of the former has been omitted. Interpolations, alterations, insertions, and omissions are designated by stenographic marks in the Text, or specified in the notes. In the Critical Notes, which, Dr. Bloomfield says, are almost entirely original, he gives his reasons for the course which he adopts in the Text. The Text, having the verses marked in the margin, is, in accordance with the most apparent reasons, divided into paragraphs. These are shorter than those of Griesbach. The punctuation is revised, and the parallel references, quotations, and interlocutions are appropriately designated. The Exegetical Notes are modelled after those in the critical editions of the Greek classical writers, being intended to comprise all that relates to the interpretation and to the grammatical sense, regard being had to the connexion and the scope of the passage. Illustrations are sought for in parallel passages in sense or diction of Scripture itself, from the Septuagint and the Apocrypha, and from the works of Josephus and

Philo, from the Apostolical Fathers, from early Apocryphal and Rabbinical writings, from the Latin and Greek Fathers, and from the Greek Commentators and classical writers. From the last source the editor's private studies have enabled him to offer much that is original.

In opposition to the notion of Doddridge and of some other theologians, founded on the canon of Cocceius, "that the words of Scripture mean all that they *may* mean," Dr. Bloomfield very sensibly contends that there is only *one* true sense, — *that in the mind of the sacred writer*. In his interpretation he has endeavored to unite a zealous respect for antiquity with a cautious admission of novelty.

As respects the style of the New Testament, Dr. Bloomfield is alike opposed to the opinions of its being in pure and elegant Greek, and on the other hand to its being barbarous and ungrammatical. He accounts for the use of unusual words and phrases, consistently with purity, by alleging that the classical authors which we possess do not contain a tenth part of the Greek language, and also from the lawful introduction of the popular or provincial colloquial and domestic phraseology. The instances which have been specified, where the writers of the New Testament have not observed the common rules of grammar, he answers by quoting the distinction of Tittmann, — "that the sacred writers have observed the rules of grammar, though not the rules of the grammarians."

The first edition of the work was flatteringly received by the English public, and in three years the author betook himself with much satisfaction to preparing a second. In this he introduced some improvements, especially in his Introductions to all the books of the New Testament, and in the Punctuation, with added wisdom, drawn from consulting the Reformers and the great masters in English Theology. He again enters his dissent from the principles of Griesbach.

Perhaps we can best aid our readers to form an idea of the character of Dr. Bloomfield's work, by indicating his course in regard to some of the questions which have been most contested.

It appears to be one of Dr. Bloomfield's most striking characteristics as a critic, that he endeavors to hold the two opinions, on many of those points on which his predecessors have differed. Thus on the great question of the origin of the first three Gospels, he professes to set aside the three theories, that

the three Gospels were derived from some original document, or from detached narratives of parts of the history of Christ, or from oral tradition; and he endeavors to support a modification of the other theory, that one or two of the three Gospels were taken from the third. He thus states his view of the case.

"1. That the Gospels of Matthew and Luke were original and independent narratives (except that Luke probably made some use of the Hebrew original of St. Matthew). 2. That Mark's Gospel appeared after those two; and that the Evangelist freely used the matter contained in one or the other, according as it suited his purpose, and was agreeable to his plan. 3. That such parts as are not found in Matthew or Luke, were either derived from St. Peter, (under whose sanction and direction he wrote,) or at least from the testimony of "eye witnesses and ministers of the word."

With what propriety Dr. Bloomfield can disclaim the three former theories, while he takes the essential part of each and all, we are at a loss to see. His own theory wants the very qualifications, the absence of which furnishes him with the best arguments against the others, namely, simplicity and historical support; while, in our opinion, it gives a death-blow to the most important end which it is the chief object of all the theories to establish, namely, the fact that the Evangelists are independent historians.

Again; Dr. Bloomfield seeks to hold both opinions on the question whether Matthew wrote his Gospel in Greek or Hebrew, by agreeing with Whitby, Benson, and Hales, in the most unsupported supposition, that Matthew wrote a copy of the same Gospel in both languages. He supposes that the Hebrew was published A. D. 37 or 38, and the Greek A. D. 41. We must differ from him in the whole matter. The best ancient authority favors the belief that Matthew wrote his Gospel only in Hebrew, and circumstantial evidence fixes its date about A. D. 63.

Dr. Bloomfield supports the authenticity of the first two chapters of Matthew and Luke on good grounds. As regards the very difficult subject of Matthew's genealogy, he reconciles it with the Old Testament by alleging errors in the *transcription*, and with Luke by supposing that he gives the genealogy of Mary, and Matthew that of Joseph.

Dr. Bloomfield favors the literal interpretation of "the Temptation," which he calls "a most awful and mysterious

transaction," by supposing that it was a *real event*, and not a *visionary scene*. To say nothing of the entire absence of all Scripture testimony that such a *being* as the Devil really exists, there is nothing in the account of the Evangelists to call for so many fearful and unnatural assumptions as a literal interpretation involves. An overwhelming objection to it is offered in the fact, that the frightful appearance of such a being would defeat the very object of his visit.

In his Note on Matthew iv. 24, Dr. Bloomfield gives us his opinion on demoniacal possession. The hypothesis of Dr. Mede, that the demoniacs were merely persons affected with lunacy, he conceives to be utterly untenable. He adopts the belief of the existence of evil spirits, and endeavors to answer the objections raised against it. To the question which is asked by those who adopt Dr. Mede's opinion, why there should have been demoniacal possession at the time of our Savior, and not at the present day, he answers ;

"That these possessions might then be permitted to be far more frequent than at any other period, in order that the power of Christ over the world of spirits might be more evidently shown, and that he, who came to destroy the works of the devil, might obtain a manifest triumph over him."

We had hoped that this notion was consigned to oblivion by all, as it certainly is by most critics. As we read the Scriptures and study the history of our race, we think we discover evil enough for the Savior to root out, without the creation of any new sources or agents of it, for the express, but most unprofitable purpose of being destroyed. If our examination is correct, the New Testament mentions seven cases of the cure of those called demoniacs ; John does not mention one. The Evangelists have enumerated various disorders which Jesus cured by his miraculous power, and as we know that the several forms of mental disease were prevalent in Judea, it is highly probable that Jesus cured some of them. We believe that he did, and that they are the ones intended by "the demoniacs."

From our examination of several passages, where Dr. Bloomfield would necessarily give his opinion in relation to the Quotations from the Old Testament in the New, we find that he allows the principle of *accommodation*, though he is very fond

of the doctrine of types and literal prophecies. We have been accustomed to look upon the passage, where John (xix. 36,) quotes the injunction relative to the Paschal Lamb, and applies it to Christ, ("neither shall ye break a bone thereof," Exodus xix. 46,) as one of the plainest instances of a most natural application of language, which was in every body's lips, to a similar case. Dr. Bloomfield, however, in his note on the passage, thinks otherwise. He says;

"That the Evangelist *did* mean to represent the Paschal Lamb as a *type* of Christ, and consequently that such must be the only true view, no person who fairly considers the words can doubt. What can offer so probable a reason for the otherwise unaccountable injunction, that not a bone of the Paschal Lamb should be broken, as that it might point to the sacrifice of that Lamb, as a type of the sacrifice of Christ?"

We would ask if there is anything more unaccountable in the injunction that the bones of the lamb at the celebration of the *Passover* should not be broken, than in the other injunctions attending the yearly ceremony? It was to keep in the memory of the Jews their safe and sudden deliverance from Egypt; therefore they were to eat while standing, prepared with scrip and sandals, as if ready for a journey. Every thing was to be expressive of haste, consequently they were not to carry the flesh of the lamb from house to house, nor to break its bones to extract the sweet marrow.

In conformity with the fundamentals of his Church, Dr. Bloomfield would prove that the seven deacons, who were chosen (Acts vi.) to take from the Apostles the burden of distributing the necessities of life to the poor among the early Christians, were invested with ecclesiastical as well as with secular authority. He bases his argument upon these three points;—that the Apostles directed the brethren to select seven men, who, as our Translation expresses the original, were "full of the Holy Ghost;" that the functionaries were ordained by the laying on of hands; and that some of them did in fact exercise spiritual functions. These arguments have often been satisfactorily answered. We leave it to be decided by every attentive reader of Scripture, whether the *term* and the *office of deacon* do not better apply to those officers in the Congregational Churches who distribute the elements at

the Lord's Supper, and attend to the secular concerns of the body, its registers and its charities, than to the ordained candidate for the ministry in the Church of England.

Dr. Bloomfield is most zealous in the support of two out of the three interpolated texts, which, in spite of all the disclaimers of Trinitarians, are most relied upon for the support of their peculiar doctrine. In Acts xx. 28, he retains the reading  $\Theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$  in preference to  $\chi\upsilon\iota\omicron\upsilon$ . Let any one, however, examine the argument even in his own statement of it, and we think he will deny that the evidence preponderates in favor of Dr. Bloomfield's reading.

Dr. Bloomfield likewise in I. Timothy iii. 16, retains  $\Theta\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$  in preference to  $\varsigma$ ; or  $\delta$ , and says that "Griesbach edited  $\varsigma$  without any sufficient reason; for the *external* evidence in favor of it is next to nothing." This assertion is certainly most unwarrantable. Against Dr. Bloomfield, by his own confession, are arrayed three Manuscripts of Griesbach's most valued Recension, namely, the Occidental, besides most of the Versions, all the Latin, and a fair proportion of the Greek Fathers. Is this "next to nothing?" The matter rests in no small measure upon the lawful or unlawful position of a little stroke in the o of oz of the Codex Alexandrinus. It is well known that the stroke has been retouched by a modern hand; but it is contended that there was one there before. Messrs. Berriman, Hewitt, and Pilkington, armed with a spy-glass and assisted by a bright sun ray shining upon the book, thought that they could detect the old transverse line. Mill, too, who in a first inspection failed to discover it, in a second thought he succeeded; but Wetstein, accompanied by a friend, could not find it, and supposed that Mill was deceived by the line of an Epsilon shining through the transparent vellum. But Woide testifies that the position of the Epsilon will not justify this dodging of the argument.

Finally, of the celebrated passage I. John v. 7, Dr. Bloomfield had said, in his "Recensio Synoptica," "To me it appears *probable* that the verses are genuine; but I am inclined to agree with the learned Bishops Horsley and Middleton, that they will, if genuine, not *decidedly* prove the doctrine of the Trinity, and therefore by far too much anxiety about the determination of the critical question, as to their authenticity, has been felt and expressed by the Orthodox in general." Mr. Valpy marks the text with "possible spuriousness and ex-

punction," though he inclines in favor of its genuineness. He likewise says,—"It has been a question with many, whether a too pertinacious, at least too warm a zeal, has not been shown by some, to secure the authenticity of this text, as if the doctrine it contained rested solely on its authority. For, as Dr. Bentley observes, if the fourth century knew that text, let it come in, in God's name; but if that age did not know it, then Arianism at its height, was beat down without the help of that verse; and let the *fact* prove as it will, the *doctrine* is unshaken." Dr. Burton in his edition inclines against the genuineness of the verse.

Dr. Bloomfield is remarkably concise in his remarks upon the passage in his present work. We would ask his purpose when he refers the reader to eight of the best authorities in support of the authenticity of the verse, and to only four of the writers against it, and they too of the least weight. Again; we think there is some unfairness in what follows;—"I must content myself with laying before the reader *two paraphrases* of the whole passage, one *without*, and the other *with*, the disputed portion." Sir Isaac Newton is selected as the champion against the verse, and he is arrayed against Bishop Burgess for it! Dr. Bloomfield's conclusion is ominous of future volumes on the question;—"we are neither authorized to receive the passage as indubitably genuine, nor, on the other hand, to reject it as indubitably spurious; but to wait for further evidence." From what quarter he expects it, he does not say. Is this a proper conclusion to such a discussion?

We admire the candor which is displayed by the organ of a body of the English Dissenters, famed for its Orthodoxy, in reference to this Text. "From the very commencement of its existence, the Eclectic Review has opposed itself to the intrusion of a passage into the Greek Text of the New Testament, the admission of which would require the surrender of the soundest principles of criticism, and leave us no longer in the possession of those rules of evidence which enable us to determine the genuine readings of ancient writings. We have not seen any reason in our latest examination of the arguments and representations urged by the advocates of the verse, to alter our judgment in respect to its character. But while they have left us to retain, without change or abatement, our view of the whole subject, some of the publications put forth in defence of the rejected passage have furnished us with very

sufficient ground for remarking, *that other arguments have been used in its support than those which could be derived from the application of critical learning.*" \*

G. E. E.

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ART. IV. — *Cours de Droit Naturel, professé à la Faculté des Lettres de Paris*, par M. TH. JOUFFROY. *Première partie. Prolégomènes au Droit Naturel.* 2 Tomes; 8vo. Paris: 1834 et 1835.

BEFORE proceeding to a special examination of these very interesting and valuable volumes on the ground of Moral Obligation, we propose to offer a few remarks on philosophy in general, and on French Eclecticism in particular. We do this because both, in our estimation, are somewhat misapprehended, and, as a consequence of being misapprehended, they receive far too little or else a wrong kind of consideration.

We almost every day meet people by no means deficient in good sense and general information, who entertain strong prejudices against philosophy, and manifest no slight contempt for all philosophical pursuits. These people, in general, profess a great attachment to common sense, and count it a great piece of folly to look for anything superior to that. In their estimation, philosophy is mere speculation, and to philosophize is merely to construct, out of the phantasies of one's own brain, various and ever-varying hypotheses on God, the human soul, and human duty and destiny; hypotheses which disdain the aid of fact and experience, and which, however pleasing they may be to the professed metaphysician, can answer no good purpose in practical life, and must ever vanish away before the first breath of common sense. They therefore regard philosophy as a vain pretence, as a worthless pursuit, and not only as worthless but mischievous, inasmuch as it consumes that time and thought which we need for other purposes. If they be right, we are most certainly wrong in filling up any portion of our pages with notices of philosophical works; and did we be-

lieve them right, we should by no means take the trouble to review philosophical works, or even to read them.

But, with all becoming modesty be it said, we do not believe that they are right. Their conclusions appear to us to be drawn from false premises. Their objections to philosophy are founded on mistaken views of what philosophy really is, of what is its legitimate province, and of what, in point of fact, it professes to be able to accomplish. Unless we have ourselves greatly misapprehended it, philosophy is something widely different from mere speculation. The true philosopher eschews all hypothesis as scrupulously as the good man eschews evil. He is far from doing business on credit, from speculating on merely fictitious capital; he must have facts, good substantial facts; and when his stock of facts is exhausted and he feels unable to increase it, he retires from business, and counts his work achieved. He does not undertake to manufacture the truth, nor does he profess to have any means of discovering it, which are not equally within the reach of every one who will but use the faculties which God has given him. Philosophy originates and can originate none of our ideas: It works and must work with materials which have been furnished without its aid, and which are furnished to the simplest ploughboy in equal quantity and variety as to the profoundest philosopher. The difference between the philosopher and the mere common sense man does not consist in the fact, that the one has any means of knowing or any ideas which the other has not, but in the fact, that the one does and the other does not know, does not comprehend what he knows. The common sense man knows as much of the nature of things, of God, the soul, man and man's destinies as the philosopher; but his knowledge is vague, obscure, confused, and independent of his control; whereas the philosopher's knowledge is clear, definite, precise, and entirely subject to his will.

This distinction is intelligible, and in our estimation very important. Men who find, when they want them, all the great truths needed for the chief practical purposes of life; and who, nevertheless, are not conscious of having ever philosophized at all, are not a little puzzled to discover the very great worth which the philosopher ascribes to his favorite pursuit; but we think their difficulties would be in a great measure removed, if they would observe the distinction we have here indicated, distinguish between knowing and comprehending, and learn

that the province of philosophy is not to know, but to comprehend; not to give us knowledge, but to enable us to comprehend what we already know; to explain and verify what we have already received as true on the faith of common sense. We all believe that we exist. For this belief we are not indebted to philosophy. Philosophy can neither give it nor take it away. What then is the use of philosophy, in relation to this particular belief? Simply to enable us to comprehend what we do when we believe that we exist; what is involved in the fact that we believe in our existence. All the world, or nearly all the world, believe in God, in Immortality, and Duty, and believe too without the aid of philosophy. The first man who philosophized found the world believing in these, and these were the facts on which he first philosophized. What then in relation to these is the value of philosophy? Not to give us the idea of God, the idea of Immortality, and that of Duty, but to explain these ideas to the understanding, and to determine their worth. Common sense, if that be the term preferred, gives these ideas, places them in the consciousness; philosophy detects, explains, and verifies them.

To detect, explain, and verify our ideas, is no mean service. Under common sense we believe, and believe the truth; but we believe blindly, without knowing why or wherefore; without being able to justify our belief to ourselves. We take every thing on trust. But as soon as our intellect is awakened, and we begin to think with some degree of earnestness, we can no longer be satisfied with taking things on trust; we can no longer repose in blind belief; a new want, an imperious want is developed within us, and we ask ourselves, why we have believed? wherefore we have trusted? and what authority we have for believing what we find we have believed? All men may not, we admit, ask themselves these questions, for there are not a few who die children, though they die in old age; but many more ask them than we commonly imagine. There are thousands, who pass along apparently unthinking, with unperturbed looks and careless speech, in whom these questions lie fermenting, or who call upon all nature, upon the seen and the unseen, upon the living and the dead, to answer them. There is more passing beneath those leathern bosoms which men seem to wear, in those secret chambers of thought, into which no stranger enters, than we can easily divine. All who attain to self-consciousness, ask

themselves these questions ; and when these questions have once been asked, when they have once been raised, they "will not down at the bidding." Pleasure may distract, business may divert, authority may frighten us awhile from their consideration ; but at the first moment of release, at the first moment of calmness and self-collectedness, they return with all their primitive force, and importune us for an answer. Is it a mean service to answer them ? Worthless are his labors who helps us to silence their importunate clamor, and to restore peace to the soul ? Let him who has been tormented by this everlasting *Why*, and this ever-recurring *Wherefore*, which one of the most urgent wants of our nature never ceases, from the first awakening of reason, to ask,—let him answer. But to ask *why* ? *wherefore* ? and to seek for an answer, is to philosophize. Philosophy is nothing more nor less than the answer which we obtain by reflection, to the *Why* and the *Wherefore*. Why then speak slightly of it ? Why condemn the philosopher ? Wherefore attempt to dissuade from philosophizing ? Would we doom our race to perpetual infancy, and forbid the sleep of the cradle ever to be broken ? Would we place an interdict upon reflection, and oblige men forever to forego conviction, to know without comprehending, to believe without knowing *why* or *wherefore* ? If not, we must have and cannot but have philosophy.

To answer the questions of the *Why* ? and the *Wherefore* ? philosophers in their infancy framed hypotheses ; and, ignorant as yet of the legitimate province of philosophy and of the true method of philosophizing, they answered merely by guesses. They were unwilling to wait, to inquire. Their wants were too troublesome ; their need of dogmatizing was too urgent to allow them to seek an answer by slow and scrupulous analysis. They wanted the patience to untie the knot, to unravel the mysteries of our being ; and hence the failures of philosophy, and the reproaches with which she has been visited. But her real friends have profited by experience. They have grown wiser, and prefer research to dogma. They are willing to wait. They have learned that it is in vain to give hypothetical answers ; in vain to create answers ; and that their only proper method of proceeding is to seek by patient and accurate observation of the facts of consciousness, the answer which God himself has written with his own finger on the tablets of our being. They now know that their business

is not to construct, but to reflect ; and so long as they pursue the path of reflection, we are unable to perceive why the gravest common sense man should wish to impede their march. They do but bear the torch of reflection over the dark field of consciousness, and labor to enable us to see and comprehend the mysteries of our spiritual nature. They do only that which every one does to a greater or less extent who turns his mind in upon itself, communes with his own heart, and seeks to solve the problem of his being and destiny. Who is there that is willing to admit that he never does this, or at least that he never attempts to do this ? No one, we will take it upon us to answer ; that is, no one who has ever become conscious that he is an intellectual being. Let philosophy and philosophers then be acquitted ; let philosophy no longer be confounded with mere speculation ; and, above all, let the philosopher no longer be counted the synonyme of the mere builder of castles in the air.

Similar objections to some of those we have been considering, we have occasionally heard alleged against French Eclecticism. We do not take notice of this fact because we would give in our adherence to that philosophy. To us all truth is sacred and desirable, and we are ready to own and obey it, let it come from what quarter and under what name it may ; but we choose to see it for ourselves, and to accept and obey it because we ourselves are convinced by our own examination that it is the truth, not because it is the dogma, or the theory of a school. We do not hold ourselves responsible for the doctrines of the French Eclectics, nor do we propose them for the adoption of our countrymen. But we do place a high value on the labors of the French Eclectics, and we believe an acquaintance with their philosophical researches a very important acquisition in the work of elaborating a better philosophy than any which has hitherto obtained among us. We would, therefore, see their works studied, and studied without prejudice, for what they are, and not for what they are not. And this is our apology,—if an apology be needed,—for taxing the time and attention of our readers with some remarks, designed to place French Eclecticism in its true light.

Many among us confound French Eclecticism with German Transcendentalism ; and German Transcendentalism they suppose to be the very “fifth essence” of extravagance and absurdity. They who thus confound the two philosophies seem

to take it for granted that German Transcendentalism names a particular school, designates a special metaphysical doctrine. But this is a mistake. German Transcendentalism is a phrase of uncertain import. It may include systems which have hardly any thing in common. As used by the Germans themselves it is nearly synonymous with the term metaphysics, and metaphysics, among the Germans, vary with almost every individual devoted to their pursuit. German philosophy has, in point of fact, no unity which authorizes us to predicate any thing of it, as a whole, unless it be its freedom and independence, and the fact that the reason, instead of the sensibility, is in all cases its point of departure. It is not just to condemn the whole because a part may be unsound; one man's views, because another's, which are different, are judged to be erroneous. For their freedom, for their bold and uniform assertion and maintenance of the independence of the reason, we respect the whole body of German metaphysicians, whatever the systems they may have severally arrived at, or supported; in this particular they cannot be praised too warmly; but we are not aware that any of them, nor that all of them, have as yet given us a true philosophy of man. They have contributed valuable materials for the construction of that philosophy; but that philosophy, or what we deem such, we have not found in any of their systems which have fallen under our notice. Kant, the ablest and soberest of them all, has unquestionably done much. He has explored the human understanding, and determined the conditions of all experience, or what must be the nature of the understanding to render experience possible. In doing this, he has created a new era in the history of metaphysical science; but he has not given us a philosophy; he has merely fixed the starting point, and opened the route for future philosophers. Fichte was a bold speculator, an ardent friend of freedom and Humanity. For this last we honor him, and cherish his memory; but we have yet to learn the important service he has rendered to philosophy. Had he lived, he might have done something worth remembering, as he had before his death hit upon the path, which, if followed, conducts to true philosophy; but cut off as he was in the prime of his life, philosophy has gained little by his talents, genius, and labors. Jacobi had some dim visions, some vague presentiments of a superior philosophy, but he wanted the intellectual vigor to obtain results

truly scientific. He did something, however, to open the way for Fries, from whom philosophy is receiving valuable contributions. Fries adopts the true psychological method of philosophizing, and upholds the experimental against the hypothetical or constructive philosophy. Schelling, whose reputation as a philosopher will diminish with time, attempted a philosophy of Man, and of Nature ; but both he and Hegel, who in respect to method agrees with him, have vitiated their labors by adopting the hypothetical or constructive instead of the psychological or experimental method of philosophizing ; and notwithstanding they have, as we believe, divined the truth to a great extent, in consequence of the original sin of their method, they have been unable to give it any scientific value. It is their vicious method which constitutes the real objection which may be urged against those German metaphysicians, who are, we suppose, generally understood by the Transcendentalists, and it is the only objection which we deem it necessary to bring against them. They build on hypothesis, and construct a theory with which to explain facts, instead of observing facts as the only basis of all just theory. A theory, which is anything else than the true statement of what there is of the general in facts, as distinguished from the particular, has no value in our eyes. The facts should elicit the theory, and not the theory the facts. Some of the Germans reverse this maxim, and if they who do it are the ones, as we presume they are, intended by the Transcendentalists, we most certainly have no disposition to appear in their defence. But these are not the only ones who bear the name of Transcendentalist, for the term, instead of being restricted to these, is used in a much broader sense, so as to include those who adopt the psychological as well as those who adopt the hypothetical or constructive method, the philosophizers as well as the systematizers. Whenever, then, we speak of German Transcendentalists, we should be careful to discriminate, and let it be known of whom we intend to speak ; and whenever we judge it to be our duty to condemn Transcendentalism, we should state distinctly whether we mean to condemn metaphysics in general, or only some special system of metaphysics ; and, if this last be the case, as is most likely, what special system we mean.

It is desirable also, that this same discrimination should be made, when speaking of Transcendentalism as it is beginning to be manifested among ourselves, and some injustice has

already been done in consequence of neglecting it. Men are classed together under the general term, Transcendentalist, who have scarcely anything in common but their fondness for philosophical pursuits. There are men among us who have a most hearty dislike for observation, who disregard experience, ask no aid of facts, and who deem themselves competent to construct a true philosophy of man and the universe by means of speculation alone. If they who condemn the Transcendentalists mean these; they are bound to say so; for there are others among us also called Transcendentalists, who adopt the psychological method, and pursue it with the most rigid fidelity, who will attach no scientific value to any metaphysical system, whatever its pretensions, which is not a legitimate induction from facts patiently collected, scrupulously analyzed, and accurately classed. These last are no more to be confounded with the first, than a modern chemist is to be confounded with an old alchemist, or a Bacon with a Paracelsus.

If it be meant that the French Eclectics are Transcendentalists in the sense these last are, we have no objection to offer. But this is not the case. They, who call them Transcendentalists with the feeling that Transcendentalism is an accusation, mean to identify them with the other class, with the speculators, the systematizers, with those who profess to be able to arrive at truth by logic, by mere reasoning without observation or scientific data to reason from. But in this sense the Eclectics are not Transcendentalists. M. Cousin, their acknowledged chief, so far as they acknowledge any chief, bases his whole system, as we have shown when reviewing his philosophy,\* on psychology. He does not, like Schelling and Hegel, commence by a construction. He tolerates no hypothesis, no divination, no guessing at truth, but iterates and reiterates that the only legitimate starting-point for the philosopher is the observation of facts. According to him, there is and there can be no sound philosophy which does not begin with the observation or analysis of the facts of consciousness. He does not begin by inquiring what ought to be in the consciousness, how what may be supposed to be in the consciousness entered there, but simply what is there, what are we conscious of in ourselves. The first question with him is always, What is? If from the question of what is, if from the observation of

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\* See *Christian Examiner* for September, 1836.

facts he passes to the induction of principles, of laws, it is because observation itself forces induction upon us, and we cannot avoid it, even if we would. We cannot remain in the observation of facts. We do never content ourselves with saying two and two, two and two, but always find ourselves obliged to say two and two are four. Facts taken singly never satisfy us; we are always compelled to add them together and find their sum total. Our right to do this may be questioned; it may be said that we have no authority for passing from the observation of facts to the induction of principles, of laws; but he who should say so would in the very act of saying so do that which he says we have no right to do. His assertion would be an induction, not a fact. One may have observed the extravagances and absurdities into which men have fallen in their inductions, and therefore *infer* that we ought never to attempt an induction; another may, from what he has observed of the power of the reason to rectify its own mistakes, to recover itself from its own aberrations, and of the miracles wrought by induction in the physical sciences, infer directly the opposite, and assert the legitimacy of induction; another still may assert that we are too ignorant to assert anything about the matter; but all alike make an induction, and the last not less than the other two, his induction being that we are too ignorant to know whether we have or have not the right to make an induction. Whoever will regard the facts of his own consciousness cannot fail to discover that, whether induction be or be not a legitimate exercise of the reason, be or be not warranted, we do always make an induction, and we cannot help doing it. It is a necessary mode of the activity of the reason, and altogether independent of our control. It is forced upon us by a power which we are not. We can make no assertion, whether of affirmation or denial, without making an induction. This necessity, under which we labor in regard to induction, is sufficient to justify induction in the minds of all who comprehend anything of the matter, and exonerates us from all blame in not struggling in vain to resist it. If this be admitted, as nobody questions the legitimacy of observation, we may assert that both observation and induction are legitimate. These two modes of activity of the reason, observation and induction, constitute M. Cousin's method. His method, then, is legitimate, and if legitimate, if faithfully followed, it must conduct to scientific results.

The method of philosophizing, which we adopt, is that which determines the character and value of the system of philosophy to which we arrive. All philosophers and all systems of philosophy are to be classed, in the first instance, according to their method. If their method be scientific, they cannot be without value; if their method be vicious, no matter how much talent and genius they display, they are worth nothing for science. It is their vicious or unscientific method, which prevents us from attaching any importance to the systems of philosophy of many who are called Transcendentalists both at home and abroad, notwithstanding they embosom no small share of truth. The truth they have has not been obtained on scientific principles. They have obtained it by a sort of divination or guess, as when a schoolboy sometimes from sheer indolence used to guess out the answers to the questions given us in arithmetic. Our old schoolmaster always sent us back to first principles, and made us solve the problems scientifically, even when we had chanced to guess aright. But with the French Eclectics there is none of this guessing at truth. Their method of solving all philosophical problems is, as we have seen, strictly scientific. It is the experimental method, that of observation and induction. This method, though virtually the method of Descartes, is called the Baconian method. Bacon introduced it into modern philosophy, at least defended it, and applied it to the physical sciences. Locke applied it to the study of the Human Understanding, and applied it too with greater fidelity than any of his predecessors, and herein lies his merit as a philosopher. But his fidelity was not strict enough; almost at the first step he departed from his method, and hence the defects of his system as a system of philosophy. He was too eager to construct a system, and rushed into dogmatism before he had completed his observation, or psychological analysis. He did not remain long enough in the sphere of consciousness to become thoroughly acquainted with its phenomena. He spent too little time in ascertaining and describing the facts of consciousness as they actually appear in the consciousness, and passed too soon to the question of the origin of our knowledge, of our ideas. This was his fatal error, the rock on which he stranded. What reasonable hope could he have of giving a correct account of the origin of our ideas before he had determined what ideas we have? By going to the question of the origin of our ideas before he had

settled the question of the number and character of our ideas, he departed from the path of science and fell into that of hypothesis, and dogmatized instead of philosophizing. This has destroyed the scientific value of his *Essay on the Human Understanding*, but it has not destroyed his merits as a man. Great as were his metaphysical errors, he deserves, and had they been ten times as great as they were, he would still have deserved the gratitude of posterity for his ardent love of Humanity, his labors in the cause of civil liberty and Christian charity, and the much he has unquestionably done to simplify metaphysical science, and to abridge the labor of comprehending ourselves.

The French School of the last century adopted the same method, and was really, though but partially, experimental. So far forth as it was experimental, it was powerful, and deserves our respect. But it fell into the same fundamental error, which we have pointed out in its master, Locke. We say its master, Locke, for we suppose everybody, who knows anything about the matter, knows that the French philosophy, as expounded by Condillac and his disciples, was borrowed from Locke, and introduced into France by Voltaire. Condillac and his disciples drew conclusions from Locke's philosophy, which Locke himself did not draw, and which he would very likely have rejected; but they were all warranted by his premises, were but the legitimate consequences of the principles he laid down. Like him, the French School, instead of studying the facts of consciousness, and ascertaining what we know, ran against the question of How we know; and deciding after his example, *a priori*, that we know only by means of our five senses, it overlooked or denied in its subsequent psychological analysis all the facts of consciousness which it could not succeed in transforming into sensations. We say not this in a spirit of hostility to that school, nor out of any want of respect for its English master. It was a great school, it did some service to Humanity; more, perhaps, than many who depart less from it than we do are willing to admit; but its early departure from the strictly psychological method proved its ruin, compelled it to be exclusive, and it has died as must die all exclusive systems, whether in philosophy or in theology.

Now nobody, we presume, ever dreams of calling this school or its founders, Locke and Condillac, Transcendental in the

odious sense in which some are pleased to use that term ; but why not ? Why not call the old French School, Locke and Condillac, Transcendental, as well as M. Cousin ? He bears a much closer affinity to them in a scientific relationship, than he does to those commonly understood by the Transcendentalists. His method is the same as theirs ; and if he obtains different results it is because he applies it differently, because, as he would say, he follows it with more fidelity and severity, because he is more strictly experimental, a more rigid psychologist. They, by ascribing the origin of all our ideas to sensation, and allowing the understanding no materials on which to work but such as could come through the senses, necessarily condemned themselves to a mutilated psychology. They were restricted in their analysis to the facts of the sensibility ; but M. Cousin, postponing the question of the origin of our ideas till he has ascertained what are our ideas, analyzes the whole consciousness, whether its elements be the sensibility, the activity, or the reason, and is thus enabled to form a psychology as broad as the human soul itself. This is what he professes to have done. Whether he has or has not done it, makes no part of our present inquiry. We do not undertake the defence of the results he professes to have obtained. We are concerned now only with his method, and that method we do contend is scientific, the only method which can lead to scientific results. Locke and the French School adopted it, but they applied it with systematic views, with the design to maintain a system previously adopted ; he applies it without any reference to a system, before he forms his theory, and, therefore, is able to apply it without prejudice. This is his method, this is his profession. He indeed may not be true to his method, he may not practise what he professes, but that is a question which every one may and can decide for himself. By giving us his method he has enabled us to correct him where he errs, and to verify him where he is right. All we have to offer on this point is, that not every one who speculates a little on metaphysical subjects should feel himself qualified to sit in judgment on M. Cousin. Whoever would do him justice should take up his method and bring to its test all the results he professes to have obtained. They who will do this will, we do not say, adopt all those results, but at least acquit him of being a bold theorizer, a fanciful constructor of hypotheses, a Transcendentalist in the sense in which they use the term who deem

Transcendentalism an accusation. They will find him an eloquent, an enthusiastic preacher of philosophy, but at the same time a sober psychologist, a clear and able experimental philosopher. He has not, we own, this reputation among some of our friends; but we are at no loss to discover the reason why he has not. The eloquence and poetry of his style mislead many, who have imbibed the notion that whatever is warm and glowing, whatever is pleasing and inspiring, must be wanting in soberness and depth. His merits are also estimated among us principally by his *Introduction to the History of Philosophy*, and of that work not by its general spirit and method, but by some few of its generalizations or inductions, as the one on war, for instance. The method by which those generalizations or inductions are obtained, and by which their legitimacy may be determined, is, it is true, in the same volume; but to master that method and its application, and to bring the generalizations to its decision, requires some trouble, some hard thinking, some introspection, all of which are things an author must be very much out of his wits to ask of readers in this age of superficial writing and light reading.

It should also be borne in mind, that French Eclecticism is not, as they who declaim against Transcendentalism would seem to infer, of German origin. Germany has indeed made many important contributions to it, but the movement of which it is a result was produced by the introduction and study in France of the works of Dr. Richard Price, and of the Scotch philosophers, Dr. Reid and Dugald Stewart. French Eclecticism received its impulse, its method, and its direction from M. Royer Collard, who was, as everybody knows, a disciple of Dr. Reid, the founder of the Scotch School. M. Cousin was made Professor of philosophy through the influence of M. Royer Collard, and his first year's instruction in the Normal School was confined to the defence and development of the Scotch philosophy. Up to this day he has continued in the path marked out by the Scotch School. He is the continuator of Dugald Stewart. He has gone beyond Stewart, but it has been in the same direction. It is true he has followed in that direction with a freer and a bolder step than comports with Scotch timidity and caution; but he has followed with a step as firm and secure as Dugald Stewart himself. This fact is often overlooked. We have not unfrequently been amused to hear M. Cousin condemned by the very eulogists of Reid

and Stewart, when he is, in point of fact, only their complement, and can claim to have done little else than to complete what they commenced, and to have furnished the means of verifying what they took for granted.\* It is worth while, also, to notice that those old English writers, whom it is just now the fashion to praise, and we believe in some instances to read, had some anticipations of what the Eclectics have done, and relied for the worth of their conclusions on the very philosophy, more or less clearly seen by them, which we now call French Eclecticism.

We have spoken of M. Cousin ; we have done this, because he is at the head of French Eclecticism, and because his

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\* Dugald Stewart, in the Preface to his "Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man," and in the very last paragraphs, we believe, which he wrote for publication, speaks as follows of the French philosophers mentioned above. "I cannot conclude this Preface without expressing the satisfaction I have felt in observing, among the more liberal writers in France, a reviving taste for the Philosophy of the Human Mind. To this no one has contributed more than M. Victor Cousin, so well known and so honorably distinguished, as the object of Jesuitical persecution ; a persecution which appears to have followed him beyond the limits of his own country. To him the learned world is indebted, not only for his own very valuable writings, but for a French translation, accompanied with notes, of the whole works of Plato ; for an edition of the works of Proclus, the Platonic philosopher, from a manuscript in the Royal Library of Paris, and, last of all, for a complete edition of the works of Descartes, — a most important publication in the present state of science in France. M. Royer Collard, whose great talents have long been zealously devoted to the same pursuits, has, if I am not misinformed, already made considerable progress in a translation of Dr. Reid's *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man*, — a report to which I give the more credit, from the account of his previous studies given by a most respectable writer, M. Jouffroy, in a work which appeared at Paris in 1826. \* \* And here I may be pardoned for gratifying a personal feeling, by mentioning the pleasure which I have lately received from a perusal of the very elegant translation, by M. Jouffroy, of my *Outlines of Moral Philosophy*, preceded by a long introduction, full of original and important matter. This publication, together with the space occupied in the *Fragmens Philosophiques* of M. Cousin, by large extracts from the same work, comprising nearly the whole of its contents, encourage me in the hope, that the volumes I now publish, which may be considered as a Comment on the Ethical part of my outlines, may, perhaps, find a few who will not only read, but study them with attention, (for a cursory perusal is altogether useless,) in some other countries, as well as my own. — *Kinneil House, April 16, 1828.*"

method is that of all his disciples. We have spoken too of the Eclectics as a School; but in this we are not sure that we have done them justice. They seem to us to have too little of the spirit of system to be able to form a school. They are not exclusive enough for that. They cast free and impartial looks over all systems and schools, and expect and seem to themselves to find truth in them all, and truth they are ready and willing to receive, let it come whence it may, and whatever be the name or character it may bear; and this not because it makes for their theory, but because it is the truth. They are very indifferent as to theory, and their indifference in this respect, their subordination of theory to truth, to facts, or rather their habit of deducing their theory from facts, instead of constructing a theory with which to explain facts, has exposed them to a charge the very opposite of the one we have been considering. They are accused of having no theory, no system, no systematic unity; of jumbling together all systems and theories, according to their own caprice, without rule or measure. We have neither the time nor the room to answer this objection. All we can say is, that though we have studied French Eclecticism with some attention, we have never felt it, and cannot conceive how any fair-minded man could have ever entertained it. In our judgment, French Eclecticism is not, as some allege, mere Syncretism, but genuine Eclecticism. It recognises a truth in all systems, and it selects from all, but not by caprice or at hazard. It has certain principles, according to which it does it. It is true, its friends do not seek for a systematic, a theoretic unity in philosophy, which is not to be found in human nature itself. They recognise more than one element in human nature, and they look for as many elements in philosophy as they find in human nature. Their method of proceeding is, in the first place, to form their psychology, that is, by observation and induction in the bosom of consciousness itself, to ascertain the number and character of the elements of human nature; these elements being ascertained, their second step is to bring to their test all the systems or schools furnished by the history of philosophy. Their psychology becomes, therefore, their measure of the true and the false in the systems and schools which they examine. Nobody can object to this method of proceeding. Philosophy, we all know, is a human creation, a manifestation of the human reason. It can then contain nothing which is not in the human consciousness. All systems

and schools, then, must contain one element or more of the human consciousness. A study of systems of philosophy, a knowledge of their real elements becomes, therefore, a means of determining the elements of the human consciousness, and of course of verifying our psychology. This last method, the historical method, is also pursued by the Eclectics, and it is a scientific method; but the other, or the psychological method, holds the highest rank, and is always to precede the historical.

We trust we need make no apology for having detained our readers so long from the main object of this article. The work we have introduced to their notice is a philosophical work, and the production of one of the most distinguished of the French Eclectics, and we could not in good conscience have proceeded to review it, without having first said something to vindicate the general subject with which it is connected, and the particular philosophy to which it belongs. We have also wished to throw out a few hints, which might be of some service to those young men among us, who are beginning to have a taste for philosophizing. The number of these young men is already far from being small, and it is every day increasing. It is of the very highest importance, that they at first adopt a truly scientific method. Method is to the philosopher what Demosthenes declared action to be to the orator. Before one enters upon the broad field of speculation, he should have some tolerable notions of what it is, of its outlines, and some clear and definite directions as to the route he ought to pursue. Thousands have entered it, and thousands have been lost in it, and thousands too of the very elect of mankind, because they fell at first into a wrong path, into one which compelled them to traverse it in perpetual circles, without ever being able to make the least advance. After having gone round and round a few times, their heads have grown dizzy, and they have found themselves unable to see anything distinctly, or any longer to recognise their point of departure. We have wished to do something to save others from their fate. If our remarks contribute anything to this end, they will not have been made in vain. With the educated among us blind belief is passing away, and it is even so with the uneducated, and everywhere is the young heart tormented with the questions of the *Why*, and the *Wherefore*. The young mind craves no longer au-

thority, but conviction, and around, with eager eyes and anxious thoughts, does it look to find it. To the young man craving conviction we say, obtain a truly scientific method ; understand that the field of its application is your own consciousness ; the facts to be known and classed are the facts which every man carries about in himself, and if you have but a mind of tolerable sobriety and patience, and some little logical sequence of thought, you shall not fail to arrive at results consoling and nourishing to yourself and beneficial to Humanity.

The work before us, as we have said, is the production of one of the most distinguished of the French Eclectics ; and, we may add, of one of the ablest men of the age. Its author, M. Jouffroy, was first a pupil, then an assistant of M. Cousin, in the Normal School, and is now his successor in the chair of Modern Philosophy at the *Faculté des Lettres of Paris*. He is about forty years of age, and has already attained to a high reputation, both as a lecturer and as a philosophical writer. In 1826, he gave the French public a translation of Dugald Stewart's *Outlines of Moral Philosophy*, preceded by a very interesting and valuable Preface, in which he demonstrates the possibility of psychology, or of a science of the facts of consciousness, and makes an unanswerable plea for the moral sciences. He collected and published in 1833 his *Melanges Philosophiques*, an octavo volume of philosophical miscellanies, for the most part consisting of articles previously inserted in the *Globe*, and other French periodicals, but of very great value to the student of philosophy, and even to the general reader. He is remarkable for his soberness and little anxiety as to the systematic results to which he may be conducted. His object seems everywhere to be simply the interpretation of Human Nature. He seeks to analyze the facts of consciousness, not to obtain a system, but to obtain the truth. His style is not so animated, nor so poetical as that of M. Cousin, but it is strong, elevated, transparent, and is in fact one of the best specimens of style for philosophical disquisition, with which it has been our lot to be acquainted. While reading him, he strikes us as less peculiarly French than most French writers, with whom we meet ; and the cast of his mind, and his combinations of thought, seem to us to have something of the Scotch character, (though without anything of the Scotch timidity and shallowness,) a fact, if it be one, which may, perhaps, be attributed to his long and profound study of the Scotch philosophy.

The two volumes before us comprise the first part of his Course of Lectures on Natural Right, which he commenced in 1833, and which is not yet completed. The whole Course is to be divided into *five* parts, the second of which, under the title of *Morale Personelle*, is to include the system of duties which man owes to himself; the third part, under the title of *Droit Réel*, is to expose the principles of the conduct which man should observe towards things, or towards irrational creation; the fourth part, or *Morale Sociale*, will embrace the science of the rights and duties which result from men's relations to one another; and as these relations are various, it will be subdivided into several distinct parts; the fifth and last part, or *Religion Naturelle*, is to have for its object man's relations to his God, and the duties which spring from those relations. From this statement, it will at once be seen that M. Jouffroy takes the term Natural Right in its broadest acceptation, so as to include the whole range of man's duties, whether they be duties to himself, to things, to his like, or to God; and it will also be seen that his plan is so comprehensive, that it must take several years to complete his course. When his course is completed, his plan filled up, judging from the specimen before us, we think we hazard nothing in saying, it will be one of the most valuable contributions ever made to Moral Science, to the Philosophy of Natural Right.

But before proceeding to discuss our rights and duties, to ascertain the special enactments of natural legislation, there is a preliminary question of some importance to be disposed of; a question of no less magnitude than that of determining whether there be a natural right, any natural legislation at all. The idea of law, of rule, of duty, of right, implies that of obligation. To seek the laws, the rules of human conduct, man's rights and duties, is to seek what man ought and what he ought not to do; what it is his duty to do and to respect, and what he has the right to cause to be respected and done. But if there be for him nothing obligatory, if he be bound to nothing, and if others are bound to nothing in regard to him, then there are no rights and duties, no laws, no rules of human conduct to seek, no science of natural rights and duties to construct; the object of the science, the science itself escapes, disappears. Several philosophical systems, not without reputation in the world, have denied that there is anything binding upon man, that he is placed by nature under obligation to

pursue one course of conduct rather than another. If these systems be correct, then it is perfectly idle to talk of natural right, of moral science, for morality must dwindle down to a few counsels or considerations of prudence. It is evident, therefore, that the first step for the moral philosopher is to determine whether there be anything obligatory upon man, anything he is naturally bound to do or not to do, the right to do or cause to be done. To this question the volumes before us are devoted, and they contain the solution which M. Jouffroy himself gives to it, and a critical Review of the principal solutions which it has received from others.

Since we know the school to which M. Jouffroy belongs, since we know the method of that school, we know the method he will take to solve this momentous question. He will not begin by assuming that there is or that there is not something obligatory for man, and then seek for proofs of the position assumed; he will neither praise nor declaim against those who deny moral obligation; he will waste no time in appealing to our prejudices, in depicting the consequences which must inevitably follow from the position that man is not a moral being, and in deploring the wretched condition to which society would be sunk without morality; he will do nothing of all this; he will mingle with the question no considerations of what is desirable or undesirable, of what is useful or what is harmful; but proceeding on the conviction that truth is to be sought for its own sake, that it is alike truth, whether it meet men's wishes or cross them, and without offering any reasons why we should or why we should not believe there is something obligatory, he will enter into the consciousness, ascertain the moral facts of our nature, and thus determine whether moral obligation be or be not one of those facts. This is his method. He does not speculate, he does not reason; he inquires, he observes. He answers the question, not by balancing opposite arguments, and determining which are the weightiest, but by ascertaining what is the psychological fact. If moral obligation be a psychological fact, a fact of human nature, that is enough. Then there is moral obligation for man, there is a law which man is bound to obey, and the only question is, what is that law, and what are its enactments? In accordance with this method, he begins by giving us a brief statement of what he calls the *Moral Facts of Human Nature*. In making this statement of the moral facts, he gives us a

summary of what may be considered his system on the point in question. To do him full justice with those of our readers who are unacquainted with the volumes under review, we ought to give this statement without any abbreviation ; for as he himself has given it, it is as condensed as it well can be. But we are obliged, out of regard to the patience of our readers, to condense it still more ; and if, in doing this, we render his system somewhat obscure, the obscurity must be charged to our account, and not to his ; to the necessity we are under of giving indications of what his system is, rather than a development of it, and not to the system itself, which is perfectly intelligible to every man who can look steadily at the moral phenomena of his own nature. With these remarks we proceed to lay his system before our readers, with as much distinctness and detail as the space which remains to us will admit.

The idea of Law implies that of Duty ; the idea of Duty implies that of Obligation ; several systems of philosophy have said there is no obligation, and several other systems, though they have admitted moral obligation, have given such an account of it as greatly to impair its force. Before we can proceed to determine what is enjoined by natural law, or natural right, what is our duty, and what is the value of these philosophical systems, we must ascertain whether Moral Obligation be a fact of our nature, and if it be, what it is. Both questions, it must be obvious, are matters of fact and not of speculation, and are to be answered by simply observing or ascertaining what are the moral facts of human nature. We must, then, sit down and patiently examine these facts.

In his account of these facts, M. Jouffroy distinguishes the end for which man is made, the instinctive tendencies by which he aspires to that end, the faculties given him with which to attain it, the liberty or voluntary power by which he may govern his faculties, and the reason which furnishes him the motives of his conduct. He also distinguishes three different moral states in the development of human life, characterized by three different modes of determination. In the first, or primitive state, our actions are determined by our instinctive tendencies, passion ; in the second, by regard to our own personal good, selfishness ; in the third, by respect to the universal, absolute good, the good in itself.

The End of a being is determined by its nature. Every being has a nature peculiar to itself, and consequently a special

end, to which its nature predetermines it. Did we know thoroughly the nature of a being we could deduce from it the destination or end of that being. The end of a being is what is meant by its good. The good of a being is to fulfil its destiny, to go to the end for which it has been organized. As each being has a special nature, and by virtue of that a special end, so has each one necessarily the faculties required for accomplishing it. It would be a contradiction to condemn a being by its very constitution to a certain end, and not to give it the faculties which are indispensable in attaining it; and an examination of the end imposed, and the faculties provided, will show that this is never the case. In being predetermined by its constitution to make honey, the bee has the instruments with which to make it.

It follows from these principles, that man, having a special nature, has a special end, the accomplishment of which is his good, and that being organized, fitted expressly for this end, he necessarily has the faculties which are requisite for accomplishing it.

As soon as man exists, and it is the same with all organized beings, and even with unorganized beings, though this is less apparent, — as soon as man exists there take place within him certain movements, which, without any reflection or calculation on his part, bear him towards a certain number of particular ends, which, taken together, make up his total end. These instinctive movements, which occur in him as soon as he comes into the world, and which grow in intensity with his growth, M. Jouffroy calls the *primitive and instinctive Tendencies of Human Nature*. It is these tendencies, what they have in common in all men and particular in each individual, that Gall and the Phrenologists have sought to determine and to enumerate, in an exact manner, by showing what variations they undergo in different individuals and in the same individual, and of which, we venture to say, they have given a tolerable account, though they have, improperly enough, called them faculties, and made them the sole determining mode of our actions through life. These tendencies have attracted the attention of a small number of philosophers, and although they have had some influence on their systems, they have not yet received the distinct consideration they deserve.

Simultaneously with the development of the instinctive tendencies which impel man to his end, his good, the faculties,

which God has given him so that he may attain it, are also set in motion under the influence of these tendencies, and seek to seize the objects towards which they bear him. As soon, then, as man exists, there are awakened within him on one part the tendencies which are the expression of his nature, and on the other, the faculties which have been given him in order that these tendencies may obtain satisfaction. This is not merely the beginning of human life, it is its very ground, and on this ground, which never changes, must be traced all the phenomena humanity presents.

M. Jouffroy believes that he has demonstrated in a previous Course, that when these faculties are first developed it is in an indeterminate manner, and without any precise direction. What gives them a determinate and precise direction, is the fact, that they everywhere find obstacles, meet resistance in the pursuit of their objects, which compels them to concentrate their forces upon one point. Whenever they meet resistance, they bring together spontaneously all the forces which had before radiated in all directions, and make an effort to overcome it. If this world were the harmony of the forces of all the beings which compose it, and were the forces of all these beings, instead of contradicting, opposing one another, developed as harmonious and parallel forces, this would never occur. But the world is a vast assemblage of contradictions, where all destinations and the forces of all the beings of which it is composed are placed in opposition. Our faculties, therefore, cannot seize at once upon their objects. Their spontaneous, instinctive development does not suffice to obtain satisfaction for the tendencies of our nature. Man attains not his end without an effort, a conflict with hostile and opposing forces. And even with it, with all the concentration of his forces and his mightiest effort, he never more than partially realizes it in this life. He never fulfils on earth the destiny appointed him by his nature, his organization. Hence the idea and the promise of another life, a life beyond this life.

When our faculties, by concentration, by an effort, succeed in obtaining satisfaction for our tendencies, in conquering for us a portion of the good to which our nature aspires, there is produced in us a phenomenon called *pleasure*, and when they fail, there is produced another phenomenon called *pain*. We must not confound these with good and evil. Good and evil are success or failure in the pursuit of the ends to which we are

determined by the constitution of our being. Conceive man as having been made capable of acting, but not of feeling ; he would, nevertheless, have had an end to accomplish, the accomplishment of which would be his good, and the non-accomplishment of which would be his evil ; he would have tendencies aspiring to his end, faculties with which to obtain it, but he would feel no pleasure when he succeeded, no pain when he failed. We enjoy when we obtain satisfaction for our tendencies, and suffer when we fail, because we are not merely active beings, but also sensitive beings. Pleasure is a consequence, a sign of the realization of some portion of our good ; pain the consequence, the sign of the privation of good ; but pleasure is not the good, nor is pain the evil.

Inasmuch as we aspire to our good, enjoy when we obtain it, suffer when deprived of it, we love and seek all that which, though it be not itself our good, can aid us in procuring it, and dislike, entertain an aversion for whatever interposes an obstacle to its acquisition. When, therefore, our faculties, on being developed, meet objects which second or oppose their efforts, we experience for the first sentiments of affection and love, and aversion and hatred for the other. This makes the tendencies, that is, the great, the real passions of our nature, to branch out and subdivide themselves, in going to the accomplishment of their end, into a multitude of particular tendencies, which may also be called passions, but only in a secondary sense. We must be careful to distinguish them from the others, the primitive passions, which are developed spontaneously, independently of all external objects, and which aspire to their end, even before reason has disclosed it. These secondary passions are produced only on the occasion of some external object, which aids or opposes the development of our primitive passions. Those objects, which second our primitive tendencies or passions, we qualify as *useful* ; those which oppose them we qualify as *harmful*. Hence the origin of the secondary passions, and the ideas of useful and harmful.

Some of our primitive tendencies, as sympathy, are benevolent for others ; some of them are not, as curiosity, or the desire to know, ambition, or the love of power. Consequently, even in childhood, while as yet all our tendencies are developed without any conscious reference to our own interest, there are some of our tendencies which have no other result than our own personal good. This, however, is not the case

with sympathy ; for that has for its result both our own good and that of others. It is always by our tendencies, never by virtue of reason,—by sympathy, which, independently of all idea of Duty, of all the calculations of interest, impels us to seek the good of others as its proper and ultimate end,—that we are benevolent. The principle is personal, but the object to which it aspires is out of ourselves, the good of others. Man is, therefore, benevolent for others, even when he is governed solely by his instinctive movements.

The facts we have indicated constitute the primitive state of man,—childhood, the period which elapses before the appearance of the reason. The reason, when it appears, effects two important changes in this state, from which result two other states, distinct from it and from each other. The characteristic of this primitive state, that which distinguishes it from every other, is the domination of passion. There is, undoubtedly, in the fact of the concentration of our faculties, induced by the resistance they find, the beginning of self-government, and of the direction of his faculties by the personal power or the will of the man himself ; but this power, the will, is as yet blind, and wholly subject to the passions, which determine necessarily both the action and the direction of our faculties. It remains in this condition till reason appears. It is the reason alone that withdraws the will from the exclusive dominion of the passions. Till it appears, then, the present passion, and among present passions the strongest, bears away the will in its own direction, because the will can as yet have no foresight of evil. Hence the law of human determination, in this state, is the triumph of the present passion over the future passion, and among the present passions the triumph of the strongest passion. We pass now to examine the changes the presence of the reason produces in this state, which, be it remembered, is the state of childhood.

The reason, in its most simple definition, is the faculty of comprehending. We must distinguish this faculty from that of knowing. Animals know, but they do not appear to comprehend, and it is this which distinguishes them from man. If they could comprehend they would be like us, and instead of remaining all their life as they do in the state we have just described, they would rise successively, like man, to the two other states which the intervention of reason produces in us.

The reason, when first awakened in man, finds human na-

ture in full development, all the tendencies in full play, and all the faculties in action. By virtue of its own nature, its power of comprehending it very soon penetrates the meaning of the spectacle it beholds. In the first place, it comprehends that all these tendencies, that all these faculties, aspire and go to one and the same end. This end is the satisfaction of human nature. The satisfaction of human nature is the sum, and, as it were, the resultant of all its tendencies. It is, then, its true end, its real good. It is this good to which it aspires by all its tendencies, and which it strives to gain by all the faculties it exerts. From this, the reason forms the general idea of *good*, and, though it be as yet only the idea of our individual good, it nevertheless marks no slight advance from that primitive state in which it did not and could not exist.

Observation and experience of what is perpetually passing within us show the reason that the complete satisfaction of human nature is impossible, that it is vain to pretend to anything more than a partial good, and, therefore, that we should aim only at the realization of our greatest possible good. By this the reason rises from the idea of our good to that of our greatest possible good, the greatest possible satisfaction of our nature. It very soon conceives that whatever contributes to this satisfaction is good on that account alone, and that whatever hinders it is evil. But it never confounds this double property, which it finds in objects with good and evil themselves; that is to say, with the satisfaction or non-satisfaction of human nature. It makes a fundamental distinction between good in itself, and the things proper to produce it, and generalizing the common property of things to produce good, it rises to the idea of *utility*. It distinguishes also this satisfaction or this non-satisfaction of human nature from the agreeable or disagreeable sensations which accompany it. Pleasure is never in its eyes the same thing as good or utility, nor is pain the same thing as evil, or as that which is harmful. As it had created the general idea of good and that of utility, it sums up whatever is common to all agreeable sensations, and creates the general idea of *happiness*. These three ideas, *good*, *utility*, *happiness*, the reason very soon deduces from the spectacle of human nature, and they are distinct in all languages, for all languages have been made by common sense, the most faithful expositor of the reason. As soon as the reason has conceived these ideas, man has the secret of what is passing

within him. Before, he had it not. He had lived without comprehending it; now he understands it. These passions, he sees whence they come and whither they would go; these faculties, he knows how they are determined, and what purpose they serve; what he loves, what he hates, he knows why he loves, why he hates it; what of pleasure and pain he experiences, he knows wherefore he experiences it. All this is now clear to his understanding, and it is the reason that has made it so.

But the reason does not stop here. It comprehends also, that in the actual condition in which man is placed, dominion over oneself, the government of his faculties, or forces, by the man himself is the only means by which he can obtain the greatest possible satisfaction of his nature. So long as our faculties are under the dominion of the passions, they always obey the one, which, for the time being, is the dominant one. This has a double inconvenience. Nothing is more variable than passion. The domination of one passion is rapidly displaced by that of another, and one passion may reign this moment, another passion the next. Under the dominion of the passions, then, our faculties can have no sequence in their action, and must, therefore, be hindered from producing anything of value. The good, too, which results from the satisfaction of an actually dominant passion, may be the cause of a great evil, and the evil which would result from its non-satisfaction the principle of a great good. Consequently, nothing is less adapted to the production of our greatest possible good, than the subjection of our faculties to the passions. The reason is not slow in discovering this, and it concludes from it, that in order to obtain our greatest possible good, it would be better that the human force, the will, should not remain a prey to the mechanical impulse of the passions, that instead of being driven by that impulse to satisfy, at each instant, the actually dominant passion, it would be better to rescue it from that impulse, and direct it to the realization of a calculated interest, the interest of all our passions; that is, the greatest good of human nature. The reason, in conceiving this as something better, conceives it also as possible. It depends on us to calculate our interest. To do it, we have only to employ our reason. It depends on us also to gain possession of our faculties, and to employ them in the service of the idea which the reason has conceived. We have the power to do it.

This has been revealed to us,—at least, we have had a presentiment of it,—in the spontaneous effort by which we concentrated all our forces upon a single point, in order to satisfy the demand of passion. What we have done heretofore spontaneously, we have only to do voluntarily now, and the power, the will, is created. This important revolution is no sooner conceived, than it is accomplished. A new principle of action springs up within us, interest well understood, a principle which is not a passion, but an idea, which does not proceed blind and instinctive from the tendencies of our nature, but descends clear and intelligent from the reflections of our reason,—a principle, which is not a moving force, (*mobile*,) but a *motive*. The natural power, which we have of controlling our faculties, finding in this motive a point of support, becomes developed and strengthened. The will escapes from the inconsequent, variable, and stormy reign of the passions, and submits only to a law of the reason, which calculates the greatest possible satisfaction of our nature, our greatest good. Interest well understood, instead of those partial ends towards which our passions impelled us, is now the end to be sought; self-control is the means. The immediate dominion of the passions over our faculties, the characteristic of the primitive state, is broken. Between the power of the passions, and that of the faculties, now intervenes a third power, that of the reason and the will, the reason holding out an object to our conduct, and the will directing the faculties to its acquisition.

But we must not suppose that the will henceforth finds no support in the passions. Our nature, as we have seen, sends out its secondary passions for whatever seems capable of affording it satisfaction. It is *passionate* for utility. It believes this system of conduct, which the reason presents it under the character of interest well understood, is a useful system; it, therefore, approves it, loves it, and deviates from it only with regret. Through interest well understood passion is, therefore, led to support the will. Consequently, in this second state, there is a harmony between the instinctive and rational elements of human nature. But this harmony is far from being perfect. The idea of our greatest good, conceived by the reason, does by no means suppress our instinctive tendencies. They subsist, for they are imperishable. They develop themselves, they act, demand immediate satisfaction, the same as they did before the idea was conceived. They continue to

strive, as in the primitive state, to carry away the faculties in pursuit of their immediate satisfaction, and they not unfrequently succeed. If interest well understood finds sympathy in passion, it finds in it also a multitude of obstacles to be overcome. In this second state, then, the will is far from being wholly withdrawn from the immediate dominion of the passions. They are very often able, especially in weak minds, to disturb not a little the calculations of interest. In short, when the reason has appeared, when it has risen to the idea of interest rightly interpreted, a new moral state, a new mode of determination, is created; but it does not destroy the primitive mode, nor so completely supplant it, that a return to it becomes impossible. Man floats between the two states, now going to the one and now to the other, now resisting the impulses of the passions and conforming himself to the counsels of interest, and now succumbing to those impulses, and leaving them to bear him whither they will; nevertheless, a new mode of determination is created within us, and introduced into human life.

This new mode is the selfish mode. Selfishness consists in our knowingly and intentionally acting with sole reference to our own personal good. Our own good is the end we have distinctly in view, and we regard it as our ultimate end. Selfishness cannot occur in the primitive state. The child, in the beginning, is not selfish. In him the instinctive tendencies reign without a rival. These tendencies aspire, each to its end, as to its ultimate end. The child sees these ends, loves them, strives to attain them, but sees nothing beyond them. At bottom it is the satisfaction of his nature to which all his passions aspire, but he is not their accomplice. He is not therefore selfish, in the true acceptation of the word. He is as innocent as Psyche, who loves without knowing love. Reason is in man the torch of Psyche. That alone reveals to him the ultimate end of his passions, and by revealing it substitutes a rational motive to his conduct for the varying impulses of passion, which he had previously obeyed. Reason is then the sole creator of selfishness.

But we have not yet reached the state which properly deserves to be called moral. We have proceeded as far as the selfish moralities ever proceed, but we have not proceeded far enough. We have not yet found an obligatory law, without which, as we have seen, there can be no morality. We have risen to the idea of good, but we are immeasurably below that

of duty, of right, of obligation. The idea of good obtained is only that of our own personal good. With this the reason is not satisfied. The selfish mode of determination conceals a vicious circle. Selfishness calls the satisfaction of the tendencies of our nature good; but when asked why this is good, it gravely replies that it is good because it is the satisfaction of the tendencies of our nature. In vain is it that, in order to come out of this vicious circle; it seeks, in the pleasure which follows the satisfaction of the tendencies of our nature, the proofs of the equation it attempts to establish between this satisfaction and our good; the reason finds no more evidence in the equation of pleasure and good, than in the equation of the satisfaction of our nature and good, and the wherefore of this last equation is always a mystery to it. If we ask the selfish philosophers, why we are bound to perform a given action, they answer, because it will contribute to the satisfying of our nature; if we ask them why we are bound to contribute to the satisfying of our nature, they may answer, because that will yield us happiness; but if we proceed to ask, why are we bound to seek our own happiness, they have nothing to answer. We all feel that we are bound to consult the good, to obey the right; but how can we prove that the satisfaction of our nature is really a good, that to consult our own good is right? This is the problem which tortures the reason, and which it solves by revealing to us an absolute good, and our good as an element of it.

Escaping from the exclusive consideration of individual phenomena, the reason conceives that what passes in us, passes also in all possible creatures; that all, having their special nature by virtue of that, aspire to a special end, which is also their good; and that each one of these different ends is an element of a total ultimate end, which embraces them all. This end is that of creation itself, an end which is identical with universal order. The realization of this end, of universal order alone, in the eyes of reason, merits the title of good, alone answers to its idea of good, and alone forms with that idea a self-evident equation, which we have no need to prove. When the reason has risen to this conception, then, but only then, we have the idea of good. We had it not before. We had, by a confused sentiment, applied the term good to the satisfaction of our nature; but we were unable to give any account of that application, or to justify

it. By the light of this discovery, that application becomes clear and legitimate. We perceive good, veritable good, good in itself, absolute good, to be the realization of the absolute end of creation; that is, universal order. The end of each element of creation, that is, the end of each being, is an element of this absolute end. Each being then aspires to this absolute end in aspiring to its individual end, and this universal aspiration is the universal life of creation. The good of each being is then a fragment of the absolute good, and it is by virtue of this fact that it is a good. It is from this source alone that it can derive this character. If the absolute good be honorable and sacred for the reason, the good of each being, the realization of the end of each being, the fulfilment of the destiny of each being, the development of the nature of each being, the satisfying of the tendencies of each being, all meaning one and the same thing, must also be sacred and venerable for the reason.

Now no sooner does the reason conceive this idea of order, of the ultimate end of creation itself, than there is between it and this idea a sympathy so profound, so true, so immediate, that it prostrates itself before it, acknowledges it sacred and obligatory, reverences it as its legitimate sovereign, honors and submits to it as to its natural and eternal law. To violate order is ever an indignity in the eyes of reason; to realize order, as far as it is given to our weakness, this is good, this is beautiful. A new motive of acting has now appeared, a new rule really a rule, a new law truly a law, a motive, rule, law, which bears in itself the warrant of its legitimacy, which obliges immediately, and which has no need of calling in anything foreign, anterior, or superior to itself to make itself revered and acknowledged.

To deny there is for us, beings endowed with reason, something holy, sacred, obligatory, is to deny either that the reason rises to the idea of the good in itself, the absolute good, universal order; or that, after having conceived this idea we do not bow down before it, and feel immediately and intimately that we have encountered our true law, a law which we had not encountered before, two things which it is impossible to mistake or to call in question.

This idea, this law, is luminous and fruitful. By showing us the end of each creature as an element of universal order, it clothes the end of each being, and the instinctive tendencies

by which each being aspires to its end, with the same sacred and venerable character with which order itself is clothed. Before we had discovered this law we were determined to satisfy the tendencies of our nature by the very impulse of those tendencies themselves, or by the attraction of the pleasure which followed their satisfaction. The reason might judge that satisfaction convenient, useful, or agreeable, it might calculate the best means of obtaining it; but it could not decide that it was legitimate, an intrinsic good, whether it was or was not our duty to pursue it, our right to obtain it. Our right and duty to seek our own good begin only when our end is presented to us as an element of the absolute end of creation, our good as a fragment of the absolute good. That moment our good is clothed with legitimacy and absolute goodness. But not ours only. The good of each creature is at the same time and by the same title clothed with the same characters as our own. Before we had conceived that other creatures had tendencies to satisfy, that there was a good for them as well as for us, we might indeed, impelled by sympathy, instinctively desire their good, find pleasure in promoting it, and consequently make its production enter into the calculations of interest; but that it was legitimate in itself, that it should be sought for anything but for our own sake, that it ought to be as sacred and honorable in our eyes as our own, this our reason could neither discover nor even conceive. But the idea of the absolute good once conceived, what was not visible becomes apparent; the good of others being then shown to be an element of the absolute good, is shown to be a good by the same title as our own. To deny henceforth that we are bound to consult it, will be the same as to deny that we have any right to pursue ours. All difference between our right to pursue our own good and our duty to respect and contribute to the good of others loses itself, and is confounded in the bosom of the absolute good, which, being legitimate by itself, necessarily imparts legitimacy to all its elements.

All duty, all right, all morality flows from one and the same source, the idea of good in itself, the idea of universal order. Suppress this idea and there is nothing sacred for the reason, nothing obligatory, no moral difference in the ends to be pursued, in the actions to be performed, creation is unintelligible, and all notion of destiny an enigma. Reestablish this idea, and all in the universe and in man becomes transparent; there

is an end for all and for each ; there is a sacred order, which every being gifted with reason is bound to respect and labor to accomplish, both in himself and out of himself ; there are duties and rights, there is a morality, consequently a natural legislation for human conduct.

The conception of the idea of order, of absolute good, of obligation as we have described it, introduces us into the third state, to a mode of determination altogether different from the two previous ones. The mode of determination in this state is not the impulse of passion, as in the primitive state, nor reference to our own personal welfare, as in the selfish state, but reference to order, to the intrinsically good. It is fundamentally distinct from the instinctive and selfish modes. It agrees with the selfish mode in this, that it is possible only in a being endowed with reason ; but the lines by which it is separated from that mode are so broad and so characteristic, that they can hardly escape the observation of any one. As passion and selfishness may urge the performance of the same action, so indeed selfishness and the moral motive may prescribe in a multitude of cases the same conduct ; but it is precisely in this coincidence that is most clearly seen the difference which distinguishes them. The selfish motive counsels, the moral motive obliges. The first sees only the greatest possible satisfaction of our nature, and is selfish even when it counsels the good of others ; the second considers only what is intrinsically good, and remains disinterested even in prescribing our own good. In yielding to the counsels of selfishness, it is ourselves that we obey ; in yielding to the moral motive, we submit to something which is not ourselves, and we submit to it simply because in our own eyes it is good. In this last case there is a devotedness to something besides ourselves ; in the first there is not and cannot be. Now for a being to be devoted to that which he is not, and which he believes to be good, is precisely what is meant by virtue, by moral goodness. Virtue, moral goodness, can appear in us only in this third state, and is a phenomenon peculiar to the third mode of determination. We have moral goodness whenever we knowingly and with intention obey the law which is the rule of our conduct ; moral evil whenever we knowingly and with design disobey it. This is the true definition of moral good and evil. But moral good and evil are wholly distinct from absolute good and evil themselves. Absolute good and evil are order and disorder.

der. They are distinct too from that portion of absolute good and evil which we call the good and evil of man, and which consist in the satisfaction and non-satisfaction of the tendencies of his nature.

The difference between the moral mode of determination and the two other modes may be seen also in the phenomena which result from it. Among these phenomena there is one which is peculiar to the moral law. When we have voluntarily fulfilled the moral law, independently of the special pleasure received by our sensibility, we judge ourselves worthy of esteem and recompense; and in the opposite case we consider ourselves deserving blame and chastisement. This is what is called the pleasure of well-doing, and the pain or remorse of evil-doing. This judgment of merit or of demerit is necessarily a consequence of every moral action, and it can be a consequence of no other. When we have acted contrary to our interest, we may be out of humor with ourselves, may accuse our weakness or want of address; in the contrary case, we may laud our prudence, our wisdom, or our ability; but these phenomena are altogether distinct from moral approbation and disapprobation. We do not feel remorse for failing to be true to our interest; the most we feel is regret. Imprudence never excites our remorse, unless our interest has been identified with the absolute good, and then only when we believe that in neglecting our interest we have compromised the good. In this case it is the last consideration, not the first, that produces our remorse. It may be seen from this that M. Jouffroy does not condemn enlightened self-interest, but on the contrary that he legitimates it, and makes a duty of it. But it is not as our interest that he makes a duty of it, but simply as an element of universal order, as a fragment of the absolute good.

To complete the picture of the Moral Facts of Human Nature, so far as we can complete it in the space to which we are limited, two observations are wanting, which we proceed to adduce, and which we pray our readers, in justice to M. Jouffroy, not to overlook.

To what do the primitive tendencies of our nature aspire? the true end, the real good of our nature. To what tends our conduct, when directed by enlightened self-interest? the highest realization possible of our tendencies, the fullest possible accomplishment of our destiny, our end, our good. And

what, when it makes its appearance, does the moral law prescribe? respect for and the greatest possible realization of absolute good, or of order. But our good is an element of absolute good, of absolute order; the law of order then legitimates and imperatively prescribes the accomplishment of the very good, to which we are impelled by our nature and counselled by selfishness. It is true that it prescribes it without any reference to us, with a view to order, to the good in itself; it is true that it prescribes not our good only, but also that of all other beings; but our nature on the one side instinctively aspires to the good of others, and on the other side selfishness shows us that the pleasures which flow from beauty and benevolence are two of the greatest elements of our happiness, and that order in our conduct and respect for the rights and well-being of others are among the very best calculations of interest. There is then no contradiction, but a harmony between the primitive tendencies of our nature, interest properly understood and the moral law. They all point in the same direction, to the same end. The moral motive does not then come for the purpose of destroying the other two, but to explain and control them. Indeed, how could man conduct himself aright, if he were condemned to those absolute struggles imagined by philosophers, if it were necessary in the name of the obligatory principle conceived by our reason to sacrifice continually in order to be virtuous both the impulses of instinct, by which our nature is driven, and the counsels of prudence, by which it is engaged, to pursue its good? Nobody would be virtuous if virtue were possible only on such conditions. Certainly the ends of passion and selfishness differ from that of virtue; but so far from being contradictory or opposed to it, they coincide with it; and hence is it that there is not a virtue which does not find an auxiliary in passion and in interest properly understood. Hence is it also that in a great variety of cases we conduct ourselves by instinct, or by selfishness, precisely as we should were we to obey the moral law. Thus does the child, thus do the greater part of mankind, and it is by virtue of this agreement that society subsists. If all acts which are not done in view of duty were on that account alone contrary to the moral law and hostile to order, society could not merely not subsist, but it could not even be formed. It is necessary then to renounce these false notions, and see things as they are. Struggles we undoubtedly have and must have. Passion will

sometimes oppose prudence, and prudence will sometimes counsel disobedience to Right; but it will only be because passion is blind, and prudence not clear-sighted. For at the bottom of things it is ordinarily the greatest interest of passion to be sacrificed to prudence, and the greatest interest of prudence to be sacrificed to order.

We have spoken thus far of the three states which we have distinguished in man, as though they appertained to three wholly distinct epochs in human life. This is not exactly true. Neither of the three modes of determination we have pointed out in making its appearance abolishes the one which preceded it; it merely adds to it; so that when once produced the three modes henceforth coexist in human life. As to the order of their appearance, it is certain that the instinctive mode chronologically precedes the two others; but it would be difficult to affirm a similar succession from the selfish to the moral state. Although the reason appears very early, nobody will maintain that it rises at once to the sublime conception of order which is the moral law. Moreover,—and everybody knows it,—in a large portion of mankind the sublime conception of the moral law never receives a precise formula. Is it necessary to conclude from this that there is no morality till a certain age, and that there is never any in the majority of men? Not at all. We must distinguish two things, the confused view and the clear view of the moral law. A confused view of the moral law is contemporaneous with the first appearance of the reason; it is one of the reason's first conceptions; and with the majority of men this obscure conception remains through life, and is never transformed into a clear idea. What is called conscience is nothing else than this confused or obscure idea of order, and hence it is that its effects resemble less those of a conception of the reason than those of an *instinct* or a *sense*. Its judgments do not seem to be derived from general principles, which it applies to particular cases; they seem rather to result from a sort of tact, which in each particular case enables it to feel what is good and what is evil. But the obligatory character of good and evil is not affected by this dimness of perception. However confusedly conscience may perceive it, it always presents the good as that which we ought to do, and the evil as that which we ought to avoid; and we feel for obeying or disobeying it as lively approbation or remorse, as we should had we obeyed or disobeyed a more elevated and clear

conception of the moral law. Thus conscience, or this confused view of order, is sufficient to make men virtuous and vicious, criminals and heroes. And still he who conceives clearly this moral law, and the sacred obligation it imposes, is much more culpable for violating it, than he who has only a confused conception of it, for he violates it with a clearer understanding of what he does, he sins against greater light. It is not without reason then that human laws make distinctions among the guilty, and mete out severer or less severe punishments, according as they judge their understandings to have been more or less developed, and consequently as they are supposed to have a more or less clear knowledge of good and evil.

These details show us, that as soon as the reason appears it introduces at once the moral motive and the selfish motive, and that therefore these two modes of determination, which have been separated in the description, are very nearly, if not quite contemporaneous. The development of the reason does not abolish the instinctive mode which reigns exclusively in childhood ; thus after its development man's life is a perpetual alternation between the three states, a perpetual passage from one to the other, as passion, interest, or the moral law by turns controls the will and presides over its determinations. No life is exempt from this alternation. What distinguishes men is the nature of the motive which most frequently triumphs. Some habitually obey passion, they are *passionate* men ; others interest, they are selfish men ; others in fine the moral motive, they are virtuous. As one or the other of these modes of determinations predominate, such or such is the character of the man. No one obeys exclusively and constantly either of the three ; however powerful and habitual the predominance of the one, the other two always preside over some of our determinations. Moreover in the majority of cases the three, by virtue of the harmony which at bottom unites them, concur and act together, and probably there are few human actions which can be referred exclusively to either alone. Thus man is never wholly virtuous, wholly selfish, or wholly a creature of passion. With that one of these moving forces, which seems to determine him, there is always mingled more or less of the secret impulse of the two others.

Such is the picture of the Moral Facts of Human Nature according to M. Jouffroy, as faithfully as we have been able in

the space allotted us to present it. We may not have seized his exact meaning in all cases, and in some cases where we have ourselves seized it, we may have failed to impart it to our readers. Discussions of this nature are always attended with difficulty. Not that the moral facts of our nature cannot be seized as well as any other, are not, if we may so speak, as tangible as those of physiology ; but they are less studied, and the faculties requisite for observing them are less exercised than those requisite for observing the facts of the body. Our psychological language too is vague, and not yet settled. We are obliged to use popular terms ; but in using them we give them a definite and precise sense which they have not in popular usage, and which to the general reader will often seem unwarranted. But enough of this. We have no wish to exalt our merit by magnifying the difficulty of our task. Everybody, who has attempted to discourse metaphysics to those who are not somewhat acquainted with metaphysical thought, will censure us but lightly, even if we seem to many of our readers dark and unintelligible.

We might offer very easily some reflections on the system of Morality of which we have here given the outlines, and reflections which might not be without interest to our readers, but we have trespassed too long already upon their patience. They will find, if we mistake not, though in some instances he may appear to be open to criticism, that M. Jouffroy throws a clear and cheering light on many dark passages of moral philosophy, and enables us to settle to our satisfaction several important questions, on which philosophers have long disputed, and divided and subdivided into schools and sections of schools, much to the grief of the friends of philosophic truth, and to the amusement of the eulogizers of common sense.

We hope in a future number to be able to recur to these volumes, and give our readers some account of the criticisms on different ethical doctrines which they furnish us, and which, if not of the highest value, are at least intensely interesting to the moral philosopher.

O. A. B.

- ART. V.—1. *Mammon; or, Covetousness the Sin of the Christian Church.* By REV. JOHN HARRIS, Author of the "Great Teacher." Boston: 1836. 12mo. pp. 230.
2. *An Essay on the Sin and the Evils of Covetousness; and the Happy Effects which would flow from a Spirit of Christian Beneficence. Illustrated by a Variety of Facts, selected from Sacred and Civil History, and other Documents.* By THOMAS DICK, LL. D., Author of the "Christian Philosopher," "Philosophy of Religion," "Philosophy of a Future State," "Improvement of Society by the Diffusion of Knowledge," "The Mental Illumination and Moral Improvement of Mankind," &c. &c. New York: 1836. 12mo. pp. 318.
3. *The Philosophy of Benevolence.* By PARACELSUS CHURCH, A. M., Rochester, N. Y. New York: 1836. 12mo. pp. 355.

THE three works, the titles of which are above given, though of a different order of merit, belong to one class, and if they may be considered as indicating the direction which thoughtful minds are taking, their appearance augurs well for the cause of benevolence and human improvement. We rejoice that the manifestation of the selfish principle, especially in the form of a passion for wealth and display, is beginning to attract notice, and excite alarm. We rejoice that attention is awake to the subject, and we hope that the inquiries and thoughts of philanthropists and Christians will be brought more and more to bear on it. It is one on which there has hitherto been too much apathy. The tendencies of modern society have need to undergo a searching analysis, and require to be pointed out with a skilful hand; and he who effects this, who shall so hold up the mirror to the age that it shall see its true form and likeness, will render good service to his fellow beings. We are not weak and visionary enough to anticipate, from any efforts of this sort, a great and speedy revolution in men's estimate of worldly pursuits, and particularly in their disposition to do homage to wealth, for we know what deep passions are at work, and what strong holds of selfishness are to be sapped or shaken before the principles of the gospel shall triumph in the lives of Christians. Yet we despair not of the issue, for we have some faith in man, and more in God. We see some

things to encourage us in the history of the past ; the progress of society, though not without occasional pauses and relapses, has, we would fain believe, been onward ; new light has been gradually breaking forth from God's word, and the cause of humanity has been gaining ground. And the end is not yet.

Of the Treatise on "Mammon, or, Covetousness the Sin of the Christian Church," by the Rev. John Harris, the book first named at the head of the present article, we can speak in terms of the highest commendation. To say that the perusal of it has afforded us peculiar gratification, would but feebly convey our impressions of its merit. It is written with great earnestness and force, and occasionally with a near approach to eloquence. It traces selfishness, particularly the love of gain, through its various modes and windings, lays open its subterfuges and disguises, points out its inconsistency with the principles of the gospel, and presses the argument home on the conscience with a power which one would think it not easy to resist.

The history of the publication is briefly this. Early in the year 1835, J. T. Conquest, M. D., of London, offered the liberal prize of one hundred guineas with the profits of publication, to be adjudged to the author of the best Essay on the "Love of Money," or "Avaricious Hoarding," and "Unchristian-like Expenditure." "The work wanted," says the original advertisement, "is one that will bear on *selfishness*, as it leads us to live to ourselves, and not for God, and our fellow-men." Out of one hundred and forty pieces, which were sent in, that of Mr. Harris was selected as the one entitled to the prize. It treats of selfishness as the "antagonist of the gospel ;" of "covetousness, the principal form of selfishness ;" its "nature, forms, and prevalence, especially in Britain,—disguises, tests, evils, doom, and pleas ;" and concludes with some observations illustrating and enforcing "Christian liberality."

There is so much that is good in the book, which we should be glad to transfer to our pages, that we hardly know how to make a selection. We give the following paragraphs, taken almost at random. They relate to the craving, avaricious spirit of the times.

"In the eyes of the world, a man may acquire, and through a long life maintain, a character for liberality and spirit, while his heart all the time goeth after his covetousness. His hand, like a channel, may be ever open ; and because his income is perpet-

ually flowing through it, the unreflecting world, taken with appearances, hold him up as a pattern of generosity; but the entire current is absorbed by his own selfishness. That others are indirectly benefited by his profusion, does not enter into his calculations; he thinks only of his own gratification. It is true his mode of living may employ others; but he is the idol of the temple, — they are only priests in his service; and the prodigality they are empowered to indulge in, is only intended to decorate and do honor to his altar. To maintain an extensive establishment, to carry it high before the world, to settle his children *respectably* in life, to maintain a system of costly self-indulgence, — these are the objects which swallow up all his gains, and keep him in a constant fever of ill-concealed anxiety; filling his heart with envy and covetousness at the sight of others' prosperity; rendering him loath to part with a fraction of his property to benevolent purposes; making him feel as if every farthing of his money so employed were a diversion of that farthing from the great ends of life; and causing him even to begrudge the hallowed hours of the Sabbath as so much time lost (if, indeed, he allows it to be lost) to the cause of gain." — pp. 49, 50.

Again;

"But, though a man may not merit to be denominated avaricious, he may yet be parsimonious. He may not be a Dead Sea, ever receiving, and never imparting; but yet he may be as unlike the Nile when, overflowing its banks, it leaves a rich deposit on the neighboring lands. His domestic economy is a system of penuriousness, hateful to servants, visitors, and friends; from which every thing generous has fled; and in which even every thing necessary comes with the air of being begrudged, of existing only by sufferance. In his dealing with others, he seems to act under the impression that mankind have conspired to defraud him, and the consequence is, that his conduct often amounts to a constructive fraud on mankind. He is delighted at the idea of saving; and exults at the acquisition of a little pelf with a joy strikingly disproportionate to its worth. He looks on every thing given to charity, as so much lost, thrown away, and for which there will never be any return. If a benevolent appeal surprise him into an act of unusual liberality, he takes ample revenge by keen self-reproaches, and a determination to steel himself against all such assaults in future. Or else, in his relenting moments, and happier moods, he plumes himself, and looks as complacently on himself for having bestowed a benevolent mite, as if he had performed an act of piety for which nothing less than heaven would be an adequate reward. His soul not only never expands to the warmth of benevolence, but contracts at the bare proposal,

the most distant prospect, of sacrifice. His presence in any society met for a charitable purpose would be felt like the vicinity of an iceberg, freezing the atmosphere, and repressing the warm and flowing current of benevolence. The eloquent think it a triumph to have pleaded the cause of mercy before him unabashed; and the benevolent are satisfied if they can only bring away their sacred fire undamped from his presence. He scowls at every benevolent project as romantic, as suited to the meridian of Utopia, to a very different state of things from what is known in this world. He hears of the time when the church will make, and will be necessitated to make, far greater sacrifices than at present, with conscious uneasiness, or resolved incredulity. His life is an economy of petty avarice, constructed on the principle of parting with as little as possible, and getting as much, — a constant warfare against benevolence.

“But a person may be free from the charge of parsimony, and yet open to the accusation of worldliness. His covetousness may not be so determined as to distinguish him from the multitude, but yet sufficiently marked to show that his treasure is *not* in heaven. He was born with the world in his heart, and nothing has yet expelled it. He may regularly receive the seed of the gospel, but the soil is pre-occupied; ‘the cares of this world, and the deceitfulness of riches, choke the word, and render it unfruitful.’ He will listen to an ordinary exposition of the vanity of wealth as a matter of course, and will appear to give it his entire assent; and yet, immediately after, he resumes his pursuit of that *vanity* with an avidity which seems increased by the temporary interruption. But let the exposition be more than usually vivid, let it aim at awakening his conviction of the dangers attending wealth, let it set forth the general preferableness of competence to affluence, and it will be found to be disturbing the settled order of his sentiments. A representation of the snares of wealth is regarded by him as the empty declamation of a man who has been made splenetic by disappointments, or who has been soured by losses; who has never known the sweets of wealth, or, having known, has lost them, and would gladly recover them again if he could. He never listens to such representations as — that unsanctified riches are only the means of purchasing disappointment; that the possessor suffers rather than enjoys them; that his wants multiply faster than his means, — without an inward smile of skepticism, a conscious feeling of incredulity; a feeling which, if put into words, would express itself thus, ‘O, if I might be but made rich, I would make myself happy. Tell me not of dangers; cheerfully would I risk them all, only bless me with wealth.’ And his life is arranged, and spent, in strict accordance with this confession. In his vocabulary, wealth means

*happiness,—the chief good.* And in his reading of the holy Scriptures, the declaration of our Lord is reversed, as if he had said, — A man's life consisteth in the abundance of the things which he possesseth." — pp. 52–54.

Again ;

" A spirit of extravagance and display naturally seeks for resources in daring pecuniary speculations. Industry is too slow and plodding for it. Accordingly, this is the age of reckless adventure. The spirit of the lottery is still upon us. ' Sink or swim ' is the motto of numbers who are ready to stake their fortunes on a speculation ; and evil indeed must be that project, and perilous in the extreme must be that scheme, which they would hesitate to adopt, if it held out the remotest prospect of gain." — p. 68.

Again ; as to the relative amount of benevolence at the present day ;

" The truth appears to be, that, much as the benevolence of the age has increased, the spirit of trade has increased still more ; that it has far outstript the spirit of benevolence ; so that, while the spirit of benevolence has increased *absolutely*, yet *relatively*, it may be said to have declined, to have lost ground to the spirit of trade, and to be tainted and oppressed by its influence. How large a proportion of what is cast into the Christian treasury must be regarded merely as a kind of quit-rent paid to the cause of benevolence by the spirit of trade, that it might be left free to devote itself to the absorbing claims of the world. How small a proportion of it is subtracted from the vanities and indulgences of life ; how very little of it results from a settled plan of benevolence, or from that self-denial, without which, on Christian principles, there is no benevolence. Never, perhaps, was self-denial a rarer virtue than in the present age." — p. 69.

" Could we ascertain the entire amount of national excitement and emotion experienced in the course of a year, and could we then distribute it into classes, assigning each respectively to its own exciting cause, who can for a moment doubt that the amount of excitement arising from the influence and operation of money, direct and indirect, would not only exceed that of either of the others, separately considered, but would go near to surpass them altogether ? And when it is remembered that this cause is always in operation ; that it has acquired a character of permanence ; that our life is spent under the reign of wealth ; how can it be otherwise than that we should become its subjects, if not even its slaves ? " — p. 72.

Mr. Dick's Treatise, the title of which stands second in our list at the head of the article, in consequence, as he says, of some circumstances attending its transmission, did not pass under the inspection of the adjudicators, and was returned unopened. Mr. Dick is a well-known and indefatigable author. The present work is written in his usual diffuse and somewhat immethodical style, but contains some statistical information which is not without its value. Altogether, it ranks, as we think, far below that of Mr. Harris, though certainly not destitute of merit.

The other is an American production, and is written in an animated, easy, and flowing style, though not always in perfectly good taste. We do not assent to all the author's positions and reasonings. Taken as a whole, however, the book is quite creditable both to his understanding and heart, and will do good. We like the spirit in which it is written much. If Mr. Church, as we suppose, belongs to the party called orthodox, he has been very successful in divesting himself of the usual technicalities of his sect, and his views are exceedingly liberal. He speaks in terms of strong disapprobation of the sectarian spirit of the age. He thinks that the energies of Christians should be expended in something better than in the exhibition of "sectarian arrogance," in "secret heart-burning, and these vile attacks upon each other's honest peculiarities," or even in discussions on "free will, necessity, and other abstract questions," the importance of which he rates very low; he thinks that they should be directed to "raising man to the dignity of virtue and truth, and impelling him to those labors and sacrifices, by which his woes may be alleviated, his infidelity counteracted, and his conflicts healed; and by which the current of his feelings may be made to set in favor of all that can exalt, ennoble, and beautify his own condition." This, of course, we like.

In its topics and general train of remark, Mr. Church's book exhibits a striking resemblance to the other two, though, of necessity, written without any knowledge of their contents. Its object is to expose the folly and sin of a selfish, earthly, and coveting disposition; to inculcate the "true use of riches," and to bring the principles of Christianity to bear on the love of them in its ordinary manifestations; to teach the extent of the Christian doctrine of consecration and self-sacrifice. The author may push some of his views a little too far, but that he is no narrow

fanatic, will be obvious to every one who reads his chapter on the authorized uses of wealth, among which he enumerates, in addition to "the means of support," and "provision for future use and necessity," "intellectual and moral improvement," the "embellishments and luxuries of life" to a certain extent, and the "favorable regards of society." The work throughout is, in its tone, eminently Christian, and, as such a work must, breathes the spirit of a cheerful philosophy.

The subject of these volumes is highly interesting and important, and we are pleased with an opportunity of calling attention to it. It has an intimate bearing on the present condition and prospects of our country. There are certain views of it which, we think, ought to be pressed, and which cannot be pressed too earnestly. We refer to the temptations, dangers, and responsibilities of wealth. On these topics we beg leave to offer a few remarks. We begin with the dangers and temptations incident to the possession of a large measure of earthly prosperity. What are some of these? In the first place, as regards communities, nations.

Undoubtedly we are to place among them, forgetfulness of God, and our dependence on his good Providence; the gradual exclusion of him from our thoughts; a disposition to overlook his agency, to recognise in the phenomena of our being only the operation of physical causes. The tendency of the age, though not without occasionally some symptoms of a reaction, is to an essentially earthly and material philosophy. It is an age of mechanism. The results of mechanical ingenuity everywhere meet the eye. The great triumphs which are won are over matter. Mind is intensely occupied about physical agencies. And far be it from us to speak lightly of efforts to advance physical science, and especially its application to the practical purposes of life. It is one of the prerogatives of reason, that it controls blind force, and renders the most powerful instruments of nature subservient to the comfort and use of man. But a tendency to direct the attention almost exclusively to the operation of mechanical laws, to seek chiefly an outward, tangible prosperity, to regard the conquests which mind achieves over matter as its best and noblest, while the moral and religious element of our nature, its undying energies and affections, are in comparison overlooked,—a tendency nourished by the growth of wealth, and a state of society in a

high degree artificial, — may well be viewed with apprehension and alarm.

They, who gave us our homes in this new-found world, laid the foundation of our republic in a deep and pervading sense of religious obligation. A spirit of earnest and lofty piety breathed in all their acts; it animated, it sustained them; it urged them onward; it filled their hearts with courage, and nerved their arm with strength. A feeling of dependence was ever uppermost in their breasts. They were persuaded that except the Lord build the house, they labor in vain who build it; except the Lord keep the city the watchman waketh in vain; and in this persuasion they toiled, and attributed their success to God. If there ever was a community, which may be said to have been planted, and to have grown up in the recognition of an overruling Providence, such is ours, and to the religious character and virtues of its founders, we owe whatever is most precious in our institutions.

If the time ever arrives, when our chief energies, as a people, shall be directed to the outward and perishing, to the means of promoting mere physical comfort; if the sacred fire be permitted to go out on the altar; if what our fathers regarded as a spirit, we receive as a dead letter, a senseless form; if instead of honoring religion as a great and precious reality, we are satisfied to treat it with a cold and ceremonious respect, as simply a venerable tradition; if now, when the wilderness has been converted to a garden, and goodly edifices have arisen, and poverty has been exchanged for affluence, our hearts become elated, and in a spirit of pride and self-adulation, we begin to say within ourselves, our own power and the might of our hands have gotten us this prosperity and this wealth, to do with it according to our heart's desire, — thus leading the lives of practical atheists, — if this time, which heaven in mercy forbid, shall ever arrive, our doom is fixed. Our pleasant places shall become as frightful wastes; and a moral desolation, more hideous than nature's solitude, will spread over the land. In vain the fields will bloom; in vain the seasons smile; in vain the earth pour plenty into our laps, and our commerce whiten every sea; a plague-spot will be on the soul, and every joy will be tainted. We may, for a period, enjoy an overgrown and bloated prosperity, but the fabric will soon totter, and we shall be buried beneath the ruins of our own greatness.

We must remember, and the truth needs to be more and more pressed on the attention every day, that wealth is not another name for national felicity, and we must be careful that we do not overrate its importance in itself, or as furnishing the means of gratifying luxurious tastes and habits. The tendency of the age, and more especially in this country, it is said, is to attach an excessive value to it, to make it the sole, or nearly the sole ground of distinction. It is much so in England,\* though, from the constitution of English society, there are some checks there, which do not exist here, and which are of a kind we do not wish to see introduced. We have here no hereditary rank or privileges, and we want none. But men are naturally fond of preëminence, and as property is here one of the few avenues that lead to it, it is easy to see that one of the great moral dangers, to which we are exposed, is that of cherishing an undue reverence for it, accompanied as a natural consequence by an intense desire, an almost insane thirst of accumulation. The effect of this spirit of gain, this sordid ambition of self, if not counteracted by any antagonist principle, in dwarfing the private virtues, impairing the charm of social life, in discouraging liberal pursuits, and introducing a low standard of personal merit, is too obvious to require illustration. It becomes us anxiously to guard against this species of false worship,—the pernicious idolatry of wealth. We must not accustom ourselves to think that the great end of existence is gained, when earthly treasures are multiplied. We must be ambitious to obtain for ourselves, and for our country, some higher distinction than that of a carnal, unsanctified, Carthaginian prosperity. What constitutes public felicity? What is the praise we should most covet for our now great and flourishing republic? Not that of surpassing other nations in extent of territory and overgrown wealth. Many communities have risen and perished, and left no memorial but the traditionary fame of affluence. The best prayer we can offer for our country is, that it may contain a *people* eminent for moral and intellectual wealth; that it may be the home of the free, the intelligent, the virtuous; that here human nature may exhibit not a few rare specimens of superior excellence, standing out from a surrounding mass of ignorance and depravity, but an entire nation, well educated in all that is essential to

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\* See Mr. Harris's chapter on the "Predominance of Covetousness in Britain," pp. 63-77.

form and elevate the individual man, and rear him up a pillar in the great and harmonious fabric of society.

Whether or not this prayer shall be accomplished, depends in no slight degree on the direction which is given to the application of wealth among us, and the prevailing ideas of its value and importance,—in other words, on the question, whether those who share most largely in the general prosperity, and who wield all the influence which their position bestows, shall, on the one hand, by their habits, and by the impulse they give to public sentiment, encourage a cold, Epicurean sensualism, that is satisfied with present and personal enjoyment, inattentive to the loathsome forms of poverty, vice, and wretchedness which exist around it, and careless of the claims founded on the ties of a common brotherhood; or whether they shall, on the other hand, regard power as a trust; keep in view the rational ends of wealth; be anxious and labor to meliorate the human condition, physical, intellectual, and moral; to extend the benefits of education, especially to rescue the children of the poor from the combined evils of ignorance and vice, and encourage, generally, among all classes, simple and frugal habits, particularly a taste for the pleasures of knowledge, and love and approbation of the true, the fit, and excellent, and above all, and as security for all, a profound sentiment of religious obligation. Wealth must be regarded not as the end, but as the means; and the well-being of communities requires correct views of the objects to be attained by it, and vigilance in guarding against the tendency, incident especially to periods attended with indications of great and rapid accumulations, to place happiness chiefly in an outward and worldly prosperity.

Again; that the possession of a large amount of earthly good constitutes a state of temptation and moral danger to the individual, would be apparent to the reflecting mind, even without the reiterated precepts and caution of our Savior on the subject. Prosperity is indeed a gift of God, though not one of the highest, and we are permitted to rejoice in it with a temperate and chastened emotion; but it is uniformly represented in the Scriptures, and as reason tells us, with truth, as presenting a condition of trial, which calls for perpetual watchfulness, and the issue of which should be contemplated with some solicitude and distrust.

To say nothing of the dangers incident to the desire and

pursuit of gain, consisting in the tendency of such desire and pursuit to rouse into undue activity the selfish passions, to narrow and chill the affections, and nourish a cold, shrewd, calculating spirit and love of accumulation, at the expense of the more generous emotions and finer sensibilities of the soul ; to say nothing of all this, there are dangers attending the possession and enjoyment of the object. We speak now, and we wish the distinction to be carefully marked, of tendencies, not of results. These tendencies are often resisted and overcome. There are, and have been, in every age since Christianity has been in the world, instances innumerable of the correct appreciation and just appropriation of wealth, as many noble monuments testify, and as the record of the feelings of many a heart, could it be inspected, would bear ample witness. Still the tendencies remain, and of these only we speak,—of dangers to be apprehended, watched, and guarded against,—and not of the actual issue.

Some of these dangers are common to the possession of wealth and every species of earthly prosperity. They are such as originate in the facilities it affords to the indulgence of pampered desires and appetites ; temptations to extravagance and excess ; a tendency to nurture a spirit of carelessness, levity, and self-exaltation,—a disposition to forget the uncertainties of a mortal condition, to trust to the world's smiles and favor, and seek happiness in unsatisfying and precarious objects, while more rational sources of enjoyment are neglected. These render the possession, in some sort, hazardous, and the effect is often such as to impress us with the truth, that man is not perfect enough to be trusted with uninterrupted prosperity, without peril to his virtue ; and the hand, which mingles disappointment and sorrow in his cup, is extended in mercy.

Suffering and trial perform an important office in moral education. They teach us a knowledge of ourselves, they stimulate the mind to action, and they favor the growth and expansion of the kind affections. May not the very exemptions of those, whose lot is cast amid abundance, the ease, the superfluities, the means of enjoyment perpetually at their command, be placed among the circumstances, which make their state one of peculiar temptation and exposure ? Their situation comparatively calls for no effort, no self-denial and sacrifices ; the wish is no sooner formed than gratified ; every want almost is anticipated ; they are conscious of few privations ; the burdens of humanity press lightly on them. Of the nu-

merous anxieties and fears, which harass other minds ; of the evils to be met and borne, and the feverish exhaustion of spirits, the consequence of care, toil, and effort, they know little, and there is less, therefore, to remind them of weakness and dependence. All conspires to produce the state of mind to which the Savior refers, when he speaks of " trust in riches," a disposition not consciously cherished, not marked by the individual, nor, perhaps, recognised by him as existing, but still real, to rely on the seeming omnipotence of wealth, and invest it with all the attributes of a Divinity.

Then the voice of adulation and flattery, with which their ears are familiar, the readiness to serve and please, and the little resistance to their will which is met in those around them, and the smiles and deference with which they are greeted wherever they move, tend to encourage some delusions which it requires a jealous attention and vigilance to correct or escape.

Immunity from suffering, too, renders sympathy with the sufferings of others an acquisition of greater difficulty. They who are conscious of no wants but such as find instant relief, who are accustomed daily to taste all the luxuries, which affluence can procure, whose condition in life seldom brings them into contact with poverty and wretchedness, who are acquainted with them only from recital, or the reports of others, are not in a situation the most favorable for exciting feelings of intense and effective commiseration. They want the touching evidence of the reality of woe ; the sight of the pale, emaciated form ; the sunken visage ; the eye eloquent with grief ; the tale of sorrow poured, in weak, quivering accents, into the attentive ear.

These dangers and obstacles may be, and as we have said, often are, surmounted. The existence of them should have the effect only of inspiring caution, diligence, and a wakeful self-distrust. All the varieties of the human condition are attended with corresponding temptations, and he who would live well, and faithfully perform his duty, should reflect that he is under obligation to search them out, and strive successfully to resist them ; and to neglect this involves, in the eye of heaven, criminality and sin. And much suffering ensues, ensues often to the individual in consequence of such neglect.

What is one of the consequences to the individual of a false estimate of the value and uses of wealth as a means of happi-

ness? An eager pursuit of enjoyment derived from one only source, from the gratification of a single propensity, or desire, and that not the most elevated, and the result is inevitable disappointment. Among the different faculties, affections, and instincts of our nature, there is a subordination of one to another viewed in themselves, and as sources of enjoyment. If, therefore, happiness is sought in the gratification of the inferior, as the desire of accumulation and others, while the superior are suffered to pine and languish from want of exercise and nutriment, the consequence must be failure, dissatisfaction, disgust, not only because the proper balance is not preserved among the several faculties, sentiments, and propensities, but because the laws of our being, intellectual and moral being, are essentially violated, and every violation of them is attended with corresponding suffering. We may have the means of the unlimited gratification of the inferior and animal instincts and desires, and all our worldly projects may be crowned with success; but our felicity is for various reasons incomplete, and chagrin and sorrow await us. The passions we are accustomed to obey are insatiable, and are constantly renewing their demands. Each gratification has the effect only of still further inflaming desire, and amid the greatest abundance there is a perpetual craving for more. Then our reflections and conscience tell us that the objects of these passions and desires are not the most worthy; they fail of satisfying our higher faculties; and are by no means deserving our sole pursuit, even were they of more certain attainment, and far more enduring than they are. An exclusive attention to our own interests renders us more and more intensely selfish, as we advance in life; the affections grow more earthly, and the mind at length becomes, as it were, wholly materialized.

A person in this condition, though he may have succeeded in obtaining the object of his wishes, and may have acquired the wealth of half the globe, is yet far from happiness. All his labor and all his feverish anxieties have not secured him that. Wealth, viewed in itself, or in its results, is only one of the elements of enjoyment, and he who consumes his days in the eager pursuit of it, neglecting in consequence to cultivate the higher faculties and sentiments of his nature, to fortify himself with friendships, to encourage and strengthen in himself feelings of benevolence, religious hope and trust, and secure the pleasing recollections arising from a consciousness

of duty performed, trusts fulfilled, and good done, will from the nature of things, gather only a few cold and scanty joys, for he infringes those conditions, the observance of which is necessary to the soul's health, and therefore to all true and lasting peace and happiness. There are wants of the spirit which have been neglected, transcending the limits of the material, and stretching out to the "immense and infinite."

So impotent is wealth. It should be sought, if sought at all, not to gratify the desire of accumulation, or pride of possession, but for its uses. The place it occupies in our affections should be subordinate to that occupied by the pleasures of intellect, and especially moral pleasures, the pleasures of benevolence. It is only when it is so sought that it becomes capable of ministering to rational enjoyment, or the pursuit of it is worthy beings possessing a thinking, feeling, ever-living essence.

But the point of the greatest moment, after all, is a deep and practical conviction that our worldly possessions are a trust, a means of influence, for the use or abuse of which we are accountable to the Supreme Giver. We are bound to honor God and do good with our substance. We should regard wealth not as a talent to be enclosed in the chest of the miser, not as a gift to be exhausted in purely selfish enjoyment, a grant designed to pamper luxury, or minister to pride and oppression. We should view it as so much power, (for wealth is power,) entrusted to us to be used wisely, beneficially, humanely. Every addition to it augments our means, our power to act with effect, and, therefore, involves additional responsibility. It is this circumstance, in part, and not merely the facilities and temptations it affords to self-indulgence, effeminacy, and kindred failings, or vices, which renders the possession of it in a moral view so ambiguous a good. It augments our responsibility. It confers power for good or for evil, and for the use of this power we must answer as strictly as for the use of any power, faculty, or talent committed to us. We are culpable not merely if we abuse it to purposes of injustice and cruelty, but if we neglect to use it, as we have said, wisely, beneficently, humanely, for so all power should be used, and every augmentation of it, if it be not so used, but exposes us to greater condemnation. Why should not a man serve God with his property, as well as in any other way? On what principle do you affirm, that this is excepted from the rule

which lays you under obligation, as good stewards, to occupy faithfully the talents entrusted to your hands? Responsibility attaches, not to a part, but to the whole; not to a few acts of our lives, but to all of them; not to one mode of influence, but to each and all. In truth, the province of religion is a wide one; its office is to regulate every feeling and habit; and the shop of the artisan, the counting-room of the merchant, the farm, the exchange, the study of the philosopher, and cell of the recluse, must acknowledge its controlling influence, as well as the temple of worship, else is it mere Pharisaic observance, idle ceremony. The true idea of Christian consecration surely includes wealth, as well as time, the affections of the soul, the bodily and intellectual faculties and senses.

This view, trite and obvious as it may seem, cannot be urged on the attention with too great frequency and earnestness. The responsibility which attaches to the possession of wealth, as a means of influence, as conferring power to act with effect, needs to be insisted on. There are few subjects on which it concerns Christians of the present day, and among ourselves especially, to reflect with more seriousness. The physical resources of our country are rapidly developing themselves; wealth and all the outward means of enjoyment are fast multiplying around us. It requires no prophet's ken to discern in this very circumstance a condition of peculiar peril, and the reflecting mind must feel some painful anxiety as to the result. May God preserve us from abuse of his gifts, from guilt, and irreligion. Our fathers were tried in the furnace of adversity; a severer trial awaits us,—the temptations of unlimited prosperity. Heaven grant that we may pass the ordeal unhurt, that we and our country perish not, and with it the hope of humanity throughout the earth.

Wealth, we have said, is power. How this power is to be exerted, in other words, in what manner precisely wealth is to be appropriated, in order to accomplish the beneficent purpose of heaven in conferring it, is a question for the individual to determine, as he alone is responsible.

There is much false and delusive benevolence in the world. The poor are in various ways dependent on the rich; not on their donations simply, but dependent for employment and shelter, and various accommodations needful for their comfort. That is not the sole charity which steps in to rescue them from a lingering death by famine. What is thus appropriated *may*

be acquired by acts, not indeed criminal in the eye of the law, but which are really hard and oppressive, and which a sound and healthful Christian morality condemns. The fruit of such acts, or a portion of them, at least, may be given in ostentatious charity, and the deed may be trumpeted to the four winds, as proof of extraordinary benevolence. But true benevolence is consistent and uniform. It does not extort in one way, to give in another, with one hand casting gifts into the treasury, while the other is extended to wring from an unfortunate fellow being the price of his last morsel, or take, it may be, the widow's only mite, which was all her living. This is a very spurious sort of benevolence.

In regard to the appropriation of wealth to objects of beneficence, it is sufficient simply to remark, that the great moral ends of existence, intelligent, spiritual existence, are not to be lost sight of. That is the noblest beneficence, which takes into view not solely man's physical condition, but the faculties and wants of his higher nature, and provides for their gratification and relief; which regards him not merely as an animal of the more perfect sort, but as containing in himself the germ of a celestial life, an immortal element, a sentiment of duty, a sensibility to the beauty and worth of truth, and particularly moral and religious truth in all its manifestations, the capacity especially of goodness, of undying growth and improvement. Whoever does not so view him, sees him but superficially, sees but the shell, the outer integument, the visible representative of the man; he discerns not the mysteries of his inner being, the diviner part, and consequently recognises only half his wants. The highest benevolence is that, which labors to accomplish the greatest good for man, viewed in his whole nature, his intellectual, moral, and religious, as well as in his physical nature and capacities; in his relation to eternity as well as in his relation to time; his relation to his fellow-beings, his God, and the invisible world of spirits. There is no more legitimate use and application of wealth, or more correspondent to the spirit of the Gospel, than the appropriation of a liberal portion of it to the accomplishment of the objects of this benevolence. As an instrument capable of being wielded with effect, as involving eminent power and ability to do good, it should be brought to bear on the great practical interests of humanity; the interests of truth, of holiness, and a sound morality, on whatever is con-

nected with the welfare and happiness of man in the mortal and immortal part of his nature.

"Go and do good," is the great precept addressed to all of us. Engage in benevolent exertion; engage in it as matter of self-discipline, as well as for other and more obvious reasons. Engage in benevolent exertion; strive to relieve suffering and promote enjoyment. You are thus not only performing a duty; you are strengthening a disposition. You are not only lighting up a smile on the faded cheek of suffering, but you are confirming habits, and invigorating principles in yourselves. You are doing something for the improvement of your own characters. This circumstance, we apprehend, is one not sufficiently attended to; it is too often overlooked. True, this should not be our principal motive in performing acts of benevolence. We should perform them, whether benefit accrued to ourselves or not, otherwise they would not be acts of benevolence. But it is one of the innumerable evidences of the beautiful arrangements of Providence, worthy of notice, that while we are relieving the distresses of a fellow-being, and as often as we relieve them, we are using the most efficacious means of self-improvement. While we most forget ourselves, we most promote our virtue and happiness.

We are placed amid suffering and imperfection as in a school of benevolence, and the relief of suffering not only supplies a new tie, connecting us with the individual who suffers, but quickens generally our human sympathy, strengthens the chain which unites us, as by a feeling of universal brotherhood, with the whole great family of man. Were we asked to point out the process by which the benevolent character may be acquired; were we to address those who are conscious that their affections are too cold, their sympathy too feeble, who are wrapped up, it may be, in the hard panoply of selfishness, devoted to selfish aims and selfish enjoyments, who yet acknowledge the voice of duty, and authority of conscience, who in their souls love not darkness, nor would voluntarily cherish one hurtful delusion,—if such there be,—we would say to them, go, perform some work of benevolence; go witness and alleviate the misery you have so much power to mitigate or remove;—your slumbering affections will soon be awakened, and your frozen hearts warmed; a new field of labor will reveal itself to your eye, you will see new purposes in life, and discover objects of excitement more salutary than the pursuit of mere

wealth affords; the mind will be subjected to a wholesome influence; and the whole character will gradually assume a softened, a more affectionate, and more elevated tone. So true is it that we never do a good deed to others, without, by a sort of reflex influence of such act, essentially benefiting ourselves. We relieve a pang of the body, and we acquire a treasure of the soul, of inestimable worth.

The times call for effort, benevolent effort; general and simultaneous, but judicious and well-directed effort. With ultra measures, extravagancies, and fanaticism, of any sort, we have no sympathy. We would have those who contend, contend lawfully, wisely, and well, remembering that most questions are mixed, and looking rather at practical results than theoretic abstractions. But we would have all strive in the right way; all should lend a hand at the work of improvement. The field is already white unto harvest, only laborers are needed. And we should all be laborers, laborers in the field of the world, the great field of human society, that so fruit may abound to the Lord of the harvest.

A. L.,

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- ART. VI.—1. *Song of the Bell*. Translated for the Boston Academy of Music. By S. A. ELIOT. Boston: 1837.  
2. *Song of the Bell*. From SCHILLER. American Monthly Magazine for January, 1837.

THE *Song of the Bell* has had great fortune in the world. It has been cast into music by Romberg, and exhibited scenically in the speaking outlines of Retzsch. It is a perpetual requiem to its departed author in the ears of his revering countrymen. It sounds in many of the languages of the continent of Modern Europe, and a Liege professor has within no long time made it discourse with a Greek and a Roman tongue. In Great Britain it has been several times taken in hand. Among others, Lord Francis Leveson Gower has attempted by an English version to extend its reputation, without, however, adding anything to his own. And here, in these ends of the earth, appear at the same moment two metrical versions, executed with distinguished ability by townsmen of our own,

without any concert, or knowledge of each other's design. Arcadians both. One translating it in order that it might be sung, and the other singing it till he could not forbear to translate.

It is pleasant to see poetry thus united with its kindred arts of music and pictorial design. It is pleasant to see how a man may thus live on vocally and to the eye, in the creations of his genius; presenting, in a single piece, a combination of all that is beautiful; reaching the sympathies of the whole world through the avenues that lead most directly to its heart; and attended and helped by the various talents of harmonizing minds, that dwell apart by the breadth of nations and seas, but yet swell in like the orchestral accompaniments of a charming melody.

The extraordinary success of this composition of Schiller is owing, we think, to its affecting pictures of human life. It appeals to feelings that are universal. It describes with distinctness and fervor the stages of our being, and the vicissitudes of mortal things. Its scenes glow. Its figures are alive. The whole is filled with a strong dramatic interest.

We are tempted to lay before our readers an account of the plan of the poem. They are, doubtless, too familiar with it to receive any new information. But the review shall be made in so few words, that we may allow ourselves the gratification of retracing the perfect symmetry of this celebrated production, without owing them any apology for so doing, either as wasting their time, or sparing our own invention. It seems to us to be composed of three trains of representation, each always clear, yet skilfully intertwined with the other two. These are, — the casting of the bell, the moral reflections that naturally arise from that manual process, and the historical associations connected with the finished instrument, when swinging in its church tower. A careful perusal, — such as every ingenious work of art requires, — will show that such is the method of construction. We shall exhibit it best, not by taking the parts separately, but by considering each in its place in the poet's own beautiful order.

The piece opens with the suddenness and clear vision of a stage scene. The master-founder and his men are surrounding the mould, into which the melted metal is to be poured, and preparing the furnace for fusion. He exhorts them to go earnestly to work, and to distinguish themselves from vulgar laborers, by mixing their handicraft with thoughtfulness and obser-

vation. The fires are then kindled ; the copper and tin having been suitably proportioned, and the purifying salts not forgotten. At the same time, the object of their toil in the finished bell is suitably described.

While the melting proceeds, the first historiette is introduced. The bell is supposed to ring merrily for the birth of a child. He reposes in his first sleep. Anon the nurseling becomes a grown boy, and the boy an impetuous young man ; for the years fly " pfeilgeschwind," arrow-swift. He returns to his home after long wanderings, and becomes enamored of a beautiful maiden. " Love's young dream " is now so exquisitely pictured, that our younger translator cannot quit it till he has given us twenty-five lines for Schiller's sixteen, confining himself faithfully, however, to the sentiments of the original.

The mixture is now proved by inserting a small rod, which becomes instantly encrusted with the shining metal, and it is pronounced time for the casting. As the different ingredients, strong and soft, combine in the seething cauldron ; so, it is moralized, should the hearts of a youthful pair be united in concord ;

" For passion's brief, repentance long."

Again is heard the sound of the clear bells ringing for the marriage festival. In a few exquisite lines are now depicted the wedding, the transition from the magic of romance to the soberness of domestic realities,—the industry of the kind, faithful mother, surrounded with her children,—and the successful labors of the father, who sees his house enlarged, and his barns filled, and his substance increased on every side. He is elated by his prosperity, and the warning voice of the song alludes to the uncertainty of all human fortunes.

The casting is next finely described. The red-hot fluid is let loose, after the divine blessing has been invoked, and pours its fiery torrent into the mould that had been strongly imbedded in the ground for its reception. The uses of fire as a servant, and its terrors when it gains the mastery, are now brought into view. There is a night storm. The lightning strikes. The horrors of a great conflagration are set before our eyes, with the succeeding desolation, when

" Through bare walls the clouds look down."

The father of the family, stripped of all the possessions he

had so lately exulted in, gives one look to the ruins, and then seizes cheerily his pilgrim staff, for he has counted all the heads of his dear ones, and there is none missing.

The mould is now successfully filled; but what if it should have received amiss? what if it should burst? They have committed their work to the dark bosom of the earth, in the hope of its being raised to a nobler shape and a lasting existence, as the husbandman drops into the ground the seed of the harvest. This the poet turns into a natural and very striking type of the resurrection of the dead. The type was timely; for the funeral bell tolls. It is for the affectionate mother, who was so lately the guide and the delight of her whole house.

The bell is left to cool, and the workmen meanwhile have a respite from their toil, though not the master from his anxious oversight. This suggests the coming on of evening, and the chiming of vespers. A charming pastoral scene is presented in the return of the peasantry with their cattle and sheep and loaded teams, and the dancing of the young reapers upon the darkening plain. The streets grow deserted; the town-gate is shut; the fireside becomes social. The deep night at last settles down, giving no uneasiness to the innocent, who are protected by the constant vigilance of the laws. An encomium of order and peace, and a prayer that they may never be broken, conclude this part of the poem.

The bell is next to be released from its prison. The hammers are busy, and the frame flies to pieces. But even in breaking up the model there is need of a wise caution, lest the burning brass should disengage itself with violence, and scatter destruction. This calls to mind the thought of popular tumults, when uproar prevails, and the clang of the alarm-bell startles the ear. The German bard, writing in 1799, with the atrocities of the French Revolution just behind him, goes on to describe graphically that bloody period, — with more intense-ness than either of his American representatives. The terrific cry of "Liberty and Equality" sounds rather faint in the "Freedom and Equal Rights" of the two versions before us; though we are not sure that it was possible to do better with it. But in one instance, certainly, Schiller's expression is too strong for either of our translators fully to come up with; — perhaps his thought is too far "behind the age" to be repeated with approbation. He says, when nations free *themselves*

there can be no prosperous effect. Mr. Eliot translates more happily than literally,

“And when a mob e'en wrong assails,  
The public welfare is no more.”

A similar case appears to us to occur a little further on. The Würtemberg poet, who was probably not much of a “diffusion of knowledge” man, exclaims, Woe to those, who lend the heaven-torch of light to the forever blind!—complimenting the populace, it is likely, by that last appellation. We have a very good thought, though not that one, in the following;

“Woe, woe to those who strive to light  
The torch of truth by passion's fire!”

But this is digressing from our point, and anticipating what would be more in place presently.

The bell gleams forth from its casing, in full beauty. There is no spot or roughness in it. The very blazonry of the arms is distinctly defined. The goodness of God is acknowledged in it, and the name Concordia is solemnly bestowed on the work so favorably accomplished. It is then consecrated, in a very splendid passage, to the various offices which it is to fulfil, as it swings aloft, a neighbor to the thunder and to the stars, to be a voice from on high, praising the Creator, solemnizing the events of time, and counting its hours, and warning men, as its tones diminish on the ear, that so everything earthly must die away. A spirited call is made on the workmen, to lift it to its appointed height; a benediction is pronounced upon the people to whom it speaks; and its first peal is bidden to be PEACE.

Such is a plain account of the “Song of the Bell,” the most popular of all Schiller's minor pieces, and which, it is said, every well-taught German knows by heart as a part of his education. For this last assertion, however, we will not vouch, as it would have to be responsible for several hundreds of lines, and we can cite no better authority than the Cabinet Cyclopædia.

Both the translations now before us do honor to their authors;—one the President of the Boston Academy of Music, and filling the less harmonious office of mayor of the city; the other a young clergyman, Mr. Dwight. If we might venture to compare them, we should say that the first was the

more staid and cautious, the second the more fervid and poetical. The first is like the production of a highly cultivated mind, that has exercised its taste more than its invention ; while the second is like the rapid effort of one who is something of a bard himself, — “ anche pittore.” The first seems afraid of transgressing ; the second, without being at all less close to the original, indulges in a strong and spirited diction. In several instances, the imagery, that the first did not care to preserve, is reflected from the pages of the second with a bold fidelity. It should be borne in mind, however, that one, who has to study musical as well as poetical effect in his composition, lies under many restrictions. He must, for the most part, be flowing and tranquil, avoiding all words that are long, and admitting few that are rough. He must have an eye to the minstrel as well as to the author. All this Mr. Eliot has done, nowise daunted by difficulties, and even voluntarily encountering some that he might fairly have avoided.

What we have taken the liberty to say of the characteristic difference between the two versions, may be easily illustrated, by setting one or two corresponding passages of each side by side. Mr. Eliot translates, in one place ;

“ Alas ! that all life's brightest hours  
Are ended with its earliest May !  
That from those sacred nuptial bowers  
The dear deceit should pass away.”

Mr. Dwight's lines run more literally thus ;

“ Ah ! life's fairest holiday  
Closes when life's May is flown ;  
The girdle loosed, the veil away,  
All the sweet delusion 's gone.”

Another example may be found in the passage, that alludes to the enormities committed by the *poissardes* of Paris in the early days of the revolution. Mr. Eliot renders it,

“ E'en woman, to a fury turning,  
But mocks at every dreadful deed,  
Against the hated madly burning,  
With horrid joy she sees them bleed.”

In the rival version, — if we may call rivals them that are only emulous without knowing each other, in performing the same good work, — we read ;

" Women, like fierce hyenas, go  
 With bloody hands and hellish jests ;  
 They spring, like tigers, on the foe,  
 And pluck the heart from mangled breasts."

All this is good on both sides ; but the peculiar manner of each is strikingly observable, — one calm, studious, restrained, — the other giving free scope to all the impulses of the scene described. Indeed, if we could object anything to the animated translation of Mr. Dwight, it would be the marks of haste that are here and there apparent. He could make it, with a little revision, much more perfect. He has succeeded admirably in transfusing the true power of the piece ; and has failed but in a single place, we think, of exhibiting its meaning clearly and justly. This is in a passage towards the close, where the union of hands for labor is supposed to be a political union in the cause of liberty. Here he has been overtaken with an inadvertence, and nodded once, as Homer is said to have done before him. He has produced a gem, that is well worth polishing with new care. We have nothing further to suggest, in paying him our thanks, but to confess that it is one of our weaknesses to be punctilious about the accuracy of rhymes, and that his, in several cases, stand in need of a little smoothing of their locks.

The translation, with which the President of the Academy has favored us, is so prominent before the public, and from its great merit can bear so well a little respectful fault-finding, that we feel tempted to point out a few instances, in which we do not think he has represented distinctly the sense of the author. We noted one or two passages, that seemed to us to be of this sort, and upon which we proposed to exhibit more acuteness than we possess. But on revising them, our comments appeared rather hypercritical ; so that we can easily dispense our readers from being informed what these were. We will venture, however, upon a few others.

In one case the German itself is equivocal, or at best none of the most lucid. When the thriving young husband looks abroad over his increasing possessions, he sees among the rest,

" The future columns in his trees ;"

that is, as we understand Mr. Eliot, trees good for making columns, — well-timbered land, such as we, in New-England, have lately heard too much of. Mr. Dwight, on the other

hand, supposes the poet to mean, trees ranged in rows, like a colonnade. To this latter exposition we were ready to give our assent; when lo! Mr. Sotheby, the celebrated translator of Wieland's *Oberon*, steps in, and inclines us to think that, after all, the meaning is, — columns like trees; — or, as we have it in his version,

“The branching columns that support  
The loaded barns rang'd round the Court.”

An ingenious friend has just suggested still another interpretation of this doubtful version, of five little words,

“Siehet der Pfosten ragende Bäume.”

We are sure, that after this, it is not for us to pronounce any absolute decision upon the matter.

When the fatal thunder-storm rises, come these lines;

“Dark, blood-red  
Are all the skies,  
But no dawning light is spread.”

The last line does not appear to us to express vividly enough, that the glare is unnatural, and not that of daylight. The words run literally thus;

Red as blood  
Is the sky;  
That is not the daylight's glow!

When the bell is fairly in the ground, and the question arises, whether it will be brought safely out, we meet the words,

“To skill and care alone's permitted  
A perfect work with toil to build.”

But the language of the poet is here interrogative; “Will it come beautifully to the light, rewarding our pains and skill?” agreeing with what follows;

“Is the casting right?  
Is the mould yet tight?”

The emblem of the resurrection is represented faintly, almost doubtfully, in the following lines;

“And yet more precious seed we sow  
With sorrow in *the world's wide field*;

And hope, though in the grave laid low,  
A flower of heavenly hue 't will yield."

We say almost doubtfully, because they do not necessarily imply anything more than the reviving of earthly hopes and possessions, that had perished under the calamities of the world. Mr. Dwight has expressed the true thought with great beauty.

"But costlier seed we bury weeping,  
While in meek faith to heaven we pray,  
That from the coffin's loathsome keeping,  
It may spring forth to brighter day."

We could wish to hear the vesper bell a little clearer, stealing through the shades of evening, than it is brought to our ears in Mr. Eliot's verse. Something like the following might represent the original with more life ;

At the wink of star,  
Toil and care afar,  
Workmen list the vesper chime ;  
Masters know no resting time.

We will end this criticism of ours, not a presumptuous one, we hope, by referring to a passage which is at least very obliquely rendered ;

"Darkness hovers  
O'er the earth ;  
Safety still each sleeper covers  
As with light,  
That the deeds of crime discovers ;  
For wakes the law's protecting might."

We see clearly enough the temptation that here led the translator to deviate. It was the formidable appearance of a double rhyme thrice repeated. Who would not have gone so little out of his way, to get round such an obstacle ? We apprehend the true idea to be, that the black night, which allows not the guilty to repose, has no terrors for the safely sleeping citizen, since the eye of the law is always watchful.

A good work has been wrought for the public, in thus presenting them with the "Song of the Bell," in such a form that it can be sung to Romberg's celebrated music. This is the first attempt of the kind, we believe, in the English tongue, and we congratulate the translator on having surmounted so

many impediments, and executed his task with such great success. The music has been censured by some of the German critics as wanting in power of expression, and betraying the style of one who produced his chief enchantments by his purely instrumental compositions. But it is always agreeable, and in some of its parts extremely beautiful and affecting. We think it will grow in the favor, with which it has so prosperously started. We are sure that it cannot be heard well performed, without interesting the heart as well as delighting the ear.

We alluded, in the beginning of this article, to a translation by Lord Leveson Gower. It is a singularly loose and inaccurate performance, though with, at rare intervals, strong and well-turned lines. We should surprise and amuse our readers, if we set before them all his strange mistakes. He makes his bell toll "like flattery's voice," and "*murmur o'er the land*." His English is so bewildered, that he can speak of a house "rifted on the rock;" and his German is so imperfect, though he has done into English the "*Faust*," that he can translate "*speicher*," corn-barn, "*spice*," in two several instances. The fruit of the tropics would be a strange phenomenon in the fields of "*Deutschland*." He was, perhaps, misled by the similarity of sound; but he might as well have called the "*ragende bäume*" of Schiller's same flourishing proprietor "*raging trees*." These, however, are only offences against language. Who will believe that he has been wholly unaware of the admirable type of the resurrection, suggested by the raising of the bright bell from its broken mould and tomb in the earth? He seems to think that the only comparison is between the founder and the farmer, the fabric of bell-metal being nobler and more enduring than the fruits of harvest. After such a specimen of incapacity, one is almost ashamed to go back and tell how, in the description of the fire, he has been able to entertain us with such a delectable quartette as the following;

"Like a furnace glows the air,  
Windows shiver, kennels glare;  
Roaming like the salamander,  
Children whimper, mothers wander."

We are certain that our readers have had already enough of his lordship, and will close this article with a single word upon Mr. Sotheby's translation, to which we have incidentally al-

luded. It appears in "A Collection of Poems, chiefly manuscript, and from living authors; edited for the benefit of a friend, by Joanna Baillie." It is hardly worthy of its author's fame. It is stiff without being literal. It is often slovenly in the construction of the verse, and abounds with words of poetical common-place. It has neither the liquid flow and musical "availability" of Mr. Eliot, nor the fervid ease of Mr. Dwight,—of whom we now take leave with our best thanks.

N. L. F.

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ART. VII. — *Physical Theory of Another Life.* By the AUTHOR OF *NATURAL HISTORY OF ENTHUSIASM*. Second Edition. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1836. 12mo. pp. 278.

WE have read this book with surprise and disappointment. It is to a great degree free both from the faults and the excellencies, which have characterized the other works of its gifted author. It is written in a less involved, less rhapsodical, and more logical style than they; but it wants their fervor and unction, their power of thought, their cogency of persuasion. It is a labored treatise, and one in the preparation of which the writer seems to have felt but little of his wonted enthusiasm, nay, to have hardly cherished that faith in his own speculations, without which it is vain for him to hope for the acquiescent suffrages of his readers. His real views and sentiments all tend towards spiritualism; but in the book under review he has taken up the gauntlet against it, and in favor of the popular notions of a corporeal future state, and a material resurrection. His text is the words of St. Paul, "There is a spiritual body;" and it is manifest that on the literal interpretation of this and a few similar passages of Scripture, he has built a "physical theory," at which his philosophy relucts.

Our author assumes, almost without the show of argument, that body is the necessary means of bringing spirit into connexion with space and time, of giving birth to the imaginative sentiments and emotions, and of circumscribing the individuality of

each separate spiritual existence. It seems to have escaped his reflection, that the Infinite Spirit, without bodily organization, retains his connexion with space and time, and has a strictly individual being; and that these are not among the attributes which he is incapable of imparting. These assumptions once made, Mr. Taylor fairly infers from them that the future life, revealed in the Scriptures, will be a corporeal state. He then proceeds to depict the "probable prerogatives" which the future *spiritual* body will enjoy over the bodies, which we now possess; and in stating these, he so completely etherealizes the idea of body, as to leave it doubtful what he means by the term. Indeed he divests it one by one of every material attribute, all the while asserting at every step its distinctness from spirit, until, at the end of the ninth and last "probable prerogative," he informs us that "the spiritual body shall be so purely the instrument of the master power, that it will barely, if at all, enter into the consciousness as a separate existence;" and that "perhaps beings who have never been subjected to the conditions of animal life may, though actually corporeal, need to be informed of their corporeity; or they may know it, rather by reflection and inference, than by immediate consciousness!" So then, this little book teaches us more of our future condition, than we shall be likely to learn when we enter upon the life to come. We, who have read it, shall be aware of our "corporeity"; as for others, their confession must be, "Whether in the body, or out of the body, we cannot tell; God knoweth." Our author grounds on these speculations the doctrine of a local hell, where material fire is let loose upon the incorruptible bodies of the reprobate, and seems impressed with the conviction that the idea of future punishment is, on any other theory, divested of all its horrors. He, however, assigns no location to the place of torment, and otherwise occupies those subterranean regions, where it is usually located.

Most of the latter part of the volume is occupied by three "conjectures concerning the material universe, viewed as the theatre of an intellectual system." The first conjecture is grounded on a literal interpretation of St. Paul's classification of the Messiah's subjects into those "in heaven, in earth, and under the earth."\* According to this, "man is destined to pass through three stages of life; the first upon the surface of the

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\* Phil. ii. 10. Ἐπουρανίαν καὶ ἐπιγίαν καὶ καταχθονίαν.

earth, and subject to the conditions of animal organization ; the second *under the earth*, and in a transition form, of attenuated and inactive corporeity ; and the third, and ultimate, in a region of power, incorruptibility, and full activity." Of this last and most perfect state the suns of the several systems are named as the probable theatres. With regard to the second, we are told, as the result " of a calculation of forces, that our own planet, and others, are not solid globes, but hollow spheres, or spherical shells, including a perhaps irregular, but vast cavity, and this cavity occupied by some elastic fluid or gas." We cannot say but that since our college days modern science may have " changed all this ;" but certain are we that the solidity of our own planet, nay, its increasing density towards the centre, was then considered as mathematically demonstrable.

The " second conjecture is, — That within the field occupied by the visible and ponderable universe, and on all sides of us, there is existing and moving another element, fraught with another species of life, corporeal indeed, and various in its orders, but not open to the cognizance of those who are confined to the conditions of animal organization, — not to be seen, nor to be heard, nor to be felt by man." Under this head, the reality of spectral apparitions is admitted, and accounted for by the yearning of those, who have emerged into this attenuated life, to resume their former grosser mode of being, and to reënter their wonted theatre of activity.

The third conjecture relates to the destruction by fire of the present universe, to give place for a new and more perfect creation.

We have thus given a fair, though a condensed analysis of this eccentric "*physical* theory of another life ;" and will request the attention of our readers for the residue of this article to the development and defence of that *spiritual* theory, which seems to us most in accordance with the voice of reason and of revelation.

In the first place, the Savior and his apostles, in numerous passages of the New Testament, expressly teach that man after death enters immediately upon a conscious state of retribution. It may suffice to quote the following texts. " To-day shalt thou be with me in Paradise." " Whosoever liveth and believeth in me, shall never die." " The God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, — he is not a God of the dead, but of the living, for [they] all live unto

God." "Having a desire to depart, and to be with Christ." "We are confident, and willing rather to be absent from the body, and to be present with the Lord." We cannot but regard our Savior's resurrection as illustrating and confirming the view of death, which we should derive from the above cited passages. He returned to earth, not to teach us that we shall rise, but to show us that we shall never die,—to exhibit, not the body as capable of reanimation, but the soul as incapable of dissolution. He did not return to life; but appeared again to show that he was still alive, that he had not died, that the soul could live on without the body. Death, then, is in no sense a termination, but simply a most momentous epoch in man's existence,—a starting point upon a new portion of his career. To die is to live on. The moment of bodily dissolution is the moment of birth into another state of being.

But if the soul suspends not its existence when the body dies, our next inquiry is with regard to the mode of being on which it then enters. Mr. Taylor's idea of an attenuated and etherealized body, which shall supply to the emancipated soul the place of the present animal organization, till the general resurrection, if no longer, has always been, and is still prevalent among all classes of Christians. It has its origin, not in any process of metaphysical or critical reasoning, but mainly in the difficulty to many minds of conceiving of a purely spiritual existence. We are not ourselves conscious of this difficulty; but, on the other hand, find it much more easy to conceive of spirit than of matter; and, when we attempt to form an idea of matter, we are perplexed, embarrassed, and uniformly compelled to define it as a modification of spirit. But for the satisfaction of those, to whom the idea of a strictly spiritual state is difficult of attainment, we will suggest answers to the most obvious queries on this subject, and particularly to those which are, as we think, unphilosophically answered in the "Physical Theory."

And first, we are asked, how without a bodily organization, can the soul retain its connexion with space? How can disembodied spirits witness the works of creation and mark the course of Providence? How, for example, can sights reach the soul without the eye, or sounds without the ear? Or how can locomotion take place without material organs, wherewith to overcome material resistance? We reply, that, in point of fact, the ideas of things seen, heard, and felt, do reach the

soul, without any corresponding objects in the outward universe. This is the case in optical illusions, the subject of which receives distinctly into his mind the images of things devoid of real existence. In insanity too, sights, which the eye sees not, sounds, which the ear hears not, are imagined with perfect clearness. In dreams, also, we seem to see, and hear, and feel as distinctly as when the senses are all awake, and conversant with their appropriate objects. Now, if the soul can receive these several classes of impressions without using the organs of sense, why may it not without possessing them? Or, if it be capable of seeing, hearing, and feeling things that are not, how can it be incapable of perceiving things that are? Moreover, it is not the eye, that sees, or the ear, that hears. Dissect these organs entire from the human frame, and they are powerless. Leave them unimpaired, and darken the soul by insanity; they carry it false reports. It is the soul, that looks out through the eyes, that listens through the ears. And does not its power of seeing and hearing, by means of the eyes and ears, imply and include the capacity of seeing and hearing without them? Yes. Sight and hearing, and locomotion also for similar reasons, are functions inherent in the soul; and the bodily organization is less the means of their exercise, than a temporary clog and limit to their extent and power. While in the body, we are "spirits in prison," and the eye is the prison window, through which the soul enjoys a little portion of its native range of vision, the ear an aperture in the prison wall, through which we catch a few of the sounds, which, if set at large, we might take in through a vast extent of space, while the feet, so far from being the means of motion, but measure the length and direction of the spirit's chain. When the dungeon walls decay, when we quit our house of bondage, our disembodied souls will doubtless acquire at once a keenness of vision, of which we cannot now conceive, hear the full diapason of nature's harmony, and move unchecked and free, wherever love and duty call us.

It is again asked, how can society be cemented, and familiar converse exist among bodiless spirits? This question may best be answered by referring to the communion, that actually takes place between God and man in the exercises of prayer and devotion. In these we address with confidence an unseen Spirit; nor does the supplication return to us void. The response is shed into our souls, inaudibly, yet surely. We

realize God's presence, receive of his fulness, are conscious of an inward light, peace, and joy, which we can trace to no earthly fountain. In this communion there is on one side no outward sign of intercourse; and such signs are often wanting on the other side also, "the spirit making intercession for us with groanings which cannot be uttered." Now, this silent prayer, and its unheard but recognised answer, may furnish us a specimen of the universal language of spirits, and indicate to us the mode in which, in the life to come, we may hold converse not only with the Father-Spirit, but with all our fellow-spirits. In our apprehension, the body, so far from being the essential medium of social intercourse, is the means of circumscribing our familiar intercourse to that portion of the Creator's family, that like ourselves tenant houses of clay. We are doubtless surrounded by a cloud of witnesses. Heaven is no remote or inaccessible region; but embraces the air we breathe, the ground we tread. Jesus is with us; but our eyes are holden that we cannot see him. The spirits of the unfallen and the ransomed no doubt compass our path and our lying down. The minstrelsy of the heavenly host, once heard by the Jewish shepherds, floats over all our hill-tops, and all our valleys;

"And angels with their sparkling lyres,  
Make music in the air."

The holy dead, who were translated from our homes, are with us; our every prayer is upborne by their pure intercessions; our every song of praise echoed from their golden harps. But though this spiritual world thus encompass and envelope us, the dungeon walls of sense exclude our converse with it, while disembodiment is all that we need to enable us to see as we are seen, and know as we are known.

We perceive, then, that in a purely spiritual life, the soul can enjoy not only the exercise, but the freer and fuller exercise of the functions, which it now discharges through the organs of sense. We may at least, then, suppose the intermediate state from death to the general resurrection to be a strictly spiritual state. But will there be a resurrection? Are these bodies to be raised from the grave, and to be reunited to the spirits, that now tenant them? We answer this question in the negative, first, because the soul has no need of the body, and will have shown its independence of it, by having lived without it from the moment of death to the supposed moment

of resurrection. Then again, our bodies are perfectly adapted to the vicissitudes, the laws, and the discipline of this world; and are, therefore, unfitted for any other state. We infer that the mind will live elsewhere from its spurning the bounds of earth, from its earnest aspirations after a larger sphere, and a higher good. Why should we not in like manner infer, from the clod-like acquiescence of the body in its present state, from the full supply which it here finds for all its cravings, that this is its final and its only home? Moreover, the resurrection of the body, of the same identical body, is physically impossible. It can be satisfactorily proved that the cannibal often dies with the flesh of his fellow-man incorporated into his own. Every particle in our bodies has most probably formed a portion of hundreds of bodies before us, and after our decease will be owned by thousands more. In the resurrection, whose shall these particles be? It is indeed within the scope of omnipotence to raise from the dust a *fac simile* of the body in which every man died; but this would be a new creation, not a resurrection.

The Scriptures concur with the plain dictates of common sense, in teaching us that the body will not rise. "Flesh and blood," says St. Paul, "cannot inherit the kingdom of God; neither doth corruption inherit incorruption." "We shall all be changed." "That which thou sowest, thou sowest not the body which shall be." "As we have borne the image of the earthy, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly." The same apostle indeed speaks of a "*spiritual body*;" but it is very certain that he cannot designate by this title our present or any similar bodies, and he most probably used the word body as synonymous with *existence*, otherwise the phrase in question would seem to be a contradiction in terms.

But how, we are again asked, how are we to explain the passages of Scripture, which are commonly understood as referring to a general resurrection and day of judgment? These passages, we reply, are figurative representations, founded on the analogy of human tribunals, where the judge, instead of remaining perpetually in session, appoints certain days of general assizes, when the criminals, committed to prison at various intervals, are arraigned together before him. Or if it be insisted that these passages must needs denote some definite and momentous epoch, we would then refer them to the consummation of the present state of the material universe, — a period

when nature will be shaken with the most tremendous convulsions, when the recesses of the earth and the caverns of ocean will cast forth their long buried treasures, and, among other things, will "give up the dead that are in them," yet not give them up alive. Then, too, we may suppose that "the books will be opened," that the judgment passed upon every human spirit at the moment of death will be exhibited to every other, that there will be a rehearsal, before the congregated universe of mind, of the grand moral results of the drama of existence just closing.

If the future life of the blessed be a purely spiritual state, that of the reprobate must be so too. We are compelled, therefore, to give up the idea of a material hell; and to regard the language of Scripture, which depicts the corporeal torment of the subjects of the second death, as figurative. But there seems to be, on the part of many excellent Christians, a strong clinging to the theory of a literal lake of fire and brimstone, in the fear that by denying it they shall weaken the sanctions of the divine law, and hold forth the dread of but a slight penalty to the workers of iniquity. In our apprehension, however, we only render the penalty of sin the more dreadful by supposing it entirely spiritual in its nature. For what are flames to the righteous soul? Ask the three holy children, whom Nebuchadnezzar's wrath cast into the furnace, and with whom a fourth like unto the Son of man walked in the midst of the fire. Ask the martyr of old, literally burning in a lake of fire and brimstone, his countenance serene and happy, his eye beaming with rapture, his parched lips raising a song of thanksgiving. The ungodly rich man in the parable was tormented in the fire; but the holy Lazarus would with willing feet have crossed the burning lake, were this possible, and breathed the fiery air, and stood as an angel of mercy at the sufferer's side; and he would have been happy in a physical hell. No physical torture can equal that of ungratified desires, inflamed passions, unholy affections, malice, hatred, envy, remorse, despair. And how often have men, to obtain a momentary relief from this inward hell, rushed out of life through the most appalling and painful of the gates of death! Nay, there remains on record the dying testimony of a profligate, who, it seems, thought of hell only as a scene of physical burning and suffering, who, after in vain essaying to describe the intensity of his remorse and despair, exclaimed, "Hell itself would be a relief from my anguish."

The future life, then, both of the righteous and the wicked, is to be a spiritual state. Why, then, are we trained for this state by a mode of existence so widely different from it? Why are we educated in the body, if there be nothing corporeal in the conditions of our permanent being? For this arrangement we can trace many wise and good reasons; and doubtless there are many more beyond our ken. We shall at present indicate but two of the most important, and perhaps the least frequently remembered, uses of our bodily organization and enthrallment.

One prime object of our temporary confinement in houses of clay doubtless is, that, when we emerge from them, we may cherish the more lofty and grateful sense of the privileges of our heavenly birth. Prerogatives, which we originally possess, we appreciate much less highly than those, of which we have known the want. Suppose that we had been born with only one of our five senses, and that the others had come to us one by one, each after an interval of years; with what rapturous gratitude the acquisition of each would have been hailed, those only could tell, to whom, blind or deaf from birth, Jesus opened the world of sights or sounds. Suppose that we had been born with bodily organization similar to that of the oyster, and had after many years emerged into the possession of our present powers and faculties, with the full remembrance of our former state, what emotions could we cherish other than a thankfulness, to which words could give no utterance, and which to feel would burst these heart-strings! Thus it may be that God has seen fit to withhold from us for a while our spiritual birth-right, and to educate us in this chrysalis state, that, when we leave our house of bondage, and put forth our latent powers, we may prize the more highly, enjoy the more keenly, and own the more gratefully the immunities and glories of heaven. Perhaps God may have educated his whole spiritual family in a similar way. Perhaps the angels, that rejoiced before him at the dawn of his present creation, may have been nurtured in bodies like ours in antecedent worlds and systems. Or if they have stood from the first in their present dignity and glory, though in knowledge, power, and purity, they may vastly surpass ransomed man, in earnest and humble gratitude they must yield him the precedence; and earth-born angels will be recognised in heaven by the intensity of their thankfulness, so that it shall be said of them throughout eternity by

all, who listen to their songs of praise, "These are they which came out of great tribulation,—these are they, which were redeemed unto God from among men."

Another purpose, doubtless, of our temporary confinement in the body, is the cultivation of sympathy, fellow-feeling, friendship, and love. Common wants and woes, mutual dependence and aid, constitute the strongest of social bonds. Were we born at once into the possession of all those high prerogatives, which we hope to assume in a better world, there would be no room for the development of that charity, which suffereth long, beareth all things, endureth all things, and never faileth. Had heaven been our birth-place, we should have found ourselves isolated, independent spirits; there would have been nothing to cast us upon the benevolence, or to drive us to the embrace of others; and thus, with a general love for all our fellow-spirits, we should have cherished a peculiar affection or friendship for none. It may be that the company of angels formed their intimacies when they were, as we are, "spirits in prison,"—that the squadrons, which move together in the service of their God, are made up of those, who were once bound soul to soul by common wants, infirmities, and sorrows. Or, if not, man will constitute a distinct order of the heavenly hierarchy, marked by the strength and permanence of the elective affinities formed in houses of clay.

A. P. P.

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ART. VIII. — *History of Worcester, Massachusetts, from its Earliest Settlement to September, 1836; with various Notices, relating to the History of Worcester County.* By WILLIAM LINCOLN. Worcester: Moses D. Phillips & Co. 1837. 8vo. pp. 392.

It may be truly said of these local histories, that they "show the very age and body of the time, his form and pressure." In the general historian we have events and results; but here may be traced the causes that have combined to produce them,—the secret workings of those "vital ener-

gies" which have quickened and still pervade the whole. The former may be compared to one who presents us with the fair and stately proportions of some majestic and imposing edifice; and the latter, to another who gives us a *section* of the same. The one "hath the greater comeliness and delight to the beholder," while the other serves, if the less grateful, not the less important, purpose of making us acquainted with the internal structure of the edifice. Of the two, the architect, who wished to erect a similar building, would probably prefer the latter. It is from sources like these, that the general historian, the poet, and the novelist must draw for materials with which to enrich the future literature of our country. They are furnishing the themes by which our hill-tops, our valleys, and riversides will be rendered classic ground. "There is hardly one of our ancient towns," says one of our writers, "that has not its local tradition or romantic legend, its tale of Indian massacre or revolutionary heroism." And we regard it as a matter of congratulation for our country, — for posterity, who, through the dim light of ages shall seek to trace the causes of this nation's greatness, — that so much talent has been thus seasonably enlisted in exploring the minutiae of her early history, continually gathering fresh interest as time throws its thickening shadows over the actors and events of the past.

The volume before us is a model of what we deem a local history should be; scrupulously accurate, minute, presenting a faithful picture of the town from its first settlement to the present time, around which many events of the general history of the county are thrown. Every part is well executed; a fact for which the name of the author is, with every antiquary of New England, alone a sufficient warrant.

The annals of Worcester date from the year 1664, when grants of land, previously made to Mr. Increase Nowell, to the church in Malden, and Ensign Thomas Noyes, who had served under Captain Hugh Mason, were located in the vicinity of *Quinsigamond*, or *Quonsigamoag*, the Indian name of the place. Various causes conspired, however, to hinder effectual measures for the settlement of the place until the year 1673, when a company of thirty persons were engaged to commence the plantation, and in the following spring, thirty house-lots were laid out, and they began to build and cultivate. One of the early cares of the committee having charge of the enterprize was to extinguish the title of the Indian occupants.

"A deed of eight miles square, for the consideration 'of twelve pounds in lawful money of New England, or the full value thereof in other specie to the content of the grantees, within three months after the date to be paid and satisfied,' was executed, with great formality, on the 13th of July, 1674, by Solomon, alias Woonaskochu, sagamore of Tataesit, and John, alias Hoorrawannonit, sagamore of Packachoag. The receipt of part of the purchase, viz., two coats and four yards of trucking-cloth, valued at twenty-six shillings, as earnest, in hand, was acknowledged." — pp. 9, 10.

The settlement was prosperously advancing, and the inhabitants, in the language of the record, "had built after the manner of a town," when the war with Philip of Mount Hope breaking out, they were compelled, in 1675, to abandon it and fall back upon the stronger settlements.

Worcester contained within its limits, at the commencement of its settlement, between two and three hundred Indians. These were of the Nipmuck tribe, and were ranked, the majority of them, with the Praying Indians. Their principal settlement was on a hill rising in the south part of the town, and extending into Ward, called by them Pakahoag, now known as Bogachoag. It is thus described, by Gookin, in his "Historical Collections of the Indians in New England," written in December, 1764. "This village lyeth about three miles south from the new road-way that leadeth from Boston to Connecticut; about eighteen miles, west southerly, from Marlborough; and from Boston, about forty-four miles. It consists of about twenty families, and hath about one hundred souls therein. This town is seated upon a fertile hill, and is denominated from a delicate spring of water that is there." Their chiefs were John, alias Horowanninit, and Solomon, alias Woonakochu, and their minister, ordained by the "Apostle" Eliot, James Speen. During the period of the war some of the Christian Indians repaired to Marlborough; but most of them, urged by the persuasions or the threats of Philip, attached themselves to his cause. The next year sagamore John, alarmed at the dangerous aspect of affairs, prudently sought safety by submission. In the early part of July, he opened a negotiation for peace with the government of Boston, and soon came with a hundred and eight of his followers, and surrendered to the English.

"With the death of Philip, the animating spirit of the hostile

confederacy, August 12, 1676, the war ended. Its progress arrested the earliest efforts for settlement, and destroyed the little village beginning to rise in Quinsigamond; its termination left the soil almost without a relic of the aboriginal population. When the white settlers commenced building here, there were between two and three hundred of the natives. They possessed extensive planting fields, and had set apple-trees obtained from the English. The light of Christianity had dawned upon them, and some advance had been made in civilization. By the sword, by famine, by violent removal, and by flight, they were nearly exterminated. When the second plantation was attempted, only superannuated old men, women, and children, remained of the red people; those able to bear arms had been slain, or dispersed, seeking refuge in Canada among the French, or migrating far westward beyond the reach of the power they had too much provoked for their own safety. The whole nation perished, leaving no monuments of their existence on our lands, and no remains except little articles of ornament, rude utensils of culinary art, and rough weapons of stone, discovered in their former dominion." — pp. 27, 28.

Peace having been reestablished, the committee used every exertion to induce the former settlers to return, as well as others to join them. In 1678, they directed the planters to return before 1680, and build together so as to defend themselves; but, to use their own words, "there was no going by any of them, or hope that they would do so; for divers of them being importuned to go, would not." The storm of war had passed over, but its visitation was still too fresh in the recollection of the settlers, to allow them hastily to trust themselves again in a situation so remote and exposed. A general survey, however, was made in May, 1683, and the work of settlement soon after recommenced. But the cloud, which, from the first, had hung over this infant town, again lowered.

"On the commencement of the eighteenth century, the peace of the country was again disturbed by renewed outrages of the savages, always capricious in friendship, treacherous in alliance, and unrelenting in enmity. Although Worcester suffered less in Queen Anne's war, which began in 1702, by loss of life than many towns, it shared in the alarm and participated in the miseries of the final struggles of the red men to reclaim their possessions, and avenge the wrongs inflicted by our ancestors.

"When the same danger which had once before pressed on the planters became extreme, and the Indians again kindled the slumbering flame of murderous hostility, the second attempt to

build a town here was abandoned. The inhabitants fled; the place of their residence was delivered up to decay; the traces of cultivation were effaced; and the silence of ruin was again over the forsaken farms and deserted homes." — p. 35.

Among those who attempted the second settlement of the town was Digory Serjent, who had built his house on "Sagatabscot Hill," southeastward of the present town. He was a native of Sudbury, and had been a carpenter by occupation before his removal. On the approach of hostilities, when the other planters had sought safety in flight, he with his children alone remained, the sole occupants of the town, resolving with fearless but desperate intrepidity to defend from the savage the fields his industry had redeemed from the waste. The history of his fate gives a graphic picture of those disastrous times.

"During the summer of 1702, his residence was unmolested. As winter approached, the committee, alarmed by his situation on the frontier of danger, sent messengers to advise his removal to a place of security. As their admonitions were disregarded, they at length despatched an armed force of twelve men, under Captain Howe, to compel compliance with the order. At the close of day the party arrived at a garrison near the mills. Here they halted for the night, which grew dark with storm and snow, and kindling their fires, laid down to rest, while one of the band watched the slumbers of his comrades. In the morning they went onward, and reached the house of Serjent on Sagatabscot, at the distance of nearly two miles from the post where they had halted. They found the door broken down, the owner stretched in blood on the floor, and the dwelling desolate. The prints of many moccasins leading westward, still visible through the snow, indicated that they had been anticipated by a short time only in the object of their mission. Having pursued the trail of the murderers a little way, they returned and buried Serjent at the foot of an oak, long since decayed. On retracing their course to the spot of their repose, they found the prints of feet going from the fort towards Wachuset. After the war was ended, the Indians, when they revisited the settlers, declared that six of them had entered the building for shelter from the tempest, when the near advance of the English was discovered, too late to permit escape from a force so considerable, and they secreted themselves in the cellar. The soldiers had spread their blankets and laid down over the trap-door, thus securing their foes, until the morning march gave opportunity for flight.

"It was soon found that the children of Serjent were living in Canada. On the release of the eldest, she related the particulars

of the fearful catastrophe they had witnessed. When the Indians, headed by sagamore John, as is said, surrounded the house, Serjent seized his gun to defend his life, and was fired on. As he retreated to the stairway, a ball took effect and he fell. The savages rushed in, with their tomahawks completed the work of death, and tore off the scalp from his head, as the trophy of victory. They seized the mother and her children, John, Daniel, Thomas, Martha, and Mary, and having discovered the neighborhood of the white men, commenced a rapid retreat westward. The wife of Serjent, fainting with grief and fear, and in feeble circumstances, faltered, and impeded their progress. The apprehension of pursuit induced the Indian to forego the terrible pleasure of torturing his victim. As they ascended the hills of Tataesset, a chief stepped out from the file, and looking around among the leafless forests as if for game, excited no alarm in the exhausted and sinking captive, and awoke no cry of horror to betray their course. When she had passed by, one merciful blow from the strong arm of the sachem removed the obstruction of their flight. The children, they carried away, reached the northern frontier in safety, and were a long time in Canada. Daniel and Mary, preferring the wild freedom of their captors to the restraints of civilized life, adopted the habits and manners of the Indians. They never again resided with their relatives, although they once made them a visit, when Miss Williams, taken at Deerfield, was restored.

"In 1715, Thomas was at Boston. John had been liberated in 1721. Martha was probably redeemed earlier than her brothers. She married Daniel Shattuck, and returned to dwell on the spot so fatal to her family." \* \* \* — pp. 36, 37.

Brighter prospects having opened in 1713, the proprietors made a third and successful attempt to plant a town at Quinsigamond. The first permanent settler was Jonas Rice, one of the planters in the second enterprize, who returned October 21, 1713. From this day is dated the permanent settlement of Worcester. Rice, however, with his family, remained the solitary inhabitant of the spot, until the spring of 1715, when he was joined by his brother, Gershom Rice, and several other planters. The work of settlement now steadily progressed, and the town is estimated by the historian to have contained, in 1718, "about two hundred souls."

"There were in Worcester in 1718, if the evidence of the proprietary records is to be credited, fifty-eight dwelling-houses. Tradition says they were humble edifices, principally of logs, one story high, with ample stone chimneys. Some were furnished with windows of diamond glass, where the resources of the propri-

etor afforded means for procuring such luxury; the light was admitted, in many, through the dim transparency of oiled paper. It is hardly necessary to add, that all have long since sunk in decay, or been removed to give place to the more splendid habitations of modern times." — p. 45.

During Lovel's war and the French wars, the settlement suffered much by frequent alarms from the Indians, though no attack was actually made; and the demands for men and service were frequent and pressing. The number of men furnished by the town during the French wars, from the year 1748 to 1762, inclusive, exceeds 450. This number does not embrace those who enlisted into the regular army; nor, except in 1748 and 1757, the occasional service of the militia companies. Worcester furnished to the provincial service during this period, one colonel, one lieutenant-colonel, two majors, six captains, eight lieutenants, seven ensigns, twenty-seven serjeants, two surgeons, a chaplain, and an adjutant.

The act erecting the county of Worcester passed April 2, 1731, to take effect from the tenth of July following, and Worcester was made the shire town. The first Court of Probate was held in the meetinghouse, July 13, 1731; the Common Pleas and General Sessions of the Peace, the tenth of August; and the Supreme Court of Judicature, on the twenty-second of September, following.

During the period of the Revolution, to which, in our rapid survey of the town we are now brought, Worcester was the immediate scene of no important public event connected with the war; but its history, as exhibiting the feelings of the people at large, and disclosing the secret but powerful workings of that spirit which achieved our independence, is deeply interesting. Much of the spirit of those times may indeed be learned from a general survey of the country; but its secret workings in the minds of the people can be best traced in minute histories of the particular towns. We cease to wonder at what the united strength of the colonies achieved, when we contemplate the determined zeal which pervaded the breasts of the smaller communities and of individuals. A single paragraph from the instructions given by the town of Worcester to their representative in the General Court, in 1774, may serve to give the reader some idea of the spirit of those days. Say these instructions,

"If all infractions of our rights, by acts of the British Parliament, be not redressed, and we restored to the full enjoyment of all our privileges, contained in the charter of this province, granted by their late majesties, King William and Queen Mary, *to a punctilio*, before the day of your meeting, then, and in that case, you are to consider the people of this province as absolved, on their part, from the obligation therein contained, and to all intents and purposes reduced to a state of nature; and you are to exert yourself in devising ways and means to raise from the dissolution of the old constitution, as from the ashes of the phenix, a new form, wherein all officers shall be dependent on the suffrages of the people for their existence as such, whatever unfavorable constructions our enemies may put upon such a procedure. The exigency of our public affairs leaves us no other alternative from a state of anarchy or slavery." — p. 101.

A more explicit declaration of independence can scarcely be found in the noble document, which in 1776 proclaimed the dissolution of all ties of colonial relation.

The same spirit may be seen, too, in the resolves of the little convention of blacksmiths, who met at Worcester in 1774; and who, with humble but sincere devotion to their country, agreed "not to do or perform any blacksmith's work or business of any kind whatever, for any person or persons, whom they esteemed enemies to this country, commonly known by the name of tories"; and, "in particular," resolved not to do any work for "Tim Ruggles of Hardwick, John Murray of Rutland, and James Putman of Worcester, Esq's; nor for any person or persons cultivating, tilling, improving, dressing, hiring, or occupying any of their lands or tenements."

In the troubled and perilous times which succeeded the Revolution, bringing the Commonwealth to the very verge of ruin, Worcester became a conspicuous theatre of action. The narrative of the events of that period will probably prove more interesting to the general reader than any other part of the volume; and we would that our limits permitted us to transfer many of the scenes to our pages. The more obvious causes of the rebellion of 1786, and those which may palliate, though they do not justify, the conduct of the men who took up arms against a government of their own establishment, are thus briefly but clearly stated by the author.

"After eight years of war, Massachusetts stood, with the splendor of triumph, in republican poverty, bankrupt in resources, with no revenue but of an expiring currency, and no

metal in her treasury more precious than the continental copper, bearing the devices of union and freedom. The country had been drained by taxation for the support of the army of independence, to the utmost limit of its means; public credit was extinct, manners had become relaxed, trade decayed, manufactures languishing, paper money depreciated to worthlessness, claims on the nation accumulated by the commutation of the pay of officers for securities, and a heavy and increasing pressure of debt rested on commonwealth, corporations, and citizens. The first reviving efforts of commerce overstocked the markets with foreign luxuries and superfluities, sold to those who trusted to the future to supply the ability of payment. The temporary act of 1782, making property a tender in discharge of pecuniary contracts, instead of the designed remedial effect, enhanced the evils of general insolvency, by postponing collections. The outstanding demands of the royalist refugees, who had been driven from large estates and extensive business, enforced with no lenient forbearance, came in to increase the embarrassments of the deferred pay-day. At length a flood of suits broke out. In 1784, more than 2000 actions were entered in the county of Worcester, then having a population less than 50,000, and in 1785, about 1700. Lands and goods were seized and sacrificed on sale, when the general difficulties drove away purchasers. Amid the universal distress, artful and designing persons discerned prospect for advancement, and fomented the discontent by inflammatory publications and seditious appeals to every excitable prejudice. The constitution was misrepresented as defective, the administration as corrupt, the laws as unequal and unjust. The celebrated papers of Honestus directed jealousy towards the judicial tribunals, and thundered anathemas against the lawyers, unfortunately for them, the immediate agents and ministers of creditors. Driven to despair by the actual evil of enormous debt, and irritated to madness by the increasing clamor about supposed grievances, it is scarcely surprising that a suffering and deluded people should have attempted relief, without considering that the misery they endured was the necessary result from the confusion of years of warfare." — pp. 131, 132.

"Could we," adds the author in a note to the above, "roll back the tide of time, till its retiring wave left bare the rocks on which the commonwealth was so nearly wrecked, it is not improbable, we should discover, that a loftier and more dangerous ambition, and wider, deeper, and more unhallowed purposes, urged on and sustained the men who were pushed into the front rank of rebellion, than came from the limited capacity of their own minds. We might find that the accredited leaders of 1786 were only humble instruments of stronger spirits, waiting in their conceal-

ments the results of the tempest they had roused. Fortunately, the energy of government gave to rising revolution the harmless character of crushed insurrection, saved to after years the inquiry for the Catilines of the young republic, and left to us the happy privilege of receiving the coin impressed with the mark of patriotism at its stamped value, without testing its deficiency of weight, or assaying the metal to determine the mixture of alloy."

As the Courts of Common Pleas, in which we have seen so many actions had been entered in the two preceding years, were to the people the immediate instruments of their distresses, the spirit of rebellion first manifested itself in overt acts, in attempting to suspend the operations of these tribunals. The first attempt was made in Worcester, at the commencement of the September session of 1786. On Monday night of the first week in the month, a body of eighty armed men, under Captain Wheeler of Hubbardston, entered the town, and took possession of the Court-house. Early the next morning their numbers were augmented to nearly one hundred, and as many more collected without fire-arms. At the usual hour, the Judges, with the Justices of the Sessions and the members of the bar, attended by the clerk and sheriff, moved towards the Court-house. There the following scene took place between Chief Justice Artemas Ward, who had also been a general in the revolution, and the insurgents, which we will give in the words of the author, and with it close our brief allusion to Shays's rebellion.

"On the verge of the crowd thronging the hill, a sentinel was pacing on his round, who challenged the procession as it approached his post. General Ward sternly ordered the soldier, formerly a subaltern of his own particular regiment, to recover his levelled musket. The man, awed by the voice he had been accustomed to obey, instantly complied, and presented his piece, in military salute, to his old commander. The Court, having received the honors of war from him who was planted to oppose their advance, went on. The multitude, receding to the right and left, made way in sullen silence, till the judicial officers reached the court-house. On the steps was stationed a file of men with fixed bayonets; on the front, stood Captain Wheeler, with his drawn sword. The crier was directed to open the doors, and permitted to throw them back, displaying a party of infantry with their guns levelled, as if ready to fire. Judge Ward then advanced, and the bayonets were turned against his breast. He demanded repeatedly, who commanded the people there; by what

authority, and for what purpose, they had met in hostile array. Wheeler at length replied : after disclaiming the rank of leader, he stated, that they had come to relieve the distresses of the country, by preventing the sittings of Courts until they could obtain redress of grievances. The Chief Justice answered, that he would satisfy them their complaints were without just foundation. He was told by Captain Smith of Barre, that any communication he had to make must be reduced to writing. Judge Ward indignantly refused to do this ; he said he ' did not value their bayonets ; they might plunge them to his heart ; but while that heart beat he would do his duty ; when opposed to it, his life was of little consequence ; if they would take away their bayonets, and give him some position where he could be heard by his fellow-citizens, and not by the leaders alone who had deceived and deluded them, he would speak, but not otherwise.' The insurgent officers, fearful of the effect of his determined manner on the minds of their followers, interrupted. They did not come there, they said, to listen to long speeches, but to resist oppression ; they had the power to compel submission ; and they demanded an adjournment without day. Judge Ward peremptorily refused to answer any proposition, unless it was accompanied by the name of him by whom it was made. They then desired him to fall back ; the drum was beat and the guard ordered to charge. The soldiers advanced, until the points of their bayonets pressed hard upon the breast of the Chief Justice, who stood as immovable as a statue, without stirring a limb, or yielding an inch, although the steel in the hands of desperate men penetrated his dress. Struck with admiration by his intrepidity, and shrinking from the sacrifice of life, the guns were removed, and Judge Ward, ascending the steps, addressed the assembly."

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" He spoke nearly two hours, not without frequent interruption. But admonition and argument were unavailing ; the insurgents declared they would maintain their ground until satisfaction was obtained. Judge Ward, addressing himself to Wheeler, advised him to suffer the troops to disperse ; ' they were waging war, which was treason, and its end would be,' he added after a momentary pause, ' the gallows.' The judges then retired, unmolested, through armed files." — pp. 135, 136.

The remaining portions of the volume, including the ecclesiastical, biographical, and statistical history of the town, like those we have already examined, attest the ability, faithfulness, and industry of the historian ; and, if less general in their interest, are equally valuable as parts of the history of an

enterprising, intelligent, and self-governed people, and will richly repay an attentive perusal. The biographical sketches, in particular, are very full and complete, and show that Worcester has contributed her full share of the men, whose lives have blessed and honored their country, and whose names already hold a distinguished place in her annals.

L. B.

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### NOTICES AND INTELLIGENCE.

*A Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament, including the Biblical Chaldee. Translated from the Latin of WILLIAM GESENIUS, Doct. and Prof. of Theology in the University of Halle, Wittemberg. By EDWARD ROBINSON, D. D., late Prof. Extraord. of Sac. Lit. in the Theol. Sem. at Andover. Boston; Crocker & Brewster. New York; Leavitt, Lord, & Co. 1836. Svo. pp. viii. and 1092.*—It is matter of just surprise, that while there have long been in use tolerable Lexicons of the Greek and Latin tongues, a good, copious, and methodical Hebrew Lexicon continued to be a desideratum until the appearance of the works of Dr. Gesenius. The study of the Hebrew, though doubtless less difficult than that of the Greek, the Latin, or the German, has its many peculiar discouragements, apart from the want of a good Lexicon in the mother tongue. Still this latter difficulty has been powerful to prevent students from cultivating it extensively and with profit, in this country and England, even if it has not deterred many from making a beginning. This last difficulty is now entirely removed; for the work above named combines all which can reasonably be demanded of a dictionary. Those unfortunates, who, like ourselves, attempted the "dreadful Hebrew" with only Pike's Lexicon, and Buxtorf's, will fully realize the blessing of the present work.

Dr. Gesenius is well known, both in this country and in Europe, as the first Hebrew scholar of the age. His example, his lectures, and his publications have created an enthusiasm which marks a new era in the annals of Hebrew literature. At the age of twenty-four, he published a Hebrew and German Lexicon, with the title of *Hebräisch-deutsches Handwörterbuch des Alten Testaments*, (2 vols. Svo. Leipzig, 1810, 12,) which has since been translated into English by Christopher Leo. A second work, for the use of Schools, appeared a few years later, under the title of *Neues Hebräisch-deutsches Handwörterbuch, &c.*, (1 vol. Svo. 1815.) well known amongst us by the translation of J. W. Gibbs. It

had reached three editions in 1828, each being an improvement upon its predecessor, and nearly *ten thousand* copies of it have been circulated. Gesenius has likewise commenced a more extensive work, with the title *Thesaurus philologicus criticus Linguae Hebraeae et Chaldaeae Vet. Test.*, which he promises to complete during the present year.

The work which Dr. Robinson has here translated was begun in 1827. At first, the author intended merely to clothe his German Manual in a Latin dress, for the convenience of such as were not familiar with the language in which it was originally written. But about this time a new impulse was given to his studies, by the profound researches of his contemporaries in oriental literature, and comparative philology, (a science, we regret to add, almost peculiar to Germany,) which induced him to change the character of his Latin manual. Accordingly, it became a new and independent work, but with the addition of new material, and distinguished by his more extended views of the Hebrew, in connexion with other languages. It bears this title; *Lexicon Manuale Hebraicum et Chaldaicum in V. T. Libros*: Leips. 1833. This work is everywhere distinguished by a profound and accurate research, not only into the meaning of each word in the Hebrew language, but, as auxiliary thereto, in the various cognate dialects. He uniformly endeavors to point out the primary meaning of each word, and then to deduce from it the various metaphorical significations it is made to bear, as well as the different *senses* in which it appears. He does not appear to mistake the *sense* of a term for its legitimate *signification*, as some lexicographers have done, thus inflicting a great book upon the public, and burdening the learner by an huge mass of heterogeneous materials, of no use but to perplex and mislead.

The corresponding words in various tongues are pointed out when the similarity is obvious. Thus, not only the oriental languages are laid under contribution, but French, German, Danish, Russian, Greek, Latin, and English, furnish their quota to aid in illustrating some obscure passage in the Sacred volume.

The prepositions and particles are fully explained, their various significations and senses pointed out, so that in this respect the work is singularly complete. The word *וְ*, e. g., with its various senses, occupies no less than ten columns, or five entire pages. The same remark applies generally to the explanation of idioms, and phrases of the language. Authorities are given for the meaning of words, passages of the Scripture referred to, and many difficult texts cleared up. As an example of this latter, we might cite the word *בְּרָא*. In this article he gives the various meanings,

as usual referring to passages which justify them, and explains

several "vexed texts," e. g. Job ii, 9; where he makes Job's wife say, "*Bless God and die,*" regarding it still as the speech of an impious woman, who wished to say, You may bless God as much as you will, still all your piety will do you no good, for you must die!

We regret to say that entire confidence cannot be placed in the accuracy of the present translation. It seems to have been made in too great haste. A distinguished Hebrew scholar has sent us a list of a few mistranslations, which have occurred to him in using the work a short time.

Page 81, under שֶׁכֶּם, *one like the Son of man came with the clouds of heaven*. It should be, *one like a son of man*, as the definition immediately preceding evidently requires. That the Messiah is referred to was probably the opinion of Gesenius. But there is not the slightest probability that the phrase son of man is here an appellative of the Messiah. The meaning is, that one like a son of man, i. e., like a man, having the appearance of a man, was seen, &c.

Page 225, under יָרָה, which Professor Robinson renders, *to take away, to withhold from*; and subsequently, "*withholdst prayer from before God.*" The word "withhold" is not authorized by Gesenius, and does not suit the meaning of the passage, which is, that Job diminished or destroyed piety in general by the language which he used; not that he himself withheld or neglected prayer before God.

Page 243, under יָרָה; *the nations labor for the fire, in pabulum ignis*, i. e., says the translator, *they only become food for the fire*. It should be, for that which shall become food for the fire.

Page 766, under עַל־כֵּן. Here, "*quovis pretio, pr. ob quicquid est,*" is rendered, "at what price, pp. on account of what." It should be, "for any price whatever," literally, "*for any thing whatever it is,*" i. e. for any consideration, however slight. Here, too, we are at a loss to know what English word the initials pp. stand for. If he meant them for the Latin *proprie*, we see not why *pr.* should be changed into *pp.*

Page 992, under נִיחַ "ne confidat malo (sceleri) fallitur, nam malum (calamitas) ejus præmium erit," is rendered "*let him not trust in evil*, (i. e. in the wicked) for evil (i. e. calamity) shall be his recompense." Surely the professor more than nodded, when he rendered "sceleri" "the wicked," instead of "wickedness," as the sense of the passage requires.

Page 1057, under תִּכְרַת, "*Semel de reprehensione (Dei),*

queremonia" is rendered "once of reproof from God." It should be "once, of reproof of God," i. e. finding fault with God. The word refers to the prophet's expostulation with God, or the complaint concerning God's dealings, in Hab. ch. I. As Professor Robinson translates it, it is not distinguished from the definitions, which precede.

Page 805, under *wy*, he renders "quod ursam majorem, arcton, curram vocamus," &c., "which we call the Great Bear, Ursa Major, Arcturus, the Wain." Instead of Arcturus, he should have said *Arctos*, or have omitted the word. Arcturus was a star, or constellation, near Ursa Major, and denotes "the Bearkeeper."

We cannot fail to regret that the able Preface prefixed to the German Manual, comprising as it does an able Essay upon the sources of Hebrew Lexicography, does not appear in the present volume. An alphabet of the various languages alluded to in the work, would likewise be of no small aid to the student.

Still we commend this work to our readers, and trust that both its Editor, and the enterprising publishers, will receive the just recompense of their labors, and that Sacred Literature will gain new friends and admirers through their means. What nobler reward than the latter can any one wish!

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*The True Believer's Defence, against Charges preferred by Trinitarians, for not believing in the Divinity of Christ, the Deity of Christ, the Trinity, &c.* By CHARLES MORGRIDGE, Minister of the First Christian Church in New Bedford. Boston: Benjamin H. Greene. 1837. 12mo. pp. 168.—The author of this little book is an active and intelligent minister of the Christian denomination. The nature of the subject, the leading object of the writer, and the circumstances under which he prepared the copy for the press were such as to preclude, for the most part, any attempt at originality, either of investigation or argument. Still the various reading, sound sense, and logical acumen evinced in the work, as well as the excellent spirit pervading it, abundantly vindicate his claim to the high rank he holds among his brethren. It is precisely such a "Defence" as was wanted at this time, and will do much more, we doubt not, to settle and confirm the convictions of the members of his own connexion, and to convert the wavering or inquiring among the Orthodox, than either of the more elaborate and voluminous treatises from which it is in a great measure professedly derived. We hope and trust that many among the "true believers," who are not in want of this book for themselves, will assist nevertheless in promoting its circulation.

Mr. Morgridge refers repeatedly to a "Discourse on the Doctrine of the Trinity, in three Sermons," by the Rev. Mr. Robbins of Rochester, printed not long ago at New Bedford, and industriously circulated in that region. We never heard of the publication before, and probably we shall never hear of it again. A writer, who at this day makes the spurious text of the "Three Heavenly Witnesses," the basis of his argument, and finds a proof of the Trinity in the plural termination of some of the Hebrew names or titles of God, and can say among other things, in sober earnest, "The learned Professor [H. Ware, Jr.] will probably admit that no editions of the Greek Testament have been published with so much care and labor as those of Robert Stephens and John Mill," must have been asleep for the last half-century. One difficulty, however, under which our friend Robbins's mind seems to labor, we think we can do something to remove. He says: "It is hard to believe that intelligent men, who reject this passage of Scripture, [1. John v. 7,] are fully satisfied with what they do. They usually exhibit an excitement of feeling on the subject which hardly comports with a full conviction of the understanding." Let him suppose himself to be assured that an important document in circulation is a gross and palpable forgery; still let him find that there are those who are abusing the public confidence, consciously or unconsciously, by trying to give it currency. In such a case would he not, in exposing the fraud, and the delusion by which it is perpetuated, be likely to grow a little warm; and would not his warmth not only "comport with," but be in exact proportion to, the fullness and certainty of his knowledge?

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*Unitarianism in England.* — We learn from the London Unitarian periodicals, that the case of the Trustees of Lady Hewley's charity has been carried up to the House of Lords, by appeal, for final adjudication, but with little expectation on the part of the appellants, that the unrighteous decision in Chancery will be reversed. Until the Lords pronounce thereon, proceedings in the Wolverhampton case, involving the same or similar questions, have been stayed in the courts below.

The withdrawal of the English Presbyterians, who are Unitarian, from the Independent and Baptist Boards, and the consequent dissolution of the General Body of Protestant Dissenting Ministers of the Three Denominations, residing in and about the cities of London and Westminster, has given rise to a controversy which is conducted with great asperity on both sides. The Independents and Baptists, it would seem, deny that the Presbyterians have a right to withdraw, as a body. They main-

tain, therefore, that the still adhering minority, consisting, we believe, of one English Presbyterian, and three members of the Scotch Secession Church, who belong to the denomination by courtesy only, are the legal representatives of the whole Presbyterian body, and consequently that the General Body of the Three Denominations is still entire. The three Scotch ministers have even had the effrontery, as we understand, to follow out this idea, by instituting against the seceders a legal demand for the records and property belonging to the Presbyterians.

Meanwhile Unitarianism is making progress among the laboring classes, particularly in Derbyshire and Lancashire. The following is an extract from the report of one of the missionaries.

"Nov. 8, Tuesday evening. I went with some of our Padiham friends to preach at Burnley. Mrs. Mary Marquis, a widow, strong in the faith, had procured for us a good sized room, in an old warehouse, not at present occupied. She had cleaned it up, set forms in it, and lighted a large fire. The room was about one third part full when we entered it, at the commencement of the service, it was half filled. During the first hymn many others crowded in, and by the time the sermon commenced, it was full to overflowing — part of the audience standing up to my very elbows. When the door was closed, a number at the outside had to go away, being unable to get in. The object of my discourse was to prove 'that Christ derived all the power and authority he possessed from the Father. The people were very silent and attentive; they joined heartily in the singing, and when the service was over, they dispersed in great order and quietness. One man laying his hand on the shoulder of another, was heard to say, 'Now, I tow'd thee they did'nt deny Jesus.' 'Noa, noa,' replied the other, 'they do'nt.' Another thus addressed his neighbor, 'What thinks th'a to this?' 'Why mon,' the respondent said, 'we can't get ower this ony fashion.' Mary told us after service, as we were sitting by her blazing fire, and partaking of her hospitable entertainment, that, 'if I came and preached every night for a week, she believed the room would be as crowded as it had been that evening. It was calculated there were about 200 hearers. Mrs. Mary Marquis and her two daughters are full of zeal in the good cause — willing to entertain any Unitarian Preacher, and very anxious that Ministers should be sent frequently to Burnley. These good women are regular attendants at Padiham chapel on the Sunday. I and my long train of Padiham attendants returned much delighted with the events of the evening; such a train of honest and pious Christians is better than an armed band of soldiers, and the clattering of their clogs, as they tramp beside or after you, more grateful to the ear of the missionary than the clash of cymbals, or the sound of trumpets. We reached Padiham about eleven o'clock."

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*The Church of England.* — It is common for the members of the Church of England, and its daughter, the Episcopal Church

in this country, to recommend their communion as a haven of rest in these unquiet times. Why, we never could see. Perhaps in point of fact it has not condescended so frequently as some others, to enter into controversy with those who are without; but if history is to be trusted, who does not know that from the beginning to the present hour, and far beyond any other denomination, it has been torn by intestine broils? Our readers are aware of the war which has been raging for some time between "the Oxford Malignants," as they are called, and Dr. Hampden. Nor is that all. We copy the following from the Christian Teacher, for February.

"The Episcopal Church is convulsed by internal divisions throughout the length and breadth of the land. The Archbishop of Dublin is in conflict with clergymen under his own control on questions of authority; the Bishop of London is assailed by Messrs. Bowles and Sydney Smith as the great Ecclesiastical Autocrat, a sort of Church of England in small; and the old high church party with the British Critic for their mouth piece, are making approximations to Catholicism; while their fellows of the Evangelical school are shaking the coherence of the rotten old fabric, by the bustling and anomalous activity to which their ardor compels them. The bishop of Exeter denounces the *Ecclesiastical Commission* as 'a machinery of the most formidable and portentous nature, threatening series of changes in our ecclesiastical constitution, so often as the convenience of any government which may be dependent on the will or caprice of a faction hostile to the church shall dictate such changes,' (so much for the stability of the church of Christ as resting on an establishment.) But the fiercest strife is between the Bishops and the Chapters, the said Bishops wishing to take to themselves, or rather my Lord of London grasping to his own aggrandizement, the trifles of patronage enjoyed by the Chapters. Hereafter, let no naughty Dissenter, Infidel, Papist, or Socinian be accused of calumniating Anglican Episcopacy, for we defy its worst enemy to bring against it severer charges than the meek Mr. Bowles and the witty Mr. Smith have alleged. The Chapters, Mr. Bowles affirms, have to resist 'the most cruel injustice, the most opprobrious insult, insane persecution' of their superiors (the Bishops) 'insult and robbery;' 'the taking of the poor man's ewe lamb under the color of making a sacrifice and a reform.' In the same strain but richly garnished with his own racy wit, Sydney Smith's pamphlet charges home against the Bishops 'gross spoliation accompanied with ignominy and degradation,' and among other *slight* inuendos, the attempt to 'combine the sweets of rapine with the odor of sanctity.'

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*Specimens of Foreign Standard Literature.* — Hilliard, Gray, & Co. propose to publish, under this title, a series of translations from the works of several of the most celebrated writers in the higher departments of German and French Literature, to be

edited by the Rev. Mr. Ripley of this city. No literary enterprise is now before the public which we are disposed to greet with a heartier welcome. A judicious and well-assorted importation of foreign learning and thought will doubtless do much to improve and enrich what is of native growth, as well as gratify a natural and commendable curiosity, and teach us a more just appreciation of ourselves and others. The singular fitness of the Editor for the undertaking, all who are acquainted with his qualifications will be ready to admit; and we are glad to learn that he has already so far secured the coöperation of some of the best scholars of the country, without regard to political or theological distinctions, as to place the accomplishment of his purpose beyond a doubt. We learn from the Prospectus, that—

Among the writers from whom it is proposed to give translations, are Cousin, Benjamin Constant, Jouffroy, and Guizot, in French; and Herder, Schiller, Goethe, Jacobi, Lessing, Fichte, Schelling, Richter, Novalis, Uhland, Körner, Hölty, Menzel, Neander, Schleiermacher, De Wette, Olshausen, Hase, and Twenten, in German.

"The first two volumes, containing "Philosophical Miscellanies, from the French of Cousin, Constant, and Jouffroy, with introductory and Critical Notices," by the Editor, will be put to press in October next.

"These will be followed by the "Select Minor Poems of Goethe and Schiller," translated by Rev. J. S. Dwight, assisted by Professor Felton and Professor Longfellow, of Harvard University, Rev. N. L. Frothingham, and others."

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*New Publications.*—The first volume of Mr. Norton's great work on the "*Evidences of the Genuineness of the Gospels.*" Boston: American Stationers' Company. John B. Russell. 1837. 8vo. pp. 248 and cxc.

The same Company have in press, and will shortly publish a *History of the Reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, the Catholic, of Spain.* By William Hickling Prescott. In Three Volumes Royal 8vo.

We are glad to learn that an edition of the Commentary on the Bible and the Apocrapha by Patrick, Lowth, Arnold, and Whitby, in seven or eight large volumes, is to be published in New York, under the superintendence of the Rev. Dr. Schröder.

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We have received several valuable communications. The articles on "Clerical Studies," "The Miracles of Jesus," "The Word" and "The Writings and Opinions of Clement of Alexandria," will appear in our next number, or as soon as may be.

THE  
CHRISTIAN EXAMINER.

N<sup>o</sup>. LXXXI.

THIRD SERIES — N<sup>o</sup>. XII.

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JULY, 1837.

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ART. I. — *Clerical Studies : being the substance of a Dissertation read before an Association of Ministers.*

“OUR individuality must operate throughout,” says Hamann, “in every period and on every point.” The sagacious German’s remark applies with much force, under proper limitations, to the choice of studies in mature life. In general, the mind may challenge a large measure of liberty in determining its own present occupations. It follows best its own tact in selecting its own food. Its predilections, tastes, and habits, together with the surrounding circumstances, should often decide its mode of application. Besides, attention, the soul of study, depends on the heart, and we profit most by what we love to pursue.

Yet we all know, that absolute freedom of election is rarely possible to professional students ; most rarely to clergymen. In asserting the right of influence which belongs to what is individual in us, we must not overlook what ought to have sway in all that concerns our relation to others. The clergyman has, indeed, like other educated men, personal preferences, acquired tastes and attachments, which do not lose their hold on his mind when he assumes his professional engagements. Some parts of knowledge have more attractiveness than others for him. He has a native turn and a talent for one or more beyond what he has for the rest. Their being clerical

does not lend a new charm to pursuits which were else not engaging to him. But, if he be a man whose heart is honest in the sacred work, will he not perceive how just is the demand upon him to let the duties it imposes be paramount to every personal bias? Will he not own it to be seriously important to determine his intellectual avocations, as well as all others, by a regard to his usefulness more than to his inclination and taste? While he is by no means forbidden to resort to those departments of literature, which afford his mind its chosen gratifications, or conduce to the means of his individual culture, yet both by his solemn responsibilities to God and to his charge, and by a truly enlightened concern for his own improvement and happiness, he will feel himself obliged to consult in study the peculiar wants and claims of his profession before all other considerations. May there not be some ground to fear that the reading of clergymen is not enough clerical, — that, besides a too frequent submission of the whole question of mental occupation to the determination of accident or caprice, and an unwarranted neglect of other suggestions than those of present humor or convenience, we are injured by much of the effort we laboriously bestow on not unimportant subjects of inquiry, by their being too remote from, or in a degree hostile to our appropriate professional duties? Be this as it may, no doubt can be entertained as to the expediency of adopting such modes of intellectual employment, as shall regularly minister what is most useful to our indispensable preparation for public instruction and parochial influence.

In a brief discussion like the present, it is only practicable to advert to a few among the numerous particulars which are embraced in a system of professional studies for clergymen. Omitting some of the more obvious, such as the requisite attention to the Bible, and investigation of what may be termed biblical subjects, I shall touch upon one or two that are less in the beaten track, but which seem to promise large returns for the pains we shall devote to them.

Let me specify first what is comprehended under the now common name of *Psychology*. The very derivation of that name points out to us the fitness of the topics it covers to rank with those which share most largely in the attention of clergymen. The *soul* is the proper study of them that “*watch for souls.*” Its movements are implicated in all our other studies. It is both instrument and material in our professional

labors. The soul, as it thinks, wills, and is immortal, is next to God the noblest subject of contemplation. To search into its mysteries and to sound its depths has been the work of the most exalted minds. Psychology, in its widest acceptance, includes the wide field of spiritual being. But considered as the science of our own humanity, as making us acquainted with the operations continually going on in the internal world of thought and feeling, it offers enough that we may turn to the best account for all the purposes of usefulness in our calling, and of personal improvement.

How large a part of our professional business lies in the preparation of sermons. This continual authorship is confessedly our most difficult task. It exacts of the faculties their utmost efficiency. The demand for our productions being so incessant, we need above all men to have thoroughly trained minds. But what training can be more adapted to the case than that found in the study of the spiritual nature within us? The subjects of which our discourses treat refer to this nature, not only as being addressed to it for its own benefit, but as being drawn from it, relating to and descriptive of its several affections. We have occasion at all times to represent the facts of consciousness in words that shall make these facts manifest in the consciousness of others. It depends very much upon the thoroughness and accuracy of our acquaintance with the facts themselves, how true shall be our representation of them, and how effective. Mistake me not so far as to suppose my meaning to be, that one must be an adept in metaphysics in order to acquire the power to which I here allude. Many have, by what Degerando terms "moral meditation," obtained so much insight after long practice into this interior science, as, with little or no knowledge of scholastic forms and nomenclature, to possess the best information which psychology communicates. But the science itself, so truly that of reason, merits the studious investigation of the religious teacher, because it unlocks for him the chambers with whose imagery he must be familiar, whose oracles he must so listen to as to be able to interpret as well as to repeat them. It is, indeed, that self-knowledge in its more profound and extensive meaning, which embodies the wisdom of all philosophers, and is the secret of genuine authorship, and eloquence. From the full fountains of the soul well up the waters of truth, which, imparted through the lip or the pen, are alike welcome to

the thirsty spirit. But we can procure these refreshing streams only by descending to their source, "and the well is deep."

The study of this part of science is commended to us for the sake of the *discipline* afforded in the pursuit no less than for the acquisitions we may make. The Christian preacher needs to have the power of abstracting himself from what is visible and tangible and earthly habitually in exercise. His vocation lies not in the marts of sense, the highways and byways of a noisy world, in the midst of things seen and temporal. He is called to a communion with the Infinite and Invisible and Eternal, as part of his daily work, not only in solitary places, but in the houses of his people, not only with set time for preparation, but at all times. He must be ready to speak of God to men who forget Him, as one *can* speak who does *not* forget Him. He must be in the spirit of prayer all the day long, for he has in charge the interests of souls who rely upon his intercession as their own help in drawing nigh unto God, and their means of consolation in all the emergencies of life. We must show forth the power of a world to come in the world that now is, as only he can hope to do, whose mind is made apt to teach by intimately learning things divine, whose habitual tone of thought is regulated to respond without delay to any heavenly chord. The discipline which shall turn the mind in upon itself, and tend to confine attention to spiritual realities with least aid from outward signs must, as far as any intellectual discipline can, further these important moral ends.

Again; in the study of Psychology one is led to an experienced use of modes of reasoning, and a species of evidence, which often come in requisition in other departments, while the hours spent in its pursuit are rendering the critic more acute and discriminating for his own immediate duties, and the student of history more skillful for the balancing of its testimony, and the interpretation of its lessons. He will analyze language well who has learned to analyze thought. And who so capable of judging the true and false reports of the historical page, as the man deepest read in the tablets of the living heart?

As a clergyman may be supposed always careful to keep up the right influence of our moral feelings and principles, and is in no danger of being suffered to lose sight of society and the

outward world, he may reap all the advantages of this study in its tendency to concentrate the mind upon itself, in opposition to those influences abroad which dissipate and distract its powers, while he escapes the possible inconveniences of abstract inquiry.

There is one indication of the utility of the same study to a theologian, which is not to be overlooked, and which is among the signs of our own times. The scheme of unbelief which has assumed the bold front of open, blasphemous atheism in our metropolis is based, so far as it has any other basis than the worst passions of human nature afford it, upon a tissue of psychological sophistries. It propounds as first principles the most specious falsifications of man's spiritual being. The spirit that is within us, when it utters itself freely, speaks out from the depths of consciousness in its own mother tongue, and proclaims, "The Lord is my portion!" It bears testimony for God and religion. The voice of pure reason responds to the annunciations of revealed truth; is but revelation in another form. God has left a witness for himself in our whole frame, which may be overlooked, forgotten, contemned, — but not eradicated, not expunged. Were that but read and read aright, impiety would shrink abashed and rebuked; the call of God to his creature would be echoed back by all that is within us, crying, "Bless his holy name."

"The philosophy of man's spiritual nature," as the author of the Tract so entitled rightly judged, contains one of the most effectual antidotes to modern skepticism. If, indeed, we trace the path of intellectual science in conjunction with the history of Christianity, we shall want no stronger evidence than will thus be furnished us, how close is the bond which links the interests of religion to the progress of psychological truth. The solution of every problem in the human nature opens a new space for the access of light and warmth from the divine. The better man learns to know himself, the better he understands the knowledge of God; the more he feels his need of divine support, and his absolute dependence upon his Maker; and the more prepared he is to welcome the pure doctrines of the Christian revelation. In England, France, and Germany, unbelief in its vicious forms has kept company with the worst systems of mental and moral philosophy. Men were never made ashamed of their religion, until they had most reason to be ashamed of themselves. It is so now and in our own

community. But as without philosophy one cannot be a sophist, it is the business of the religious inquirer to ascertain the nature of that philosophical system, upon which the sophistry he is called to expose rests its influence. And as even the most blinding errors have somewhere a root and origin in truth misconceived or misapplied, (since otherwise they could have no hold on mankind,) it is a yet more interesting task to follow the windings of false opinion till we detect the latent spring which affords its nutriment, and can restore truth to her rights by removing the speciousness which gives falsehood its currency.

In a letter which passed between two German philosophers in 1785, one of them remarks to the other, respecting a newly found and valuable acquaintance, "among a thousand have I found a man, a young man too, who is not ashamed to be a Christian;" and in a subsequent communication of the same year, he exclaims, "Dear Jacobi, what a negative age is ours! what hosts of negative men! all take away, none will give, all destroy, none will build up; there is no seriousness, but universal levity, no dignity, but continual banter, no solidity of purpose and wide extending views, but all are contracted within the limits of some legend." In other works relating to the condition of religion and theology in the same country at the same period, similar hints are thrown out of a too prevalent lightmindedness in connexion with the infidel tendencies of the times. It is sad to say that these intimations reached to numbers of the clergy, and those who filled divinity chairs at the universities. There seems to have been a strong inclination to substitute raillery for gravity, and instead of Christian seriousness, the air of wits about town. As a preventive to such a spirit, a spirit so hostile to the love of truth and all desirable methods of seeking for it, next to moral and devotional expedients we may place those studies which demand, and are adapted to maintain, solidity and earnestness of feeling and deportment. It need not be said how much so is the particular study we are now considering.

Among the peculiarities of the sacred literature on the Continent at the present time, may be mentioned the making of Christianity, or rather the New Testament and church systems professedly founded upon the sacred records, a sort of standpoint for some philosophical theory, which, with all the appearance of deference to scriptural authority, in reality soars above

it. And where there is more sincere belief in and reverence for Christianity, we yet find it to be a favorite method to make out as nearly as possible a harmony between the scheme of philosophy embraced and the records of our faith. Hence it is quite essential to know whether the author of a dogmatic system be a follower of this, that, or the other leader in the philosophical department, before we can understand the principles which he applies to theology. One of the most learned and ingenious and reputedly pious and eloquent divines, Dr. Schleiermacher, to whom Germany is indebted for several very profound critical works, published in 1830 a second edition of a book with the title, "Christian Belief in connexion with the principles of the Evangelical Church." There is but one key by which the contents of this treatise can be laid open, and that is the author's peculiar views of psychology. From his doctrine respecting consciousness may be deduced his whole system of religion and morality, and to that all his interpretation and criticism of the Bible unfailingly minister. In these facts we have so many intimations of the importance of the studies, which relate to intellectual philosophy, to those whose province of action and inquiry is theology.

A second class of studies appropriately clerical, to which it is to my present purpose to allude, are those which are comprehended under what I may be permitted to denominate *Comparative Theology*. This shows the fate of the religious principle in its various alliances and conflicts with other principles in the systems and modes of belief which have prevailed in all parts of the world. The work of Benjamin Constant may, perhaps, afford examples of the sort of inquiries to which we should be led, if we extended the comparison of religions through its whole range. But what I more particularly intend here, is, the changes which the Christian doctrines have undergone under the influence of the different creeds of established Churches, and of the numerous sects. And in the study of comparative theology thus defined, the mind is not to be tasked with heaping together huge piles of trash from the reservoir of ecclesiastical history, merely to remark how much that is wanting in one mass may be found in another, or to label the several mounds with badges indicative of what they contain. Let the student carry the torch of philosophical criticism into the labyrinths he must examine, and extort principles from facts. There are reasons for phenomena here as

elsewhere. There are leading events in the history of creeds no less than of communities. There are effects to be known which were consequent upon such events, and had relation to the highest interests of humanity, and to the advancement or hindrance of the cause of Christ. If there be much in this department of sacred literature which one loathes to look upon, there is a great deal more to reward attentive investigation. Besides the gratification of a liberal curiosity, we may find a recompense for our labors in our increased sense of the value of uncorrupt Christianity, which is thus exhibited as unconsumed in every fire, and triumphant even in apparent defeat. The better insight we shall also acquire into the nature of the changes we learn to analyze and resolve into their true causes, into the character and tendency of the methods employed to prevent or to cure the disease of heresy, and into the qualities of all opinions, orthodox or heterodox, may be named among the advantages of the study. Nor is it an unimportant result of it, that while we shall know how to interpret the technical language, which is still bandied about by warring sects, as it was when Melancthon thought it good to die and hear no more the cry of rabid theologians, we shall be inspired with a forbearing charity toward those who mistake an echo of the old for a newly spoken oracle, and are beguiled into extravagances which better knowledge might have prevented. Whatever shall induce us to be as anxious to account for, as some are ready to condemn, opinions to which our minds refuse assent, and to convince ourselves how it may be very possible for a man to think *that* a truth, which we call an error, without being fairly liable to any imputation of evil motives, and without forfeiting all pretence to be thought rational or liberal, will no doubt be a lasting benefit.

It is a most interesting part of the business of comparative theology to exhibit the proficiency which communities have obtained in various branches of sacred learning, and unfold the promise they give for the future. In some numbers of a periodical work of much respectability abroad, we have read detailed accounts of the present state of theological science in France, and in Denmark and Sweden. These descriptions furnish many data for the student to treasure up and make the subject of reflection. Hints are thus afforded which greatly aid the inquirer in his own researches; and a sympathy with distant and unknown fellow-laborers in the same walks of

learning will be produced. This will enhance the interest felt in any favorite pursuit we may have in common with them, and give new vigor and life to our studies. It were greatly to be desired that a freer access were possible to the sources of such information, and that we had a journal which would impart to us intelligence of what is doing for theology in every quarter of Christendom.

These remarks will sufficiently evince the nature and value of the class of studies they are intended to point out and recommend.

May I be permitted to mention a third, and that a kindred branch of inquiry of no less use to the clergyman, the *History of Christian Morality*, or *Sacred Ethics*. This is not to be confounded with the more general, and in some aspects equally important subject of Ethical Science. Nor is it the same as a merely biblical compend of moral principles and maxims put into order as parts of a system, to which might be attached the name of the Moral Doctrine of Jesus, or a similar title. It is known to you that Christian morality has been a matter on which scholars and men of a philosophical turn have expended much labor. It has been, equally with Christian doctrines more properly speculative, embodied in systems which have had their partisans among Christian people, and given rise to a peculiar kind of authorship. Writers of great eminence have from age to age sent forth elaborate works, in which new views of moral truth, as connected with and influenced by the progress of light upon dogmatical science, have been elicited. This constitutes a branch of literature by itself. It is of the very highest order of interest and importance to the clerical student. As the moralists of one period, church, or community after another pass before us in regular succession, and we contemplate their peculiarities of feeling, principle, and character, subject their opinions to analysis, and penetrate the spirit which pervades and actuates them, we seem to have in view the Christianity of the day, in all its practical relations and bearings. We are made acquainted with the modes of interpreting and applying the rules for holy living, the maxims and principles of the New Testament, which were intended to regulate men's common conduct and dispositions. We see the operation of all those causes which were at work to render turbid the pure and perfectly simple moral doctrines of Jesus, and accommodate the high and disinterested spirit of his re-

ligion to the low and selfish policy of a world that wishes to be thought wise, and yet remain wicked. We are thrilled now with the notes of some reformer denouncing the corruptions of the times, and now we are moved by a still deeper sympathy with the persecuted victims, whose hard fate it was to be sacrificed because they would not sin, as the rest did, or because they let their light shine too full in the faces of those who had no wish to be taught their own vileness, by a forced comparison with the opposite virtues. There also we are introduced to such men as Petrarch, Erasmus, Pascal, Fenelon, and a host like them, whose views of the great questions of duty borrow a charm from their genius, or are illustrated by their personal excellence. Here we come in contact with Monks and Jesuits, whose strange perversions and abuses are only less wonderful than their wide influence upon the character of their times and the fortunes of mankind.

From such glances as these we may easily infer how fruitful a field for cultivation is opened for us by Christian ethics. The uses, to which we may make the studies to which it invites us subservient, are various. In the first place, we may bring the lights of a rich experience derived thence to bear upon our own moral condition, and that of our people. We may be assisted to attain clearer and more adequate conceptions of the moral truths of our Religion, by having them presented in all possible combinations and under all sorts of outward influences tending to obscure or to illustrate them. *Casuistry* offers much that we may apply in our discourses and parochial services, but that entire subject with all its ramifications falls into this department of general theology. In a word, we may hope to nourish our best feelings and sentiments out of the instructions here afforded us, while we are sharpening the judgment and enlivening the inventive faculty by the questions it announces for solution, with the manifold solutions of those who have attempted them before us for our guide and warning.

Time will allow me to offer no more suggestions. I might else venture to speak of the claims of the science of Education to a place among clerical studies, and of that species of investigation in Physics and Natural Religion, which draws from the treasures of the one, to enrich the evidences of the other, in which pursuit a clergyman would find both profit and delight.

In conclusion, let me avail myself of the words of Dr.

Staudlin, in closing the preface to one of his works on Christian Morals. "The composition of this treatise has been to myself truly profitable and instructive, pleasant and comforting. In times when so much that was dear to us has sunk away, when so much that merits love is hated, and so much that deserves reverence is despised, when the pretended culture and illumination of the day grows ever worse the further it removes from religion, moral principles, and Christianity, when one with so few can even talk upon these subjects, nothing is more invigorating and refreshing than quiet literary communion with the great men of earlier days, who contemplated these as the highest of all themes, and without them acknowledged nothing great, nothing worthy in science."

E. Q. S.

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ART. II. — *The Miracles of Jesus.*

WHEN a fact is reported to us, we are not at liberty to pronounce it a violation of the order of nature, merely because it is strange. Its strangeness justifies the demand for a peculiar weight of evidence. But whether it has occurred in obedience to the laws of nature, or in violation of them, is a question not to be determined until the fact is fully established, and all the conditions of its occurrence are ascertained and estimated.

In the meanwhile, the inquiry into its truth must be conducted upon the presumption that it is in some degree, the very lowest perhaps, *probable*, capable of proof. We cannot advance a hair's breadth, except upon the supposition of some law, fact, or principle in nature, with which the fact reported consists. So much is admitted even by those who define a miracle to be a departure from the order of nature. For they maintain the existence and supremacy of a law, having for its end the education of mind, and they insist that the Christian Miracles, inasmuch as they tend, by attesting the truth of Christianity, to enlighten and elevate the human mind, concur with the highest law of nature.

Is there not, by the way, a very strong presumption that

facts, which accord with the grandest law of all existence, agree also with all the laws of the universe, however great their apparent deviation from them? Nothing is so obvious, so admirable, and so complete as the harmony of things. A fact, then, that agrees with one law, and that the most important, may certainly be suspected to accord with all the laws of nature. Whether it does or does not, however, cannot be settled until it has been thoroughly investigated, and all the particulars of its occurrence have been carefully noted and weighed.

The design of the present article is to inquire, whether the extraordinary facts of the life of Jesus actually occurred, as they are represented. Let us suppose the question now to be, to determine their reality. It is hardly worth while to speculate about them, before their truth is decided. But, if we do not greatly err, our proposed investigation will supersede the necessity of speculation. In examining the claims of the Christian miracles to full and cordial credit, we must needs discover something of their nature, and it will appear more or less clearly, whether they are to be regarded as interruptions or illustrations of the order of things.

The Christian records furnish us with the means of deciding whether these wonderful facts really took place.

The accounts of the miracles of Christ must be either wholly true, or wholly false, or a mixture of truth and falsehood. In other words, if the singular events related did not take place as they are represented, then they must be either ordinary occurrences misapprehended and exaggerated through ignorance, or something worse, in the narrators, or mere inventions of the passion for the marvellous. There is no other supposition.

In either of the last two cases, it is evident, beyond demonstration, that the miracles must violate grossly the moral unity of his being, whose acts they are asserted to be. The general features of his character, as all confess, are grand and noble. His miracles apart, he has neither said nor done anything at variance with a nature singularly simple, generous, and venerable. We could not, indeed, have ventured to tell beforehand the course such a being might pursue, the precise acts he would perform. But when certain things are attributed to him, we may determine whether they are in keeping with his character. We cannot form the remotest idea of the possible

works of any great artist, painter, or poet. We cannot dream even of the forms in which his genius will delight or awe us. "Every genius is an impossibility till he appears. We should not call him new and original, if *we* saw where his marble was lying, and what fabric he could rear from it." But when a work of art is placed before us, it is within our ability to ascertain its genuineness. Through a kindred spirit, and by dint of critical observation, we may discover whether it breathe the spirit, whether it bear the likeness of the mind from which it professes to have sprung. The decision may not be in all cases equally easy. But in the case, with which we are now concerned, it is neither difficult nor doubtful. Putting out of view the miracles ascribed to Jesus Christ, we know enough of him to be able to form a distinct idea of his moral lineaments, of the pervading tone of his character. We know its leading traits; or, at least, we know abundantly enough of him to be instantly struck with the distinction and the contrast between him and the miracles, if those miracles are nothing more than common events, distorted by accident, ignorance, or fraud, or pure fabrications of the craving for the wonderful.

This now we affirm. Were the miracles, Jesus is said to have wrought, only ordinary occurrences exaggerated, or mere fictions, they would at once appear in their real character by their gross inconsistency with his character. They would have, and they would instantly be felt to have, no living connexion with him. As well might you mistake the fetters, fastened upon a man, for natural parts, living members of his living body, as such fabrications for the acts of Jesus; or as easily mix the commonest pebbles with the finest diamonds, and pretend there was no telling one from the other.

And here it strengthens this statement to remark, in passing, that as the authors of the Christian records have not studied consistency, as they show not the faintest appearance of having been influenced in the selection or relation of the details of their histories, by any anxiety for the effect those details might have upon the moral unity of Jesus, we may regard the accounts of the miracles, supposing them to be false, as neither softened, nor qualified, nor shaped, in order to their being made consistent with his character. They are given, we may infer, in all their native extravagance. If misrepresentations, then are they gross misrepresentations; if effusions of the passion

for the wonderful, then no cunning art has been used to give them shaping and consistency. So far as it goes, the ignorance or the deception is thorough-going and unqualified. We repeat, therefore, were they really false, their falsehood would stand out in their palpable want of keeping with him to whom they are referred. They would break in upon his individuality, and this so rudely that, we cannot but think, they would, like the apocryphal miracles, long ago have lost all credit. They would have fallen out of the text and mouldered away into oblivion.

It appears never to have been considered to what a complete and decisive test the miracles of Christ are subjected, by their avowed connexion with him, by being explicitly referred to his agency. They thus occupy a point,—they are placed in relations by which their falsehood, were they false, must be glaringly exposed. In defending them, it is customary to lay great stress upon the circumstance, that they took place openly, in the light of day. But the presumption for their truth, resulting from this consideration, is not a thousandth part so strong as that afforded by their juxtaposition to the penetrating illumination of the character of Christ. Purporting to be his acts, they are placed at once in the very focus of the strongest light ever yet poured on the eyes of man. And were they mere earthly exhalations, they would have been dissipated by it long ago, or they would have remained only to be exposed in all their deformity by a light far above the brightness of the sun. In professing to be the works of one, not unknown to us, and, so far as known, seen to possess certain decisive and original qualities of mind and heart, they furnish us with the means of trying their truth by their correspondence with the truth so singularly bright in him.

They have stood this test. Whatever repugnance may sometimes have been expressed or felt at the bare idea of representing Jesus Christ as a wonderworker, yet when the particular miracles ascribed to him are fairly considered, no one can say that they violate the moral consistency of his character, or that they are obviously not of a piece with him. No man can read, or hear read, the account of the raising of Lazarus, for instance, and say, that, supposing this event to have taken place just as it is represented, it outrages our idea of him. We are not shocked by any want of fitness to our conception of Jesus. There is nothing here little, puerile,

ridiculous. As much may be said of nearly all the accounts of his miracles. Let us be as skeptically biassed as you please, still they do not create in us that instantaneous and unequivocal feeling of a want of keeping, which would be produced, were they mere fictions or misrepresentations. Here is a most important consideration. Most remarkable is it that the relations of the miracles do not do gross violence to the general tenor of the history. No seam appears. In this way, a very strong presumption in favor of their truth is created. To our mind it is all but decisive of the point in hand. It should at least command for them our awakened and respectful attention.

But this is not all. It is only the foreshadow of the argument in their behalf. Not only do they not mar the wholeness of the character of him, whose works they are declared to be, they positively illustrate it. They actually disclose,—lay bare the divinest principles of his being. Of all the sayings and acts attributed to him, his miracles are, by far, the most complete and splendid illustrations of the laws and order of his inner life. Inasmuch as they are novel, they are *supernatural*. They are above what we have witnessed of nature, commonly so called. Still they are not *nonnatural*. On the contrary, they are eminently and emphatically natural. They contain and exhibit a new and abundant portion of the purest spirit of Nature.\*

It is common to speak of man, in an uncultivated state, as in a state of nature. But this representation has very fairly been objected to; and it has been asserted, on the other hand, that the true state of nature is disclosed in man educated, elevated, with all his faculties, intellectual and moral, vigorously developed. Accordingly, in the most finished man nature is most expressively revealed, and her profoundest laws demonstrated. And those of his acts, which illustrate his highest powers, are precisely the most natural manifestations of his being, the most luminous facts in nature. We say again, then, that the miracles of Jesus are, in the fullest sense of the word, natural facts. And just so far as their naturalness is felt, they are felt to be supernatural also, new facts added to nature, and in

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\* We do not wish to restrict the term “supernatural” to the sense given above. It has other senses. But this meaning is clear and admissible. See a short Essay, entitled “The Sanity of True Genius,” by C. Lamb. Elia. English edition.

advance of all our previous knowledge, but still of a seamless piece with nature, irradiated by her brightest lights, displaying her inmost spirit, the Divinity that stirs within her.

To illustrate and fortify the ground now taken, we have only to analyze the miracles of Christ. This is a great work. Of the most familiar appearances of nature we know but little. We acquire but a very imperfect acquaintance with the most common facts. We are able to see but a little way into their meaning, as symbols of the all-informing spirit. With regard, therefore, to any new manifestations of Divine Power, it is not at a glance that our dim eyes can trace the characteristics of their origin, the features of their noble descent. We may feel, — thousands in all ages have felt, that the Christian miracles bear the deep impress of the Divinity which inspires all nature. And this feeling has been too strong to be much weakened by any mechanical theories, based upon false analogies, any narrow speculations concerning the philosophy of these new facts. Still it will yet be long before we learn to conceive of them aright, and to describe them with any degree of logical correctness. What ages does it take for the higher productions of the human mind to be worthily apprehended! For a long period, genius passes for insanity, and works profoundly true, and of the closest accordance with nature, are regarded as the wildest aberrations. So when the Infinite Mind, in the direct and unbroken march of its august purposes, presents before mortal eyes new forms of its power, man, in his ignorance, for centuries accounts them undoubted violations of the ordinary course of things. The understanding is for a while overpowered, unable to identify the footsteps of the Infinite One. Yet the heart beats and burns in undefined sympathy therewith. How great the labor, to discover and define the divine principles which the miraculous works of Jesus demonstrate, and by which they are proved to be in perfect keeping with all these other and familiar works and ways of God, between which and them, however, there is at the same time a mighty interval! We can cast but feeble glances into this great depth.

Before we enter upon this attempt, we wish to repeat what has been said somewhat more briefly. Our meaning may be illustrated thus. Suppose a man of extraordinary genius were now living, and astonishing the world with the displays of his power. We could not guess in what particular shapes his

spirit would disport itself. But suppose that, after various productions of excelling beauty, he should present us with a new work, not only far surpassing the works of all other men, but even all his own previous achievements. Thousands, probably, would cry, "A miracle!" while some would account it a mere effusion of enthusiasm, without form or consistency. Of those who felt its beauty, how few would be able to distinguish the nature of the power which moved them! Only after the lapse of time, and numberless theories, and an infinite variety of opinion and controversy, would it begin to be discovered, by the ordinary mass of minds, that what seemed so wild, was, in reality, fashioned after the most perfect model of truth; what appeared so monstrous, was a genuine production of nature, formed of her finest stuff, and in her most finished mould. So is it with the miracles of Jesus. They are new works of God; and so far in advance are they of all the works of Nature, so penetrated with her divine spirit, that we cannot wonder that man, "the earth-blinded," is so slow to conceive of them aright,—to read these new and mighty signs.

1. The first aspect, under which the miracles of the New Testament may be viewed, is in relation to a great purpose which they have served, the establishment of the Christian Revelation, a religion of light, progress, and happiness. However they are regarded, it is not to be disputed that they had a place, and performed a part in laying the foundations of our religion. Whatever the precise position they occupy, whether otherwise in harmony with it or not, they are evidently portions of the heaven-constructed edifice; and viewed in reference to this great system of faith, it is felt that they are so far worthy of Christ and of God. In this connexion they are acknowledged, as I remarked at the outset, to be in accordance with the spirit of Nature's laws. This Dr. Channing, in his *Dudleian Lecture*, explicitly admits, although he still regards the Christian miracles as violations of the letter of those laws. Yet in so far as they have contributed, by confirming Christianity, to the great moral and intellectual end for which the order of Nature is arranged, he represents them as "concurring with Nature."

In speaking of the miracles as having attested the Christian Revelation, we would not be understood to assent to the opinion of those who believe that this was their special design. We do not presume to say what was the one great object, which

they were intended to serve, and for which they were made to occur. We may perceive many purposes which they promoted, but what was their one definite design, we venture not to state. We cannot sympathize with the confidence, with which many undertake to tell exactly what is the intended end of any event, even the humblest. It may hardly seem to suit a grave discussion, still we cannot but quote the happy phrase of the Abbe Corea, who styled the seekers after final causes, "the coffee-house politicians of Heaven," persons, who, in an obscure corner of the Universe, presume to fathom all the designs of the controlling power, and to tell precisely the purpose aimed at by every movement that occurs. According to these philosophers, the manifest use of that provision, for instance, by which *rain* is produced, — the very thing for which it was contrived, is, to fertilize the ground. Consequently, the rain that falls into the sea and upon the desert is forthwith pronounced a comparative waste, — an accidental effect of a general law. And yet it is in the highest degree probable that the showers, which mingle with the ocean, are thereby ministering to some vast physical process, which shall be productive of benefits, in comparison with which the fertilizing of the now-existing earth is but a trifle and an accident. Again. The received hypothesis concerning the admirable fuel, which contributes so much to our comfort during the long and hard winters of this climate, is, that it is of vegetable origin, — the product of a process undergone by the boundless forests of the antediluvian world. To an observer at that early period, antecedent to the existence of our race, that immense vegetable growth, needed neither for ships nor houses, answering no human purposes, no purposes whatever beyond the subsistence of a few orders of wild beasts and reptiles, would have seemed but as an accidental result of a general law of vegetation. And yet, when we consider to what numberless purposes of human art and comfort, the coal, composed out of those very forests, now ministers, we cannot escape the conviction that their growth was anything rather than a matter of accident. Once more. A gentleman, injured by the upsetting of the vehicle, in which he was riding on a public road in England, was carried into a house where he became acquainted with a lady, whom he subsequently married. From that

union descended George Washington.\* Nothing can appear more truly accidental than the position of the stone upon the highway, which, by overturning a carriage, led to so grand a consequence. And yet, looking at the result, why might we not find here, as well as elsewhere, a final cause of the law of gravitation? In view of cases of this kind, which might be accumulated without number, I confess myself wholly unable to put my finger upon the one main purpose of any occurrence, however insignificant apparently. It would rather seem that every particle of the great whole exists for an end indefinite, inconceivable. And hence it is that everything contains an infinity of uses, and serves purposes that defy enumeration.

While, therefore, the miracles of Christ are confessed to have contributed to a great religious revolution, to the confirmation of a divine communication, it would be presumptuous to assert this to have been their special design, to which every other consequence that has resulted or may result from them is accidental and secondary. It is true, Jesus pointed to his works as attestations of his authority; and his authority they certainly do attest triumphantly. But then it does not follow that this was the sole or the chief end for which they were wrought. We may refer to the fact of our having frequently given money to the poor to prove that we ourselves are not destitute. Does it prove that this was the motive of our gifts? Nevertheless, in tending to confirm faith and promote the progress of mind, which the miracles have done, they obviously correspond with the spirit of nature, and, in this respect, are natural occurrences.

2. The miracles of Jesus, with scarcely an exception, were immediately beneficent. They were acts of benevolence done to the suffering, the lame, the blind, and the bereaved. Not selfish were they, but generous. They tended directly to bless. In this respect, also, they harmonize with all the arrangements of nature. All tend to the production of happiness. But here again it cannot be affirmed that they took place chiefly for the sake of those whom they immediately benefitted, that the physical comfort of those whom he relieved was the only thing aimed at by the miracles of Jesus. He

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\* This anecdote, related by an English author, has sufficient probability to answer the purpose of illustration.

healed the body ; he impressed the mind. Both these were results which, we may fairly suppose, he contemplated ; but were it to appear that the influence of these extraordinary facts was restricted to either one or both these things, then would they no longer correspond with all the works and ways of nature. In these last, as I have already observed, we can see an infinite diversity of purposes answered. But *the purpose* of any one thing is absolutely incomprehensible. It can neither be defined in words, nor estimated by the understanding. And on this account, because not only the whole, but the least portion of the whole exists for an infinite end, every part is inexhaustible in the uses which it serves.

3. The next general feature of the miracles of Christ, and, to our minds, not the least interesting, is *the absolute simplicity of the mode of their occurrence*. Much as has been said and written about this characteristic of his wonderful works, it has never yet been distinctly apprehended. It is common to say in their defence, that Jesus used no sort of mummery. There was no Abracadabra, no muttering of barbarous sounds, no magical implement, no affectation of mystery, no cloud of secrecy. Still the positive simplicity of the methods by which he wrought miracles is not reached. Only their comparative simplicity is perceived. He used no conjuror's arts. That is evident to every eye. Still he employed means. He touched the lepers. He spoke to the winds and waves, and to the dead. He made clay of his spittle and anointed the eyes of the blind. And while we discern the superiority of these modes over the involved and imposing artifices of all other wonder-workers, we have not seen, as we might, that they differ in kind, as well as in form, from the spells and formulas of magic. We still conceive of them as operating in the same way, as holding precisely the same mystical relation to the effects by which they were followed, as do the muttering, and the wand, and the strange characters, and circles of an enchanter to the wonders he evokes. In fine, the *modus* of the miracles of Jesus remains, in the general apprehension, mysterious and inscrutable, exactly in the same sense in which the incantations of sorcery are mysterious.

It is true there is the same mystery in the works of Jesus that there is in all events, however familiar. In the most ordinary processes of nature, the efficacy of means is equally inexplicable. How light is the means of vision ; or sound of sense,

we know not. We observe the facts ; and they are so common, they have long ceased to surprise us. Yet they remain as wonderful as ever.

But the miracles of Christ are not only mysterious as all events are mysterious ; they do, it must be admitted, bear at first sight a strong resemblance to works of magic in the instantaneousness and singularity of the effects produced. But here the resemblance ceases. In respect of the manner in which they are described to have been wrought, they bear all the marks of the most simple and natural acts. When Jesus performed a miracle, he assumed no unusual attitude ; he put on no particular garb ; he waved no Aaron's rod ; he affected no peculiarity of manner. As he spoke, as he walked, as he breathed, so he appears to have wrought miracles, with the same entire simplicity. To his own mind, a miracle seems to have been like any other event, — just as natural ; and he appears to have expected to be heard by the dead, when he addressed the dead, with as much confidence and with the same quiet faith, with which he expected to be heard by the living, when his words were addressed to the living. He did not extend his hand to lay it upon the head of a little child, more simply and naturally, than he stretched it forth to touch and cure the leper or the blind.

We call his extraordinary acts, wonders. And truly they are wonderful ; but in no respect are they more wonderful than in the fact that they never appear to have been wrought to excite wonder, or to gratify curiosity. For those, who denied him the respect and confidence to which he knew himself entitled, he refused to work miracles. He intimated very strongly that they, whose attention could be arrested only by such means, were in a low moral condition. "Except ye see signs and miracles, ye will not believe." It has been suggested as a reason for thinking lightly of the miracles, that he himself does not appear to have thought much of them ; as if this very circumstance did not constitute the grandest and most touching trait of his extraordinary works. The idea of him becomes the very embodiment of the moral sublime, when we remark his entire freedom from all hurry, eagerness, and self-estimation, in the exercise of his astonishing power. The Apostle felt this singular quality of his Master, when he said, in that passage so wretchedly mangled by theologians, that Christ did not esteem his likeness to God a thing to exult over. In his miracles, as in all else he did, one simple, calm, self-

possessed nature shows itself. Although he wrought miracles, abundantly sufficient in number to demonstrate his singular authority, yet we gather from the records that he did not perform so many miracles as we should presume beforehand a man would work, who should possess such a marvellous power. He used his power freely, but he did not go out of his way in pursuit of opportunities of displaying it. Only three cases of the raising of the dead are related. And in one of these he makes no account of the miracle. We refer to the case of the little girl, the daughter of a ruler of the synagogue. He was told that she was dying, and his aid was solicited in her behalf. Before he reached the house, intelligence was brought that she was dead. He continued on his way, however, and when he arrived at the place, he found the professional mourners, whom it was the custom to employ, already assembled, and the house was filled with the sounds of lamentation. He instantly hushed the noise, and dismissed the company, declaring that the child was not dead, but only asleep. Shutting out all but the parents, and one or two of his personal friends, without the least parade of preparation, he approached the bed where the girl lay, and called to her to arise, and she was instantly restored; and he directed them to give her food. Could anything have been done, so far as the manner of doing it was concerned, more naturally? He charged those present on this occasion to tell no man what had happened. It seems as if he would have hidden from his left hand what his right was doing, even when it was doing so mighty a work. Observe him closely on this occasion. His whole mode of proceeding is as if he were discharging a familiar office of humanity. His singularity as a wonderworker is the absence of everything peculiar and formal, the perfect simplicity of his whole deportment. Nothing seems more natural to him than his miracles. In short, so far as I am able to discern upon the closest inspection, he wrought miracles, not as if there were anything special, peculiar in them, but just as naturally as he did everything else.

Here it is, — the reader will pardon the repetition, — that the truth and greatness and originality of his character as a wonderworker have not yet been perceived, and we have all fallen far short of doing him justice. The comparative simplicity of the means by which he wrought miracles is obvious enough to the common eye. But in the general apprehension,

they differ not, except in respect of a certain simple brevity of form, from magical spells and charms ; our meaning is, that they have as little felt relation to the effects by which they were followed. They are virtually conceived of as mere pretences, having, not a natural, but only an ostensible connexion with their extraordinary consequences ; as if they were employed, not in the simple honesty of nature, but primarily for the sake of the bystanders. When, for instance, Jesus stood before the open grave of his deceased friend, and cried with a loud voice, "Lazarus ! come forth !" this articulate utterance, this loud voice, this direct address to the dead man, all this is not understood as the *bonâ fide* sign of the power by which the individual addressed was awakened from the sleep of the grave, but, in fact, only a show, used for the sake of the spectators ; the miracle being wrought, not by means of the voice of Jesus, but by an act of divine power, extraneous, and wholly independent of him. So again, when he extended his hand and touched the leper, this movement is not seen as the simple prompting of his will, operating to its end, miraculously indeed, but still like all other means. Wonderful indeed is it, that effects so extraordinary should be produced by methods so simple ; that a dead man should awake and come forth out of his grave at the bidding of a human voice ; that a loathsome disease should vanish at the touch of a human hand. But the voice and the hand are perpetually working wonders ; and how it is that the utterance of a few feeble articulate sounds should act upon the living, and the human hand communicate motion to the smallest atom, — these are things, of which we can give no account, except by referring them to an invisible supernatural force. Strange and unprecedented, therefore, as were the effects produced by the voice and touch of Jesus, it cannot be affirmed that, without a violation of natural laws, they are impossible ; since even the most familiar effects of the voice and hand are alike inscrutable, and, strictly considered, are literal miracles, phenomena revealing a mysterious power of unascertained limits.

As there is no philosophical objection to the supposition, that the miracles of Christ were the natural effects of his inspired will acting through the simplest means, this idea is authorized by a regard to the moral unity of his nature. It discloses, in relation to his miracles and character, an instance of the profoundest moral harmony, a harmony which fails to appear

when his wonderful acts are conceived of as results, of which the methods he employed were not the *bonâ fide* means. No prevalent theories concerning the mechanical order of nature can induce us to part with the splendid revelation of moral unity, of which we have here caught a glimpse. We cannot consent to regard him as using words, as lifting a finger, except from an impulse of mind corresponding with a true sincere spirit. It is not to be believed that on those great occasions especially, when he restored sight to the blind, and health to the diseased, and summoned the dead back to life, he used words or assumed postures not strictly honest and natural,—that he addressed the dead, not really with the idea of being heard and obeyed by the dead, but merely with an eye to the living spectators. We cannot entertain this belief, because it not only has no vital coherence with his nature, but dims that idea of a perfectly true and single mind which he has helped us, as no other ever has done, to form. According to the common impression, his miracles were not wrought as he has caused it to appear that they were wrought; and it would have been in stricter agreement with the fact, if, instead of that loud command addressed directly to Lazarus, he had prayed to God to work the wonder, and referred the spectators to that Divine Agency, which, as it is commonly understood, was not exerted in and through the will of Jesus, but extraneously and coincidentally. But he made no such reference at any time. “*I will*,” said he to the leper, “be thou clean!” “Young man! *I say unto thee*, arise!” “Damsel! *I say unto thee*, arise!” How impressively is this the tone of one conscious in himself of the power to utter these awful commands, and who spake, knowing that he would be obeyed! He rises before us in unearthly majesty, the very image of God, when we consider him as speaking to the winds and waves, or to the dead, as touching the leper, or anointing the eyes of the blind with his saliva, with the same singleness of mind which characterizes him on all other occasions. It is because his miracles, as they stand recorded in the sketches of his life, admit of being viewed in this light, nay, the letter and the spirit of the record demand it, that we hold them to be real. They are at one with a being surpassingly simple and glorious. Consistent and luminous expressions of his inward life, they prove themselves to be indivisible parts of him, genuine productions of God.

4. But not only does the whole manner of Jesus, in the

performance of his extraordinary works, breathe the divine genius of nature, he has told us, in terms the most explicit, what the power was, by which they were wrought. He affected not the slightest concealment. On the contrary, he implied, and asserted over and over again, that the effects produced by him, were to be traced to Faith. To Faith he attributed transcendent power. To those whom he relieved by a word, or a touch, his language was, "Thy faith hath cured thee;" "According to thy faith be it done unto thee." To the parent, who sought relief for his sick child, his declaration was, "Believe; all things are possible to him that believeth." To the blind men in the vicinity of Jericho, he said, "Believe ye that I am able to do this?" Add to these those solemn words, "Whoso believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live; and whoso liveth and believeth in me, shall never die." Could we rid ourselves of the impression, that we have ascertained the laws and limits of all the forces acting around and within us, we should find little difficulty in perceiving that, according to the simplest interpretation of this language, Faith must be recognised as an agent in the production of the miracles of Christ.

But it will instantly be said that Jesus did not intend to ascribe any vital influence to faith; that the faith of the sick and the blind, for instance, did not really operate to their relief, but was merely the qualification, on account of which he consented to exercise his supernatural power. The force of this remark is more in appearance than in reality. You certainly do not mean to say that Jesus ascribed any *merit* to faith,—that he wrought miracles only for those whom he accounted *deserving*. Such an idea is countenanced neither by true religion nor sound philosophy. It was for the unworthy that he lived, and labored, and died. Not the righteous, but sinners, came he to call to repentance. It was upon no ground of merit that he ascribed so much importance to faith. Was the demand for faith, then, an arbitrary condition, having no foundation in nature, a mere caprice? Such it must be esteemed,—there is no other alternative,—if no vital connexion is supposable between it and those effects to which it was so repeatedly and emphatically pronounced to be preliminary. It is a divine trait of the utterances of Jesus, that they express truths, facts, which, the more they are studied, are found to be, not the creations of a solitary mind, but truths,

existing from eternity, in the very constitution of things. Hence it was that he felt and declared, that his teaching was not his, but God's. It was not the peculiar offspring of his own mind. It was true, independently of him. If it be supposed, that, although he laid so much stress upon faith, it still was not naturally, essentially necessary, — that it sustained no living relation to the effects, to which he so frequently declared it to be conditional, then we have no test of the truth and divinity of his declarations concerning faith, and they are undistinguishable from the fictions of a mere human mind. Let us not be misunderstood. We do not mean to say that we must be able to trace the vital connexion between faith and his miracles, but that we must suppose that the requisition of faith was founded upon such a connexion. If it were not, how is it to be distinguished from a purely arbitrary requisition?

But what did he mean by Faith? Could we only find the answer to this question, we should be able to discover what share Faith had in the working of his miracles. A clear and comprehensive definition of faith is difficult, perhaps impossible. It may be illustrated, however, in a manner sufficiently definite to meet the purpose of our present investigation. One thing is evident. By faith is signified an act or state of mind. The term denotes a mental force. In referring his miracles to faith, then, it may be said, in other words, that Jesus ascribed them to the power of mind.

And here, at this stage of our discussion, a painful embarrassment is occasioned by the unchristian philosophy, now actively pervading almost every department of human thought. We of these times are materialists, thorough, unconscious, practical materialists. Not that the advocates of materialism abound. This philosophy is not preached. On the contrary, the philosophical writings of the present day are fast assuming a decidedly opposite character; which fact only shows that the need of better conceptions is beginning to be perceived, — that the false and blinding influences of material modes of thought are beginning to be felt. Materialism is not now taught; scarcely a single preacher of the doctrine appears; — for the best of all reasons, as it has justly been remarked, that it does not need to be taught. It is everywhere in vigorous and triumphant practice; and all our ways of feeling, of reasoning, and of life, are vitiated by it. Does not the almost universal impression seem to be, that mind is, not the cause, but the result, or prop-

erty of organization? To venture an opposite opinion is to expose oneself to the suspicion of wild and unprofitable dreaming. To allow the reciprocal influence of mind and matter is about as far as it is deemed justifiable to go. In this state of things, it requires no slight effort to raise the mind to that high ground, and sustain it at that elevation, whence all matter is seen only in subordination to mind, and all its phenomena are recognised as manifestations of mental power. We profess not to have broken away from the influence of prevalent opinions. Seldom are we able to see with our own eyes. When occasionally, for brief spaces, we are able to elude the mighty authority of opinion, so perfectly self-evident does it appear that mind is, not the consequence, but the cause of matter,—that to mental force, acting without us or through us, are to be attributed all sensible phenomena, that we are utterly at a loss to know with what arguments,—with what terms to approach those, who profess themselves unable to see the same, or seeing it, yet cannot perceive, also, the deep wisdom of the account which Jesus Christ gives of his miracles, when he refers them to the efficacy of faith.

Difficult as it may be, under these circumstances, it may not be impossible so far to identify faith, as to suggest an idea of this mysterious agent having some pretensions to definiteness.

Consider the abounding testimony of common observation. How continually are individuals surprising us with exhibitions of unwonted force,—new power! And to what are these traceable, but to an inward force, an impression of mind, which can be designated by no one term so well as by faith? Men fail to meet emergencies. They yield to obstacles, which they might control, and convert into opportunities. And why? Because, in the common language of the world, they want confidence in themselves. How frequently is it said, "You might do this or that, if you only believed that you could." The brave man, whose faith in himself is unaffected by any disturbing fears, passes unharmed through perils to which the coward becomes the immediate victim. "The tender and delicate woman, who would not adventure to set the sole of her foot upon the ground for tenderness and delicateness," upon an adverse change of condition, puts forth an energy which paralyzes disaster, and astonishes all beholders, but none more than herself. From the household experience of

life instances might be gathered without number, all pointing to this conclusion, all uniting to show that faith, in one form or another, is a fountain of power, whence the various currents of human activity derive strength to an unascertained degree.

Not only is a vast amount of the common activity of the world obviously attributable to an influence of mind, properly denominated faith; very extraordinary and quite miraculous effects have been produced by the same influence. Stimulated by sudden and unexpected circumstances, the mind has had awakened within it a new sentiment of power, by which it has been prompted to efforts so novel and so great, that they seemed more than human, — not its own, as if it had been the subject of a sudden and supernatural afflatus. A volume might be filled with well-attested cases of instantaneous and astonishing cures produced by mental impressions. It is unnecessary to enlarge upon this class of facts. All are familiar with them. And it may be said, without fear of contradiction, that they indicate the existence of unknown forces in the human mind. The cases I refer to, with which the recollection of every reader will furnish him, are usually very summarily dismissed, as the mere effects of imagination.

Not more miraculous, by the way, is the power of articulate sounds, words, phrases, in expressing and stimulating thought, than in putting a stop to all thought, in annihilating all curiosity, as they often do. How many absurd and shocking dogmas have been protected, as by a shield of triple brass, by that one word, "mystery!" "Imagination," "force of imagination," are terms possessing like power, and in numberless instances, they have been given and received as a full explanation of the striking effects whose cause may be so characterized. A man lies prostrate under a severe affection of the body. Suddenly the house is in flames, which burst into his chamber, and threaten to consume him. He leaps from the bed, to which he was a moment before bound in utter helplessness, and the fetters of disease fall from him like the green withs from the champion of Israel. "Wonderful force of imagination!" With some brief exclamation of this sort we are satisfied. But surely it is worth while to investigate this force of imagination, to ascertain, if we may, whether it be a random, meteor-like power, breaking in upon the order of things, itself acknowledging no order, or, as is far more likely, a force, like all the other forces of which we are cognizant, having its laws and conditions.

Without attempting a metaphysical investigation of the nature of the power by which such striking physical effects have been wrought, it is sufficient to remark that there is a resemblance between the facts alluded to above, and a large proportion of the miracles of Jesus, a resemblance which no intelligent and candid man can wholly overlook. The principal miracles of Christ consisted in the relief of the sick, the infirm in body, and in mind; and in all these cases, there is ample room for the supposition of a powerful mental force. Were all the miracles ascribed to him of this description, few, I apprehend, would find any difficulty in referring them to the influence of faith. Consider the case of the man with a withered hand, who was cured at the word of Jesus. We would avoid repeating what we have said elsewhere upon this and other of his miracles. But let the reader remark that, in this instance, he did not apply his power directly to the diseased limb; he addressed the man. He bade him stretch out his hand; and he stretched it out, and it was made whole like the other. Now had this individual been suddenly precipitated into the water, we can easily conceive that a sense of imminent danger may have so wrought upon his mind as to induce him to forget that his limb was withered, and to exert so powerful a volition that the nerves and muscles of the withered hand would instantly have been acted upon, and the hand itself thrust forth. Frequent cases of this sort have occurred. But will it be said, that a highly excited sense of bodily danger could alone operate to this effect? What were the circumstances under which the man with a withered hand stretched it out, and instantly recovered its perfect use? He was standing in a synagogue, upon a spot made sacred and impressive by religious associations. The eyes of an excited crowd were bent upon him. He was standing in the presence of a man to whom the eyes of thousands, flaming with awe and trembling curiosity, were turned. A multitude of hearts, stricken and melted by his unwonted air of authority, were heaving around him. The singular dignity of his character must have shown itself in his voice, in his eye, in his whole expression and deportment. We appeal to the experience of the reader. Are we ever conscious of a more thrilling emotion of mind, than that inspired by one who is receiving wide and fervent homage? How do our hearts tremble and glow when we stand before a man, whose name is upon all our lips, whose

steps are thronged by multitudes! When we think with what fearful power the individual mind is moved by an excited state of the general mind,—how it is borne along, as by a resistless current, it seems hardly necessary to suppose that the man, whose hand Jesus restored to soundness, had any distinct sense of the true greatness of him, whose commanding he so instantly obeyed. He was awed by his simple presence. He looked upon him with that profound reverence, which the excited looks, and the breathless accents, and the heaving bosoms of the multitude, feeling as one man, must all have united to inspire. At the same time, the extraordinary personal dignity, which it is impossible to disconnect from the idea of Jesus, and the calm and kingly tone of authority, with which he spoke, must also have contributed not a little to the effect. Far more clearly than we are able to express, do we see to what a transcendent influence the mind of the sufferer was subjected.

To other instances similar remarks are applicable. Once a paralytic man was brought to Jesus. But so dense was the crowd around the house where he was, that it was impossible to get the sick man in. Accordingly, they who had him in charge bore him, lying on a bed, to the top of the house, and let him down by the roof. What an impressive evidence of the faith of the people in the power of Jesus was furnished by this proceeding! So was it interpreted by our Savior himself. How overpoweringly must the faith of the multitude have wrought by sympathy upon every individual composing it, and especially upon him, bowed down by disease, between whom and Jesus the excited attention of the throng was divided. There is a tremendous power in the action of mind upon mind. It is true, "the noble omnipotence of sympathy" has oftenest been shown, in the history of man, by its perversion. Still, it only appears the more impressively with what vital and victorious authority it must act when it is awakened by truth. Upon all the known principles of our nature, we may believe that the impression made by Christ, upon those especially, whom severe bodily suffering had already disposed to admit his extraordinary power, was deepened, beyond expression, by the authority of the multitudes who were so moved by his presence.

Consider the case of the blind man restored to sight at the word of Jesus, recorded in the eighteenth chapter of Luke.

Having journeyed about over Galilee, Jesus of Nazareth is

now approaching Jerusalem, attended by a crowd which grows larger and larger at every step of his progress, and their hearts beat high with wonder and hope. As the throng draws near to Jericho, a city a few miles from the capital, there is seated by the way side a poor, blind man. As his name is mentioned by the other historians, we may suppose that he was generally known; that he had occupied the same spot for years. Hither had he been led, here to appeal in silent misery to the charity of the passers by. Little dreamed he that this was to be the last day of his wretchedness. He had heard, no doubt, much of the wonderful man, the rumor of whose miracles of power and mercy had excited the whole country. His severe affliction, the loss of sight, had undoubtedly affected him powerfully, and prepared him to give full credit to the strange things that were told. Fondly had he prayed that the prophet would only come that way, that he might for once stand in his presence. This was his cherished dream. But alas! he was poor and friendless, and who would care to lead a beggar to the great wonderworker! But now the ears of the blind man catch the sound of a passing multitude, and he asks what it means. He is told that Jesus, Jesus of Nazareth is going by; and instantly he shouts, "Son of David! have pity on me!" The people, as they pass, in no gentle language, we may suppose, bid him hold his tongue. The impudent beggar! to think that the prophet would take any notice of him,—of him, whose blindness, they thought, perhaps, in conformity with a common sentiment of the times, was the well-merited punishment of his sins! Some, perhaps, were offended at the boldness with which he applied to Jesus a title consecrated to the Messiah. They bid him be still. He heeds them not. He only utters so much the more the heart-rending cry, "Son of David! Son of David! have pity on me!" His voice reaches the ears of Jesus, and he pauses and directs the blind man to be brought to him. Conceive, if you are able, conceive how the whole frame of that wretched creature must have quaked through every limb, when the desire of Jesus was signified to him, and he felt many eager hands extended to take hold of him, and lead him into that awful presence.\* The crowd gives

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\* Mark tells us that, when the blind man was informed that Jesus called for him, "he cast away his garment, rose, and came to Jesus." Some MSS. read, "he, casting away his garment, leaped,

way,—he stands before the man of Nazareth. That clear, commanding voice, modulated to a tone of more than regal authority, sounds in his ears, "What would you that I should do for you?" "I would receive my sight," is the reply. We, who have eyes, and see, can form no adequate idea of the depth of emotion with which this request must have been preferred. We have no knowledge of such a state of mind as is here expressed; and consequently we cannot presume to estimate the influence such a mental state might have upon the body. Here is one human being, standing before another, and asking him to restore him to sight, with undoubting faith that he, of whom he makes this request, is perfectly able to grant it! For years he had asked of others nothing more than a pittance of money or of food, doubting whether he would be heeded. But of Jesus, with unhesitating confidence, he asked his sight. Is not a most singular state of mind here disclosed? Taking my ground upon the mighty and undeniable influence of the mind upon the body, I ask, also, whether we may venture to deny, or to measure the mysterious power which a mental impression like this must have over the body, over all its functions and infirmities? Are we not prepared to perceive the full meaning of the words of Jesus, when he says to the blind man, "Receive thy sight. Thy faith hath delivered thee from blindness." Can we not see with what electric power these few words must have wrought upon the blind

and came to Jesus." We learn from Mr. Norton's recent work, (long expected, cordially welcomed,) that this passage in Mark's gospel, (x. 50,) is referred to, according to the latter of the above readings, by Origen, as a passage which might seem to have been penned by the Evangelist, "without thought." The instant, however, we endeavor to enter into the mind of the blind man, the reason why a circumstance, apparently so insignificant, should have found a place in the record, is disclosed. In the eagerness of his emotion, he flung away his garment, and he, who had so long sat there, feeble and wretched, seemed as if he would have flown, his conductors probably being scarcely able to control his movements. These particulars, at first sight scarcely worth recording, naturally arrested attention at the time, as the effects and indications of the deep feeling which produced them. The more we strive to enter into the excited state of mind which surrounded our Savior, the more will the amazing naturalness of the New Testament Histories open upon us, until we shall be ready to think, with Origen, as incidentally quoted by Mr. Norton, "that not one jot or one tittle" of these extraordinary writings "is without purpose."

man, giving the last quickening impulse to his faith, so that the power of vision, which exists, be it remembered, not in the eye, which is only its instrument, but in the mind, was suddenly put forth, and those sightless orbs were restored to soundness.

In the instances now specified, which represent a class, embracing the larger portion of the miracles, we discern in those upon whom these extraordinary effects were wrought, an unusual state of mind, a full conviction of the ability of Jesus to do for them, at his will, what he did instantly do. This is what he denominated Faith. How it was produced, is presently to be considered.

We would first ask that that class of miracles, of which we have now spoken, may be patiently and candidly compared with those extraordinary cases of instantaneous physical relief, caused by the sufferers being suddenly thrown into circumstances of imminent danger. In these last the mind has been immediately aroused to a new consciousness of power, — to a living faith in itself, by a sudden and resistless appeal to the love of life. Will any one undertake to affirm that the same effective faith can be produced by no other means? Strong as is the love of life, our nature has other, far nobler and stronger principles, which admit of appeals infinitely more powerful, and may be moved to far more vital action. Our human sympathies may be wrought upon with tremendous force; and through them, the mind may be put upon superhuman efforts. Those sentiments within us, whereby we are able to entertain the soul-stirring ideas of Infinity and Perfection, and wherein is our inmost life, — through these we may be so thrillingly moved as to be urged to demonstrations of power, in comparison with which all that may be achieved under the instinct of self-preservation is poor and feeble. By nought are the unfathomed and all-unfathomable depths of life in the nature of man so profoundly stirred as by those sacred sympathies, which, through Jesus Christ, were taken hold of, as by the visible hand of the Omnipotent. Were we only aware of the untold mass of vital force there is in the mind, and of the influence possessed over it by our various instincts and sentiments, the sentiment of veneration especially, so far from having our credulity tasked by the miracles of Christ, we should rather wonder that more and mightier miracles were not wrought; and could account for the fact that

more imposing demonstrations of power were not presented by him, only by observing the same feature of the Divinity in him, which is exhibited in the world of nature around us. Vast and various as are the displays of the Divine Power which we witness, perhaps we feel nothing more deeply than that it has not exhausted its resources, that it is not more glorious and awful for what it does than for what it forbears to do.

If what has now been urged is admitted, and the agency of faith is discerned in the miraculous cures of the infirm, the paralytic, and the blind, the question arises, How was this faith, so miraculously vital, produced? How were the minds of sufferers so profoundly impressed as to exert this extraordinary physical influence?

We have already alluded to two circumstances, which bore with great force upon the minds of those who were laboring under severe bodily infirmities. 1. The pressure of long and heavy suffering. This inclined them strongly to believe in the power of Jesus. Here was an influence to which they were subjected, as powerful as it was natural. 2. The force of the public mind, deeply moved by the appearance and bearing of Jesus. Everywhere he excited wonder and awe. Crowds were collected wherever he came; and there was a wide conviction that he was no ordinary man. Every individual looked upon him through the magnifying medium of the public feeling, and was thus wrought upon mightily. These two things must be kept distinctly in view.

Still the question remains, How was the belief in the miraculous power of Jesus produced in the first instance? How came it to be believed that he could heal the sick and relieve the suffering at will?

In answer to this inquiry, it is worthy of note that the first miracle which he wrought was performed on inanimate matter. The first exercise of his extraordinary power was shown in changing water into wine. Admit this fact to have occurred, and then the inference was direct and inevitable that he, who could work such a wonder, was possessed of miraculous power, and was able to perform other and greater miracles. But this is not our solution of the case.

Jesus was believed by others to possess the power of working miracles, because he believed it himself, and showed that he believed it, and that he believed nothing but what was true.

His faith it was that produced faith. Mark ; I do not say that he fancied himself to be able to work miracles. It was no delusion, but faith, — calm, consistent, genuine faith, faith which may be termed knowledge.

That he possessed this extraordinary knowledge, appears by tokens the most decisive and satisfactory. If he did not know, — if he only fancied himself to be endowed with miraculous power, then was he under a monstrous delusion, and it is altogether incredible that he should have cherished and acted upon so gross an error, without betraying it in his whole conduct and manner, by word and work. But he has exhibited not a shadow of evidence that he was deluded. On the contrary, everything he did and said belongs to a true and healthy condition of his inward life. If we cannot discern in him a true mind, by which we mean not merely an honest mind, but a mind, all whose convictions were founded in reality, then are we at a loss to distinguish truth from falsehood, right from wrong, light from darkness, and we grope in pitiable helplessness. No; he was not self-deceived. There is not a trace in him of self-deception. Never man gave such triumphant proof as he, that he believed only what was true. There is no sign of well grounded conviction which is not legible in his whole deportment, and particularly in his bearing as a worker of miracles. Nay ; he has given us a new revelation of a true mind, a perfect model, whereby to test the presence of genuine conviction in other men. And let us enter fully into his spirit, and we need never more be imposed upon.

We care not for the grounds upon which that calm, unconscious, coherent faith of his in his own miraculous gifts was founded. That it was faith, in the purest sense of the word, and no delusion, its whole manifestation satisfies us. We know it by his own simple rule, by its ambrosial fruits. You may gather grapes from thorns and figs from thistles, but tell us not that the sublime Life portrayed in the Gospels was the life of a man, who was so egregiously deluded as to believe that he could heal the sick, restore sight to the blind, still the tempest, and raise the dead at a word, when, in reality, he could do none of these things.

It is deemed an established principle that an individual does not prove a thing to be true, merely by proving that he believes it himself. But it is a principle demanding important qualification. A true faith is distinguishable from a false one. Let

us see that a man's convictions are in harmony with his own nature, and with all nature ; that so far from introducing discord into his life, they beautify and transfigure it, revealing its unity and simplicity ; then we feel that they are sound convictions, not erroneous, but true. The grounds on which they repose may be hidden from us. We may not see the root. But if the fruits are fair to the eye, and pleasant to the taste, and full of healing for the sick, and of life for the dying, then we know, by the best evidence, that there is a root, nourished by the river of God ; and seed from the heaven-sown tree falls into our hearts, and a like faith germinates there also. We cannot desire, — we cannot imagine more satisfactory evidence than Jesus of Nazareth gave of his faith in his miraculous gifts, and of the truth of that faith.

Still, but not for the confirmation of our faith, we may be anxious to discover the grounds upon which he cherished this singular conviction, the method by which he obtained the knowledge of the power that was given him. How came he to know himself to be possessed of the ability to perform these mighty works ?

His faith was the direct gift of God. He saw into the miraculous depths of his own spirit by the intuition of a divinely-inspired mind. Not from education, not from circumstances, not from flesh and blood, but from our Father in Heaven he received the nature, and the faith in that nature, which he possessed. He who sent him into the world upon a high mission, gave him all the qualifications requisite to its fulfilment. As he was *born* to bear witness to the truth, he was born also with that original and miraculous consciousness of his power, of which his life was the full and authentic manifestation.

He stands alone and unapproached. We know of no being that has appeared before or since, with whom we can compare him without doing violence to the reverence he commands. It does not follow, however, that his existence is to be accounted an anomaly. If the peculiarity of his gifts appears to be at variance with the order of nature, not less evidently does it harmonize with the variety, which is a characteristic of nature not less conspicuous. To those who find it difficult, without assuming a violation of nature's laws, to believe in the existence of such a being, we would adopt the triumphant argument of Paul, when, in reply to those who deemed it impossible that

the dead should live again, he appeals to the endless diversity of the glories of creation, and virtually demands, who, amidst these varied displays of power, can question the possibility of the restoration of the dead in such bodies as it may please the Almighty to give them. Cast a glance over the world of mankind. Similar as we are to one another, yet no two men are alike. How infinitely various the endowments of individuals! In the different departments of life, there are some who are rarely distinguished, possessing powers, underived from education, powers, which act with unconscious ease and unerring rapidity. To these we give the name of genius, a term very vaguely defined in the general apprehension, but still, so far as defined, synonymous with inspiration. It signifies a power which comes through no human influence, but must be regarded as a free gift of God. When we see a little child, not otherwise remarkable, penetrating at a glance the mysteries of numbers, leaping with the quickness of lightning at conclusions, which mature and educated minds reach only by a long and laborious process, exercising this rare power, with the same simplicity and unconsciousness that mark his ordinary movements, what, pray, do we behold but the manifest power of God? Or, when the poet, rending the veil of custom which shrouds all things to the common eye, opens worlds of beauty in the lowliest scenes of life, creates new forms of loveliness, and causes us to feel that we are bound to all created things by holier and closer ties than those of blood, do we use a metaphor, or rather do we not state a fact, when we pronounce him inspired? He has a native, original power of seeing, the result of no human circumstances, the immediate gift of Heaven, distinguishing him from all other men. There is one glory of the sun, another glory of the moon, and another glory of the stars. But the visible splendors of the universe differ not more widely than man does from man. Who shall pretend to tell what gifts men may receive from the bountiful Father of Spirits! How know we but at this very moment, there may be entering into life in some obscure Nazareth, a child, whose star no wise men have discovered, who brings with him a nature glorified with some of the rarest endowments God ever bestows on man, filled with a new measure of life, destined to illustrate new agencies in nature, or to breathe a new soul of love into a heartless and sensual world! Jesus Christ was distinguished above all men. He saw clearly into his own being, and into

the nature of man. He discerned the miraculous spark of Divinity glowing amidst the embers of the weakest and most degraded mind. He saw in all men powers of which they were ignorant; and seeing, believing as he did, he spoke and acted according to this divine faith, and as he expressed his faith by a word or by his touch, the fountains of the great deep were broken up, and the world beheld new revelations of the Divine Spirit. By a true and perfect faith, he awakened faith. He commanded confidence; he inspired others with the full belief in his power, and every instance of its exercise contributed to deepen and diffuse the conviction that God was with him, and in him, as he never was with any other man.

That he was not the victim of false enthusiasm or of delusion, in any shape or degree, he has shown, as I have said, by indubitable tokens. There were no vehement assertions of authority. There was no hurry, and no pause, no self-exaggeration, no impatience to produce conviction. Whether men believed him or not, he cared not for his own sake, but for theirs; he was ready to die that they might believe. Not only is every symptom of a mistaken and heated mind wanting, but never before or since has there been such an exhibition of a mind true in all its persuasions. There was the deepest feeling with the most unaffected dignity, the most explicitly avowed consciousness of a more than imperial destiny, with the simplest and most natural interest in humanity in its meanest forms. In all circumstances; through all opposition, and trial, and suffering, his spirit poured forth the same unearthly music, and every heart, not wholly lost to truth and to God, awoke and responded thereto. Alas for us! we have not yet entered into the sanctuary of his mind, or we should better understand his power. We lie, like the poor cripple, at the Beautiful Gate of the temple. Still, could one be found now to adjure us, with the look and tone and faith of an apostle, by the name of Jesus of Nazareth, to rise up and walk, miracles might again be wrought by him on the spirits and on the bodies of men.

It will be observed that thus far our attention has been confined almost exclusively to those miracles of our Savior, of which the sick, the blind, the infirm in body or in mind, were the subjects. In these cases, the possibility of a mental influence is, to say the least, conceivable. Surrounded as we are

by so many impressive intimations of the power of mind over matter, and of the human mind over the body in which it resides, we cannot deny that the extraordinary physical effects produced by Jesus upon the diseased may have been wrought by his will, acting upon the will of those whom he relieved, and through that communicating instantaneous physical soundness. Thus viewed, these miracles are of a piece with his nature, and with all nature, and this harmony is their most decisive claim to be received as facts.

But he wrought miracles not only on the bodies of the living, but also on inanimate matter, and on the dead. With five loaves, and two small fishes, he fed thousands. He hushed the winds and waves at a word. He called Lazarus from the grave, where he had lain four days. Where are the signatures of nature on these miracles? Where and how was the operation of faith here?

In reference to the singular facts now referred to, I remark, in the first place, that, so far as the manner of Jesus is concerned, there are none of his wonderful works more impressively marked with the spirit and simplicity of nature than these. By nothing that appears in him on these occasions, is there given the least ground for supposing that he was doing any but the most natural things in the world.

When he miraculously fed thousands, he was moved to it by a simple impulse of common humanity. "I have compassion," said he, "on the multitude, because they have now been with me three days, and have nothing to eat; and if I send them away fasting to their own houses, they will faint by the way." Some had come from a great distance. He inquires of his disciples what means there were of supplying the wants of the people. They produce the merest pittance. He bids them arrange the multitude with some degree of order. And then, when that small quantity of food is laid before him, and just as it is about to increase so wonderfully under his hands, is there a trace of self-consciousness visible? Does it appear that he sought to draw attention to what he was about to do, as if it were something singular? Nothing of this kind is seen. In accordance with a familiar custom, he lifts up his voice in simple acknowledgment of the common bounty of Heaven. There is no reason to suppose that he used any other than a simple and usual form of thanksgiving. And what is the miracle that he works? Does he cause a table to rise and spread itself out,

furnished with the conveniences, covered with the variety becoming such an entertainment as the invisible and interposing hand of a God might be expected to provide? Oh no! The simple food before him, — the simplest viands, these it is that he so marvellously multiplies. And when the people have all eaten and are filled, mark that direction to his disciples, which, I hesitate not to pronounce, under the circumstances, as perfectly sublime, for its simple and wise agreement with nature, — “Gather up the fragments, so that nothing be lost.” Everywhere in creation we behold profusion, but no waste. Was the mind of Jesus ever more profoundly natural than as it is here expressed? To refresh the fainting multitude he exercised an unheard of power, but without the shadow of display, without a single trace of appearing to do anything strange. His purpose answered, his power silently retired, and his frugality is as conspicuous as his kindness. Observe, too, it was not to collect people around him, that he fed them thus. He wished to dismiss them. He was anxious to be alone. When they had eaten, he sent them away. The contrast between him and the people around him was never, on any occasion, more striking. The whole country was in a flame. The multitude, whom he fed, he had sought from very fatigue to avoid. They followed him into the desert, or rather they preceded him, to the spot whither he went with his few personal friends for the sake of repose. There had been, as Mark relates, such crowds “coming and going,” that Jesus and his disciples “had not leisure so much as to eat.” He had endeavored to retire privately. But he could not be hid. Some persons recognised him as he was entering the vessel to cross the lake, and the rumor of his going ran like wild-fire, and immediately cities and villages, far and near, poured forth their population, so that when he reached the shore, thousands were waiting to meet him. Affected by the sight, for they seemed to him like sheep without a shepherd, he resumed his labors. Yet he caught no excitement from the multitude. His manner was marked throughout, as we have seen, with the quietness of Nature.

But the multiplication of the loaves and fishes, — by what possible influence of faith was this effected? How could the mind of Jesus so act upon, as to increase them thus marvellously? How could faith create food?

In relation to this point, it is important to remark that, when

Jesus himself spake of the power of faith, he always illustrated it by reference to its influence upon inanimate matter. "If," said he, "ye have faith as a grain of mustard-seed, ye may say to this mountain, or to this sycamore tree, be thou plucked up by the roots and cast into the sea, and it would obey you." So full of a transcendent energy was faith, in his view, that where it existed, in the smallest degree, as a grain of mustard-seed, he declared that it might uproot trees and overturn mountains at a word.

It is not necessary that we should clearly see how the faith of Jesus wrought upon the loaves to multiply them. Our purpose is to show that the miracles of Christ bear the impress of that hand which forms and guides all nature. If the event, which we are now considering, presents certain striking traits of nature, as it cannot be denied it does in the manner of Jesus on this occasion, it is no ground for rejecting it as a fact, merely because, under one aspect, the signature of nature fails to appear. It may be that the hand of nature is there, but that our eyes are too slow to see it. All that is necessary, therefore, in the present case, is to show that the influence of faith in multiplying the loaves and fishes is not impossible. Who will venture to say that the relations of matter and spirit are defined? According to the best philosophers, "all that we know of the impenetrability of matter amounts to this, that there exist certain repulsive forces, which counteract those compressing forces we ourselves exert. Now, if this is the case, we must ascribe these forces to something analogous to that of which we are conscious in ourselves. In other words, we must ascribe them to the agency of mind; for active force is an attribute of mind, just as much as sensation or thought."\* What we call matter, therefore, there is no slight authority for believing, is not an independent existence, but a mode of mind. And the power of Jesus over inanimate substances was the action of mind upon mind. There is, then, at least, a possible affinity between the cause and the effect; a possible relation between the visible forms upon which Jesus wrought, and the invisible force of his will. The effects he produced upon the loaves and fishes; on the waves when he walked on them, or when he stilled their fury by a word; and on the fig-tree which he cursed, are without a precedent. They come not within

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\* Boscovich, quoted by Stewart.

the limits of human experience. But it can be neither affirmed that they are impossible, nor decided that they are violations of the laws of nature. Suppose the proportion now existing in point of numbers, between those who hear and speak on the one hand, and the deaf and dumb on the other, were reversed, — nay, were there only two or three individuals of our race who possessed the gifts of speech and hearing, should we be justified either in questioning their existence, or in assigning them to a miraculous order of beings? Yet we should perceive that they had methods of acting upon each other, of which we could form no conception.

According to the common mode of maintaining the truth of the Christian miracles, the multiplication of the bread, it is insisted, was effected by Divine Power. Undoubtedly. But God is a pure spirit; and Divine Power is the power of mind. Now was the force, present and active in the material substances upon which Jesus wrought, greater in degree (it may have been, as we have seen, the same in kind,) than that which was present in the spirit of Christ? Is it altogether inconceivable that God may inspire a human mind, or, which is the same thing, that he may exert through a human mind, a higher degree of force than is exerted through the forms and changes of matter? This idea, it may be said, is conceivable, but wholly gratuitous. We deny that it is entirely unauthorized. We do not know the measure of the power with which the children of God, the partakers of his spirit may be gifted. The endless variety of minds justifies the hope and the prayer for the advent of new minds, bringing new gifts, exhibiting the inexhaustible force of spirit in new modes. Besides, God has not left us. He is here, and we are standing on the theatre upon which love and wisdom infinite are pouring themselves forth in ceaseless activity. If it be said that these views open the door for the wildest and most extravagant pretensions, for the idlest fancies, we can only say that for our own part, while we should deem it the grossest presumption to undertake to say in what forms the Infinite Mind may display itself, we claim the power and reserve the right of trying, fearlessly and thoroughly, every pretension that may be made to new power. Before we admit the reality of any new authority, to which an individual might pretend, we must hold it to be our right and our duty to scrutinize its mode of action, and see whether it harmonize with all the true agencies of nature, — not merely

whether its results are extensively beneficent, but also whether its whole appearance and spirit illustrate (so to speak) the style of nature, the spirit of God, the unity, perfection, and glory of the spiritual world. Its effects, as they are manifested in its action upon the material world, may be altogether novel and unprecedented, still if it is of nature and of God, it will show in its whole mode, the impress of its divinity. The power exercised by Jesus Christ stands this test triumphantly. It not only agrees with, it reveals the inner laws, the deepest order of nature. It breaks no physical law, because the pervading law of the physical world is subordination to the power of mind.

Jesus hushed the winds and waves by a word. "Peace! be still!" said he, and there was a great calm. How those simple words wrought upon the storm we know not. Neither do we know how sound acts upon the souls and bodies of men through the ear. The one is not less inscrutable than the other. Were we aware of that mighty force, of which the majestic form and the commanding voice of the man of Nazareth were the outward manifestation, it would less surprise, — it would seem more natural, that the storm bowed before his transcendent will, than that our familiar utterances, dubious symbols as they oftentimes are, should act upon the hearts and command the movements of our fellow-men. What else but an instantaneous repose of the elements should follow the bidding of a spirit so godlike!

He raised the dead. Here again we remark, that never is his manner more profoundly natural, than upon the occasions on which he performed these awful miracles. These were the times to try the character of Jesus to its inmost centre. Were the records of these events mere fabrications, what a shock would be given us by the contrast between fictions so gross and a character so surpassingly single and self-consistent! We hold them to be real facts, not only because, as we read, no discord grates upon our inward sense, but because they awaken a new feeling of majesty, a new sense of the godlike. Once, as he drew near a certain city, attended by a large crowd, he met the funeral of a young man, the only son of his mother, and she was a widow. He approached the bier, and they who bore it stood still, and he said, "Young man! I command thee! arise!" And he sate up, and Jesus delivered him to his mother. Nothing, by the way, but nature, nothing but

truth could have inspired an account so divinely simple. As we pause over the record, a feeling of reality comes over us so vividly, that we have not the heart to utter a word. It seems like profanation. He that hath eyes to see, let him see that there was, not only no unmeaning preparation, no artifice to attract attention and stimulate curiosity, no imposing display, but the simplest method and the calmest dignity. He works the miracle, but not as if it were anything surprising. He says not a word, he lifts not a finger to make the crowd gaze and wonder, and therefore it was that they did wonder and fear and believe. Upon the restoration of the little girl, we have already had occasion to remark. Of her he said in so many words, "She is not dead, but sleepeth." Had he thought of displaying his own power, he would have directed those around him to observe that she had breathed her last, and to satisfy themselves by close inspection that she was dead. He does nothing of the kind, but the whole proceeding, on his part, is marked with the simplicity and directness of a common act of kindness. The only other instance of restoration from the grave is that of Lazarus. The whole account of this event is marked by the most surprising touches of nature. When the stone had been rolled away from the sepulchre at the bidding of Jesus, he lifted up his eyes to Heaven, and said, "Father, I thank thee that thou hast heard me, and I knew that thou hearest me always ; nevertheless, because of the people that stand by I have said it, that they may believe." And when he thus had spoken, he cried with a loud voice, "Lazarus ! come forth !" And he that was dead came forth, bound hand and foot with grave-clothes, and with a napkin about his face. And Jesus said, "Loose him and set him free." I cannot comment on this passage. What words shall move or convince him, who does not feel, not merely that it does not outrage, but that it exalts his idea of greatness.

But, although it must be admitted that these three facts accord with, and deepen our impression of the sublimity of this peerless character, it will be asked, what possible operation of faith was there here ?

It is worthy of our most awakened attention, that of the three individuals whom Jesus restored to life, one was a personal friend of his, and the two others were young persons, one a little girl only twelve years of age, and the other a young man.

A connexion, which we cannot persuade ourselves is fanciful, discloses itself between cases of this description, and certain remarkable declarations of Jesus. "Whosoever believeth in me," said he upon the occasion of raising Lazarus, "though he were dead, yet shall he live, and whoso liveth and believeth shall never die." Lazarus had died loving Jesus, believing in him. His spirit had sunk into the mysterious slumber of death, cherishing a principle of faith, over which, as a property or element of the mind, no physical change could have any power. He had gone out of life, bound to Jesus by a tie which death could not break. The connexion between the body and the soul in life is inscrutable, and so is it in death. Where the spirit is in life we know not. We are "obscurely sensible" of its immediate presence in the brain or the heart. Neither do we know where it is in death. The universal impression is, that the union of the two is severed with the last heaving of the lungs. We know not that it is so. When the spirit suspends the outward manifestation of its presence, we immediately conclude that it has changed its place. But let us guard against the illusions which the idea of space practises on us. How know we but that "the lost friend is still mysteriously here, even as we are here mysteriously with God?" We know not but that a transcendent spiritual force may recall the spirit out of that cloud into which it passes, and which we call death, and cause it to resume its connexion with the body. Such a spiritual sympathy existed between Jesus and Lazarus, before the death of the latter, that we cannot venture to deny that this spiritual fellowship may have been the means by which the living wrought upon the dead. The dying have been revived for a little while by the earnest appeal of a beloved voice, and bright intelligence has been kindled once more, though but for a moment, in the glazed eye. No human mind can fathom that power of which the awful summons, "Lazarus! come forth!" was the symbol. We entreat the reader to consider that these are not the suggestions of an extravagant pretension of knowledge. Their force must be felt only as we confess our ignorance, and extricate our minds from these hasty impressions concerning life and death, which we are apt to cherish as self-evident truths.

When the defender of the common theory of the miracles calls upon us to prove that these mysteries *are*, as we have suggested they may be, he mistakes the grounds upon which

we both stand. We are not opposing speculations to facts. For the facts as they are represented, we stand up (need we say it?) as stoutly as others. The question is between one theory of the facts and another. We beg leave, also, to ask the advocates of the popular theory to prove what they assert, that the spirit of Lazarus had passed irrevocably out of the reach of the voice of Jesus. It will be replied, that no such event has ever occurred before or since as the restoration of a man four days dead at the sound of a human voice, and this is proof sufficient and in point. But we ask again, with no disposition to evade the difficulty, has such a man as Jesus of Nazareth ever appeared? Our idea is, that he was an original creation, a new and exalted son of God, whose being not only harmonized with all the familiar laws of Nature, but also revealed new laws, new modes of Divine Power, which we are capable of tracing so far as to perceive that they do not interrupt, but agree with all the ways of God in creation and in the soul of man,—that they are, in deed and in truth, divine, natural laws,—instances, modes of Nature's working,—not breaking in upon the wholeness of nature, but crowning it with surpassing splendor, unfolding its perfection and order.

There is especial fervor in the gratitude which Jesus expressed for the opportunity of raising Lazarus. On no other occasion did he utter himself in the same way. But for what did he thank God? Not, certainly, for the bare opportunity of raising a dead man. Lazarus was not the only individual who had died in the course of his ministry. And had he merely desired an opportunity of restoring a dead man to life, it might easily have been obtained. No; it was not merely for such an opportunity that the divine joy of his heart broke forth, as he lifted up those eyes, just before streaming with tears, and exclaimed, "Father! I thank thee that thou hast heard me." A personal friend, a believer had died; one, between whom and himself had been formed the indestructible tie of faith, and that condition existed, which the elevation of his spirit rendered necessary to the exercise of his miraculous power. He could not raise the dead merely to prove his power, to convince the doubting. The dignity, the divinity of his purpose would not permit it. The relation in which Lazarus had stood to him opened the way for the miracle he was about to perform. He could now exert his authority singly, out of pure affection for Lazarus, and for the sisters of

Lazarus. There was room for a simple and true act of his inspired will. And on account of those who stood by, he thanked God for the opportunity, now accorded him in the gracious providence of Heaven, not merely of displaying a physical wonder, but of exhibiting that power of faith, which is the most decisive token and the brightest revelation of the spirit of God. Herein was the rare glory of his character, that, in the presence of the very multitudes whom he wished to influence, he could do such things as no man had ever done before, not only without the slightest shadow of display, but with as perfect singleness of mind and simplicity of manner, as if there were not one human eye to see what he was doing.

The two others whom he restored to life were young persons; one was quite a child. Remember what he said of the young; "Of such is the kingdom of Heaven." There is something more here than a mere figure of speech. Faith is the peculiar trait of childhood and youth. So congenial to a child's nature is it to cherish trust, to bestow confidence, so ready is he to listen to all sounds as to true voices, that, if we supposed he had come into this world from a preëxistent state, we should infer that he had lived in a world of perfect truth. "Heaven lies about us in our infancy." The mind of the very young child appears to live and move and have its being all unconsciously in those truths, which the man is toiling almost hopelessly to find. They brood over it "like the Day." And although the chilling and corrupting illusions of sense fast, very fast, close us round, and the heavy yoke of custom bows us down, and we daily travel farther from the East, yet something of the child's heart stays with us to the end, amidst the thickening clouds of pride and sin.

"O joy! that in our embers  
Is something that doth live;  
That nature yet remembers  
What was so fugitive!"

Had the deep, articulate meaning of the immortal ode, from which I quote, reached our inner sense, were it something more to us than the faint music of a distant angel, we should be prepared to perceive the full significance of the hallowed words of Jesus. Between him and children there was a peculiar sympathy. He took them in his arms and blessed them. He placed a child before his disciples and pointed to him as a

model. In declaring, as he did with so much solemnity, that the guardian angels of children stand always around the Eternal Throne, he intimated that God is very near to the young. It was because he felt himself bound by spiritual, living ties to little children, that he said of the little girl, "She is not dead, but sleepeth." To him her spirit was so visibly within call of his, it was so perfectly easy to summon her back, that she seemed not to be dead.

These remarks must suffice to disclose to those, who are disposed to perceive, the probable correspondence between the restoration of the girl and the young man, and the deepest laws of Nature, the order of that spiritual world of which faith is the ruling principle. To such, we say, as are disposed to perceive it. Without this disposition, words, reasonings are vain. "Murmur not among yourselves," said Jesus, "no man can come to me, except the Father, who hath sent me, draw him." God forbid we should adduce these words in an arrogant, assuming spirit! Most deeply do we feel that our own vision is but dim, our own faith, faint. And if he, who sees men only as trees walking, is disposed to boast of his sight, he only proves himself among the blindest. There are many, whom we regard with cordial deference, far better qualified to expound these views, would they only throw aside that prejudice of novelty, which, by the way, there is so much to justify. We invoke their hearty candor.

In conclusion, we would briefly remind those who insist that Jesus referred his miracles to the power of God, that it has been the main purpose of the foregoing pages to justify this reference,—to show that his miracles were wrought by the spirit, that they bear the impress of the finger of Him, of whom and to whom are all things. Let the language of Jesus be carefully studied, and nothing will appear more plainly than that he ascribed all events, even those we deem natural, to the immediate agency of Heaven. When Peter avowed his faith in him as the Christ, his language, taken to the letter, implies, that Peter had been the subject of an immediate revelation. "Flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but my Father who is in Heaven." But no enlightened interpreter so understands it.

It has been our aim to show that the wonderful works of Jesus are in perfect harmony with nature's highest laws. Do they still appear to violate the order of the physical universe?

Let it be considered whether that reveals anything more clearly than the natural, essential sovereignty of the mind.

W. H. F.

ART. III. — *The Evidences of the Genuineness of the Gospels.* By ANDREWS NORTON. Vol I. Boston: 1837. pp. 248, ccxc.

THE merits of this book may, very probably, for a time at least, be underrated. This is an age of superficial and rapid reading, and not the most favorable to the success of a work, which appeals to none of the morbid sensibilities of our nature, and is connected with none of the exciting topics of the day. Those who read it carelessly and superficially will of necessity fail of forming a just estimate of its character, for they will not penetrate the spirit and views of the writer. For a different reason, readers of another class, though they may be impressed with its great excellence, can yet hardly be expected to do full justice to the author, because, not being acquainted with the state of the evidence to be derived from the writings of Christian antiquity, and with the vexed questions of theologians and critics of modern times, they cannot be aware of the difficulties which have been surmounted, nor will they perceive the need of that careful elaboration, which certain portions of the argument, attended, as they have all along supposed, with no embarrassment, have received. The lovers of novelty and paradox may possibly find the work too sober for their taste. But this we cannot consider as a defect in it. Novelty, certainly, is no criterion of truth, and a propensity to adopt new and fanciful opinions, and strike out extravagant and startling hypotheses, constitutes, to say the least, a very doubtful qualification for the execution of a work of this sort. We like a little sobriety now and then; there is too little of it in these days, and on subjects like that treated of in the present volume, it is not, as we think, misplaced.

One great merit of the volume, regarded as a treatise on the evidences of the genuineness of the Gospels, or rather, a particular branch of them, is, that its statements are entitled to

implicit confidence. It contains, as we believe, no assertions, which are not strictly warranted by fact. There is no overstating of the evidence, no exaggeration, no appeal to spurious or doubtful authorities, and no injudicious use of such as are genuine. From a portion of these charges we cannot except even the "fair-minded" Paley, and the "accurate" Lardner. The former made no pretensions to original learning. The latter, though laboriously minute, and always to be spoken of with respect, appears to have possessed little talent for generalization, and, by his mental tastes and habits, was not qualified to present the essence of his authorities with the reasoning founded on them, in an impressive and attracting form. Besides, the ground of the controversy has somewhat changed since the time of Lardner, and the question presents itself under new aspects. New difficulties have been started, and new fields of inquiry opened, or those before trodden, more fully explored. A multitude of hypotheses have been framed by theologians, some of them crude and ephemeral, but some, from the celebrity and learning of their authors, and the ingenuity exhibited in their defence, entitled to examination. The result of all has been to embarrass and perplex the subject, without furnishing a satisfactory solution of the phenomena to be explained.

It was time the subject should be taken up by one qualified to correct the inaccuracies of former statements, to expose the fallacies of some leading theories, particularly of German critics and theologians, and present the true state of the evidence in a clear and intelligible form. For this task Mr. Norton is pre-eminently fitted, and he has executed it with singular fidelity. The work embodies the result of thorough research, and mature reflection, and contains, either in the text or notes, (we must not be too fastidious about the form,) a great mass of severe and compact reasoning, which forms a striking contrast with the loose way of thinking and writing too prevalent at the present day.

Mr. Norton is certainly no visionary. Though some may think that he has his theory, he cannot be called a system-builder, and when his speculations are pushed to a point most remote from the ordinary apprehensions of Christians, it will always be found, upon examination, that he has some ground to stand upon, and, many will think, firm and tenable too. Those who are fond of the dreamy mood, may possibly think

the work not sufficiently transcendental, while those whose thoughts have been accustomed always to move in the beaten track, will be occasionally startled at what they will deem the boldness of his criticisms, and daring flight of some of his conclusions. No one, surely, can read the book without profit, and those most versed in theological studies, if they do not derive from it germs of new views, and new trains of thought, will yet find a multitude of topics discussed with a fulness of learning, without pedantry, with a critical acumen, and a constant attention to results and inferences, for which they will look in vain in any similar work of ancient or modern times.

The object and views of the writer are so well stated, in a neat and appropriate preface, that we cannot, perhaps, better commence the slight analysis of the work we propose to give, than by extracting a portion of it for the information of those of our readers into whose hands the volume has not yet fallen. The delay in the appearance of the work, it having been begun in 1819, and from time to time confidently expected by the public, is thus explained.

"The causes of delay have been partly circumstances merely personal, partly my being occupied by other objects, theological and literary, but principally the fact, that the inquiry on which we are about to enter, when thoroughly pursued, presents itself in unexpected relations to many important subjects, all of which it is necessary to examine in order to its satisfactory discussion. As regards some of the principal of these subjects, the truth did not seem to me to have been established; and, as regards every subject that may be embraced in such a work as the present, he who would execute it in a proper manner should examine for himself; trusting as little as possible to second-hand information, and neither adopting old opinions because they have been acquiesced in, nor new opinions because they have been confidently asserted." — *Pref.* pp. v. vi.

After stating the object of the large body of notes contained in the volume, Mr. Norton proceeds;

"I have published this volume separately, because it completes one division of the work intended, containing the statement of the testimony of the great body of early Christians to the genuineness of the Gospels. It likewise comprises as large a number of subjects as it may be well to present at once to the attention of my readers; and, such being the case, I was desirous of saving this portion of my labors from the accidents to which a manuscript is exposed.

"It is my purpose next to show the strong confirmation of the more direct historical evidence, afforded by the manner in which the Gospels were regarded by the early Gnostic heretics; a field, which, though not untrodden, has been unexplored; and then, after endeavoring to remove some misapprehensions respecting the historical, to proceed to the collateral evidence for the genuineness of the Gospels." — *Pref.* pp. vi. vii.

From these extracts it will be perceived, that the present volume is designed to embrace only the *direct historical* evidence for the genuineness of the Gospels. The other classes of evidence it does not touch. This should be constantly borne in mind by the reader. It should be recollected that it is only a portion, a particular branch only, of the argument for the genuineness of the evangelical records, which is here treated; otherwise, important misconceptions may take place, and erroneous inferences will be drawn.

Mr. Norton appropriates some pages in the form of an Introduction to a statement of the question, in presenting which he is led to notice the difficulties to be encountered, particularly those raised by some German theologians. His object is to prove the genuineness of the Gospels. This he attempts by establishing two propositions; the first is, that "they remain essentially the same as they were originally written;" and the second, that "they have been ascribed to their true authors." The first of these propositions has reference to the hypotheses of Eichhorn and some others, that "our four Gospels, in *their present form*, were not in use, and were not known, till the end of the second century;" that previously to that time, "other Gospels were in circulation, allied to those we possess, but not the same."

Eichhorn's theory, which relates particularly to the origin and composition of the first three Gospels, Mr. Norton thus gives, partly in his own language, and partly in language borrowed from Eichhorn himself.

"There was very early in existence a short historical sketch of the life of Christ, which may be called the Original Gospel. This was, probably, provided for the use of those assistants of the apostles in the work of teaching Christianity, who had not themselves seen the actions and heard the discourses of Christ. It was, however, but 'a rough sketch, a brief and imperfect account, without historical plan or methodical arrangement.' In this respect it was, according to Eichhorn, very different from our

four Gospels. 'These present no rough sketch, such as we must suppose the first essay upon the life of Jesus to have been ; but, on the contrary, are works written with art and labor, and contain portions of his life, of which no mention was made in the first preaching of Christianity.\* This Original Gospel was the basis, both of the earlier gospels used during the first two centuries, and of the first three of our present Gospels, namely, those of Matthew, Mark, and Luke, by which those earlier gospels were finally superseded. The earlier gospels retained more or less of the rudeness and incompleteness of the Original Gospel.

"But they very soon fell into the hands of those who undertook to supply their defects and incompleteness, both in the general compass of the history, and in the narration of particular events. Not content with a life of Jesus, which, like the gospel of the Hebrews, and those of Marcion and Tatian, commenced with his public appearance, there were those who early prefixed to the Memoirs used by Justin Martyr, and to the gospel of Cerinthus, an account of his descent, his birth, and the period of his youth. In like manner, we find, upon comparing together, in parallel passages, the remaining fragments of these gospels, that they were receiving continual accessions. \* \* \* By these continual accessions, the original text of the life of Jesus was lost in a mass of additions, so that its words appeared among them but as insulated fragments. Of this any one may satisfy himself from the account of the baptism of Jesus, which was compiled out of various gospels. The necessary consequence was, that at last truth and falsehood, authentic and fabulous narratives, or such, at least, as through long tradition had become disfigured and falsified, were brought together promiscuously. The longer these narratives passed from mouth to mouth, the more uncertain and disfigured they would become. At last, at the end of the second and the beginning of the third century, in order, as far as might be, to preserve the true accounts concerning the life of Jesus, and to deliver them to posterity as free from error as possible, the Church, out of the many gospels which were extant, selected four, which had the greatest marks of credibility, and the necessary completeness for common use. There are no traces of our present Gospels of Matthew, Mark, and Luke, before the end of the second and the beginning of the third century. Irenæus, about the year 202, first speaks decisively of four gospels ; and imagines all sorts of reasons for this particular number ; and Clement of Alexandria, about the year 216,† la-

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\* Einleit. in d. N. T. I. 5.

† The dates here assigned by Eichhorn, it should be observed,

bored to collect divers accounts concerning the origin of these four Gospels, in order to prove that these alone should be acknowledged as authentic. From these facts, it is evident, that first, about the end of the second and the beginning of the third century, the Church labored to establish the universal authority of these four Gospels, which were in existence before, if not altogether in their present form, yet in most respects such as we now have them, and to procure their general reception in the Church, with the suppression of all other gospels then extant.' "—pp. 9–12.

This theory of Eichhorn, of which Mr. Norton proceeds to give farther illustrations, it is obvious, shakes the credit of our present Gospels. But the theory, as Mr. Norton contends, is wholly unfounded, and he introduces evidence and argument to show that the Gospels have been exposed to no peculiar causes of corruption, but, in every essential particular, have been preserved and transmitted as they were originally written.\* This is evident from the fact of the essential agreement between our present numerous manuscript copies of the Gospels, as also between our copies of ancient versions, and copies of the writings of the Fathers, abounding in quotations from the Gospels, the necessary inference from which is, that there existed an original manuscript from which these copies were taken.

"Now, all these different copies of the Gospels, or parts of the Gospels, so numerous, so various in their character, so unconnected, offering themselves to notice in parts of the world so remote from each other, concur in giving us essentially the same text. Divide them into four classes, corresponding to the four Gospels, and it is evident, that those of each class are to be referred to one common source; that they are all copies, more or less remote, of the same original; that they all had one common text for their archetype. They vary, indeed, more or less from each other; but these variations have arisen from the common

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are, as has been computed, the dates of the death of Irenæus and of Clement, not of the period about which they wrote and flourished. These dates he elsewhere gives correctly.

\* Mr. Norton makes a qualification, not materially affecting his argument, in regard to Matthew's Gospel, which he supposes, according to the most ancient tradition, to have been originally written in Hebrew, and early translated into Greek. One or two other slight qualifications he states, which it is not important here to mention.

accidents of transcription, or, as regards the versions, partly from errors of translation; or, in respect to the quotations by the fathers, partly from the circumstance, that, in ancient as in modern times, the language of scripture was often cited loosely, from memory, and without regard to verbal accuracy, in cases where no particular verbal accuracy was required. The agreement among the extant copies of any one of the Gospels, or of portions of it, is essential; the disagreements are accidental and trifling, originating in causes, which, from the nature of things, we know must have been in operation. Every copy of any one of the Gospels presents us with essentially the same work, the same general history, the same particular facts, the same doctrines, the same precepts, the same characteristics of the writer, the same form of narration, the same style, and the same use of language; and by comparing together different copies, we are able to ascertain the original text to a great degree of exactness; or, in other words, where various readings occur, to determine what were probably the words of the author. The Greek manuscripts, then, of any one of the Gospels, the versions of it, and the quotations from it by the fathers, are all, professedly, copies of that Gospel or of parts of it; and these copies correspond with each other. But, as these professed copies thus correspond with each other, it follows that they were derived more or less remotely from one archetype. Their agreement admits of no explanation, except that of their being conformed to a common exemplar. In respect to each of the Gospels, the copies which we possess must all be referred, for their source, to one original Gospel, one original text, one original manuscript. As far back as our knowledge extends, Christians throughout all past ages, in Syria, at Alexandria, at Rome, at Carthage, at Constantinople, and at Moscow, in the east and in the west, have all used copies of each of the Gospels, which were evidently derived from one original manuscript, and necessarily imply that such a manuscript, existing as their archetype, has been faithfully copied." —pp. 28—30.

But, it may be said, that the manuscript, or exemplar, from which our present copies of the Gospels were severally transcribed, was not the original manuscript, but one selected by public authority, and established as containing a standard text; at the end of the second century. To this supposition Mr. Norton replies in an argument drawn from the state of Christians at that period, showing that the supposition is intrinsically incredible. The argument is too long for extract, and we will not mutilate it by quotation. The result is thus given;

"There is, then, no ground for the supposition of any interposition of authority, or of any concert among Christians, at the end of the second century, to select our present Gospels for common use ; or, in other words, to select from the great number then in existence, four particular manuscripts, which should serve as archetypes for all subsequent transcribers, and the text of which should alone be considered as the authorized text. Our present agreement of authorities, which necessarily refers us back to one manuscript of each of the Gospels, as the archetype of all the copies of that Gospel, cannot thus be explained. We are left, therefore, to the obvious conclusion, which we adopt in regard to other writings, that this manuscript was the original work of an individual author, which has been faithfully transmitted to us." — pp. 41, 42.

By a mode of reasoning similar to that already pursued, Mr. Norton proceeds to show that no such liberties as have been pretended, or imagined, could have been taken by transcribers of the Gospels previously to the end of the second century. The reasoning, if sound, and we see not how it is to be rebutted, derives additional interest from its intimate bearing on the question of the antiquity of the Gospels. By a calculation, the details of which are given, Mr. Norton estimates the number of copies of them in existence at the period alluded to, at sixty thousand.

"There were, then, at the end of the second century, when it is agreed that the Gospels were in common use, at least sixty thousand copies of them dispersed over the world. These copies had not been subjected to the licentious alterations of transcribers. They agreed essentially with each other. This is implied in the fact, that they *were* copies of our present Gospels. It is made evident by the consideration, that if there had been important discrepancies among these sixty thousand copies, no series of events could either have destroyed the evidence of these discrepancies, or could have produced the present agreement among existing copies, derived, as they are, from those in use at the period in question. The agreement, then, at the end of the second century, between the numerous copies of the respective Gospels, proves, that an archetype of each Gospel had been faithfully followed by transcribers. This archetype, as we have seen, there is no ground for imagining to have been any other, than the original work of the author of that Gospel. It follows, therefore, that, in the interval between the composition of these works and the end of the second century, their text did not suffer, as has been fancied, from the licentiousness of transcribers.



scripts of the Gospels had ever existed ;—that we may infer the same from all the other notices respecting the text of the Gospels in the writings of the fathers ; and from the absence of anything in their works, which might show, that their copies differed more from each other, than those now extant ;—that the peculiar style of the Gospels generally, and the uniform style of each Gospel, afford proof that each is, essentially, the work of one author, which has been preserved unaltered ;—that this argument becomes more striking, when we consider, that far the greater number of the copies of the Gospels, during the first two centuries, were made by Greek transcribers, who, if they had interpolated, would have interpolated in common Greek ; that it is from copies made by them that our own are derived ; but that the Gospels, as we possess them, are written, throughout, in that dialect of the Greek, which was used only by Jews ;—that spurious works, or spurious additions to genuine works, may commonly be discovered by some incongruity with the character or the circumstances of the pretended author, or with the age to which they are assigned ; but that with the exception, perhaps, of a few passages, the genuineness of which is doubtful, no such incongruity appears in the Gospels ;—and, lastly, that the consistency preserved throughout each of the Gospels in all that relates to the actions, discourses, and most extraordinary character of Christ, shows that each is a work which remains the same essentially as it was originally written, uncorrupted by subsequent alterations or additions.” — pp. 88–90.

The next chapter is taken up with a consideration of objections. The theory of the corruption of the Gospels, as already perceived, has been connected with an hypothesis concerning the origin of those of Matthew, Mark, and Luke, an hypothesis supposed to be necessary to explain the phenomena of the agreement and disagreement of these Gospels with each other. According to this theory, which is explained and ingeniously defended by Bishop Marsh, who borrowed it from Eichhorn, there existed an original document or manuscript, corresponding to the original Gospel of the latter. This document received from time to time various additions from those into whose hands it fell, and different copies of it being used by Matthew, Mark, and Luke, as the basis of their Gospels, the identity and difference observable in their respective productions are readily accounted for. For a particular examination of this theory, Mr. Norton refers his readers to a note at the end of the volume. “If the reasoning there urged,”

he says, "be correct, it will appear that the hypothesis of an original document, gradually receiving addition from different hands, and used in different forms by the first three Evangelists, involves suppositions which cannot be admitted; that it is unnecessary in order to account for the agreement of the Gospels with each other; and that it is neither implied, nor rendered probable, by the phenomena to be explained; but that, on the contrary, it is inconsistent with those phenomena." If this hypothesis is abandoned, the theory of the corruption of the Gospels loses its main support. The evidence adduced by Eichhorn does not establish it, nor do the few passages which have been quoted from ancient writers, particularly from Celsus, and Clement of Alexandria, afford it any countenance.

Mr. Norton's second proposition, it will be recollected, is, that the Gospels are ascribed to their true authors. The first argument is, that they were received as genuine, and regarded with the highest reverence as sacred books, by the great body of Christians during the last quarter of the second century. This appears from Irenæus, Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, Celsus, Origen, and others, who, it should be observed, are to be regarded, not as single authorities, but as furnishing the collective testimony of Christians of the age; evidence of the belief of a whole community, every member of which was deeply interested in the object of that belief. The testimony to the genuineness of the Gospels is, therefore, distinct in its character from that which may be adduced to prove the genuineness of ancient profane writings.

"But," says Mr. Norton, "the Christians of the latter half of the second century could not be ignorant of the history of the Gospels, or in other words, of the manner in which they had been regarded by their predecessors. From the statements which have been quoted from different writers, we may fairly take the year 175, as a period, when, as shown by direct historical evidence, the Gospels were generally received among Christians. But the old men of this period were born about the end of the first, and the commencement of the second century. During their youth, they had been contemporary with those, who had been contemporary with the apostles and the other disciples of Christ himself, and who might have received immediate instruction from them. Irenæus informs us, that he had listened to the discourses of Polycarp, who had been a disciple of St. John, and conversant with others

who had seen the Lord.\* These facts are important as respects the value of the individual testimony of Irenæus to the genuineness of the Gospels. But they are also to be regarded as particular exemplifications of a general truth, about which there can be no dispute; that it needed but a single link in the chain of succession, to connect the old men of the time of Irenæus with the apostolic age. This being the case, the Christians of his time could not be ignorant of the manner in which the Gospels had been regarded by their predecessors; and in his time, the belief of the genuineness of the Gospels was established throughout the Christian community." — pp. 138, 139.

Christians of that day were equally interested in the question of the genuineness of their sacred books, with those of the present age. But what was their intellectual and moral character? Mr. Norton thinks, that it has been greatly underrated.

"Our religion, at the time to which we refer, was not so corrupted, as greatly to weaken its power over the affections and moral principles of those by whom it was held; and there is no doubt that the Christians of the second and third centuries were, as a body, distinguished from the world around them, by their moral superiority, and by virtues, which scarcely existed beyond the limits of their community. They were not, as some have pretended, an illiterate people. They had among them a full share, to say the least, of the learning and intellectual improvement of the age. From the middle of the second century, they abounded in writers, many of whose works are lost, but many which remain give proof of more than common learning and vigor of intellect. There is a tendency to speak of the Christian fathers with a disrespect wholly unmerited by those of the first ages. During the latter part of the second and the first half of the third century, that is, from the time when Irenæus wrote, till that of Origen's death, though the Christians were much fewer in number than the heathens; yet the Christian writers, as a body, have far higher claims to intellectual distinction, than the heathen. After the period last mentioned, as Christians increased in numbers, their intellectual ascendancy, of course, became more conspicuous, and, at the same time, less extraordinary.

"Such was the character of the community, throughout which the Gospels were received as genuine. There was no controversy nor difference of opinion on the subject within this commu-

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\* Irenæi Epist. ad Florin. apud Euseb. H. E. Lib. V. c. 20. — *Contra Hæres.* Lib. III. c. 3, § 4.

nity. If it had happened, that instead of three or four, there had been three or four hundred, or three or four thousand Christian writers extant, who had had occasion to mention the subject, they would have expressed themselves, as those whom I have quoted. We have, then, the testimony of a whole community to the genuineness of their sacred books; and the circumstances and character of this community were such as to render their testimony in the highest degree credible."—pp. 144, 145.

In confirmation of the testimony of Christians to the genuineness of the Gospels, Mr. Norton appeals to a variety of facts and considerations. We had prepared a general abstract of them, but we give in preference Mr. Norton's own summary at the close of the chapter.

"The general reception of the Gospels as books of the highest authority, at the end of the second century, necessarily implies their celebrity at a much earlier period, and the long continued operation of causes, sufficient to produce so remarkable a phenomenon.

"This phenomenon, it may appear from what has been said, could not have been the result of any combination, nor of fraud, nor accident. Those by whom the Gospels were received as books of the highest value, were men superior, generally, in moral and intellectual qualities, to their contemporaries; if they were deceived, it was at their peril; they enjoyed such means of knowledge concerning the history of the Gospels, as might, and, we may truly say, must have removed all doubt, whether they were genuine or not, and in their words and by their lives, they unequivocally affirmed them to be genuine. The first three Gospels, when compared together, present appearances, which, viewed in connexion with the fact of their general reception, admit of no explanation that does not suppose their genuineness. But further;—from the nature of the case, the Gospels must have made their way to general reception by their intrinsic worth and authority. Four histories of Christ, the work of unlearned Jewish authors, written in a style which must have appeared barbarous to native Greeks, and regarded by those who held them in the highest respect as presenting discrepancies with each other, which, in the literal sense of their words, were irreconcilable, obtained equal reception throughout the Christian community, from beyond the Euphrates, through Asia Minor, Greece, Egypt, and Italy, to the western coasts of Spain and Africa. They were received as sacred books by portions of this community, who, probably, had never heard of each other's existence. Wherever the religion had spread, they had spread with it. The faith of Christians

rested on the belief of their authenticity. Of these facts, no other account can be given, than that those writings were derived from the same sources as the religion itself; and had been handed down with it from the apostolic age, as its authentic records. But if this be so, no reasonable question can be raised respecting their genuineness. It could not be established by any proof more decisive and unsuspecting, than what has just been stated; for it appears as a necessary inference from notorious and indisputable facts." — pp. 179, 180.

Thus far, Mr. Norton has gone on the supposition that there is no *direct* historical evidence of the existence and genuineness of our four Gospels, of an earlier date than about the year 175, or the latter part of the second century. The fact of their general reception at that period, viewed in connexion with all the circumstances attending it,—with the character and numbers of the Christian community, and the phenomena exhibited by the writings themselves,—he has hitherto contended, admits of explanation only upon the supposition of their genuineness in their present, or nearly their present form. There is, however, as he maintains, direct testimony of an earlier date. Justin Martyr wrote about the middle of the second century. "From his two Apologies, and Dialogue with Trypho, the Jew, might be extracted," says Mr. Norton, "a brief account of the life and doctrines of Christ, corresponding to that contained in the Gospels; and corresponding to such a degree, both in matter and words, that almost every quotation and reference may be readily assigned to its proper place in one or another of the Gospels. There was, consequently, until within a short period, no doubt entertained that the Gospels were quoted by Justin. The facts just stated do not establish the proposition; but they afford a strong presumption of its truth."

To the supposition, however, that Justin quoted from our present Gospels, it is objected, first, that he does not name the Evangelists, nor designate our present Gospels by any title afterwards in use. His quotations are taken from what he calls "Memoirs by the Apostles." This description, Mr. Norton contends, was of the "kind his purpose required, and was sufficiently correct;" that addressing, as he was, unbelievers, to whom the names of the Apostles were unknown, he could hardly be expected to use language more definite. When he speaks of "Memoirs of Christ, composed by Apos-

tles and their companions," he designates our Gospels with great accuracy. No description could be more precise, Matthew and John being Apostles, and Mark and Luke, according to constant tradition, companions of Apostles.

Again ; it is objected, that Justin's quotations do not verbally agree with the corresponding passages in our present Gospels. To this Mr. Norton replies, by showing that the Fathers generally were not in the habit of quoting the Scriptures with exact verbal accuracy ; that in many of Justin's quotations from the Septuagint there is great want of verbal coincidence with the original ; and finally, that in repeating the same quotations from the "*Memoirs*," he varies from himself, which proves that he did not aim at verbal accuracy. Nor did his purpose require it.

The third and last objection is, that Justin has quoted passages concerning Christ, not found in our present Gospels. These passages Mr. Norton examines at some length.

"The examination of the passages which we have gone over, is of more interest than may appear at first sight. Justin carries us back to the age which followed that of the apostles. His writings have been searched for the purpose of finding some notices of Christ, or some intimations relating to him, different from the accounts of the evangelists. It will be perceived that nothing, which can be regarded as of any importance, has been discovered. On the contrary, he gives a great part of the history of Christ, in perfect harmony with what is found in the Gospels, sometimes agreeing in words, and always in meaning. We may infer, therefore, that the account of Christ, contained in the Gospels, was that which his followers had taught, and had received as true, from the beginning ; that it was the account which Christians acknowledged as the foundation of their faith ; and that there were no opposing narratives respecting him, which disappeared in part, and in part coalesced into the forms which the four Gospels present. It is remarkable, that in so early a writer as Justin, we discover so little matter, additional to what is contained in the Gospels ; so little, which it is necessary to suppose derived from any other source. The most satisfactory explanation of this phenomenon seems to be, that the Gospels had come down from the apostolic age with such a weight of authority, there was such an entire reliance upon their credibility, that it was generally felt to be unwise and unsafe to blend any uncertain accounts with the history contained in those works. Such accounts, therefore, were neglected and forgotten. The Gospels extinguished all feebler lights." — pp. 222 - 224.

After stating the direct argument in proof that the "Memoirs" quoted by Justin were our present Gospels, Mr. Norton proceeds to gather evidence from a still earlier period. The only direct evidence he adduces, or which, as we conceive, can be adduced, is that of Papias, and St. Luke's own testimony to the genuineness of his Gospel. Papias, bishop of Hierapolis, in Syria, flourished early in the second century, about 116; he was, as he says, acquainted with several of the companions of the Apostles. Eusebius has preserved some fragments of a work written by him, and now lost, in which he mentions the Gospels of Matthew and Mark. This is important testimony certainly, if we proceed on the principle that our present Gospels, since their first composition, have undergone no essential alteration.

The testimony of Luke, alluded to, is found at the beginning of the Acts of the Apostles. The nature and purport of this testimony, and the bearing it has on the evidence of the genuineness of the Gospels of Matthew and Mark, form the subject of some remarks, with which Mr. Norton concludes the "direct historical evidence for the genuineness of the Gospels, from their reception by the great body of Christians."

In justice, however, to the argument for the genuineness of the Gospels from evidence of this kind, and in explanation of the fact, that so small an amount of it can be gleaned from the period of fifty years, between the death of the last of the Apostles and the time of Justin Martyr, some reasons ought to be stated, accounting for the paucity of the remains of Christian writings, during that important period. On this subject Mr. Norton has the following passage.

"Between the publication of St. John's Gospel, and the time when Justin wrote, an interval, probably, of about fifty years, we find very few Christian writers, of whose works any considerable remains are extant. It was a period of distress and confusion. Our religion, left upon the death of that apostle without any powerful and distinguished advocate, was struggling for establishment against the opposition and persecution of the world. A great revolution was taking place in the minds of those who had been acted upon by the preaching of the apostles. Their opinions, like their circumstances, were unsettled. The separation, or the union, which was afterwards effected, between ancient errors and the new doctrines of our faith, was as yet undecided. Our religion had not assumed among its professed followers a well defined character; and its sublime truths were not so fully com-

prehended, as when men had become more familiar with the conception of them. It has not yet secured possession of the minds and hearts of many converts well qualified by their literary eminence to explain and defend it. These causes will account for the few remains of writers from among the catholic Christians, during this period; and for the comparatively few notices which we find of the Gospels before the time of Justin Martyr." — pp. 241, 242.

The Additional Notes occupy somewhat more than half the volume, and relate to a variety of topics, intimately or more remotely connected with the main subject. They embody the result of extensive and careful inquiry, and bear marks of the writer's usual clearness and accuracy. Several of them would be read with interest, disconnected with the volume to which they are appended. Though introduced to illustrate some topic, or fact, discussed or alluded to, they in some sort, as the author observes in his preface, possess the character of independent dissertations. We regard them as of great value. They present a mass of facts and reasoning connected with the records and evidences of our religion, and the several questions to which the discussion of them has given rise, which are accessible to the general reader in no other form.

The first Note, of ninety-one pages, contains remarks on the present state of the Text of the Gospels; on the Systematic Classification of the copies of the New Testament, adopted by Griesbach and others, and the extravagance of the language used by them concerning the diversities of the text in different copies; on the Character and Importance of the Various Readings of the New Testament; on the Original Language of Matthew's Gospel, and its use by the Hebrew Christians; and on some Passages in the Received Text of the Gospels, of which the Genuineness is doubtful. In regard to these passages, some of them, at least, the freedom with which Mr. Norton has expressed his opinions, will, we doubt not, subject him to censure, and he will be charged by many with latitudinarianism. Mr. Norton is not the man, however, to be deterred from an open avowal of his opinions from the fear of consequences. His sincerity no one can call in question. In his reverence for the pure records of our faith, we believe that he yields to no man living. Of his abhorrence of artifice, and all designed suppression of truth, of trick and management of every sort, he has afforded abundant proof in his numerous literary

and theological writings, and for these qualities we respect him. Whether or not his conclusions on the subject under notice be correct, we like his frankness and honesty. We have no wish to impose any restraint on freedom of thought and expression. We would encourage them, nor have we any apprehension as to the result. Truth can never suffer in "free and open encounter," nor ought we to doubt of her victory, "though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth."

In the fourth Note, which embraces a hundred and six pages, Mr. Norton enters fully into a consideration of the question of the correspondences and differences, in the three first Gospels, which involves, in some sense, the question of their origin; examines the different theories which have been formed to account for those correspondences and differences, and states his own conclusions and inferences. Our limits will not allow us to attempt any analysis of its contents. We can only say of it, that it is learned, full, independent, and discriminating. However the writer's views may be regarded, whether or not they may be considered as furnishing a satisfactory explanation of the phenomena of the coincidences and diversities alluded to, none will deny that his argument is conducted with great skill, and carries with it evidence of deep thought, and an intimate acquaintance with his subject. As a specimen of reasoning, it will be admired by those who still think that some obscurity hangs over the question of the composition of the Gospels, that some difficulties yet remain to be cleared up. By those whose attention has already been directed to the topics to which it relates, it will be read with no ordinary interest, and every person of liberal curiosity, we should think, must be gratified with its perusal, and will feel amply rewarded for the time and attention he may bestow on it.

The next Additional Note is on the quotations of Justin Martyr. Mr. Norton, after some notice of a work of Credner, in which the latter advances a new hypothesis on the subject, adds, in reference to the character and writings of recent German theologians, —

"It is a specimen of a numerous class of productions of the later German theologians and speculatists, many of which are thrown out by young men to draw upon themselves temporary notoriety, and resemble academical exercises, written with little regard to the truth of the propositions maintained; while others aim at a graver and more paradoxical character, and open ghastly

views of a grand reform in all our modes of thinking, and in all that the wise have believed and held sacred. The bounds of common sense have been broken down, and theorists are expatiating freely in the regions beyond. Any novelty, however crude and extravagant, seems to find favor. These novelties, theological or metaphysical, are not maintained with any elaborate ingenuity, nor with "any rash dexterity of wit," but by bold assumptions and hardy assertions, set off with a show of learning which cannot be trusted, and held together with scarcely a semblance of what an intelligent man would consider an argument. They are often only obsolete errors revived, and partially disguised by a use of language, barbarous at once from its technicality and its indefiniteness of meaning. In many of the writings of which I speak, the most obvious facts and the strongest probabilities are put so entirely out of view, that a self-distrusting reader may begin to doubt whether he has not all his life been in some strange mistake, and to imagine, that a field of knowledge is familiar to his new instructor, of which he had no conception. Often the purpose of the writer is not stated with precision, his work is very inartificially put together, one doctrine is at variance with another, his hypothesis assumes no settled form, so that one can hardly say what he would have it believed that he means to assert or deny. With much real want of skill in the clear arrangement of thoughts and the perspicuous use of language, is joined an affected obscurity of expression; the whole producing, if I may so speak, a constant blur before the eyes of the reader; and often the words swell into a volume of mist, through which the outlines of half-formed ideas can hardly, if at all, be discerned. These works are not, indeed, mischievous as establishing any error; for they establish nothing; they perish and are forgotten, as rapidly as they are produced; *unda supervenit undam*; but they are mischievous by their numbers, as serving to darken and perplex the truth, and to divert attention from those views and studies, by which alone it can be attained. They form piles of rubbish in the way of intellectual improvement. Their assuming tone imposes upon some or many readers, imperfectly acquainted with the subjects of which they treat, especially readers of that class who are apt to admire most what they do not understand. In their aggregate, they tend to produce doubts whether anything can be satisfactorily ascertained concerning the subjects of which they treat; subjects often of great, perhaps the greatest interest; and as they indicate in their authors, so they create in their admirers, an incapacity for thinking clearly and reasoning wisely, and deaden that strong feeling of moral responsibility to seek only for the truth, with which any important investigation should be pursued." — pp. ccliii — cclv.

The concluding Note relates to the writings ascribed to the Apostolic Fathers. These writings are abandoned by some, as being all of them spurious, or of doubtful credit, while they continue to be quoted by others, as though their genuineness had never been called in question, and that of most of them, certainly, for very substantial reasons. In regard to the question of their genuineness, there has been manifested, of late, a strange inattention and apathy. Mr. Norton defends the genuineness, in the main, of one of the epistles attributed to Clement of Rome, and the epistle of Polycarp, bishop of Smyrna, to the Philippians, a part of which is extant in Greek, and the remainder in an old Latin translation. He assigns satisfactory reasons for regarding the remainder of the class of writings referred to, as unquestionably forged, or spurious. In regard to the evidence for or against the genuineness of the Gospels to be derived from this class of writings, none of which, according to Mr. Norton, if we except the epistle of Clement and that of Polycarp, can be referred to a date prior to the middle of the second century, and most of which were the fabrication of a much later age, Mr. Norton has some remarks, the concluding part of which, we will venture, notwithstanding the length of our preceding extracts, to give.

“The manner in which the writings ascribed to Apostolical Fathers have been adduced in proof of the genuineness of the Gospels, is the result, as it seems to me, of an imperfect view of the nature of that proof. The mode of reasoning by which we may establish the genuineness of the Gospels, has been regarded as much more analogous than it is to that by which we prove historically the genuineness of other ancient books; that is to say, through the mention of their titles and authors, and quotations from and notices of them, in individual, unconnected writers. This mode of reasoning is, in its nature, satisfactory; and would be so in its application to the Gospels, if the question of their genuineness did not involve the most momentous of all questions in the history of our race, whether Christianity be a special manifestation of God’s love toward man, or only the most remarkable development of those tendencies to fanaticism that exist in human nature. Reasoning in the manner supposed, we find their genuineness unequivocally asserted by Irenæus; we may satisfy ourselves that they were received as genuine by Justin Martyr; we find the Gospels of Matthew and Mark mentioned in the beginning of the second century by Papias, probably not sixty

years after their composition; and to the genuineness of St. Luke's Gospel we have his own attestation in the Acts of the Apostles. Confining ourselves to this narrow mode of proof, we arrive at what in any common case would be a satisfactory conclusion. But, when we endeavor to strengthen this evidence by appealing to the writings ascribed to Apostolical Fathers, we in fact weaken its force. Most of these writings are spurious, or, to say the least, they cannot be proved genuine. Two, indeed, we believe to be genuine; but this very circumstance disqualifies their authors from affording the particular proof we wish; because we cannot show that the passages in which they correspond with the Gospels were not derived immediately from the oral communications of the apostles. At the very extremity of the chain of evidence, where it ought to be strongest, we are attaching defective links which will bear no weight."—pp. cclxxxviii—ccxc.

From the foregoing analysis and extracts, we are sensible that our readers will be able to form a very imperfect conception of the rich materials which compose the volume, but our limits will allow us to do no more. The book, as we have said, was needed. It was time that the direct historical evidence for the genuineness of the Gospels, should be presented in a form entitled to confidence, that the precise state and amount of that evidence might be known, the effect of insisting on too much, or resorting to weak and visionary arguments, being to throw doubt over the whole subject. Christians have not known what to believe, and what to rely on. Something approaching to "pious frauds," as they are called, has been sometimes resorted to for the sake of effect. At least, statements have been made, which will not bear strict analysis, and assertions have been indulged in, which are true only with very considerable deduction. The cause wants not such aid. It needs not the help of exaggeration or artifice. It is strong enough without it; stronger without, than with it.

We have already mentioned, as among the excellences of the volume, that, what few books do, it presents the true state of the case. There is no question as to the facts and authorities adduced; the reasoning founded on them, of course, must be estimated by its intrinsic merit, by its solidity or want of it. Mr. Norton has gleaned from a wide field. Those who are unacquainted with the process, by which a work of the kind undertaken by him is to be executed, and which is essential to anything like completeness in the performance, are not in a

condition to judge of the great amount of labor which must be often expended, where there is very little to show in return. Statements apparently simple often require to be verified by long and patient research. It is often necessary to read, or attentively examine, numerous authorities, — the Fathers, for example, if the question depend on their testimony, — in order to ascertain not only what is, but what is not, found in them, not only what they do, but what they do not, say. The fidelity with which Mr. Norton has accomplished his task will render it unnecessary for the same ground to be soon gone over again. So far as relates to the kind of evidence, to which his attention has been confined in the present publication, we venture to say, that subsequent inquiries can add nothing. The mine we believe to be fairly exhausted, and the work may be appealed to, and will be appealed to, as one of standard authority. We say the kind of evidence to which his attention has been confined, for there is other evidence of immense weight bearing on the point. This evidence is to form the subject of the two subsequent volumes. From the nature of the topics to be discussed, and the peculiar qualifications of the writer to do them justice, we hazard nothing in predicting, that those volumes will be read with an interest, which the present, from the greater familiarity of the subject, could not be expected to inspire. We look forward with impatience, in particular, to the appearance of the next volume, in which evidence is to be presented, gathered from the field trodden by the Gnostics, — a field, which, we are sensible, has been heretofore too much neglected, and from which, as we have long been convinced, there is much to be culled.

We ought to mention, as a recommendation of the present volume, in connexion with its thoroughness, the exact and intelligible style in which it is written, reducing it to a level with the understanding of every well-informed reader, be he theologian or not. Mr. Norton is too finished a scholar to deal in pedantry, and the technicalities of the schools, or to encumber his argument with a mass of crude and useless learning. The fruits of his reading are visible, as they should be, in its results, and not in the parade of quotations and references, the introduction of which on all occasions, — the common fault of half-educated scholars and theologians, — only serves to show either poverty of thought, or vanity and want of skill or taste in the writer.

The volume appears in a beautiful form in point of typographical execution, but in consequence, the price at which it can be afforded, we regret to say, must greatly limit its circulation. We could wish it placed within the reach of all who have a desire of improvement, and can relish a work which demands, in the reading, some exercise of thought. While all sorts of worthless books, on religion and other subjects, are perpetually thrown out on the public, and many of them eagerly devoured, it is to be lamented that the few works of real merit, which occasionally appear among us, should, for any cause, remain unread.

A taste for collection in books, and the arts, has scarcely yet been introduced among us, though there is wealth enough in the community to justify a far more liberal expenditure in this way, than has hitherto been witnessed. As matters stand among us, the cheapness of a book is an important recommendation. There is a large class of readers among us, embracing many of our most intelligent citizens, clergymen of limited incomes, and numerous others, who can afford to purchase no other. How far it is advisable or proper to sacrifice appearance to cheapness is a question, of course, to be decided by those who write or who publish. We certainly would on no account encourage the use of the coarse black paper, and blurred type, which are the disgrace of some of our presses, and threaten to extinguish the eyes of the reading generation. We love a fair page and clear type, and are as fond as any of neat and beautiful editions. Such, however, is our impression of the merit of the work, which has given occasion to our present remarks, that we are exceedingly desirous of witnessing its extended circulation, even at the expense of a little typographical elegance. We hope that the sale of the present volume will be such as speedily to authorize the issue of an edition in a form, which will place it at the command of a larger portion of those, who, from their intellectual tastes and habits, are qualified to appreciate it, and who would derive benefit and pleasure from its perusal.

A. L.

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ART. IV. — *Memoir of the Rev. Bernard Whitman.* By JASON WHITMAN. Boston: Benjamin H. Greene. 1837. 16mo. pp. 215.

THE characters of men are much less complex than is commonly imagined. In almost every human soul, certainly in every soul worth studying, there is one great central principle, one predominant characteristic, one ruling passion, which moulds all the affections of the heart, and sways all the habits of the life. The province of the philosophical biographer is first to ascertain this leading trait, and then to trace it out in its various ramifications and results. This trait is a key to the whole man, interprets all the dark passages of his life, reconciles all the inconsistencies of his conduct. These remarks hold equally true of good men and of bad. In the characters of every exemplar of moral excellence, there is some one crowning virtue, around which all the rest cluster, and from which they derive their vitality and power. Thus, among the apostles of our Lord, in John this was love, in Peter zeal, in Paul fearless integrity.

The subject of the Memoir before us filled so large a space in the eyes of the community, wielded an influence so *unique* in its nature, as well as extensive in its degree, that we cannot willingly suffer the book to pass away unnoticed, or the character to fade from memory without an essay at its analysis.

The secret of our lamented brother's eminence, popularity, and usefulness has been to many minds a difficult problem. He was far from being a learned man, and equally far from either the conceit or the ostentation of learning. He was eloquent neither as a writer nor as a speaker. He had not a logical mind; and, though most of his writings purport to be argumentative, it was but seldom that he reasoned either from or to general principles, or indeed from any thing except the records or phenomena of individual experience. Nor had he much of refinement or artificial polish, to commend him to those who are won by the graces of style or manner. Yet he was equally respected by men of every class. His discourses were gratefully listened to, his writings eagerly read, alike by the scholar and the artisan, the merchant and the farmer, the highly intellectual and the dull of mind and slow of heart, the refined and the unpolished. Similar was the case with

him in social life. It will be hard perhaps for many of his friends to say why they loved him, or what constituted the charm of his society. Yet he had a home in the hearts of all who knew him; he was welcome in every circle; and perhaps there never lived a man, who was regarded by so many individuals of all ages, conditions, and characters, with a strictly family affection.

We apprehend that the true secret of his success, his universal acceptance, and preëminent usefulness lay in the extent to which he had developed and cherished the social element of his nature. He was certainly, during the many years of our intimate acquaintance with him, the least selfish man we ever knew; and the Memoir, with which his brother has furnished us, enables us to trace from his earliest days the same expansive fellow-feeling, which marked his career of active duty. "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," seemed less the law of his conduct, than the breath of his life. While toiling or making sacrifices for others, he was entirely devoid of the painful consciousness of labor and self-denial; but was sustained in beneficent energy by the same cheerful and spontaneous impulse, which urges most men in the pursuit of gain, or spurs them up the ladder of ambition. His heart throbbed in unison with the general pulse; his soul merged itself in the wants, joys, and sorrows of the multiform soul of the community. So entire and earnest was his sympathy, as to endow him with an intuitive and almost preternatural insight into the necessities of those among whom he sojourned, or for whom he labored, and thus to impart to all his intellectual efforts that uniform appropriateness to time, place, and occasion, which is amply competent to atone for numerous defects in the popular writer or speaker. This ready sympathy with humanity is attended with one element of danger to the mental growth. He, whose breast glows with it, finding it more blessed to give than to receive, is too prone to neglect all preparation for usefulness, all mental discipline and culture, and to rush into the moral harvest field, unskilled in the implements, ignorant of the art of husbandry. It is for this reason that so few of our most eminent philanthropists have left a reputation for wisdom commensurate with their benevolence, or have made any valuable bequest to the science or literature of posterity. To leave behind one a far reaching and ever brightening track in the intellectual firmament, de-

mands a longer and more laborious process of secluded preparation, and, if not a greater selfishness, a sterner self-denial, than can be endured by the enthusiastically philanthropic. The destiny of these last is not to bear sway in the empire of mind, but to wield a yet more desirable and glorious sceptre over fervid hearts and holy deeds. These remarks we shall take occasion to expand and illustrate as, following the guidance of the "Memoir," we proceed to offer a brief sketch of the life and character of one, whose pious self-devotion to the cause of Christian truth and social duty merited for him the fame of a pure philanthropist.

Bernard Whitman was born at East Bridgewater, Massachusetts, June 8, 1796. He was the thirteenth child of Deacon John Whitman, who still survives, his mental faculties undimmed by more than a full century of years. He was thus born into a large family; into a family too, though not poor in the common sense of the word, in which frugality, self-denial, and labor were incumbent duties on every member. The discipline of such a domestic position was invaluable in breaking down the first forth-puttings of selfishness, and inspiring a strong fellow-feeling; for common burdens, conflicts, and efforts constitute a much surer bond of mutual interest and affection than even household ties. The same good influences, which we have ascribed to our friend's family connexion, may also with fairness be attributed to the community, in which he received his early education. It was a neighborhood of plain, hard-working, unsophisticated New England farmers; and every one knows how closely such neighborhoods are cemented in mutual dependance and sympathy, how readily the burden of one is lifted by all, how heartily the joy of one is shared by all. Of this spirit Mr. Whitman, while yet a boy, drank deeply; and manifested, in childhood and youth, as his pastor testifies, the same "generous disdain of deceit, of wrong, and of oppression, together with the same promptness and zeal to assert and maintain the just rights and claims of others, as well as his own, which were afterwards so conspicuous in the man — the enlightened, sincere, and warm-hearted Christian — the devout and indefatigable minister."

Several circumstances, among which the most influential undoubtedly was the fact, that, during a vacancy in his native parish, the candidates for settlement boarded with his father, early directed his attention to the Christian ministry as his

profession. His father being unable to afford him pecuniary assistance, he left home at the age of sixteen, and labored in different manufactories as an apprentice, journeyman, and overseer, until he had earned a sufficient sum to enable him to commence his studies. To this portion of his life he ever after attached a very high importance, as having at once enlisted his sympathies with the class of people among whom his lot was subsequently cast, and given him an intimate knowledge of their peculiar wants, temptations, and trials. He prepared for college principally as a beneficiary at Exeter, under the tuition of the venerable Dr. Abbot. Here, though respectable, he was not distinguished as a scholar; and appears to have been diverted in some degree from habits of close application, by his incapacity to discern and feel the bearing of his classical course on his present or future usefulness. But in the pursuit of what he perceived to be directly useful he was untiringly diligent. He entered with deep interest into the circumstances and feelings of all his fellow students; and, while he was respected and beloved by those of his own age, he was looked up to by the younger boys as their patron, protector, and fast friend. He was also peculiarly active in procuring relief and aid for the destitute in the neighborhood of the Academy, and was the means in some instances of preventing extreme suffering from want. He was at this time greatly prejudiced in favor of Calvinistic views of the gospel, less from scriptural inquiry or experimental knowledge, than from the strong hold fastened upon his social feelings by the familiar extra meetings which he had the opportunity of attending, and the contagious zeal of numerous youthful converts around him.

"In conversation with an intimate friend upon this subject, he attributed his not having been entirely carried away at this time, to the well timed advice and judicious treatment which he received at the hands of his teacher, who, without arousing his already excited feelings by opposition, impressed upon his mind the importance of practical godliness, and referred him to the scriptures as the standard of faith and practice.

"But, notwithstanding he was thus saved from the extravagance of religious excitement, his sectarian prejudices, at this time so strong, were not easily nor soon removed. For, not long before his death, he stated to his brother, the Rev. N. Whitman, in a very solemn and impressive manner, that, when he entered Harvard College, it was with a determination not to

listen to nor be influenced by the Unitarian preaching under which he might there sit, and that, while present in the chapel on the Sabbath, he used to court sleep, or fix his thoughts upon something foreign from the place and the occasion, that so he might escape the contamination of heresy." — pp. 46, 47.

He entered college in 1818; and remained there but little more than a year. He maintained a highly respectable rank in his class, and an unbounded popularity among his classmates, — a popularity won by no undignified concessions or compliances, (for he bore among his fellow students the reputation of the strictest sobriety and the most conscientious piety,) but by his frankness and generosity, and by the constant outflowing of a strong fraternal emotion, which made itself felt, and compelled reciprocation. Nor is it unworthy of notice as illustrating his sterling benevolence, that, while at College, he kept up with the younger lads whom he had left at Exeter a constant correspondence, in which he gave them the most judicious advice with regard to both scholarship and character. Early in his Sophomore year a rebellion broke out in his class, in consequence of the suspension of two favorite members for a disturbance in Commons Hall. One of these young men was Whitman's room-mate. The class resolved, with one exception, to attend no more recitations until the punishment, doubtless judicious, but, as they most sincerely believed, unjust, should be rescinded. Whitman entered with warmth into the class feeling; and, with the conscious rectitude of one, who was resenting injury and seeking a redress of grievances, he made himself peculiarly obnoxious by an inflammatory speech under the Rebellion Tree. This circumstance, together with his situation as a beneficiary, which seemed to impose upon him peculiar responsibilities as an upholder of the majesty of college law, rendered it expedient in the eyes of the government to select him from among the rest for the penalty of rustication. After pursuing his studies in private for a year, he reentered the next class, and, unwilling to remain in a lower than his original standing, immediately requested and received a regular dismission from college. The esteem in which he was held by the class from which he was thus separated will appear from the fact, that, on his dismission from college, they collected among themselves and gave him, as a viaticum, a very considerable sum of money, which he, with characteristic delicacy of feeling,

though utterly penniless, refused to appropriate to his necessities, but converted it into a perpetual memorial of friendship, by purchasing a number of standard works in English literature, which he inscribed as the gift of his classmates. It may not be amiss to state here, that he in later years most sincerely regretted his folly in yielding to the rebellious excitement above referred to, that he was always solicitous to impress on his young friends the duty of implicit obedience to, and unreserved confidence in, the authorities of college, and that he had even planned a series of "Letters to College Students," of which the inculcation of these sentiments was to be the chief object.

About this time Mr. Whitman became acquainted with the writings of Swedenborg, and there was much in their benevolent spirit, which commended itself to his feelings and judgment, and almost persuaded him to give in his adherence to the New Jerusalem church. But he was at a loss for the requisite evidence of Swedenborg's divine inspiration, and was at the same time able to trace to the New Testament most of those delightful features, that had at first presented themselves as peculiar to Swedenborg's disciples, so that he never became of their number, though he ever after attributed to his intimacy with them and their standards some of his dearest views of Christian doctrine, and his strongest impulses to benevolent effort.

For the five years subsequent to his leaving college, Mr. Whitman's time was divided between the labor of instruction and his preparation for the ministry. During the first two years of this period his theological opinions had been gradually assuming a more liberal stamp, so that, when from prudential motives he commenced his professional studies with Mr. Davis, a Calvinistic clergyman of Wellfleet, there is but little doubt that his doctrinal views were in conflict with those of his instructor. With Mr. Davis he remained but a few months, and completed his preparatory course under the direction of the Rev. Dr. Abbot of Beverly. While at Beverly, though always active and busy, it was seldom in the work of improving his own mind by regular and systematic study. He found himself in a community, in which he could be useful; and, forgetting the duty of husbanding time and effort in preparation for a wider field and higher post of service, he entered at once and eagerly upon the field that was opened before

him. There were at that time numerous young men permanently or occasionally resident in the town, some in mercantile pursuits, some in college, others engaged in the business of instruction. All these were invited to make his room their habitual resort. He conversed with them and counselled them, not with the formality of a senior, but with the familiarity of an affectionate coeval, concerning the temptations, perils, and duties of their age and situation, always drawing forth illustrations from his own varied experience, and recounting with singular *naïveté* his own mistakes and failures, for the caution of his friends. He recommended to them and loaned them books; and was at great pains to excite in them a taste for intellectual pursuits, as well as to give them a deep sense of the dignity of virtue and the worth of Christian piety. He was also surrounded by a numerous circle of young ladies, whose interests he attempted to promote in similar ways, and among whom he formed a Reading Circle, and suggested numerous other plans conducive to their literary or moral improvement. And so successful was he in these efforts, that, of all the young persons who were then under his influence, there could probably be found not one, who does not cherish him in grateful remembrance for specific benefits attributable to him alone. In these pleasing duties he was regardless, not only of his own time, expense, and fatigue, but even of his reputation among the stricter religionists. So long as his own conscience reproached him not, he took no thought for the world's praise or frown. He doubtless overstepped the bounds of prudence and dignity by associating freely and habitually with the gay and frivolous, and on the gayest occasions; but he did this, (as he said, and as his demeanor always showed,) that he might find objects and opportunities for exerting a salutary influence, and might shed a savor of sobriety into the vortex of heartless levity. By these social connexions he gained a more intimate knowledge of the human soul and its avenues, which must have done much towards qualifying him for the practical duties of his profession. He wrote also a few sermons, on which he enjoyed the free and candid criticism of his instructor, who was himself eminent for the simplicity, clearness, and methodical arrangement of his discourses. He also derived from the same source much valuable advice with regard to ministerial prudence, consistency, and fidelity. But he pursued no regu-

lar course of critical or theological study; and thus commenced as a preacher with but a slender stock of the knowledge that is drawn from books, yet with a singularly clear and comprehensive acquaintance with that volume of human nature, so often illegible to the scholastic divine. He was licensed to preach in the autumn of 1824, and was ordained pastor of the second church in Waltham, February 15, 1826.

Mr. Whitman entered upon the ministry with very different purposes and views, from those which he embodied in practice. "He intended to confine and devote himself to the advancement of what he regarded as the best interests of his own people. He had no thought of becoming an author, or of laboring for the public. The ways in which he then intended to labor for the best interests of his people were by plain, direct, and practical preaching, by encouraging in every possible way their general, social, intellectual, and moral improvement, and by faithful parochial visitation. In short, it was his intention to become as far as possible a faithful parish minister." But he was settled over a parish, which had just dismissed a Calvinistic clergyman, who carried with him to a new place of worship a minority of the parish and nearly all the communicants. This circumstance gave rise to much private bitterness, denunciation, and controversy, and excited the inquiries of many with regard to the new and more liberal form of doctrine, to be dispensed from the pulpit so recently a strong hold of orthodoxy. Mr. Whitman perceived the wants of the community in which he lived, and to meet them diverged from his allotted path, and assumed at once a controversial attitude. His first publication was a Sermon on "Denying the Lord Jesus," which was published in August, 1827. This sermon is a successful attempt to fasten upon the Trinitarian community the charge, which they are so fond of hurling against Unitarians, that of "denying the Lord that bought them." Mr. Whitman shows that it is the former class of Christians, who truly deny Jesus, by setting aside his own explicit declarations concerning himself, and substituting in their stead doubtful inferences from the darker sayings of his apostles. This sermon passed through several editions, found a rapid sale and extensive circulation, and brought its author advantageously before the public as a prominent defender of the persecuted faith. From that time forward eyes were turned to him from every quarter; and, wherever abuses were

to be exposed, or liberal sentiments to be explained or vindicated, the aid of his tongue or pen was sought. Applications of all sorts were poured in upon him. Here he was invited to solemnize a dedication; there to help ordain a watchman on the outposts of Zion. One week, he was sent for to break ground in a new field, and to plant the seed of sound doctrine in fresh soil; the next, he was urged to revive a decaying church, or to rekindle the flame on an altar where it had been wholly quenched. Here he was solicited to lift up the hands of a young or feeble pastor; there to resist the encroachments of some hot-headed zealot. The publication just noticed would most probably have closed as it opened his career as a controversialist, had it not so spread his fame as to lead to these numerous calls. But with him every invitation to do good was of solemn and peremptory obligation; he never had the heart to decline a post of service, which he was thought worthy to occupy; and often, in the most inclement season, has he endangered his health and left his personal affairs at loose ends, in order to perform some labor of Christian love, hundreds of miles from his residence. On these occasions he was always successful; and the secret of his success was, that he threw himself into the situation of the people whom he addressed, felt their wants as one of them, cherished a hearty sympathy with them, and sought his only inspiration in that sympathy and the oracles of divine truth. We have often heard him describe his process of preparation in such cases, and always in very nearly the same formula. The formula was in substance as follows: "I asked myself, who are these people to whom I am going to preach? They are of such and such capacities, can understand such and such kinds of reasoning. They have sent for me to tell them what we believe, and why we believe it. There are certain doctrines, which they are particularly liable to misunderstand; and on these I must dwell at greater length, and must look up some illustrations from their own experience. They have been under such or such preaching, or this or that orthodox leader has been among them, and said such and such things about Unitarians. These I must disprove, and do it, if possible, by examples; for with most men an example is worth more than a demonstration. They have got into certain faults; I must throw in a hint at these. Or they need sympathy and encouragement; and they shall have it, &c." So fully did Mr.

Whitman enter into the feelings and necessities of all the diverse and distant congregations to which he ministered at different times, that he seemed to all to have written as if he had always been their pastor, and had known the least minutæ of their situations. These occasional discourses were often published, and were always read with avidity by the public at large; for there are few moral idiosyncrasies in the world, so that what comes home to the wants and hearts of those for whom it is written, must needs touch a kindred chord in the breasts of hundreds more.

By closely studying the conditions of individual ecclesiastical bodies, and cautious inductions therefrom, Mr. Whitman gradually became conversant with the general features of the age and land, with the extent and magnitude of public evils, and the remedies which it was within the scope of an enlightened piety to apply. He embarked warmly in the cause of Temperance, and was peculiarly successful and popular as a Temperance Lecturer, even among his most bitter opponents in theology. "His popularity was not secured by the relation of anecdotes, the exciting a laugh and affording amusement; but by the clear, direct, and conclusive reasoning presented, and by the circumstance, that, while he spoke plainly and earnestly upon the subject, he also spoke in the most perfect kindness."

"He would place himself behind the counter or within the bar, and imagine the train of thought passing in the retailer's mind. He would show the fallacy of the reasoning — would demolish it by his powerful arguments, and then would appeal to the retailer himself with the utmost kindness and good temper, and ask if he were mistaken in what he had imagined. If it was not as he had said, he professed himself willing to take back his statements. But, if the correctness of his statements was admitted, he urged home with the greatest possible plainness and point the practical application of them. And, what was remarkable, he did all this in such a manner as not to give offence to the individuals so directly addressed." — pp. 196, 197.

Mr. Whitman also a year before his death took an open and decided stand with the anti-slavery party, though he disapproved of many of their most violent measures. The expediency of his course in this respect is certainly questionable; but no one could doubt the honesty of his purposes or the generosity of his impulses in adopting it.

The work, by which probably, more than by any other, Mr. Whitman's name became known to the whole reading public, was his "Letters to Professor Stuart" on religious liberty. We can testify from our remembrance of his remarks during and after its publication, that this was far from being a task in which he engaged with self-complacency and pleasure. As the pamphlet consists mainly of personal anecdotes illustrative of sectarian bigotry, oppression, and dishonesty, its authorship might at first sight seem utterly inconsistent with Mr. Whitman's diffusive philanthropy of spirit. But, under the circumstances which led to its preparation, it was entirely in accordance with his general character. Professor Stuart, in his letters to Dr. Channing, had denied the charge that it was the tendency of orthodox measures to abridge religious liberty, and had thrown upon the Unitarian community the burden of proving it, at the same time accusing them of an intolerant and calumnious spirit in pressing the charge. It seemed essential to the cause of liberal Christianity that these letters should be answered, and the iniquity of the exclusionists laid bare; and this could be done only by that explicit statement of facts, for which Professor Stuart had called. The respected individual to whom the letters were addressed, had led a life so secluded from "the sound of the trumpet and the alarm of war," that he would have been the last man on whom the burden of such a controversy could fairly have fallen. The case was the reverse with Mr. Whitman. He had travelled much, had corresponded extensively with both clergy and laity, had been consulted personally by many who had suffered under orthodox exclusion and oppression, and was undoubtedly acquainted with, or within reach of, more facts in point, not only than any other, but than all other individuals in the Unitarian body. Of this he was aware; and, impressed with the belief that the work ought to be done for the cause of truth and justice, he considered his peculiar position and connexions as tantamount to a call in Providence for his services. It was to his benevolent soul a hard and painful task to pen the dark catalogue of folly and guilt; nor did he undertake it in the hope of personal fame or emolument, but rather in the spirit of self-sacrifice, in the earnest desire of lowering the tone of orthodox denunciation, and checking the bitterness of sectarian animosity, — a result which, we believe, rewarded and crowned the effort.

The largest work, which Mr. Whitman gave to the public, was his "Letters to Universalists." He was led to the preparation of this work by extensive personal observation of the fatal tendency of that creed, which denies and ridicules the doctrine of future retribution, and by the success which he had had in anticipating or meeting objections to this doctrine in individual minds. This volume was prepared in great haste, from materials furnished in part by the author's friends, and without sufficient care in the selection and arrangement of topics. It is diffuse to a fault; and contains some instances of weak and irrelevant reasoning. But it so thoroughly exhausts the subject, that he, who should wish to present a logical argument in favor of the doctrine of retribution in another life, could not do better than to systematize and abridge the contents of these "Letters."

Our limits will not permit us to name all Mr. Whitman's numerous publications separately; but we would say a few words more with regard to the secret of their unprecedented popularity.

In the first place, he wrote for the people,—for the *people* emphatically,—for the great mass, as distinguished from the peculiarly enlightened on the one hand, and the grossly ignorant and vulgar on the other. The *people*, for whom he wrote, he knew; nor did he barely feel for them, but *with* them. He felt the pressure of their wants on his own soul. His style was therefore never officially didactic or frigidly rhetorical; but a sympathetic spirit breathed in every page. His readers felt as though the instruction which he dispensed, or the arguments which he urged, had issued from one of themselves, who had been toiling and panting with them up the mount of clear vision, and who, the moment he had, as foremost of the band, attained a new prospect, was impelled by a strong fraternal impulse to communicate its features to his more tardy brethren.

Then again, the *people* for whom he wrote might have claimed the authorship of a very large portion of all his works. Having their good constantly in view, and believing that they were their own best instructors, he hung upon their lips as ancient aspirants after wisdom did upon those of renowned sages. He treasured up their remarks, their anecdotes, their arguments, and always gave the preference to materials thus collected. This is the reason why the more intelligent

sort of common readers literally seem to be hearing themselves talk, when perusing Mr. Whitman's popular pamphlets.

Then he gained a great advantage by the freshness of mind, which he brought to his task on all subjects of theological controversy. Most clergymen, when they write on such subjects, bring out of their treasures things old as well as new, and often draw chiefly upon the old, — upon notes, dissertations, criticisms, &c., bearing at once the date and the scholastic stamp of their preparatory professional course. Mr. Whitman had none of this "old store" to resort to. As themes of research and study, the subjects of his controversial writings were new to him; for, as we have already remarked, he had never been a theological student. He therefore in these cases entered simultaneously upon his private investigations and his labor for the public. The result, with a mind less active or less benevolent than his, would have been superficial, puerile, and unsatisfying tirades. But his sense of responsibility to the public made him earnest and faithful in his researches, while the newness of the topics of his inquiry inspired and sustained an enthusiasm of style, and gave him with regard to all his arguments and illustrations much of the same spirit, that prompted the deathless *Ευρηκα* of Archimedes.

Mr. Whitman gained much in adaptation to the general mind by his indifference to fame. He never sought renown, seemed surprised to have attained it, indeed could hardly be made aware of the fact, and even to the close of his life attributed most of his celebrity to the large return of merely affectionate esteem and interest for the active sympathy and aid, which it was his joy to dispense. As he wrote not for fame, he never sacrificed ideas to mere rhetoric. He never catered for the refined, much less for the fastidious taste. He was himself a man of delicate sensibilities and pure taste; nor did he ever for the sake of popular effect descend to the intrinsically and absolutely vulgar, but loathed the least approach to it in the writings of others. Yet he despised all purely conventional canons as fit only to shackle mere sentence-makers; and thus, though he occasionally provoked a sneer from the class of readers for whom he did not write, he gained vastly in compass and power of illustration and argument with those for whom he did write.

His indifference to fame also made him careless of origin-

ality; and enabled him often to work upon the public mind with a combination of forces. When he prepared a book or pamphlet, his motive was not the desire of writing it, but the belief that it ought to be written. He therefore freely called upon his friends for such portions of his works as he thought them better able than himself to execute faithfully. These calls, made in the name of the public, and in the faith that they would be met with a spirit of benevolence kindred to his own, it was almost impossible to decline; nor, however absolutely materials thus contributed were placed at his disposal, or however fairly he made them his own by the new dress in which he clothed them, would his characteristic honesty ever permit them to appear without full and generous acknowledgments for them. A striking instance of this occurs in his "Letters to Universalists." There were certain critical researches, in connexion with that work, which could not be made without access to the University Library, and he therefore requested friends resident in Cambridge to consult authorities for him and transmit the results. They transmitted them in crude, undigested notes, without the slightest idea of making themselves joint authors of his book. What they gave him he threw into shape, enriched, and endowed with its argumentative point and bearing, and then, greatly to the surprise of his friends, gave them credit by name for the authorship of all the critical portion of the work. Indeed, so long as he effected his object in writing, it was a matter of entire indifference to him, whether he appeared as an original author, or as the *redacteur* of the views and researches of others.

Mr. Whitman's services to the public at large were by no means confined to his writings. He was a safe and prudent counsellor; and was often applied to for advice in doubtful or difficult emergencies. He lent his earnest efforts to the cause of education both in common schools and by Lyceums and popular lectures. He gave encouragement and aid to those, who were endeavoring to obtain the advantages of a liberal education. Indigent scholars were frequently indebted to him for gratuitous instruction, for the loan of books, and ill as he could afford it, even for pecuniary assistance. Many owe to him the first impulse which prompted them to enter upon a now honorable and useful literary career. He was at especial pains to help in their preparation for the gospel ministry pious,

but unbefriended youth, who had looked forward to the sacred office with longing, yet, until encouraged by him, with the feeling that it was utterly impossible to attain to it. We are personally acquainted with several eminently devoted and acceptable ministers, who attribute solely to his kind counsel, influence, and aid either their entrance upon a theological course, or their perseverance in it amidst appalling obstacles and difficulties. But we do wrong not to quote the paragraph, in which his brother describes his services in this way to the Christian ministry. We copy it as presenting an example which if the clergy in general would follow, the waste places of Zion would soon cease to mourn.

“Mr. Whitman’s missionary spirit was not confined, in its manifestations, to direct missionary efforts. He availed himself of every opportunity to encourage others to enter upon the work of the Christian ministry. It is often the case, that young men, who are looking forward with ardent desires but trembling hearts to the Christian ministry, are discouraged by hearing the clergymen, with whom they may meet, dwelling much upon their trials and labors. And then too it often happens that those, who are just about entering upon the profession, are taken by the hand, and when they are expecting some word of kind encouragement or a hearty welcome to the joys of the work, hear only some mournful expression of pity, that they are entering a field of labor, where so much effort is required and so many troubles and disappointments to be encountered. Is there not reason to fear that the [silent] influence of many clergymen tends, in this way, to deter from the work of the ministry, some, who, under other circumstances, would have gladly devoted themselves, heart and soul, to its labors? Mr. Whitman, it is true, regarded the ministry as a sphere requiring great effort, but then he knew too, that nothing great or worthy can be accomplished without effort. He knew that the ministry had its trials and disappointments and discouragements, but he knew too, that no sphere of labor was without these. He never, in his general conversation, or in his intercourse with his ministering brethren, dwelt upon his labors or his trials. If any one thought that Mr. Whitman’s labors were severe, it was because the results of severe labor were witnessed, and not because Mr. Whitman himself ever alluded to their severity. On the contrary, he was more inclined to speak of plans for still greater effort and still more extensive usefulness, which were in his mind. The influence of his conversation, even the most casual conversation into which he might fall, was to impress the mind with the thought that the Christian

ministry was not only a great but a glorious work, and to excite an ardent zeal to be pressing forward in this great work. Such was the general tendency of his conversation. Still further, he was ever watchful of the young men with whom he might casually meet, carefully studying their feelings upon the subject of religion, as manifested in general conversation. And his observation was directed to the point, to ascertain, if possible, whether their interest in Christianity, their personal religious and moral character, and their general qualifications of mind and speech were such as to render it proper to counsel and encourage them to enter the Christian ministry. The writer well remembers being at Waltham, when a young man, now a successful minister of the Gospel, called and was introduced to Mr. Whitman, for the purpose of obtaining through him, of the Middlesex Bible Society, some copies of the New Testament, for a Sunday School in the village where he then resided. Mr. Whitman, as usual, so treated him as to make him feel at once apparently most perfectly at home, and entered into such general conversation as to ascertain that the young man was deeply interested in the truths of our religion, and, in the true spirit of this religion, was ardently desirous of extending these truths far and wide. After the young man left, Mr. Whitman said, 'I must see that young man again; he must be advised and encouraged to enter the ministry. He has the right kind of interest in the subject, and seems to possess the right feelings. All he wants is encouragement to induce him to devote himself to the work.' And it was in this way, that he was ever upon the watch; ready, if he saw one who needed only a word of encouragement, faithfully to render him the assistance he might need. And then too, when he met with one who was wishing and hoping, but scarcely daring to resolve to enter the ministry, most cordially did he take him by the hand, most kindly did he cheer and encourage his trembling heart, most readily did he offer such assistance as it might be in his power to give. Nor was this mere profession."—pp. 165–169.

In a letter from one of the young men, thus led into the ministry, we find described a delightful trait of Mr. Whitman's character, which will be recognised at once by all who knew him.

"I am persuaded that your brother was wont to attach much more importance than is common to those casual connexions which are formed in our progress through life. He felt that important obligations sprung from them, which he was desirous to fulfil to the utmost. I may illustrate what I mean by the

instance of his treatment of myself. We had met, and, for a short time, lived together as school-fellows. But there was very considerable disparity in our ages, enough to prevent that kind of intercourse and attachment which is common to school-mates of nearly the same age. Still I believe that while he lived he felt himself bound to me by strong ties of *duty*, and that he never lost an opportunity to inquire after my welfare or to promote my usefulness. He loved and labored for his race, but amidst all his cares and labors for the public good, he never lost sight of any one of those, with whom he had been, in any way, connected long enough to acquire the power of exerting an influence over them by his precepts or his example. He never ceased to do them good, even when the changes of life had long severed his connexion with them. I often hear the same testimony from those with whom we were mutually connected at school and elsewhere." — pp. 171, 172.

Numerous as were the labors and enterprises which Mr. Whitman achieved for the public good, his fertile mind in its plans of usefulness also kept far in advance of the work immediately in hand. He left behind him sketches of several intended publications, chiefly of a practical character, which, had Providence spared him for their completion, would undoubtedly have made his name as dear on the bed of sickness and in the bosom of affliction, as it was honored by opponents of error and seekers after truth. Among these projected works were "Letters to a Friend in Sickness," "The Wedding Present," "Letters to the afflicted under the loss of Friends," and "Letters from a Father to a Daughter."

But some of our readers, we know, have long since begun to query within themselves with regard to Mr. Whitman's particular parochial charge, and to anticipate the statement that one, who watched so faithfully over the general interests of Zion, was but a neglectful and indifferent shepherd of his own flock. But the contrary was the case. His affectionate fidelity as a pastor has its grateful and regretful testimony in the hearts of all who sat under his ministry; and the mutual attachment, which subsisted between him and his people will appear from the fact, that twice, when urgently invited to other and more extensive fields of duty, he submitted the case to the decision of his parish, and was each time retained by an *unanimous* vote. He was in one respect conveniently situated for the labor of the pen. He was, to a great degree, exempted from the usually onerous duty of parochial visitation.

His parishioners were principally connected with the manufacturing establishments, were constantly busy through the day, and so circumstanced that his intercourse with them was made the most familiar and useful by inviting them to visit him freely at his own house in the evening. He labored indefatigably for the intellectual and moral improvement of the operatives in the factories. He gave regular instruction in the common branches of education to many of the females. He bought and circulated among them books of practical piety. His own library was always open to them, and it was his constant and successful aim to establish among them a respectable standard of intelligence and steadfast principles of morality. He was also one of the most efficient among the supporters of the "Rumford Institute," the earliest institution of the *Lyceum* kind out of our large cities, an institution still flourishing and useful, and possessing a well selected library of over a thousand volumes.

In his own pulpit Mr. Whitman seldom assumed a controversial attitude. His parochial sermons were eminently serious, direct, and practical, appealing to the heart and conscience, and setting forth in the language of earnest entreaty or exposition the great doctrines of penitence, regeneration, judgment, and immortality. His style of preaching was remarkable for its clearness and simplicity. We have often heard him say that, in preparing for the pulpit, he kept constantly before his mind's eye an intelligent child of twelve years of age, and was careful to write nothing which such a child could not understand. His "Village Sermons" are fair specimens of his ordinary discourses; and bear ample testimony to his loyalty to the oracles of revelation, and his fidelity to the souls entrusted to him.

We cannot forbear quoting from a letter from one of his parishioners a paragraph, which at once shows how much desired and beloved he must have been as a pastor, and illustrates what we believe to have been the great secret of his success.

"His great and peculiar characteristic was to infuse his own spirit into others. He breathed the breath of life into the people around him, and made them living souls. There never seemed, there never *was*, any *self* in your brother. In this lay his great power over others. We all, who knew him, seemed parts of him and he of us. There was a glorious energy of

character in him, always directing itself onward with a high and noble firmness. It gathered to itself all good within its widely extended atmosphere. Blessed were those who lived within its influence." — p. 139.

Mr. Whitman was arrested in the prime of energy and usefulness by a severe cold contracted in the spring of 1834, which issued in a pulmonary consumption. He early became aware of the fatal character of his disorder. The discovery excited not even a moment's pain or sadness; but was met in the same cheerful spirit, with which he had prepared for the duties of life. He arranged his secular affairs with precision and accuracy, that he might leave no unnecessary care and responsibility upon his friends. He was as careful of the welfare and happiness of others, as self-forgetful, as earnest to do good, as he had been in the days of health. He did not regard his work as done, so long as life lasted, and to the end he seized every opportunity to give salutary advice, or to make impressions in favor of Christian piety. We quote from the Memoir the following beautiful and characteristic anecdote.

"Mr. Whitman enjoyed much pleasure in seeing his friends. As he assured the writer, with but a single exception, he had been *relieved* by their visits. And, in regard to this exception, he discovered, he said, after a time, that the individual was troubled with a nervous and trembling dread of death. 'When I discovered this,' he said, 'I spoke upon the subject as well as I was able, in hopes, that, if what I said was feeble, the *pulpit* from which I was preaching might give it weight.' Thus true was he to the great principle of his life, availing himself of every casual interview with a friend to do him good." — p. 203.

Mr. Whitman continued gradually to decline until the morning of Nov. 5, 1834, when in the full possession of his mental faculties, and in perfect tranquillity of soul, he gently breathed his last. We should do our readers injustice, did we describe our friend's latter days and closing hour, in any other way than by copying, as our limits may permit, from an Address delivered at his interment by the Rev. Mr. Ripley of Waltham, his near neighbor and constant visitor. The Address forms an appropriate and intensely interesting appendix to the Memoir.

"I observed to him, that although he was taken from his labors so early in life, in the midst of his plans of usefulness,

still he had great cause of thankfulness to God, that he had been enabled to accomplish so much, in a short time; so much more than most of us effected in a long ministry. He replied, 'I am thankful; and I could have wished, had it been God's will, to have lived to do much more; for I had marked out much work which I intended to execute. I had prepared skeletons of sermons principally for the young, which I had hoped to fill out and preach this summer; and determined upon my plan of labors for some time to come. But God has ordered otherwise; and I bow to his will.' I reminded him of the last discourse which he preached to my people, a few weeks before his sickness, and which seemed to make a deep impression on all who heard it. 'Yes,' said he, 'that is the best method of enforcing moral and religious truth, by apt and familiar illustrations, brought home to every soul. Had I lived, I should have preached more than ever in that way, — the only way in which preaching, as it seems to me, can do much good. Indeed,' said he, 'I had just begun to learn how to preach. I should not in future have devoted much attention to controversy, because the time has gone by, when I think it was needed. My preaching would be for the most part, practical; illustrating the paternal character of God, the life and example of Christ, the importance of early religious education. That,' said he, with emphasis, 'is the *grand point*; that is the foundation of a religious character. I do not mean to say, that I regret having been engaged in religious controversy. And though some things which I wrote, and some expressions which I used, may have seemed harsh and severe, I thought them necessary at the time, and that I was doing my duty to truth and religion. And I do not now regret the course I pursued.'" — pp. 210, 211.

"The last time I saw your pastor was the afternoon before his death; a day ever to be remembered by me. As I entered his chamber a scene presented itself, which made an impression on my mind, that will never be effaced. There was just light enough in the room, to enable the friend who sat by his side to read to him devotional hymns, and those beautiful and sublime chapters, the 14th and 17th of John and the 15th of Corinthians. The calm and serene and holy expression of his countenance, — the bright and heavenly lustre of his eyes, — all spoke with an eloquence which language cannot describe of peace and heaven within. I felt the place to be holy. I said to him, You are highly favored, my brother, in being so free from suffering, that you can indulge these meditations, and pass your hours in these exercises, which will shortly form your employment and delight forever. Your heaven has already commenced. 'Yes,' said he, 'I have indeed a foretaste of heaven; I have communion

with heavenly spirits. Some of my dreams have been most delightful. When I leave my friends on earth, I shall only go to a larger family in heaven. If I had strength, I could talk; I could preach to those around me. I could pray and tell of my experiences. But I dislike all display. One short line expresses all I feel and wish to say. *Father, thy will be done.* That is enough." — pp. 212, 213.

"Never have I seen more completely exemplified the power of religious faith to sustain, cheer, and console the Christian, than in him, during the whole of his sickness. Never have I witnessed such childlike submission to the will of God. The last moments of his life are confirmation of this; for when he perceived himself to be dying, he said, 'O Father, receive my spirit. I die in peace with all.' After a pause he added, 'my firm faith in Christ supports me now.' Who could witness such a scene and not exclaim, 'Let me die the death of the righteous, and let my last end be like his!' In this humble yet exalted and heavenly frame of mind our friend closed his present being." — p. 214.

May we not well say of such a life and such a death, as we have now portrayed, "Mark the perfect man, and behold the upright: for the end of that man is peace?"

A. P. P.

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ART. V.—*The Elements of Moral Science*. By FRANCIS WAYLAND, D. D., President of Brown University, and Professor of Moral Philosophy. Third Edition. Boston: Gould, Kendall, & Lincoln. 1836. 12mo. pp. 402.

THE well earned reputation of Dr. Wayland, as a writer and a moralist, ensures a ready and respectful acceptance of any new production of his pen. Our own notice of this work has been delayed too long, but not, as will appear, out of any want of regard for the author. He has set an honorable example to literary men in the employment of time and talent. Charged with all the duties appertaining to the Presidency of a very respectable literary institution, and actively engaged in the details of instruction, he has yet found time for the pre-

paration of two manuals\* of science, every line of which evinces care and patient thought. We are indebted to him for the only considerable treatise on Moral Science, of which this country has to boast. The natural partiality for an American work on a subject, to which our countrymen have hitherto paid little attention, would secure to it no little favor, were it less able to stand on its intrinsic merits. But we risk nothing by the assertion, that this treatise and Mackintosh's "Review" have done more for Ethical Philosophy, than any other publications of the present century in our language. We speak not now of the opinions, which Dr. Wayland has advanced, to some of which we object, and shall take occasion to express our objections with perfect freedom. We refer particularly to the literary execution of the work, and to the spirit in which it is written. It is marked by great originality of thought, clearness and force of argument, and extraordinary vigor and purity of style. Perhaps a mode of reasoning less abstract and severe might have added to the attractiveness of the book, and greater fulness of illustration have been used without any loss of precision or depth.

It is to be hoped, that the publication of this work will rescue the science, of which it treats, from unmerited neglect in our schools and colleges. The present is not the time, ours is not the country, in which we can safely give up the study of first principles, and trust the formation of character to the exigencies of active life. We hold that conscience may be educated, nay, that it requires education; that, by accustoming the mind to dwell on questions of casuistry, to look at the motives of actors rather than at the consequences of actions, and to try doubtful cases rather by general rules than by particular results, a healthy state of moral feeling may be induced, or the original and pure impulses of the better part of human nature may be cherished and confirmed. If this work be not systematically performed in early life, to what influences shall we trust the protection and improvement of the moral faculty? To the calls of business, in which the *auri sacra fames* is forever at war with scrupulous justice, and trivial but frequent violations of moral law are sanctioned by custom? Or to the struggles of the political arena, where it is well for the com-

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\* Besides the work under review, Dr. Wayland has published within a few months a text-book of Political Economy.

batants, if in the heat of the contest they do not forget, that such a thing as moral law has any existence? By imparting knowledge, we create a power of fearful magnitude, and the responsibility for its misuse rests not more on those who do, than on those who might have prevented, the wrong.

The fact, that the community is not fully sensible of the importance of these studies, only places in a stronger light the necessity of fostering them in the higher institutions of learning. To do otherwise would be to make these bodies follow, and not guide, public opinion. The interests of learning can be safely intrusted only to the learned. The public cannot appreciate the gradual but effective workings of the higher modes of education, and in the attempt to make them productive of more immediate and tangible good, would probably destroy their efficiency altogether. Doubtless, a knowledge of French and Italian is held in higher estimation in our fashionable circles, than great skill in determining casuistical doubts; and a merchant's operations on Change would not be much facilitated by an acquaintance with the Theory of Moral Sentiments. The public, therefore, are not likely to call with much earnestness for improved modes of instruction in Moral Philosophy, and did the matter depend on them alone, the science might sleep in as undisturbed repose for centuries to come, as Aristotle's Logic has done for centuries past. This last branch of learning, we may remark in passing, seems to have revived of late, much to the astonishment of those who are not accustomed to watch the cycles of popular opinion respecting matters of knowledge. It has revived for the same reasons, which, among others, should procure greater attention to be paid to the study of Ethics. The discovery has been made, that proper discipline of mind is at least of equal value with a large fund of practical information. Syllogistic lore may be useless, and worse than useless, if the proficient be induced to dress up matters of common reasoning in a scholastic garb, and enunciate his premises and conclusions according to the strict rules of art. But it may be highly valuable, in the veriest utilitarian sense, if it lead to an increased power of analysis, to greater acuteness in detecting fallacy, and a more cautious regard to the ambiguity of terms. So moral subjects afford the fairest field for the application of moral reasoning, and the intellect cannot fail to be improved, while the affections are cultivated, and the conscience enlightened and made strong.

We have spoken of the *neglect* of Moral Science in our seminaries, and the term will hardly appear strong, if we look at the present mode of instruction in this branch. Recitations *memoriter* from the text of so lax a moralist as Paley will do little towards the formation of sound principles, or the cultivation of taste for the pursuit. A book is studied instead of a subject, and the memory is strengthened at the expense of the understanding. A slavish habit of mind is induced. The student readily accepts conclusions supported by such admirable clearness of style and by an unrivalled power of illustration. Never was there a stronger instance of the force which reasoning borrows from perspicuity and method. Never a more unhappy application of these qualities to the support of error. Blinded by the author's candor and suavity of manner, the pupil will hardly admit that the positions can be controverted.

The instruction afforded is not only unsound, but imperfect. Hardly a hint is given, that the subject embraces the most curious problems, which have exercised the master minds of antiquity, and which the acutest of modern philosophers have discussed with various degrees of success. The speculations of the ancients are the more instructive, from the remarkable exemplification, afforded by their lives and characters, of the workings of their principles. Religion afforded them no positive precepts to modify the operative power of speculation. Their principles affected not only their writings, but their lives. They acted what they taught. The cynic lived in his tub, and growled at the follies and vices of the world. The skeptic would not turn aside from his path, though a precipice lay before him. The stoic quailed not, though the fatal mandate from the emperor had arrived, and the blood was already flowing into the bath from his opened veins. The epicurean remained aloof from public cares, wandered in his gardens, and surrendered himself to the charms of literature and love. Compare the characters of Cato and Sallust, of Pomponius Atticus and Brutus, and you detect at once the different schools to which they belonged, and estimate the merits of the respective systems from their practical effects. Mackintosh calls the five hundred years, which elapsed from Cæneades to Constantine, the greatest trial of systems which the world has witnessed.

Consistency is not so highly prized among the moderns.

The truth of opinions is estimated by other tests than the conformity between them and the lives of their supporters. Public opinion tyrannizes, and the dread of singularity, arising from the increased power of fashion, brings the actions of men to the same standard, however much their doctrines vary. The lives of skeptics and scoffers too frequently put to shame the professions of the more orthodox in point of opinion; the bigoted, the selfish, and the uncharitable may take a lesson even from the infidel Hume. The common rules of morality are too generally approved, to admit of individuals violating them with impunity; and the founders of vicious systems are interested to show, in their own persons at least, that their principles lead not necessarily to vicious practices. With their followers, however, this consideration holds not to an equal extent; and among them, corrupt doctrines commonly produce their appropriate fruit. To confine the student of morals, therefore, to the knowledge of a single system is to expose him to the assaults of error and sophistry, wherever he may chance to encounter them, and when memory and habit will be too weak to resist the seductions of vice, accompanied by an opiate to the conscience and the understanding.

We believe, therefore, that Dr. Wayland has judged ill in excluding from his work any notice of the opinions of other moralists. Admitting, "that a work which should exhibit what was true, would be more desirable than one which should point out what was exploded, discuss what was doubtful, or disprove what was false," we may yet question the power of any one writer to determine the truth to the equal satisfaction of different minds. The history of Ethics is in itself a part of the science. An enlarged and generous plan of instruction would be, to lay open before the pupil the whole field, instead of confining him to a single point of view, and to trust somewhat to the powers of his own understanding for the separation of truth from error. There is hardly any system of morals which does not contain some glimpse of truth peculiar to itself, and the attempt to collect these scattered lights must conduce to liberality and strength of mind. Nor would the advantage be slight, if such a plan of study tended only to incite the curiosity of the student, and led him to seek a more intimate acquaintance with the writings of Butler, Hutcheson, Adam Smith, and others, who have labored effectually for the improvement of the science.

But we are detaining our readers from such farther acquaintance with the work before us, as may be gained from a brief outline of Dr. Wayland's system. Proceeding from the acknowledged fact, that all human actions are either right or wrong, and that the guilt or innocence of the agent depends on the *intention* with which the act is committed, our author enters into the inquiry respecting the source of moral obligation. We are bound to practise virtue, because such is the Divine will. "The Will of God alone is sufficient to create the obligation to obedience in all his creatures; and this Will of itself precludes every other inquiry." We stand in various relations to all sentient beings. From the knowledge of these relations arises necessarily and immediately a consciousness of moral obligation. But the relation in which we stand to the Deity is infinitely more important and solemn than any other; and the corresponding obligation accordingly involves and transcends all other duties. We are bound to entertain towards our fellow beings, not merely such dispositions as arise from a knowledge of the ties which bind us to them, but such as are appointed by His will.

Actions presuppose powers. We perceive the existence and qualities of material things, and are therefore said to have the power of perception. Indeed, to see and to possess the faculty of vision are synonymous phrases. It is admitted, that all can discern the moral quality of actions, can distinguish to a certain extent between right and wrong. We possess then the power of moral discernment, call it a conscience, a moral sense, or what you please. The term *conscience* is perhaps the least objectionable, and as such is adopted by Dr. Wayland. If the discrepancies between the moral decisions of various nations be alleged against the existence of such a faculty, it is answered, that the difference relates to the mode in which the power acts; and the objector, so far from controverting, admits the fact, that all people possess this power, however variously exerted. And the difference becomes very slight, if we look, not at the actions themselves, but at the intentions with which they are committed. Nowhere is it considered right to *intend* the misery of parents, or the unprovoked destruction of our fellow beings.

Conscience has both a directive and an impelling power. It points out the proper path, and urges us to continue in it. After the act is performed, conscience causes remorse or self-

gratulation, according as its monitions have been slighted or obeyed. The various impulses, of which human nature is susceptible, differ not only in strength but in authority; and conscience is the most authoritative of all, though it may sometimes be the weakest. The dictates of appetite yield to those of self-love, when we are convinced, that the indulgence of a desire, however strong, for a particular kind of food, would be injurious to our bodily health. But self-love submits to conscience, when it appears, that a particular action, which would promote our own interests, would materially injure those of our fellow beings. Again, we pity the brute, when it injures its fellows; but man, who wrongs his brother, is condemned. The one is guided only by instinct, the other by conscience, a higher and clearer impulse. A third argument for the supremacy of the moral faculty, drawn from a consideration of the purposes for which man was probably created, is ingeniously and forcibly put; but for a knowledge of it we must refer our readers to the book itself.

With respect to the improvement of conscience, the general position is established, that it follows the law of habit. Both its directive and impelling power, and its sensibility are strengthened by use and weakened by disuse. As the taste is improved by familiarity with the finest models of Art, so the moral faculty is rendered more nice and discriminating by frequent consideration of characters of the highest excellence. On the other hand, whatever leads to frequent contemplation of vice, and fills the imagination with impure conceptions, cannot fail to injure the delicacy of moral perception, and to induce habits of sinful indulgence. Some excellent rules for moral conduct, derived from these remarks, form one of the most valuable portions of the work.

We cannot say as much in praise of the chapter on the nature of virtue in itself, and as it exists in imperfect beings. The definition of virtue is an improper one, and the conclusions drawn from it appear to us equally degrading and false. But we reserve our specific objections for another place.

Human happiness is defined to consist in the "gratification of our desires within the limits assigned to them by our Creator." Passion may lead to the transgression of these limits, by blinding us to the superior importance of ulterior and permanent benefits, when compared with immediate good. Even self-love, a higher impulse, cannot lead us to subject self-inter-

est to the welfare of others, and thus to answer the intentions of the Divine Being, as evinced in the constitution of society, or rather of man's social nature. Conscience can only create the desire of fulfilling those obligations, which arise from known relations; it does not point out any other relations, than those which intellect discovers, nor can it always suggest the mode by which an obligation may be fully discharged. But pain and misery, by the very constitution of things, are annexed to the violation of right; whether the doer is conscious of the wrong, or is rendered irresponsible from his ignorance of the relations whence the duty arises. Hence there is a necessity for additional moral light, which can be obtained only from natural and revealed religion.

Natural religion teaches us our duty, by leading us to consider the consequences of acts. Taking for granted the existence and benevolence of the Deity, we may rest assured, that whatever promotes our individual weal, and advances the interests of society, is agreeable to His will. Common sense, however, directs our inquiry in this case, not to the results of the particular act, but to the general effects of a course of conduct involving this act, when universally permitted. We extract a portion of Dr. Wayland's argument under this head, as a favorable specimen of his manner.

"To all this, I know but of one objection that can be urged: It is, that pain is not, of necessity, punitive, or prohibitory; and that it may be merely monitory or advisory. Thus, if I put my hand incautiously too near the fire, I am admonished by the pain to withdraw it. Now, this pain is, manifestly, only monitory, and intended merely to warn me of danger. It is not, of necessity, prohibitory; for, I may hold my hand so near to the fire as to produce great pain, for some necessary purpose,—as, for instance, for the sake of curing disease,—and yet not violate my obligations to my Creator, nor in any measure incur his displeasure.

"Now, the fact thus stated may be fully admitted, without in the least affecting the argument. It is evident, that many of the pains, to which we are at present exposed, are, in their nature, intended to warn us of approaching harm, as in the instance just mentioned; or, they may be intimations of mischief actually commenced, of which we could not be otherwise aware,—as in the cases of internal diseases. And, it is manifest, that, such being their nature and design, they must be intimately connected with, and either accompany or precede that injury of which they

are intended to forewarn or to inform us; and it is natural to expect that they would *cease* or *tend to cessation*, as soon as they have accomplished the object for which they were intended. And such, I think, will in general be found to be the fact, with respect to those pains which are in their nature monitory.

"But I think it will be evident, to every one who will observe, that many of the pains endured under the present constitution, are not of this kind.

"Thus for example:

"1. There are many pains which are inflicted in consequence of actions of which we were forewarned by conscience. It would seem that the design of *these* pains could not be monitory, inasmuch as admonition is performed by another faculty.

"2. There are many pains which, from the nature of our constitution, are not inflicted until after the act has been performed, and the evil accomplished. This is the case with drunkenness, and many other vices. Here, the pain cannot be intended as a premonition; for it is not inflicted in its severity until after the injury has actually been done.

"3. Not only does the pain, in many cases, occur afterwards; it frequently does not occur until a long time after the offence. Months, and even years, may elapse, before the punishment overtakes the criminal. This is very frequently the case with youthful crimes, which, ordinarily, exhibit their result not until manhood, or even old age. Now, pain must here be intended to signify something else besides warning.

"4. We find that the punishment, in many cases, bears no sort of proportion either to the benefit obtained by the individual, or even to the injury, in the particular instance, inflicted upon society. This is manifest in very many instances of lying, forgery, small theft, or other cases, in which, by a single act of wrong, a person ruins a reputation which it had taken a whole life to establish. Now, in such a case as this, it is evident that the purpose of warning could not be intended; for this end could be accomplished, at vastly less expense of happiness, in some other way.

"5. We find that the tendency of many instances of punishment is not to leave the offender in the same state as before, but rather in a worse state. His propensities to do wrong are rendered stronger, and his inducement to do well weaker; and thus he is exposing himself to greater and greater punishments. The tendency, therefore, is not to recovery, but to more fatal moral disease." — pp. 20–22.

Arguing from facts, from the acknowledged profligacy, that has existed among societies of men, who were guided only by the system of natural religion, Dr. Wayland endeavors to

prove the insufficiency of this system, and refers us to revelation, as the only remaining source of moral light. Of the chapter respecting the mode in which we are to ascertain our duty from the Scriptures, it is sufficient to observe, that, excellent in itself, it would be more in place in a work on Christian Theology than in a book professing to treat only of Moral Science.

Rather the larger portion of the work is devoted to the subject of Practical Ethics. The general division of duties is founded on the passage of Scripture, which reduces all human obligations to love to God and man. In the subdivisions, something is sacrificed to the love of system and originality, by introducing a new terminology; as where the author treats of veracity, distinguished into that of the present and past, and of the future; comprehending under the latter head the doctrine of promises. It is no derogation from the merits of Dr. Wayland's book, to say that, in this portion of it, he has been largely indebted to Paley, an author whose excellent practical sense and clear reasoning, where he treats of casuistry applied to the common matters of life, have caused nearly all departures from his method to be considered as failures.

We have given but a brief analysis of the work, yet sufficient perhaps to present the general features of the system, and to serve as the foundation for some remarks on its merits. We object, in the first place, to the will of the Deity, being assumed in a treatise of this nature, as the source of all moral obligation. Moral science, no less than natural philosophy and history, is concerned with actual facts, — with the explanation of existent phenomena. Words corresponding to *duty*, *obligation*, *right*, and *wrong*, exist in every language. In every age and nation, crimes have been visited with punishments irrespective in degree of the relative amount of evil resulting to the community from the commission of the acts. The parricide is everywhere regarded with greater horror and detestation, than the simple murderer; though if we look only to the general welfare, it matters not, whether a man be slain by a stranger, or by his own son. The loss of life, the loss to the community is equally great, and the necessity of guarding against the repetition of the act is equally cogent. What is the meaning of the class of words alluded to? Under what circumstances are they applied? What is the nature of the sentiments, under the influence of which they are used? Why

have punishments been made to vary on any other standard, than that of the various degrees of harm done to society?

So far as the Ethical philosopher attempts to answer these queries, he is not concerned with the question, *what ought to be*, which has been thought to cover the whole ground of Ethics, but with the question, *what is*. The inquiry respecting the will of the Deity, then, has nothing to do with the theoretical part of Moral Science, any more than the speculation concerning final causes has to do with Natural Philosophy. It is a different question, subsidiary perhaps to the main subject, but forming no integral part of that subject. What would be thought of the astronomer, who, when questioned concerning the cause of the moon's revolving round the earth, should answer that the immediate agency of the Deity sustained it in its monthly path? Equally irrelevant would be the reply of the moralist, when asked to explain the nature of the obligation under which Regulus acted, who should allege only the conformity of this act to the Divine will.

Again, a proper system of Ethics is universal in its application. It respects men simply as men, and not merely as Christians. It is designed for Jew and Gentile, Christian and Pagan, bond and free. The relation in which we stand to the Deity does indeed, as is stated by our author, transcend in importance all other relations. But it is paramount to the extent of setting aside the obligations arising from such other relations, only when the two classes of duties clash. Perhaps it will be difficult to prove, that a direct collision ever can occur between them. Reverence to the Deity comes in aid of conscience, and not to supersede its authority.

Could the will of God be made known to us by immediate inspiration, were it proclaimed by a voice from heaven, so as to admit of no doubt concerning its origin, no question respecting its meaning, then, indeed, the dictates of conscience would be no longer binding, and the creature would respect and obey the Creator alone. The father must be prepared to bind his son upon the pile, and "to be faithful even unto slaying," unless released from the dreadful duty by the same authority, which imposed the sacrifice. But we live under a different dispensation. We ascertain his will by inference, by diligent use of those faculties with which he has endowed us. Reason, judgment, the moral faculty itself, are employed, not merely in executing His commands, but in ascertaining what those com-

mands are. These powers are the interpreters between God and man. Thus in the perusal of Scripture, the only reason for construing a passage in a metaphorical sense is, often, that by a literal interpretation, it would convey a doctrine utterly repugnant to all our moral feelings. The law written on the heart expounds the law graven on tables of stone, and therefore cannot *practically* be subject to it, although *theoretically* of inferior obligation. As the interpreter, to us it is the ultimate approver of moral law.

We would not be misunderstood. It is not denied, that the obligations incumbent upon man are increased by a knowledge of revealed truth; that as moral rules are thus enforced by a higher sanction, the breach of them must be visited by a higher punishment. But to enforce these considerations is the province of the theologian, and not of the moralist. They belong to the pulpit as a part of religious truth, and not to the professor's chair as matters of science. Were it otherwise, to the Christian there would be no such science as Ethics. Morality would be merged in religion, and an important argument for the truth of Christianity, grounded on the conformity of its moral precepts to the dictates of natural law, would be entirely lost.

These reasons appear to us conclusive against a direct reference in a system of Moral Philosophy to the revealed will of the Deity. Yet the opposite doctrine is stated by Dr. Wayland in the broadest and most offensive terms.

"Thus the obligation to *act religiously*, or piously, extends to the minutest action of our lives, and no action of any sort whatever can be, *in the full acceptation of the term*, virtuous, that is, be entitled to the praise of God, which does not involve in its motives the temper of filial obedience to the Deity. And still more, as this obligation is infinitely superior to any other that can be conceived, an action performed from the conviction of any other obligation, if this obligation be excluded, fails, in infinitely the most important respect; and must, by the whole amount of this deficiency, expose us to the condemnation of the law of God, whatever that condemnation may be." — pp. 156.

This is a remarkable paragraph. We cannot believe, that the author penned it with that degree of consideration, which appears to have been bestowed on every other portion of the work. Experience has proved, what reason indeed might have discovered, that a literal interpretation of the command

to "do all things to the glory of God," can lead only to the wildest excesses of fanaticism. It is a mark of the highest attainments in virtue, to have cultivated such dispositions of mind, as lead to the immediate, almost the involuntary, performance of benevolent acts. Deliberation upon the course of conduct, which duty requires, is often inconsistent with the noble quickness of purpose, which belongs to a truly generous character. It is idle to object, that because his actions are habitual, they are automatic, and as such not meritorious. The formation of an evil habit is no excuse for the practice of vice. Why should a good habit rob a virtuous deed of its praiseworthy character? A sailor plunges from the deck of a vessel, at the imminent hazard of his life, to rescue a fellow-being from the waves. He does it from the mere instinct of humanity, without a thought on the common relation of the sufferer and himself to the Deity, or on the necessity of rendering obedience to the Divine commands. Yet to deny to such an act the character of virtue is to contradict the general verdict of mankind.

We admit, that a wilful violation of the known will of the Deity for the sake of performing any other duty, however imperative,—an attempt, for instance, to save a parent from starvation by turning robber on the highway—is sinful, and deserving of the highest punishment. But the principle of Dr. Wayland goes much farther. We are exposed to the dreadful consequences of the law, if this obligation to render obedience to the Deity "*be excluded*;" that is, if it be *left aside, not taken into view*; not, if it be known, and yet intentionally disregarded. We can hardly believe, that a person of naturally kind and benevolent feelings can entertain so monstrous a proposition. It is the nature of these feelings to require immediate gratification. They lie, if we may be allowed the expression, in direct contact with the will, and an action which is prompted by them is performed wholly under their influence, without reference to any ulterior rule or motive. Is it a crime to yield to such impulses? Is it sinful to cultivate such feelings?

The weakness of human nature is such, that it requires to be goaded into action by more sharp and powerful motives, than are afforded by the cool and deliberate deductions of the understanding. Passion and appetite must concur with reason and the general desire of happiness. Man is partly an in-

instinctive being. Were it not for the pains of hunger and thirst, though reason might teach the necessity of taking nourishment, lest the body should gradually waste away, yet the act of supporting the physical system would be too often postponed or entirely neglected. The same is the case with our moral nature. Conscience and the social and benevolent affections act directly on the will. The mother cherishes her offspring, not from any consideration of duty either to society or the Supreme Being, but from the instinct of maternal love. Pity prompts to relief, magnanimity to self-sacrifice; the feeling of justice shrinks instinctively from any violation of another's right. It is dangerous to suppress such feelings, and to introduce motives, of higher authority perhaps, but less urgent, sure, and immediate in their operation. Obedience to the Deity is shown in the cultivation and control of proper affections, and not in superseding them as motives to action. The bigot thinks he does God service, when he severs the bonds of natural affection, and binds his own brother to the stake. The fanatic casts away all human ties, and impressed with the belief, that he is selected for a peculiar mission, to enlighten the human race and glorify the Deity on earth, acts consistently with this notion, and violates without compunction every law of God and man.

Dr. Wayland's whole system of Theoretical and Practical Ethics is founded on Scripture, and must be regarded as the ingenious attempt of a mind deeply imbued with religious feeling, to show the sufficiency of the Bible, not only for the regulation of human life and character, but for the guidance of at least one branch of scientific research. We will not say, that the book is written in the very spirit, which has prompted some ill-judging divines to discredit and defame the most eminent geologists of the day, on account of a real or fancied discrepancy between the results of their discoveries and the Mosaic account of the creation. But we could wish, that the work was not open to censure of another kind; that its author had not shown the danger of confounding peculiar theological opinions with the great principles of religious truth; that he had not attempted to maintain the doctrines of a sect, when he fancied, that he was only writing on matters of science, and defending Christianity. That a Calvinistic writer on Ethics should endeavor, when treating of human nature, to lay a foundation for the doctrines of original sin, total depravity, and

the atonement, is not at all wonderful. But we were unprepared for an attempt of this kind from a writer of so much candor and good sense, as are usually displayed by Dr. Wayland. How far he has made the trial, and with what success, may be ascertained from a perusal of the two sections already alluded to, on "virtue in general," and on "virtue in imperfect beings." A few extracts will show what positions the author labors to establish.

"And as, on the one hand, we can have no conception of the amount of attainment, both in virtue and vice, of which man is capable, so, on the other hand, we can have no conception of the delicacy of that moral tinge by which his character is first designated. We *detect* moral character at a very early age; but this by no means proves, that *it did not exist long before* we detected it. Hence, as it may thus have existed before we were able to detect it, it is manifest that we have no elements by which to determine the time of its commencement. That is to say, in general, we are capable of observing moral qualities within certain limits, as from childhood to old age; but this is no manner of indication that these qualities may not exist in the being before, and afterwards, in degrees greatly below and infinitely above any thing which we are capable of observing."—p. 85.

"Man is created with moral and intellectual powers, capable of progressive improvement. Hence, if he use his faculties as he ought, he will progressively improve; that is, become more and more capable of virtue. He is assured of enjoying all the benefits which can result from such improvement. If he use these faculties as he ought not, and become less and less capable of virtue, he is hence held responsible for all the consequences of his misimprovement.

"Now, as this misimprovement is his own act, for which he is responsible, it manifestly does not affect the relations under which he is created, nor the obligations resulting from these relations; that is, he stands, in respect to the moral acquirements under which he is created, precisely in the same condition as if he had always used his moral powers correctly. That is to say, under the present moral constitution, every man is justly held responsible, at every period of his existence, for that degree of virtue of which he would have been capable, had he, from the first moment of his existence, improved his moral nature, in every respect, just as he ought to have done. In other words, suppose some human being to have always lived thus (Jesus Christ, for instance), every man is, at every successive period of his existence, held responsible for the same degree of virtue as

such a perfect being attained to, at the corresponding periods of his existence. Such I think evidently to be the nature of the obligation which must rest upon such beings, throughout the whole extent of their duration.

"In order to meet this increasing responsibility, in such a manner as to fulfil the requirements of moral law, a being, under such a constitution, must, at every moment of his existence, possess a moral faculty, which, by perfect previous cultivation, is adapted to the responsibilities of that particular moment. But, suppose this not to have been the case; and that, on the contrary, his moral faculty, by once doing wrong, has become impaired, so that, it either does not admonish him correctly of his obligations, or that he has become indisposed to obey its monitions. This must, at the next moment, terminate in action more at variance with rectitude than before. The adjustment between conscience and the passions, must become deranged; and thus, the tendency, at every successive moment, must be, to involve him deeper and deeper in guilt. And, unless some other moral force be exerted in the case, such must be the tendency forever.

"And suppose some such force to be exerted, and, at any period of his existence, the being to begin to obey his conscience in every one of its *present monitions*. It is manifest, that he would now need some other and more perfect guide, in order to inform him perfectly of his obligations, and of the mode in which they are to be fulfilled. And supposing this to be done: as he is at this moment responsible for *such a capacity of virtue*, as would have been attained by a *previously perfect rectitude*; and as his capacity is inferior to this; and as no reason can be suggested, why *his* progress in virtue should, under these circumstances, be more rapid than that of a perfect being, but the contrary; it is manifest, that he must ever fall short of what is justly required of him,—nay, that he must be continually falling farther and farther behind it.

"And hence, the present constitution tends to show us the remediless nature of moral evil, under the government of God, unless some other principle, than that of law, be admitted into the case. These conditions of being having been violated, unless man be placed under *some other conditions*, natural religion would lead us to believe, that he must suffer the penalty, whatever it be, of wrong. Penitence could in no manner alter his situation; for it is merely a temper justly demanded, in consequence of his sin. But this could not replace him in his original relation to the law which had been violated. Such seems [?] to be the teachings of the Holy Scriptures; and they seem to me to declare, moreover, that this change in the conditions of our being, has been accomplished by the mediation of a Redeemer, by which we may,

through the obedience of another, be justified (that is, treated as though just), although we are, by confession, guilty." — pp. 90–92.

"Now, if it be remembered that we are under obligations, greater than we can estimate, to obey the will of God, by what manner soever signified, and that we are under obligation, therefore, to obey Him, if he had given us no other intimation of His will, than merely the monition of conscience, unassisted by natural or revealed religion, how greatly must that obligation be increased, when these additional means of information are taken into the account! And, if the guilt of our disobedience be in proportion to the knowledge of our duty, and if that knowledge of our duty be so great that we cannot readily conceive how, consistently with the conditions of our being, it could have been greater, we may judge how utterly inexcusable must be every one of our transgressions. Such does the Bible represent to be the actual condition of man; and hence it every where treats him as under a just and awful condemnation; a condemnation from which there is no hope of escape, but by means of the special provisions of a remedial dispensation.

"It belongs to theology to treat of the nature of this remedial dispensation. We shall, therefore, attempt no exhibition, either of its character or its provisions, beyond a simple passing remark, to show its connections with our present subject.

"The *law of God*, as revealed in the Scriptures, represents our eternal happiness as attainable upon the simple ground of perfect obedience, and perfect obedience upon the principles already explained. But this, in our present state, is manifestly unattainable. A single sin, both on the ground of its violation of the conditions on which our future happiness was suspended, as well as by the effects which it produces upon our whole subsequent moral character, and our capacity for virtue, renders our loss of happiness inevitable. Even after reformation, our moral attainment must fall short of the requirements of the law of God, and thus present no claim to the Divine favor. For this reason, our salvation is made to depend upon the obedience and merits of another." — pp. 146, 147.

We have no wish to comment upon the matter of the foregoing extracts. The doctrines defended have hitherto been regarded either as so contrary to reason, or *above* reason, that they rested solely upon scriptural authority, and were to be received as special matters of revelation, upon the instrumentality of faith alone, with a reverential submission of human judgment to the wisdom and power of God. Whatever may

be thought of the Scriptural argument in their favor, they are so entirely repugnant to our natural feeling of justice, that when a person attempts to maintain them on the grounds of consciousness, by doing away with this repugnancy, we cannot argue with him. He is a different being from us. That such an attempt has been made, only shows what loose habits of reasoning are induced by the endeavor to support these doctrines even on Biblical grounds; and evinces still more strongly the necessity of keeping the department of Ethics distinct from that of Dogmatic Theology.

The argument of the second extract, however, from its great ingenuity, may appear to deserve a more close examination. The fallacy in it has arisen from the preconceived opinions of the writer on religious subjects, which have induced him, in a treatise purely Ethical, to attribute guilt to vice, but no merit to virtue. It is a poor rule, which will not work both ways. If from the general power of habit, the commission of a single fault blunts the discriminative power of conscience, lessens its impulsive force, and leads to other vicious acts, so that the individual can never be released from its future injurious operation, — then we urge, *e contra*, that one virtuous action, a deed of charity for instance, is not only meritorious in itself, but from its tendency to strengthen the benevolent impulses of our nature, creates a fund of good desert, equally permanent in its working to the benefit of the agent. It is surely possible, that a result of the latter kind should balance one of the former. Dreadful and debasing as are the tendencies of sin, there is an effective, healing power in virtue. This is heresy, Dr. Wayland will say. He had better call it sophistry, for then only could we join issue with him. It is not asserted, that a dependent being can claim merit *with the Creator* for any action whatever; but only that he deserves and receives the approbation of conscience, when he has complied with the dictates of this faculty. But after all, from the admitted position, that evil habits deteriorate the moral powers, to infer the irretrievable effects of a single error or crime on the individual's whole future capacity for amendment, is to draw the argument altogether too fine, and to apply a mode of reasoning, which, however proper in mathematics, is ludicrously out of place in morals.

The doctrine is too harsh and repulsive in its first aspect. Men can never be persuaded to repent, unless previously as-

sured of the efficacy of repentance. To deny them this assurance is to blot the moral sun from the heavens, and leave all mankind to the agony of unavailing regret. Individuals have been driven to madness from the fear of having committed the unpardonable sin. Dr. Wayland would make all sins unpardonable, for the sake of proving, that we can be saved only by the merits of another; and he would teach this doctrine too, not as an incomprehensible revelation from the Deity, but as the obvious dictate of natural reason. We believe neither in such a state, nor in such a remedy. Firmly persuaded of the evils of transgression, we are yet to learn, that it leaves man in a condition entirely hopeless, except from the expiation of his guilt by the sufferings of a different and an innocent being. We believe, that in his punishment are contained the elements, if he will use them, of his restoration; that remorse pursues sin, but repentance overtakes and vanquishes it.

We close this notice of Dr. Wayland's book, with the expression of deep regret, that with all his usual liberality and acuteness of mind, he has yet suffered his peculiar religious views to exert so strong an influence, that a portion of a work designed to be used for a scientific manual in our higher seminaries of learning, is rather to be regarded as a controversial publication on disputed points in theology.

F. B.

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ART. VI. — *Miriam; A Dramatic Poem.* Boston: Hiliard, Gray, & Co. 1837. 12mo. pp. 124.

THERE are many things to recommend this Poem to the favor of the public. It is the work of a Lady. It is not a hasty production, written by a steam process, and hurried all hot and immature from the brain of the writer upon the notice of the community. It has lain by eleven years, a fact that evinces no common degree of self-denial. The object of the writer in composing it appears to have been, to indulge her own taste for literary pursuits, and to entertain "a small circle of friends." And under such circumstances the mind is more likely to exert itself freely and happily, than when it is ham-

pered and agonized by the attempt to gratify public taste by conforming to any artificial standard. Moreover, "*Miriam*" is designed to illustrate a state of things in which all Christians feel a deep and permanent interest. The early history of our religion, and the struggles and sufferings to which its first advocates were exposed, have already and long since made for themselves a place in the affections and enthusiasm of the Christian community. Finally, the work before us has much intrinsic merit.

The principal idea of the poem is the struggle between love and faith, or between the affections and conscience, and the triumph of the latter. *Miriam*, a Christian, brings herself to cast off her Pagan lover, Paulus, to whom she is tenderly attached, and

"offer up a sacrifice  
Of life's best hopes to the One Living God." — p. 19.

The characters introduced are an aged Christian, Thraseno; his two children, *Miriam* and *Euphas*; *Piso*, a persecutor of the new sect; Paulus his son, the lover of *Miriam*; and several Christians.

The Scene is laid at Rome, in the infancy of the new faith, when, to use the words of the preface to the poem, "Christianity was struggling, almost for life, under the persecution of triumphant Heathenism."

The plot of the poem, as far as there is plot, is this. The aged father of *Miriam*, the same night she bids farewell to her lover, is surprised together with his friends, while attending in secret the obsequies of one of their sect, and is in the power of *Piso*, a revengeful enemy of the Christians, who was formerly the unsuccessful rival of Thraseno for the love of the mother of *Miriam*, and who now recognises, in the features and voice of *Miriam* and her brother, a resemblance to the fair being whom he in his youth had loved and lost. This interlacing of circumstances gives occasion for the play of various passions, and for the introduction of many interesting scenes.

The poem is divided into three parts, or scenes. The first introduces us to the conversation between Thraseno and his children. *Miriam* begs to be excused from accompanying them to the secret meeting, and they leave her. Then commences the interview between the lovers in which she com-

municates to Paulus her altered feelings, and her resolution to give him up. They are interrupted by the entrance of Euphas, who relates the seizure of their father and his friends. Then appear "*armed Christians*," who secure Paulus as a hostage for the safety of the Christian prisoners. A great deal is thus thrown together, which might have been kept distinct. Indeed the first Scene comprises nearly one half of the whole poem. And there is some occasion for the question being asked, whether this unbroken continuity of dialogue might not have been avoided, and whether the poem would not have gained thereby in action, spirit, and effect. Our author has, however, in her preface, furnished in part her own defence. She tells us that "it never formed any part of her plan to attempt a regular tragedy." The poem before us must therefore be judged of as a sketch, and as such, it certainly gives us a high idea of what might have been accomplished, had the author enlarged her plan. As it is, the merit of the work seems to us to consist, not so much in striking delineations of character, or masterly exhibitions of passion, as in a beautiful exhibition of the single idea of Duty struggling with Inclination. It is the story, in a dramatic form,

"Of her whose warring love and faith have dug  
Her own untimely grave — have worn away  
Her hopes, her nerves, her life, with secret waste." — p. 107.

The following extract is given from the scene between the lovers, after Miriam had communicated to Paulus her intention of giving him up.

"PAULUS.

Maiden! by all my perish'd hopes,  
By the o'erwhelming passion of my soul,  
By the remembrance of that fatal hour  
When first I spake to thee of love — and thought  
That thou — Aye! by the sacred gods, I swear,  
I will not yield thee thus! In open day,  
Before my father's eyes — and bearing too  
Perchance his malediction on my head —  
Before the face of all assembled Rome,  
Bann'd though I be by all her priests and gods; —  
Thee — thee will I lead forth — my Christian bride!

MIRIAM.

Aye! sayst thou so, my Paulus? thou art bold,  
And generous. Meet bridal will it be —

The stake — the slow red fire — perchance the den  
 Of hungry lions, gnashing with white teeth  
 In savage glee at sight of thy young bride,  
 Their destin'd prey! for well thou know'st that these  
 Are but the tend'rest mercies of thy sire  
 To the scorn'd sect, whose lofty faith my soul  
 Holds fast through torments worse than aught that these  
 Can offer to the clay wherein it dwells.

PAULUS.

Drive me not mad! — Nay — nay — I have not done;  
 The dark cold waters of despair rise fast,  
 But have not yet o'ertopped each resting-place.  
 We will go forth upon the bounding sea,  
 We two alone, and chase the god of day  
 O'er the broad ocean, where each eve he dips  
 His blazing chariot in the western wave,  
 And seek some lonely isle of peace and love,  
 Where ling'ring summer dwells the livelong year,  
 Wasting the music of her happy birds,  
 The unpluck'd richness of her golden fruits,  
 The fragrance of her blossoms o'er the land.  
 And we will be the first to tread the turf,  
 And raise our quiet hearth and altars there,  
 And thou shalt fearless bow before the Cross,  
 Praying unto what unknown God thou wilt,  
 While I —

MIRIAM.

No more, my Paulus! it is vain.  
 Why should we thus unnerve our souls with dreams,  
 With fancies wilder, idler far than dreams?  
 Our destiny is fix'd! the hour is come!  
 And wilt thou that a frail and trembling girl  
 Should meet its anguish with a steadier soul  
 Than thine, proud soldier!" — pp. 27 — 29.

It will probably be felt by some readers that the Christianity displayed in this poem is tinged at times with an illiberal and exclusive spirit, which contrasts too harshly with the otherwise amiable and tender spirit of Miriam.

"Union for us is none, in yonder sky;  
 Then how on earth?" — p. 20.

This savors more of the dogmatist than of the affectionate friend, and more resembles the tone of school theology than of that Christian charity, which at least "*hopeth* all things." It is rather singular, too, that sentiments such as we have noticed, growing out of a too strict construction of Christian principles, should be united in the same work, with others which evince great freedom in interpreting the Christian rules. The idea, for example, of securing Paulus as a hostage and threatening his life, in case Thraseno and his company were not set at liberty by a certain time, is, to say the least, on the borders of that ground which the early Christian would have allowed himself to occupy. As for those who keep watch over Paulus, they seem to be as familiar with the trick of war and the law of revenge, as were Napoleon's old guard.

In the first Scene, after Euphas had informed Miriam of the seizure of the aged Thraseno, *armed Christians* are represented as approaching, and Miriam, in her anxiety for her lover, urges him to fly in the following words :

"MIRIAM.

They come! with vengeance on their lurid brows —  
In mercy, fly! and I will check pursuit,  
Flinging my worthless self before their steps,  
And bathing with my own heart's blood the sword  
That thirsts for thine! — O God! it is too late!"

pp. 36, 37.

We notice also a greater fondness for the words *proud* and *pride* than is consistent with good taste or Christian sentiment. Near the commencement of the poem, when Miriam's father and brother are endeavoring to persuade her to accompany them to the secret meeting of their sect, Euphas says, in explanation of the object of the meeting :

"EUPHAS.

Know'st thou last night the long-tried Stephen went  
Unto his peaceful rest? and we this eve  
Are bidden to the humble burial,  
Shrouded in night, of him whose name might well  
Have graced a nation's proudest chronicles." — p. 8.

Now Stephen was probably a just and pious man, like his great prototype the martyr. And we cannot see that such a

man's name has much to do with the proudest chronicles of a nation. The proudest chronicles of nations are usually filled with the names of heroes, statesmen, great captains, illustrious sages—not with the names of simple-hearted, good men. And surely the Christian can very well afford to let these things be as the world's habit has fixed them.

We should not think it just to institute a comparison between two poems so dissimilar as the one before us, and the *Tragedy of Ion*, which has lately excited so much attention. Still there are points of resemblance which we cannot deny ourselves the pleasure of adverting to. The coincidence that struck us particularly, while reading these two poems, is in the way the writers manage and represent the Tyrants they introduce. Adrastus, king of Argos, and Piso, the patrician persecutor of the Christians, are both tyrants, each in his way. Both had been hardened by familiarity with scenes of blood; and both were recalled to their humanity, and the paralyzed sensibilities of their souls were revived by the same means. Each was reminded of his early love, and reminded too by a person who was in fact intimately connected with the object of that love. Each sees before him the image, and hears the tones of her who had melted his youthful soul, and who had, after a brief interval of enjoyment, been forcibly withdrawn, and left his heart to grow cold and hard and selfish and cruel. The power of association to restore our youthful life, to open again the sealed fountain of affection, and to conjure up the spirits of better and happier days, is beautifully illustrated in both of the poems. The way in which this is managed in *Miriam* is, we think, peculiarly striking and felicitous. Piso had already in his conversation with Euphas, intimated something concerning the effect produced by his presence.

“ Boy! there is that  
Within thy pensive eye I cannot meet,  
I have beheld a face so like to thine —  
Else had our parley shorter been.”

But as soon as Euphas mentioned the love that existed between Paulus and Miriam, Piso, in a violent paroxysm of rage, cries out:

“ Where is the sorceress? I fain would see  
The beauty that hath witch'd Rome's noblest youth.

EUPHAS.

Hers is a face thou never wilt behold.

PISO.

I will.

On her — on her shall fall my worst revenge;  
And I will know what foul and magic arts" —

It is just here, in the midst of his angry purposes, that the beautiful form of Miriam glides in. And by his excited feelings, bearing, as she did, the lovely features of one whom he had formerly loved, she might easily have been mistaken for a shadow, sent from the "dim realms" of the dead, "to look him into peace." —

"Beautiful shadow! in this hour of wrath  
What dost thou here? In life thou wert too meek,  
Too gentle for a lover stern as I.  
And since I saw thee last, my days have been  
Deep steep'd in sin and blood! What seekest thou?  
I have grown old in strife, and hast thou come,  
With thy dark eyes and their soul-searching glance,  
To look me into peace? It cannot be.  
Go back, fair spirit, to thine own dim realms!  
He whose young love thou didst reject on earth  
May tremble at this visitation strange,  
But never can know peace or virtue more!  
Thou wert a Christian, and a Christian dog  
Did win thy precious love. I have good cause  
To hate and scorn the whole detested race;  
And till I meet that man, whom most of all  
My soul abhors, will I go on and slay!  
Fade, vanish — shadow bright! In vain that look!  
That sweet, sad look! My lot is cast in blood!

MIRIAM.

Oh, say not so!

PISO.

The voice that won me first!  
Oh, what a tide of recollections rush  
Upon my drowning soul! my own wild love —  
Thy scorn — the long, long days of blood and guilt  
That since have left their foot-prints on my fate!

MIRIAM.

Oh, man of guilt and woe!  
Thine own dark phantasies are busy now,  
Lending unearthly seeming to a thing  
Of earth, as thou art!

PISO.

How! Art thou not she?  
I know that face! I never yet beheld  
One like to it among earth's loveliest.  
Why dost thou wear that semblance, if thou art  
A thing of mortal mould? — oh, better meet  
The wailing ghosts of those whose blood doth clog  
My midnight dreams, than that half-pitying eye!

MIRIAM.

Thou art a wretched man! and I do feel  
Pity ev'n for the suffering guilt hath brought —  
But from the quiet grave I have not come, —  
—— Look up, thou conscience-struck!

PISO.

Off! off! — She touched me with her damp, cold hand!  
But 't was a hand of flesh and blood! — Away! —  
Come thou not near me till I study thee.

MIRIAM.

Why are thine eyes so fix'd and wild? thy lips  
Convuls'd and ghastly white? Thine own dark sins,  
Vexing thy soul, have clad me in a form  
Thou dar'st not look upon — I know not why.  
But I must speak to thee. 'Mid thy remorse,  
And the unwonted terrors of thy soul,  
I must be heard — for God hath sent me here.

PISO.

Who — who hath sent thee here?

MIRIAM.

The Christian's God,  
The God thou knowest not.

PISO.

Thou art of earth!  
I see the rose-tint on thy pallid cheek,

Which was not there at first ; it kindles fast !  
Say on. Although I dare not meet that eye,  
I hear thee.

MIRIAM.

He hath given me strength,  
And led me safely through the broad lone streets,  
E'en at the midnight hour ! my heart sunk not,  
My noiseless foot paced on unfaltering  
Through the long colonnades, where stood aloft  
Pale gods and goddesses on either hand,  
Bending their sightless eyes on me ! by cool founts,  
Waking with ceaseless plash the midnight air !  
Through moonlit squares, where ever and anon  
Flash'd from some dusky nook the red torch light,  
Flung on my path by passing reveller.  
And He hath brought me here before thy face ;  
And it was He who smote thee even now  
With a strange, nameless fear.

PISO.

Girl ! name it not.

I deem'd I look'd on one, whose bright young face  
First glanc'd upon me 'mid the shining leaves  
Of a green bower in sunny Palestine,  
In my youth's prime ! I knew the dust,  
The grave's corroding dust, had soiled  
That spotless brow long since. A shadow fell  
Upon the soul that never yet knew fear.  
But it is past." — pp. 69 — 73.

Those who have read Talsourd's tragedy must remember that striking scene, the first interview between Ion and king Adrastus. After urging upon the tyrant various motives, and finding that neither regard to his own safety, nor generous sympathy with the sufferings of his people touched him, Ion carries him back to childhood, and endeavors to strike upon some chord, among his earliest recollections, which should vibrate in unison with the wailing mothers and children of Argos. In vain. "His youth was blasted." But there was yet one vein to be explored in his soul.

"ION.

If thou hast ever loved —

ADRASTUS.

Beware ! beware !

ION.

Thou hast! I see thou hast! Thou art not marble,  
 And thou shalt hear me! Think upon the time  
 When the clear depths of thy yet lucid soul  
 Were ruffled with the troublings of strange joy,  
 As if some unseen visitant from heaven  
 Touch'd the calm lake and wreath'd its images  
 In sparkling waves; — recall the dallying hope  
 That on the margin of assurance trembled,  
 As loth to lose in certainty too bless'd  
 Its happy being; —

ADRASTUS.

That tone! that tone!  
 Whence came it? from thy lips? It cannot be —  
 The long-hushed music of the only voice  
 That ever spake unbought affection to me,  
 And wak'd my soul to blessing! O sweet hours  
 Of golden joy, ye come! your glories break  
 Through my pavilion'd spirit's sable folds!  
 Roll on! roll on! Stranger, thou dost enforce me  
 To speak of things unbreathed by lip of mine  
 To human ear; — wilt listen?

ION.

As a child.

ADRASTUS.

Again! that voice again! — thou hast seen me moved,  
 As never mortal saw me, by a tone  
 Which some light breeze, enamor'd of the sound,  
 Hath wafted through the woods, till thy young voice  
 Caught it to rive and melt me." — pp. 28, 29. N. Y. Ed.

It is a pleasing task to trace such coincidences as these, where, as in the present case, there is no room for a suspicion of plagiarism. They only prove that the instincts of genius often lead different writers into the same paths of thought, and produce unwittingly a resemblance too close to have been aimed at.

We shall use the critic's privilege a moment longer, and then close. In her Preface, our author says, speaking of herself, that "the lapse of years has already cooled her imagination, and taught her that exertions, whose tendency might be more practical and useful, would now interest her

feelings more deeply." We are sure that we are not to understand this as if it were designed to countenance the common mistake of narrowing the meaning of the words, *practical* and *useful*, so far as to exclude the labors of the Imagination, and the results of high art. And we would fain hope that there is no settled purpose of retiring from a field on which so much honor can be won. Society cannot willingly permit those, who are able to present good thoughts and pure sentiments in the fascinating shapes of poetry, to relinquish their peculiar province for other departments of labor, for which the thousand are abundantly qualified. As well might the old Prophet have thrown off his mantle, and dropped his scroll, in order to follow the plough, or handle the hammer.

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- ART. VII. — 1. *The Duties of Hard Times. A Sermon preached to the First Church, on Sunday Morning, April 28, 1837. By its Minister, N. L. FROTHINGHAM. Boston: Munroe & Francis. 1837.*
2. *Views of Duty adapted to the Times. A Sermon preached at Portsmouth, N. H., May 14, 1837. By ANDREW P. PEABODY, Pastor of the South Church and Parish. Portsmouth: J. W. Foster, and J. F. Shores & Son. 1837.*
3. *The Temptations of the Times. A Discourse delivered in the Congregational Church in Purchase Street, on Sunday Morning, May 7, 1837. By GEORGE RIPLEY, Pastor of that Church. Boston: Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1837.*
4. *The Hard Times. A Discourse delivered in the Second Unitarian Church, and also in the First Parish Church, Portland, Sunday, January 1, 1837. By JASON WHITMAN. Portland: Arthur Shirley. 1837.*

WE are glad that these discourses have been published, and regret only that many other excellent ones upon the same topic, of which we have heard, have not also been given to the public. The clergy, in our cities and large towns, have very generally, we believe, taken occasion to preach upon the times, to present to their parishioners and fellow citizens thoughts, suggested by the existing commercial embarrassment,

and to urge upon them those duties and virtues which, always important, are peculiarly incumbent at a season of so extensive depression, anxiety, and distress. And in this the clergy have done rightly and been faithful to their trust. Christianity is never more powerful, never gains an easier access to the mind, or a firmer hold upon the heart, than when it is made to bear directly upon the actual circumstances in which men are placed. It is then felt to be a reality, to have something in it. Its adaptation to human condition and human wants is more distinctly perceived. A willing ear is opened to its teachings; a respect for it is awakened, and men turn, with confidence and faith, to its truths for instruction, to its principles for guidance, to its hopes for support and consolation.

And seldom has a condition of things occurred in which the instructions, guidance, support, and consolations of religion were more needed than at present. An extraordinary, wide-spread, and almost unexampled commercial embarrassment prevails. Many are obliged to say to their neighbors, like the steward in the parable, "have patience with me, and I will pay thee all;" and many cannot promise even so much as this. History, we believe, presents not a case exactly parallel to the present. Action and reaction, ebbs and flows there have ever been in all human affairs, and ever will be. The various branches of industry and commerce have not in any country been for a long period exempt from them. Seldom, however, has the commercial world been so extensively and deeply convulsed as at this moment. The causes of this embarrassment come not within the province of this journal. They are so widely removed also from our usual course of study and pursuit, that, although we may have in common with the whole community a general apprehension of them, in some measure correct, any attempt to discuss, analyze, and explain them could only indicate our presumption, and would exhibit perhaps, not so much our penetration, as our ignorance. But the moral aspect in which this embarrassment is to be viewed — the moral benefits that may be expected to result, or that ought to be gathered from it, the moral duties that grow out of it, or are incumbent on us while under it, — these fall within the sphere of our object and labors; and we may be allowed to occupy a few pages in illustrating and enforcing them.

A dark cloud overshadows the whole face of society. Gloom is upon many brows, anxiety in many hearts. We

would do what we can to dissipate that cloud, to change the gloom to cheerfulness, the anxiety to peace of mind. There are moral and religious considerations that can do this. There is a conviction, which all can have, of more worth than the treasures of a world; the conviction that a man's life consists not in the multitude of his possessions, but in the purity of his own thoughts, in the consciousness of his own rectitude and integrity, in the strength, depth, sincerity, and holiness of his religious hopes and affections. But independent of this conviction, which can at all times lighten the burden of calamity, the most unreflecting mind cannot fail to perceive, that blessings and benefits will flow from the present difficulties. If we take at first but a narrow view of the subject, and look only at those cases of individual suffering and distress, those instances, sad and painful, of individual reverses of condition and prospects, which come under our own observation, the deep and respectful sympathy excited in behalf of those who are called to meet them, is soon changed or lost in reverence and admiration, at the many noble, generous, and Christian qualities, the energy of character, the strength of principle, the warmth and purity of heart, which these reverses serve to develop and exhibit; qualities before unknown to their possessor, or to others, because nothing had occurred to call them out.

Even in ordinary times, it has been generally found and admitted that,

"There is some soul of goodness in things evil,  
Would men observingly distil it out,"

and in times of difficulty and trial, of reverses and misfortune, this goodness displays itself in rich and often unexpected abundance. It thus displays itself amid the present embarrassments in instances, that do honor to human nature. We know not but some cases of fraud, intrigue, and duplicity may have been disclosed also; but if they have, these only serve, like the black setting of the diamond, to increase the lustre of integrity and moral worth. Characters are now placed before us in a new light, and virtues and affections exhibited for whose development prosperity afforded little opportunity. Rectitude as unsullied as the light, principle as unbending as adamant are found, where only a worldly and prudent policy may have been suspected to exist. Instances are heard of in which disinterestedness has proffered its aid, or gratitude made

its acknowledgements, in ways which make it difficult to determine which is most worthy of admiration, the generosity or delicacy of the act. Many have had their own hearts made better, by witnessing the firmness, fortitude, patience, and sympathy exhibited by the hearts of others.

This benefit will at least result from the present difficulties. They will, in most if not all cases, develop, strengthen, purify, and exalt the characters, both of those who suffer and those who sympathize, increase our respect for human nature, our reverence for moral virtue, our confidence in man. Suffering there is already; more there unquestionably will be. Many of the industrious will be thrown out of employment, the dependent and infirm deprived of their stay and support. Many of the young will have a blight brought upon their early prospects, cares they little expected will gather around them, sacrifices they did not anticipate it will devolve upon them to make. Many of the old will see the fruits of a long life pass from their hands, associations that have been strengthening for years broken up, hopes of retirement from business and freedom from care, that were on the point of being realized, disappointed, and life, as it were, opening upon them anew, with its burden of duties and responsibilities. But as are their days so shall their strength be. Their energy will rise with the necessity for exertion, powers of which they were all unconscious will be called out, qualities they knew not to be theirs shall be developed, and amid the falling away of earthly hopes, they shall learn themselves, and teach to others, the worth of that hope which the vicissitudes of earth cannot disturb.

There will be then much individual improvement of character, under the individual cases of reverse and misfortune which occur. In extending our view to the general influences of the present embarrassments, it is obvious that one of the first and most valuable of these will be a check upon that extravagant estimate and overstrained pursuit of wealth, which are marked features in the character of the nation and the times. That such a check was needed and will be a blessing to the social and moral condition of the community, cannot be doubted. We were getting to be almost insane upon the subject of wealth. The lust of accumulation has ever been the root of much evil among men, but in this country several causes have naturally operated to give a strong impulse to this passion.

Our political organization is that, which offers the widest scope to enterprise, and applies the strongest stimulus to ambition and exertion, while, at the same time, it produces a state of society in which wealth is necessarily the principal distinction, the surest and readiest of attainment, and therefore the first and most eagerly sought. In other countries, large portions of the talent, the ambition, the enterprise of the community are drawn off into other channels, or slumber in the possession of hereditary rank or entailed wealth. Here all these are directed into this one broad channel, engendering a restless, anxious, impetuous emulation, exciting to gigantic enterprises, and begetting an entire absorption of the soul in one great thought, the amassing of a fortune. Our physical condition also, has coöperated with our political organization in producing this effect. A new country like ours, of almost unbounded extent, rich beyond comparison in resources, whose rivers, forests, mines, valleys, and mountains are daily unfolding means of wealth and progress, apparently incalculable, naturally awakens in its inhabitants earnest and insatiable desires, and marks their conduct by a thrifty despatch in getting rich. We have had also more than twenty years of uninterrupted peace, save the limited and temporary disturbances on our Indian borders; in addition to this they have been years of unexampled improvement in arts and manufactures, and in the applications of science to the increase and diffusion of the comforts and luxuries of life.

These causes have greatly added to the interest and importance which, in all countries and in all times, have been attached to the pursuit and possession of property, and were fast forming us to a national character, which would give us a name, but not a praise throughout the earth. And the influence of these causes has not been all bad. Great benefits have in many respects flowed from the activity, enterprise, and emulation they have engendered. We had a vast, an almost illimitable territory, and much of it has been occupied, subdued, cultivated. Towns have been built and cities reared, mountains levelled, and valleys filled, and distant places brought near, and the wide wilderness of nature changed to a garden of human civilization, comfort, and luxury. These are the stupendous changes that have been effected, the social benefits that have been diffused by these causes; changes and benefits that seem almost to be the work of magic, so rapid have been their course and extension.

But the moral influence of these causes has not all been good. They were making us proud, presumptuous, extravagant, luxurious, visionary. We were getting to think that there was no end to the wealth, and could be no check to the progress of our country; that economy was not needed, that prudence was weakness, that moderation was a sinful neglect of the golden chances by which many were winning fortunes. The tardy gains of honorable enterprise were spurned, that the lucky speculation of an hour might bestow a fortune. We needed a check, a restraint, a rebuke. Many felt that it was needed and foresaw that it must come, and he who ruleth over the nations has at length sent it. As in other general calamities, the evil in many individual cases falls on those who may not themselves have been guilty, but the benefit will be reaped by all. The fever which has raged in society will abate. The pulse of industry and enterprise will beat with less violence, but more real strength. We shall learn to realize that if riches increase, the heart is not to be set upon them; that if desirable, we are not to make too much haste to possess them; that if possessed, they are worthless to him, who has no other worth. We shall learn that the happiness and dignity of life depend not upon luxury, are not augmented by display, that the true pleasures of social and domestic intercourse arise not from its outward decorations, but from simplicity and sincerity of manners, purity of heart, tenderness of affection, and a general elevation of sentiment and principle. The almost despotic sway, which wealth once exercised over the public mind, will give place to a more rightful rule, a more just estimate. It will, as it ever must and should, be one, but not the sole and only object of human interest and pursuit. It will be perceived that society and government have a high moral purpose to effect by their institutions, and individuals and legislatures will feel that they have other and more important duties than to inquire into and manage the concerns of a bank, determine the charter and location of a rail-road, or distribute a surplus revenue *per capita* among an improvident and unreflecting population. Learning, education, virtue will be more cared for, their influence more prized, their interests better guarded and fostered. Intelligence, not wealth, moral principle, not reckless speculation, will be acknowledged the sources of national prosperity and happiness.

For though we proposed at the outset, not to discuss in detail the causes of the present embarrassment, we cannot forbear the single remark, that, on a broad view, the want of this intelligence and moral principle is the chief cause. We can trace the present difficulties to no foreign injury or aggression, to none of those providential calamities and disasters, which God sometimes brings upon a people. No long, disastrous, and expensive war has drained our treasury, impoverished our country, crippled our industry, cut off our youth, wasted our strength. No pestilence has swept over the land, carrying terror and dismay before it, leaving desolate hearts and millions of dead behind it. No famine has prevailed. No unfruitful seasons, short crops, and blighted harvests have diminished our resources, choked the fountains of our wealth and the springs of our enterprise. Nothing of this kind has occurred to embarrass us. We were in the midst of peace, apparent prosperity, and progress, when, after extensive individual failures, the astounding truth burst upon us like a thunderbolt, was proclaimed from city to city with the light of every day, that we were in appearance if not in fact, either through the want of means or inability to use our means, a nation of bankrupts, and a bankrupt nation. Now if foreign aggression or injustice, if providential calamity or disaster, have not, as they certainly have not, produced this state of things, what has? The answer is obvious. *The ignorance, the folly, the imprudence of the American people* have produced it. We ourselves, and we alone, are to blame for it. How and in what way this ignorance, folly, and imprudence have displayed themselves, whether in the acts of the Government, or in the course pursued by individual enterprise and extravagant speculation; whether one or both of these are to be taken into consideration to account for the result, are questions we leave to those who have more disposition to discuss and more competency to determine them than ourselves. We only say what must be admitted, and will be admitted by all of all parties, for it is the decision which impartial history will pronounce upon the facts of the case, that in one way or another the ignorance, the folly, the imprudence of the American people are the cause and the sole cause of their present difficulties. As individuals, some of us may not be obnoxious to this charge; but as a community, a country, a nation, we are. The charge will be made, the truth will be

proclaimed throughout the earth, that the American people, in a time of perfect peace and prosperity, either did not know how to resist the temptations of prosperity and manage their affairs with success, or knowing how, they had not virtue and principle enough to do it.

This is an humiliating consideration, and ought to check a little of our national boasting and self-conceit. And if there is any benefit in the lessons of experience, if men will ever be taught wisdom by suffering, there is reason to hope that now our habits, our manners, our modes of living, and our modes of transacting business will be corrected and improved, in those respects at least in which they most need correction and improvement; the extravagant estimate and the overstrained pursuit of wealth which have prevailed will be checked, public opinion enlightened, public sentiment elevated, and the great moral interests of society, more guarded and fostered, and thus a national character be formed, worthy the fame of our ancestors, worthy to receive, fitted to preserve and transmit to others, the privileges they secured and transmitted to us.

But while the embarrassments of the times humble pride, they will subdue envy; while they check presumption, they will silence discontent; while they produce suffering, they will awaken sympathy; and another benefit that may be expected to flow from them is this, — a kindlier feeling of respect, confidence, and good will, between all classes in the community. One of the features, which society has presented within the last few years, the most fearful in its aspect, and destined if unremoved to be most disastrous in its issue, is its contentions and animosities, its divisions into parties, where the dividing line has reference not to policy or principle, but condition, where the poor are arrayed against the rich, the mechanic against the merchant, the laborer with his hands against the laborer with his head. In a community, like ours, where arbitrary and artificial distinctions are not admitted, where the fluctuations of families is a necessary law of the system, where the poor of to-day are the rich of to-morrow, the laborer of to-day, the capitalist of to-morrow, where few can go back more than a generation without coming to an ancestor, poor in wealth, however rich and honorable in virtue, and could they look forward as far, would see perhaps a posterity, poor in both these respects, it seems strange that in such

a community, such a division should ever have been suggested or cherished. One would have thought that an instantaneous rejection would await it from the common sense and general intelligence of the people. Such has not been the fact. The idea has been promulgated and has gained adherents and influence, that there are diversities of interest, as well as diversities of condition and of gifts. That the few who have wealth or learning are separated from the many who have not, and that the measures, policy, or circumstances, that are favorable to some, are not favorable to all. Much heart-burning and ill-will, much disorganizing speculation and unjust aspersion, have arisen from this idea. It sprang from our prosperity and threatened much evil. The present embarrassments will demonstrate its falsity, check its progress, and repair its evil consequences. Being general and extensive in its causes, it will be general and extensive in its effects. It will reach, it has reached already, the labor as well as the capital of the country. The girl at the loom, the farmer in the field, the mechanic in the shop, the merchant at his desk, will all feel it. He who counts his treasures by millions and he who has no wealth but the strength of his own sinews will alike be affected by it. None are above its reach or below its influence. We have reason to hope therefore that all will be brought together by it, will be made to realize, that there is a chain of mutual dependence and reciprocal obligation, in which all are linked and from which none can separate; that as the head cannot say to the hands, nor the hands to the head, "I have no need of thee," so no man and no class of men can safely or innocently regard themselves as independent of any or all others. A common suffering will produce a common sympathy, a perception of mutual dependence will beget a sentiment of mutual kindness, and that jealousy and alienation that were growing up between the different classes in the community will be changed to mutual confidence and respect.

Should no other benefit but this result from the commercial difficulties and derangement under which the country is suffering, we shall not have cause to regret them. No greater evil can befall a community than separation and jealousy between its different classes and conditions. This is a violation of the great law of the Universe, by which all things are bound together in mutual dependence and usefulness. Whatever lives, and moves, and grows, lives, and moves, and grows for

some purpose, does good to, and receives good from, some other. And man, the most dependent creature upon earth, who cannot build his house, or clothe his body, or satisfy his hunger without levying contributions upon every realm and tribe of nature, who arrays himself with pride in the winding sheet of the silk-worm, and whose most important destinies have been at times affected by a spider's web and a raven's croak, man, is both foolish and guilty whenever he regards, or attempts to make himself independent, of any or all of his species, and equally so when he regards any as independent of, or useless to himself. Society is to be surveyed as a whole, and the parts are to be judged by their relation to the whole, and he who separates the parts, and endeavors to have one regarded as the only, or the most essential, important, or useful part, is about as wise as he who should pronounce the key-stone to be the only essential, important, or useful part of the arch. What would be the value of that stone, if the others were wanting or were weak? The order of providence makes great distinctions in individual condition; but every man, whether he dwell in a palace or a hut, have his garments of silk or sackcloth, make pins or govern the state, be gifted with genius or ignorant of letters, is or can be useful, important, and respectable in his sphere of action and duty, and contribute something to the comfort, happiness, and improvement of all. Franklin was useful as a printer; he would have been useful had he followed his father's trade as a soap-boiler; yet he was not the less useful as a philosopher. Every book he helped to print has, perhaps, long since been worn out, every word of the types set up by him will perish, yet thousands will still owe the preservation of their lives to his discoveries, and posterity will associate his name with all that is sublime in the discoveries of science, so long as the lightnings play in the heavens. The cabin boy of a fishing-smack is useful; he is useful when he obtains the command of a vessel; and he is not the less useful when, enjoying the reward of his industry and enterprise, his ships float on every sea, and hundreds are employed in his various branches of trade and commerce.

"Honor all men," as the injunction of Scripture, for all are useful, important, respectable, necessary in their place, all are parts of one great whole, and the whole suffers if the parts are injured. This simple and obvious truth, often forgotten and overlooked in prosperity, is perceived and felt in a

general calamity, like that which now presses upon our country. And if this calamity should tend, as we hope and believe it will, to check the alienation and jealousy that were growing up among us, to humble the pride of the opulent, to stifle the murmurs of the envious, to silence the discontent, and remove the prejudices of the humble and laborious, if it should serve in any extent to make all feel that all are mutually dependent, and bound by the strong tie of reciprocal benefit and obligation, it will be to all a blessing and not an evil, will bring with it a good of lasting and incalculable worth.

We have thus illustrated some of the ways, in which the existing commercial embarrassments may produce beneficial effects upon individual character, and change, in some important respects, the opinions, feelings, and conduct that are prevalent in the community. It was our further purpose to speak of the duties that grow out of these present difficulties; but we have space for only one or two brief remarks.

It is a period of general uncertainty, and consequently to some extent, of anxiety. No one can tell, they especially, whose commercial transactions are extensive, cannot tell, how they may be affected by the incidents of the coming day or the coming month. Solicitude is natural and becoming under such circumstances. But solicitude need not and should not sink into anxiety and gloom. Cheerfulness, mutual confidence, and forbearance, therefore, are duties strongly urged upon us by the present crisis. These are duties, especially the first, obviously incumbent upon those who suffer; for there is One who maketh rich and who maketh poor, who exalteth and casteth down; and we are destitute of the very first principles of piety, if we cannot extend the providence of God to our temporal as well as to our spiritual affairs,—if we do not see his hand and recognise his goodness, in the success and failure of our enterprises, as well as in the joy of our families, the formation and the dissolution of the domestic ties of life. Besides, there are worse evils than the loss of property. We are by no means disposed to put this down as a slight matter, a thing to which we ought to be perfectly superior and entirely indifferent. Neither religion nor common sense seems to us to justify or demand such an estimation of it. It is yet a light affliction compared with many that might befall us. It can never wring the heart with that

bitterness of anguish produced by some other sorrows. It is an evil that can either be remedied or endured, and while life, and health, and strength are continued to us, while general respect and affection rest upon our characters, while friends are spared to us, and the smile of kind faces, and the music of sweet voices, and the affection of fond and confiding hearts await us beneath our own roofs, the loss of property has not touched, and cannot touch, the real sources of our happiness. These sources, it may be, will overflow in richer abundance, and awaken in our hearts a peace, a calmness, an elevation of sentiment and feeling unknown in more prosperous hours. Cheerfulness, mutual confidence, and forbearance are duties incumbent upon all. It cannot be doubted, that the evils under which we suffer have been greatly increased by the panic that has spread throughout the country, the distrust, the want of confidence that has prevailed and still prevails. We hear much said of the evils of the "*credit system*," and the necessity of doing it away. That this system has evils cannot be doubted; but as for doing it away entirely, we might as well talk of doing away with commerce. We may have an entire metallic currency, (and we confess ourselves to be as much pleased as any one with the sight of gold and silver,) but the currency of a country has, after all, little to do with its extensive commercial transactions. The basis of commerce is not gold and silver, but property in the broad meaning of the word. The chief medium of this commerce is not gold and silver, but credit, mutual promises, and mutual confidence. The millionaire would not carry about with him one hundred thousand dollars in gold, did he possess it; nor would he have it carted off to a distant city to pay his debts there. He would pay those debts by drafts or bills of exchange, by written promises, the representatives of wealth. In this manner and to this extent the system of credit and confidence is essential to commerce, and must ever form a part of it. While we lament and should endeavor to apply, as soon as possible, a controlling check to the excess, to which the system has been recently carried, we ought also to endeavor to restore and preserve that substantial and necessary part of it, which is the life of commerce, essential to the enterprise and progress of the community.

And amid all the difficulties that now prevail, there are com-

petent grounds for this credit and confidence to rest upon. There is first, the absolute wealth of the country, which is unquestionably great. Our embarrassments have arisen not so much from the want of means, as from causes which have made it, in all cases difficult, and in some impossible, to use and apply those means. There is secondly, "the productive industry of a free and energetic people." Men will ever work, and the earth ever yield her increase; and whatever debts we may owe to each other or to foreign nations, we may confidently expect, that the labor and the soil of our country will ultimately discharge, amply and fully discharge them. There is a third ground of confidence in the rectitude and honor of our merchants and business men. Upon this point, we cannot better express our own thoughts, and more appropriately close this topic, than by extracting the following just reflections from the excellent sermon of Mr. Peabody.

"May I not add the exhortation to confidence particularly and emphatically in the honor of the *mercantile* community? It is they, who have to bear the brunt of every storm. It is upon them, that the pressure first falls, and only through them, upon the public at large. And often would they bear it alone, and throw off the burden without its being felt by others, if their brethren would only have faith in their well tried rectitude and ability, and would listen to their demand, 'Have patience with us, and we will pay you all.' The mercantile profession deserves well of humanity. The name of a merchant is an honorable name. The merchant's general standard of probity and generosity is a high one. There are, indeed, exceptions to this remark; but exceptions of the kind that prove the rule. For, when the pure escutcheon of commerce is blackened by a stain of villainy, the intense and universal surprise, alarm, and indignation which it excites, attest at once the rareness of the instance, and the integrity of the profession in which it occurs. Nor is it a baseless claim, which, in a period of distress, merchants proffer on the general forbearance and confidence. Theirs is a claim less of favor than of debt,—of a debt, by which they are never slow in binding their fellow-citizens during the palmy days of their prosperity. For who bear so large a proportion as they of the public burdens? Who so ready as they to aid in every enterprise for the common good? Go to the trustees of our great public charities, our hospitals, our asylums for the blind, the dumb, the insane,—peruse the list of their endowments and benefactions; and with hardly an exception, against every truly liberal donation, you will read a merchant's name.

It is the earnings of commerce that have created our academies, our colleges, our seminaries of sacred learning; and were our ancient and immensely wealthy university summoned to yield up what she has received through the munificence of merchants, there is hardly an alcove in her library which would not be emptied, hardly a building on her grounds which would not be demolished, hardly a chair of instruction in her halls that would not be vacated. The class to which the community are thus largely indebted may certainly proffer, in the day of their adversity, a most righteous claim on the sympathy, the sustaining suffrages, and the ready trust of their fellow-citizens. So long as they are fair and open in their dealings, so long as they merit the honest fame they bear, let the shoulders of the whole community be stooped to their burden; let them be supported by the capital of the retired and the industry of the active; let them be borne through the billows by the strong arm of public confidence. Then all is safe. But if they fall, they fall not alone, — they bury in their own ruin shattered capital and crippled industry." — pp. 8–10.

Again, would we meet the demands of the times, we must cling more closely to our religious faith, and cultivate more thoroughly our spiritual affections, for in these alone shall we find strength for the vicissitudes and trials that may befall us. "Godliness is profitable for all things." The religious man, independent of the future rewards which await him, has the advantage in the conflicts of life. The Christian, the spiritually minded man, has more power to meet the exigencies of his situation, to retrieve his misfortunes, to build up again his broken estate, and regain his former affluence than any other. The carnally minded man, the mere man of the world, one whose soul has never felt the grandeur of its destiny, and is not allied by faith and affection to its infinite Creator, is very liable to sink under the pressure of calamity. There is no response in his bosom to the call for renewed exertion; no elastic springing of the powers, none of that sustained and enduring perseverance, which can at all times welcome enterprise, and endure toil. Darkness gathers over his soul, as difficulties press upon him. Every thing seems despoiled of its grace and sweetness. Every thing is wrong, because his own mind and heart are in a wrong state. The chances are fearfully against him, that he yield to temptation and cover himself with guilt and shame. But the spiritually minded Christian, who feels his relation to the Infinite and the Eternal,

who has an inwrought conviction of the imperishable nature and glorious destiny of his own soul, to whom every moment brings a sense of God's presence, and every event a reference to God's will, he has a cheerful alacrity, an elastic, undying energy within him. Conscious that amid all perplexities, he has a divine protector and is under a divine guidance, ever looking upon life as a scene of moral discipline and development, he sees without dismay new scenes of duty and enterprise opening before him, meets with cheerfulness new cares, and bears without complaint fresh burdens. The Philistines groaned and fainted under the weight of the sacred ark of the covenant, because no faith and affection were in the service; but the Levites, delighting in the holy ministry, made the air resound with their songs of joy, as they bore aloft that same ark, through the rugged paths of the mountains and over the burning sands of the desert. So the man of the world faints under trials, which the Christian bears with a cheerful face, and a firm heart. Let the evil of the times, therefore, make us cling more closely to our Christian faith, and cultivate more thoroughly our religious affections, then will the wasting energy of resolution be repaired, the drooping powers revived, the cloud lifted up from the soul, and our wounded spirits sustained under all the manifold conflicts and disappointments of life.

S. K. L.

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#### NOTICES AND INTELLIGENCE.

*The Ministry of Jesus Christ: compiled and arranged from the Four Gospels, for Families and Sunday Schools. With Poetical Illustrations and Notes.* By T. B. Fox. Vol. I. Boston: Weeks, Jordan & Co. Portsmouth: John W. Foster. 1837. 16mo. pp. 247. — Though only the first volume of this work has as yet appeared, we are unwilling to let the present opportunity pass without commending it to the favorable notice of the public. It is the history of the life of Jesus, given in the words of the Evangelists selected and thrown into the form of a continuous narrative, the harmony of Dr. Carpenter being generally followed as a guide. In the side margin references are given, which show where the several portions taken from the different Evangelists and wrought into the narrative may be found, and the Index is so arranged as to point out in each case the parallel passages. The second volume is to contain a selection of Poetical Illustrations, and the Notes.

"The illustrations, it is believed," says Mr. Fox, "may serve to impress more deeply on the minds and hearts of the young the beauty and meaning of the incidents and passages in the gospels to which they allude. The notes are few, and consist of explanations of the manners and customs of the Jews, notices of those emendations of the common version required by Griesbach's edition of the Greek, which materially affect the sense; and references to passages in the Old Testament quoted in the gospels."

The publishers inform us, in a note, that the first volume will be sold separately to such as may desire to use it as a Class Book in Sunday Schools. With a view to this object, it is well printed, and done up in a neat and convenient form, and sold at a moderate price, so as to leave to those teachers, who use no other manual but the gospels, hardly any thing to be desired.

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*Meditations for the Sick.* By JONATHAN COLE. Boston: James Munroe & Co. 1837. 16mo. pp. 119. — The author tells us in the Preface, that he was led to prepare this little book with a view to supply the want, often felt and expressed by ministers, of a work of a practical and devotional character, adapted particularly to the circumstances of the sick. It consists of sixteen chapters on appropriate topics for meditation in the sick chamber; to each chapter are appended a brief prayer and a pertinent hymn; and some further Poetical Extracts of a consolatory description are inserted at the end of the volume. All elaborate discussion and refined speculation are professedly avoided, as "wholly out of place in a work designed for those whose bodily infirmities render any long continued mental exertion fatiguing and injurious." It will be perceived, therefore, that it is not a book to satisfy men whose minds in sickness and at the approach of death are troubled with doubts, and need further light on the vexed questions respecting providence and immortality. But for another class of persons, and it is a numerous one, who only need at such times to have their conscience and religious feelings awakened and directed, it will be found a most edifying and welcome companion. There is one defect, however, which we hope to see supplied, should this valuable little manual come to a second edition, as we doubt not it will. Enough is not said, as it seems to us, to probe to the quick the sick man's conscience, and thus to induce a spirit of profound contrition, and a living sense of his need of a Savior; so that he may not only be resigned, but on true and safe grounds.

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*An Historical Address, delivered before the Citizens of the Town of Dedham, on the twenty-first of September, 1836, being*

*the Second Centennial Anniversary of the Incorporation of the Town.* By SAMUEL F. HAVEN. Dedham. 1837. — This address belongs to a class of productions, becoming somewhat numerous of late, which the return of the second Centennial Anniversary of the settlement of our towns has called forth, — the last of the class we have read, though "not least" in merit. It is a production worthy of the occasion. Dedham, it appears, enrolls on the list of her sons and their descendants, a fair proportion of distinguished names, as evidence of which it is only necessary to mention those of Ames, Dexter, and Everett. The original settlers, according to Mr. Haven, were men far above the ordinary level. John Allin, the first pastor, was associated with the apostle Eliot in his labors among the Indians of Natick; was a champion in the ecclesiastical controversies of the day; and both he and Lusher rendered important political service to the colony. Both were leading minds. The latter drew up the declaration of the rights of the colony, and prepared instructions for the embassy, which was sent to England to adjust difficulties, soon after the accession of Charles II. to the throne.

Mr. Haven has succeeded in enlivening his narrative by not a few anecdotes and incidents, illustrating the character of the times, and of the men who figured in them. His materials appear to be judiciously selected, and are well wrought. We are not fatigued by tedious minuteness of detail, nor treated with a mere tissue of dry and barren generalities, the sins of some discourses of this sort. The Address, as we should think, is one which will be read with interest by the lovers of local history, or who are fond of tracing back society to its elements among us, though they may have no associations of home or of ancestors connected with the place. It contains a just tribute to the many virtues of those who helped to lay the foundations of our present prosperity and privileges, and forms a valuable contribution to our historical records.

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*A New Translation of the Hebrew Prophets, arranged in Chronological Order.* By GEORGE R. NOYES. Volume II. Containing Nahum, Zephaniah, Habakkuk, Obadiah, Jeremiah, Lamentations. Boston: James Munroe & Co. 1837. 12mo. pp. 293. — The third volume is nearly through the press, after the appearance of which we shall take an early opportunity to call the attention of our readers again to the extraordinary merits of this version.

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Our contributors must bear with the necessary delays in the insertion of their articles. We have on hand several valuable papers on general subjects, which we are obliged to lay over.

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